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ST. PRIVAT 



GERMAN SOURCES 



TRANSLATIONS BY 



HARRY BELL 

M. S. E., U. S. Army 




STAFF COLLEGE PRESS 
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 



1914 



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Preface 



TH E publication of this collection of translations was undertaken 
in pursuance of the policy of making available in the English 
language the materials necessary for the intensive study of the 
history of modern foreign wars for the use of students at the Army Staff 
College. Nearly all our officers read French and can profit by the ex- 
tensive publications issued by the Historical Section of the French Gen- 
eral Staff. The German sources are however a sealed book to many of 
our officers. The plan has been therefore to give herein the German 
side and bibliographical notes to guide the reader to the best books on 
the French side. 

The documents included in this collection were chosen by Captain 
A. L. Conger With special reference to its use by Staff College students. 
Captain Conger was unable however to supervise its publication as he 
was ordered to a Texas maneuver camp at the time the Service Schools 
were broken up in May, 1914, just as the printing was being begun. 
That the publication of it was not then given up is due to Mrs. Conger 
who volunteered to continue the work of editing and checking the 
translations, so essential in all historical work, adding footnotes and 
cross-references and doing the proofreading. The printing of such a 
volume is a severe tax on the limited facilities of the Staff College Press. 
That it has been possible in addition to the heavy routine demands is 
owing to the enterprise and efficient management of the press by the 
Secretary, Captain A. M. Ferguson. 

W. A. Holbrook, 

Lieutenant Colonel, Cavalry, 

Director, Staff College. 

Army Service Schools, 
December, 1914 



Table of Content 



Page 

Preface iii 

The Prussian Guard on the 18th of August, 1870; Helmuth 1 

Operations of the lid Army ; Von der Goltz 45 

Prom My Diary ; Von Wittich 83 

Military Correspondence of Prince Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen 89 

War Diary of the 1st Squadron, Royal Saxon Guard Cavalry; 

VonKlenck 103 

Reflections on Army Matters and the Conduct of War; Von 

Boguslawski 116 

The Initiative of King Albert in the Campaign 1870-71; Von 

Hodenberg 129 

The Xllth Corps in the War of 1870-71 (Chapters VII to XIII); 

Von Schimpff 161 

Extracts from "The 18th of August, 1870;" Great General Staff 215 
A German Professional Final Judgment Concerning the Battle of 

St. Pri vat ; Leipziger Zeitung 373 

The 18th of August, 1870; — r 379 

The 18th of August, 1870; Von Kretchmar 393 

Extracts from Life Recollections of Gustav von Schubert 401 

Crown Prince Albert and Prince George of Saxony on August 

18th, 1870; Paul Haake 421 

Saxons and Prussians at St. Privat; Paul Haake 467 

Appendix A, Biographical Notes 473 

Appendix B, Bibliographical Notes 478 

Index ... 483 



ST. PRIVAT 



The Prussian Guard on the 18th of 
August, 1870 ' 

BY 

Captain Arnold Helmuth 

Great General Staff 



T N the hard fought and bloody battles of the 16th of August 
the heroic perseverance of 65,000 Germans had resulted 
in successfully holding up the retreat toward the west of 
the French main army of more than 125,000 men, and 
especially in blocking at Vionville one of its three main 
routes of retreat. Night alone had brought an end to 
the bitter struggle; under its cover Marshal Bazaine 
caused his army to begin its withdrawal, placing it in 
the now world renowned position extending from Roncourt 
through St. Privat and Amanvillers to the Mosel. The gen- 
eral opinion held in the French army was that it had been 
engaged today with at least an equal enemy, and that to- 
morrow it would have before it a superior one. Marshal 
Bazaine saw that his own troops were so exhausted by the 
recent battles, and that the general condition as regards 
morale was so shaken that he had to consider a march directly 
past the German front impossible of execution for the time 
being; furthermore he believed himself able to withstand a 
renewed German attack only in a position which, according 
to his view, was impregnable. It was his idea that should 
its leaders decide on the attack the German army would go 
to pieces on it; and then, through the debris of that army, 
he believed the road would be opened to any desired point. 

Should, however, the Germans decline to attack this 
strong position, they could then not continue their further 
advance. 

1 A lecture delivered February 22, 1873, before the Scientific So- 
ciety (Wissenschaftlicher Verein) of Berlin. 



2 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

In contrast to the views of the French marshal, Prince 
Frederick Charles believed that he would have tomorrow to 
defend the battlefield, victoriously held today, against a re- 
newed attack and issued orders in the evening calling all the 
remaining forces at his disposal to the decisive point. 

His Majesty the King had arrived and established Royal 
Headquarters in Pont a Mousson this same day and when the 
reports from Prince Frederick Charles of the outcome of the 
battle reached him orders were sent, during the night, to 
General von Steinmetz to lead his two corps available for 
this purpose (the 7th and 8th) at daybreak across the Mosel 
and toward Gravelotte and Rezonville on the right of the 
Second Army. 

On the forenoon of August 17th the concentration of the 
German armies took place under the eyes of His Majesty and 
without interference by the enemy and by afternoon seven 
army corps and three cavalry divisions, or more than 200,000 
men, stood shoulder to shoulder on a front extending from 
Ars in the Mosel valley westward as far as Mars la Tour. 
The Pomeranian Army Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, 
or an additional 35,000 men, were held in readiness to advance 
on the morrow to the probable field of battle as a timely re- 
serve. For although the enemy, contrary to all expectations, 
displayed no inclination towards moving to the attack, the 
German army directorship remained firmly decided on ad- 
hering unwaveringly to the offensive. By noon the convic- 
tion had been gained that the French army, protected by a 
rear guard, had taken up a new position to the rear of the 
one previously held and about one o'clock General von Moltke, 
on the hill near Flavigny, dictated, in the name of the King, 
the orders for the 18th of August. The intentions and meas- 
ures taken by the enemy, up to that time still unknown, were 
to determine the precise movements. The enemy might 
either remain definitely in a position supported by Metz, or 
might, after recuperation, take the road westward. 

General von Moltke reckoned with both possibilities. 
General von Steinmetz was to cover the right flank of the 
army against Metz with the 7th Army Corps on the Mosel; 
Prince Frederick Charles, with his five army corps of the lid 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 3 

Army, being joined on his right by General Goeben with the 
8th Army Corps, was first to proceed in a northerly direction 
against the road via Doncourt. Should the enemy retreat, he 
would be struck in the flank and forced to stand and fight; 
had he definitely fallen back on Metz, an immediate right 
turn was to be executed by the German armies to attack him. 

Of main importance to the German army directorship ap- 
peared the objective— long since considered— of forcing the 
hostile main army in a northerly direction away from its 
home land. 

The Guard occupied the extreme left wing of the great 
front, west of Mars la Tour, with the Saxons on their left. 
On the march since five o'clock, they had arrived at their 
places of bivouac only toward four o'clock. The night be- 
fore the decision passed quietly, but the bivouacks were astir 
before break of day and, while the men were preparing for 
the advance, Prince August of Wurttemberg received in Mars 
la Tour the orders of Prince Frederick Charles. In the main 
battle order the Guard Corps was assigned to a place in the 
center of the first line; on the right it had the 9th and 8th, 
on the left the Saxon Corps; the 3d and 10th Corps, which 
had lost so many men on August 16th, were to follow in re- 
serve. The immediate march objective of the Guard was 
Doncourt. 

Starting at once, the corps reached with its head of col- 
umn Mars la Tour toward six o'clock. There, however, they 
met the Saxons who were just then passing in their assigned 
direction towards Jarny, and a long halt ensued. 

The early morning was cool and clear, yet a hot day was 
to be expected. In order to prepare all hearts for the hard 
day's work solemn field divine services were held in simple 
earnestness. 

In the meantime General von Pape had already sent out 
the Guard Hussars and everywhere could be seen even up to 
the enemy, like flaming signals, these restless red riders of 
Colonel Hymmen's. 

Toward nine o'clock the march was resumed, the 1st 
Division with the corps artillery leading, preceded by an ad- 
vance guard under Colonel Erckert; the 2d Division followed 



4 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

next, then the Cuirassier Brigade. The Uhlan Brigade was 
reconnoitering along the Maas, the Dragoons were still with 
the 10th Corps, together with which they had plucked their 
laurels on the bloody field of Mars la Tour. 

The point reached Doncourt about ten o'clock. Already 
it had become sultry. Detachments were sent to Doncourt 
to bring water, but since the Guardsmen found the village 
filled with wounded of friend and foe and since water there, 
as everywhere else on that plateau, was scarce, they sympa- 
thetically went without the only refreshment generally 
available that day. 

In the meantime the King with Royal Headquarters 
watched from Flavigny the movements of the army and 
events on the side of the enemy. The impression was 
gained that Marshal Bazaine intended to hold himself stub- 
bornly in his reconnoitered position with a view to receiving 
an attack. In accordance with instructions of Royal Head- 
quarters covering this contingency, Prince Frederick Charles, 
halted at Vionville, at once initiated the great right turn of 
his army. The Guard received Amanvillers as march ob- 
jective; on its right marched the 9th Corps on Verne ville and 
La Folie, and on its left the Saxons on Ste. Marie. The first 
two were intended to attack the enemy in front and on the 
right flank; the Saxons were given orders to halt for the 
present at Ste. Marie, but to be in readiness to take up the 
attack at any moment. The reserve corps followed in a 
manner corresponding to these new movements. 

Thus the entire army now turned into a new front, 
facing east, the 7th Corps on the Mosel forming the fixed 
pivot of the turn. 

Although only partially on roads, in a confined space, in 
the immediate vicinity of the enemy, this movement was 
executed without interruption and with the precision of the 
most exact hoisting gear. To gain an idea of the masses to 
be led we should remember that the troops here assembled, 
not counting the regimental baggage, would occupy a road 
space of more than seventy miles if marching on a single 
road. 

The Guard Corps started the new advance in two 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 5 

columns, on the left the 1st Division from Doncourt, on the 
right the 2d Division from Bruville, both marching on 
Habonville; thus the former had the shorter route to the 
objective. The advance guard had barely started when, 
toward 11.45 o'clock, the thunder of cannon was heard 
coming from Verneville, indicating that General von Man- 
stein had encountered the enemy there and at once attacked 
him energetically with his usual and well known decision. 
In wars of today the thunder of cannon is to a well schooled 
army, led by generals of experience and decision, the same 
as was in olden times the sound of the shield struck by the 
leader, a far sounding, welcome exhortation for the fight, 
and here also, as on Ossian's heath, activity reigned su- 
preme along the entire plateau down to the Mosel. 

And look, heroes full of might 
Mount upwards through winding valleys, 
Each inspired with the remembrance 
Of victory in times that are past! 

Just as though the thunder of cannon had been the 
signal for a preconcerted rendezvous, all troops, down to the 
far-off patrol, hastened toward the battlefield to join, side 
by side, their comrades there engaged and to secure for 
themselves the honor share of participation in the battle. 
The hard battle now ensuing was to develop in general about 
as follows: While General Manstein with the 9th Corps 
attacked the center of the hostile position between Verne- 
ville and Amanvillers and became quickly engaged in a 
very close fight with superior hostile forces, on his right 
General von Goeben with the 8th Corps, hearing the noise of 
the battle, hastened on through Gravelotte; on the left 
Prince August of Wiirttemburg with the Guard hastened to 
his support through Habonville; farther to the right General 
von Zastrow with the 7th Corps tenaciously engaged the 
hostile front, bristling with obstacles, while on the extreme 
left the Crown Prince of Saxony led the 12th Corps from 
Ste. Marie alongside the Guard, at the same time sending 
columns through Auboue to envelop the hostile wing at 
Roncourt. 

Now came hours of heavy battling, hours of desperate 



6 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

struggle, in which the scales of battle-luck inclined neither 
to the one nor to the other side, no matter how much blood 
and bullets were poured into them. But finally, after the 
sun had stooped low in the heavens, General Fransecky led 
the 2d Army Corps to Gravelotte under the very eyes of the 
commander-in-chief. With loyal perseverance which could 
not be lamed even by the greatest obstacles, the Pomera- 
nians pressed forward to bring support to the troops under 
General von Steinmetz in the destructive fight round St. 
Hubert and Point du Jour, which were captured and held. 
In spite of having, in part at least, started before midnight, 
of having marched almost continuously and without refresh- 
ment for nineteen hours, and in spite of the fact that a 
series of fatiguing days had preceded these exertions, the 
Pomeranians threw themselves into the fray with vigorous 
bravery and like fresh troops. Their hurrahs, rising louder 
and reaching farther, gave at Royal Headquarters, where 
the fatherland stood personified and where the day's burden 
rested the heaviest, the confident pledge that security was 
now attained against any reverse although such had been 
possible up to that time. The enemy, on the other hand, 
who saw new masses inserting themselves wedgelike in the 
dark line between Moscou and Point du Jour, was made to 
feel that here, if at all, the indefatigable opponent sought to 
bring about the decision the following morning as he actually 
did intend and to do which he had the means. In the center 
the 9th Corps, although bleeding from thousands upon 
thousands of wounds, unswervingly held the Bois de la 
Cusse and its position at Chantrenne. The 3d Corps at 
Verneville formed its reserve, and with it, reinforced by a 
Guard brigade, General von Manstein by dark captured the 
heights of Amanvillers. 

Finally, after desperate struggles and raging strife, the 
Guard, with the Saxons joining in from the north, destroyed 
the enemy in St. Privat and thus even on this day brought 
about the glorious decision of the great battle, to participate 
in which the 10th Corps also had pressed forward from 
St. Ail. 

The sun stood in a cloudless sky at midday when the 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 7 

Guard felt the pressure of the constantly increasing thunder 
of cannon urging them to the front. Prince August of 
Wurttemberg hastened to Habonville; General von Pape gal- 
loped ahead of the advance guard to orient himself as to the 
terrain and combat situation. The thunder of far more than 
100 guns had already become mixed with the rattle of the 
mitrailleuse, with the reports of the volleys, and with the 
crackling of the rapid fire from many thousands of infantry 
rifles. From the heights at Habonville General von Pape 
viewed the terrain; over yonder on the wall-like ridge, on 
which St. Privat rises, dominating the terrain on the left, he 
saw, in the enemy's line, battery joined to battery, throwing 
their projectiles unerringly into the flank of the 9th Corps. 
The main question, therefore, on the German side, was one of 
bringing up quickly artillery to divert the enemy's aim and to 
occupy the hostile artillery. General von Pape immediately 
ordered his four batteries to come up; with them appeared on 
the gallop Lieutenant Colonel Bychelberg, and at 12.45 Captain 
Dewitz fired the first shot. But since the first position taken 
south of the railroad did not satisfy Lieutenant Colonel By- 
chelberg, he went at a gallop down the railroad cut and the 
ravine opposite, the entire space covered with a hail of bul- 
lets, and up the other side into a new position southwest of 
St. Ail. Ordered up by Prince Hohenlohe, Colonel Scherben- 
ing with five batteries of the corps artillery very soon 
appeared and with surprising rapidity fifty-four guns were 
in line, to take up in calmness the work against the hostile 
batteries. By these means, in some measure at least, was 
the 9th Corps relieved. 

The infantry of the advance guard, directed on Ste. 
Marie by General von Pape, quickly pressed on after the 
artillery, trotting ahead. The general had perceived that 
there was no prospect of success in an advance against 
Amanvillers opposite the strong hostile line which showed no 
gap, and believed that he saw a better chance for attack far- 
ther north. When the first shells exploded in the ranks of 
the battalions under Colonel Erckert, the colonel caused his 
men to give a rousing hurrah for the King, proving thereby 
their battle zeal. The colonel thereupon led the advance 



8 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

guard into the bottom of the covering ravine towards Ste. 
Marie, first sending off Major Feldmann with the 1st Battal- 
ion of the Guard Fusilier Regiment to occupy Habonville and, 
at the same time, guard the artillery. 

Prince August of Wurttemberg had already decided to 
lead his entire army corps alongside the 9th Corps into the 
battle, and sent information to that effect to General Man- 
stein. The latter, however, who never hesitated a moment, 
even under the most harrassing circumstances, replied that 
direct support was not required, but that an attack on St. 
Privat appeared to be desirable. It is significant that it was 
regard for the welfare of another which first turned the 
thoughts of Prince August to the capture of St. Privat. Its 
white walls, reflecting the sunlight far over the country, at- 
tracted, and held continuously, the searching glances of all 
leaders. 

The ridge which served to indicate the hostile position 
shapes itself into a high knoll just before it falls off toward 
the north, toward Roncourt, and on this knoll, dominating 
the entire surrounding country, lies St. Privat. Built like a 
city, with massive houses, almost completely surrounded by 
high walls, it formed the firmest bulwark of the enemy. The 
hill itself slopes gently on the west to the ravine leading 
(north) by Ste. Marie; the entire slope is flat and firm like the 
floor of a barn; a few flat meadow basins and plowed furrows 
constitute the only depressions, potato haulms here and there 
the only sparse cover; there is no real cover; whoever enters 
that field is absolutely unprotected from the mass fire of the 
enemy. The fortress like glacis was 3,000 paces broad, and 
this open glacis an attacker had to traverse. Marshal Can- 
robert, one of the best in France, held that height with the 
6th Corps— 35,000 men and 74 guns. On his left at Aman- 
villers stood General Ladmirault with the 4th Corps, and as 
General Cissey with one division was also to take a hand 
directly in the battle about to begin round St. Privat, there 
were approximately 45,000 men and 100 guns available for 
the defense of that position. The hostile infantry was armed 
with a rifle capable of firing 12 rounds per minute; there was 
plenty of ammunition. By this it may be seen what enor- 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 9 

mous fire power was at the command of the defender with 
wMch to sweep the smooth slope continuously for a distance 
of 3,000 paces. 

The hill to be contested will evidently then be soon en- 
circled by the raging and seething of rolling breakers; never- 
theless the leaders, convinced of the necessity, hesitate not a 
moment but give as the direction, that hill. Into the waves 
the loyal men throw themselves unhesitatingly and with un- 
reserved devotion, over them, and in the vortices temporarily 
stopping each rush, flutter the glorious banners carried on 
high with heroism combined with patriotism, and finally the 
German field insigna are carried through into the hostile 
bulwark. 

When we see how these men, after long endeavors and 
struggles, and in spite of distress, suffering and destruction, 
finally break the road to victory, and when we master our 
inevitable agitation, we are forced to admire in amazement 
the majestic force of the idea in all its magnificence which 
triumphantly manifests its victorious power even over death 
and destruction. 

During the advance on Ste. Marie General Pape saw a 
hostile detachment hastening towards St. Ail. He immedi- 
ately sent Major Sanitz with his battalion on that point and 
the nimble, swift Guard Fusiliers succeeded in gaining the 
village ahead of the enemy and in driving him back with 
short rapid fire. Ste. Marie, on the other hand, was found to 
be held in force and the attack (to be prepared for only, for 
the present) was, pursuant to orders brought from corps head- 
quarters by General Danneberg, to be made only in conjunc- 
tion with the Saxons who were expected to come up on the 
left. General von Pape therefore caused Ste. Marie to be 
encircled on the south and southwest by the Schmeling 
Fusilier Battalion and the Jagers, and these troops were soon 
engaged in a lively fire fight with the hostile skirmishers 
densely lining the edge of the village and the walls enclosing 
the fields in its front. This was the French 94th Regiment, 
which had been advanced to Ste. Marie by Marshal Canro- 
bert. Colonel Erckert caused the the nearest hostile detach- 
ment to be driven back by the Fusiliers at the point of the 



10 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

bayonet; farther to the left the Jagers worked their way 
with drillground precision and with well aimed fire closer 
and closer to the enemy. Behind the screen formed by them, 
extending towards Ste. Marie, General Pape brought up his 
main body. The regimental bands played the Prussian 
national air; with colors flying, greeting the exploding shells 
striking in their ranks with loud hurrahs, this proud mass of 
12,000 men entered the battlefield opening before their eyes 
and soon to open to their deeds. First both brigades took 
a covered position in readiness; thereafter the 4th Guard 
Regiment prolonged with its Fusiliers the firing line of the 
Jagers to the left. In the meantime General von Pape 
caused his artillery to fire energetically on Ste. Marie and 
towards three o'clock, the Saxon batteries appeared west of 
the village whence they could also throw their shells into the 
place. Thus began combined action on the part of the Guard 
and the Saxons. Close by on the right stood the Hessian 
troops belonging to the 9th Corps. Thus the Guard, repre- 
senting the whole of Prussia (being composed of the sons of 
all its provinces), the south of Germany on the left, the 
north on the right, advanced shoulder to shoulder to oppose 
the common enemy— truly an imposing spectacle of the new 
era of the German fatherland. 

The batteries had now for some time been throwing a 
heavy rain of shells into Ste. Marie; the village was in flames, 
houses began to fall, the enveloping walls showed breaches, 
and the road now stood open to the infantry for the assault. 
Toward three o'clock General von Pape consulted with the 
Saxon General of Division Nehrhoff and reached an agree- 
ment with him in regard to the charge. General Nehrhoff 
held the 47th Brigade under General von Leonardi west of 
the village in readiness for the attack, while on the right 
of that brigade the Guard battalions impatiently awaited the 
signal for the assault. A little after three o'clock the signal 
was given. As soon as the battalions rose up for the assault 
the rapid fire of the hostile detachments doubled. But with- 
out taking time to reply to it the attackers pressed forward at 
unbroken double time with jubilant hurrahs, and the objec- 
tive was everywhere reached almost at the same time. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 11 

On the left, coming from the west, the 4th Guard Reg- 
iment charged alongside the Saxons, on their right the Jagers 
bought their share of honor with the death of Lieutenant von 
Gersdorff . The hottest and bloodiest road, however, fell to the 
lot of the battalions Sanitz and Schmeling of the Guard Fusi- 
liers on the right, for they received, in addition, a destruc- 
tive mass fire from their right flank from the hostile infantry 
and artillery farther to the rear. 

Hundreds fell killed and wounded, but Colonel Erckert, 
riding in the lead, gave the direction to the heavy shock, 
and the battalions reached the village simultaneously with 
the others. The enemy, already shaken, could not hold out 
against such a mighty onset. The detachments posted in 
front of the village were thrown back into it; with them and be- 
yond them the onset continued to the opposite side of the 
village. Driven out on to their reserves in rear, the beaten gar- 
rison left several hundred prisoners in the hands of the im- 
petuous victors. While the Saxons pursued the fleeing enemy 
to beyond Ste. Marie and become engaged near Roncourt in 
a very bloody fight with fresh masses, General Pape had the 
village occupied and now a total of seven Guard battalions stood 
within and behind it, in readiness directly to defend it. But 
the enemy, who on the whole was little inclined to take the 
offensive, made no attack. However, the entire space from 
St. Privat to within about 800 paces of Ste. Marie was swept 
with a rain of bullets by the enemy's skirmishers. 

Colonel Erckert, conducting the movements just outside 
the village opposite the enemy, declined to take advantage of 
any cover, and fell, mortally wounded by a bullet through his 
head, just after he had received a cheer from his Fusiliers after 
their first splendid feat of arms. He was a true knightly 
figure and one of the bravest of heroes, so many of whom 
were to cover the ground, soaked this day with so much blood. 

A continuous rain of bullets from the long range chasse- 
pots reached as far as the reserves in rear and added a grue- 
someness to the situation of the battalions under General Kessel 
(1st and 3d Regiments) while they were waiting, kneeling in 
the open fields southwest of Ste. Marie, for further orders. 
The bullets rained unceasingly into and alongside of the col- 



12 AENOLDHELMUTH 

umn, and by a chance shot Lieutenant von Helldorf was 
struck in the breast. To honor the young hero, who died 
soon after, Colonel v. Roder gently closed his eyes, for as yet 
death could still be appreciated in its full majesty in each 
individual case. It is a bitter thought that the bullet hasten- 
ing into space, probably fired by the shaking hand of a weak- 
ling, may bring the best hero to the ground, yea it would be 
a terrible, unbearable mockery of fate, were there not within 
each brave soldier's heart a comforting voice speaking 
with convincing assurance that even in the spitting rain of 
today's mass fire the course of each bullet is guided by 
Him with whom is each beginning and each end. 

After Ste. Marie had been captured, Prince Hohenlohe 
immediately caused his batteries to take a position more to the 
front. In advancing intrepidly through the redoubled fire 
Captains von Dewitz and Niederstetter were mortally wounded 
and the new position could be gained only under renewed 
losses. The left wing of this position touched St. Ail; on the 
right it extended close to the Hessian batteries so that there 
were now eighty-four guns in a single line. It is true that 
the dense clouds of powder smoke made difficult aiming at the 
enemy who was higher up, and that the pieces were finally 
almost glowing from the hot work; it is true also that the 
position was under a continuous hail of bullets and shells, but 
still the work was continued in all calmness and with splendid 
endurance and regularity. The leaders turned their attention 
only on the enemy and the object to be attained; the cannon- 
eers thought only of their guns and the work in hand. Thus 
we see again on this day artillery acting in unbreakable unison 
with the infantry; this line of guns proved an unshakable 
support on this stormtossed battlefield. 

The French artillery was unable to cope with such endur- 
ance on the part of the German artillery firing with a precision 
which had already come to be feared; it soon ceased its fire 
completely and the German batteries fired only occasionally, 
whenever a target offered. Thus after four o'clock a certain 
pause occurred in the battle which was marked along the 
entire front, eight miles long, at the same moment, but 
which could only signify the calm before the storm. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 13 

In obedience to instructions from Prince Frederick 
Charles, Prince August of Wiirttemberg intended to carry on 
a delaying action until the enveloping movement of the Saxons, 
already begun, would make itself felt. Of the 2d Division, 
which had appeared on the battlefield quite a long time before, 
the 3d Brigade, Colonel von Knappe, had been detached by 
Prince Frederick Charles with one battery and two pioneer 
companies to report for orders to General von Manstein. 
Prince Frederick Charles intended a general simultaneous 
attack along the entire front from Amanvillers to St. Privat; 
but the 9th Corps, whose troops were slowly bleeding to death 
in the annihilating battle, needed reinforcements for that 
purpose. General Budritzky led the remainder of the 2d 
Division to St. Ail at four o'clock, for Prince August wanted 
to concentrate his forces more closely together for the attack 
to be undertaken. Toward five o'clock the 4th Brigade, 
General Berger, deployed at St. Ail; General von Budritzky 
directed Major Rheinbaben to bring his three batteries into 
position south of the road and these batteries, paying no 
attention to the hail of projectiles, were soon engaged calmly 
and methodically in their work. Thus was five o'clock 
ushered in. The Saxons had by this time their artillery in a 
position to the north of Ste. Marie, facing Roncourt; the 
Leonardi Brigade, which had participated in the assault on 
Ste. Marie, reassembled after a bloody fight northwest of 
that village; all remaining troops concentrated at Auboue. 
From there about five o'clock, Prince George started with the 
column designated for the enveloping movement toward Mon- 
tois, General Kraushaar with one brigade brushed the hostile 
detachments which had gained a foothold therein out of the 
forest between Auboue and Roncourt. As a matter of fact 
the interference of the Saxons at Roncourt could not be ex- 
pected until after six o'clock. The Guard Corps had been 
notified of the measures taken, but the information, brought 
verbally in part, gave the Prince the impression that the 
Saxons would attack directly the right wing of the enemy as 
early as five o'clock. Prince August saw that on the rest of 
the front to the right no progress was being made in the 
battle, that the sun was already sinking low in the heavens, 



14 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

that only a few hours remained for intelligently directed 
action, and that anything which had to be done in order to 
reap the fruits of victory in today's battle must be done 
quickly. Prince August was certain of the speedy cooperation 
of the Saxons and he also knew that the sounds of waging 
battle would serve to bring his neighbors more quickly. After 
all these reflections Prince August decided about five o'clock to 
begin the attack and Prince Frederick Charles, to whom he 
communicated this decision, could not withhold his sanction 
after hearing stated the reasons which induced the decision. 
Thus the orders for the attack were issued shortly 
after five o'clock. For this attack there were available: at 
St. Ail 6,000 men under General Berger of the Budritsky 
Division, at Ste. Marie 16,000 men under General Pape. 
Since, however, Ste. Marie was important as a point of sup- 
port and had to be held with a sufficient force to meet 
all eventualities, there were only immediately available at the 
start 12,000 men of the 1st Division to be counted on for the 
attack. There was thus a total of 18,000 men available for 
attack on this characteristically strong position defended by 
more than 40,000 men. For only the extreme right wing of 
General Canrobert could be kept employed at that time by 
the Saxons. After greeting General Budritsky, and the 
Berger Brigade just preparing for the attack at St. Ail, 
Prince August of Wurttemberg rode over to Ste. Marie to 
General Pape, and after a brief conference the latter ordered 
the advance of the 1st Brigade which at that time stood more 
than a hundred paces southwest of Ste. Marie. But the 4th 
Brigade was by that time already pressing forward against 
the enemy on that side, so that its attack was made about a 
quarter of an hour earlier than that of the Kessel Brigade. 
At the same time with the 4th Brigade the Hessians of the 
9th Corps had advanced on both sides of the railroad, and in 
turn the Guard Brigade under Colonel Knappe on their right. 
At Ste. Marie General Pape sent the 2d Guard Regiment into 
a gap which occurred on the left of the road between the 4th 
and the 1st Brigade. From that time on raged a desperate 
battle along the entire ridge from Amanvillers to St. Privat. 
General Pape prolonged his left wing with the 4th Guard 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 15 

Regiment, then the Saxons pressed forward alongside and 
with that wing and the battle then also raged north of St. 
Privat until finally— just as the sun cast its last rays on 
this blood-soaked field of contention— the storm flood of 
German impetuosity broke the last dam of the French and 
drove them down into the hollow and back towards the 
fortress which afforded them protection. Deed there joined 
to deed in forming a costly chain and in the golden book of 
glory and duty there will be seen by posterity the names of 
ail those heroes who there found their death for the fatherland 
or who still shine preeminently in the crowds of the brave. 
There the regiments, battalions and batteries each proved 
themselves by deeds and by suffering. 

In the lofty trial of strength, of fidelity and bravery 
thus begun the 4th Brigade had the precedence. In the 
midst of the pouring rain of bullets General Berger caused 
the Kaiser Franz and Queen Augusta Regiments to deploy 
immediately east of St. Ail, which they did with drillground 
and drillbook precision. After deployment the proud line 
advances to make a simultaneous attack on the designated 
objective, the ridge south of St. Privat, filled with the 
enemy's troops. The regimental bands first play the na- 
tional hymn, but the sounds are lost in the ever increasing 
heart-rending sounds of battle, and having no arms with 
which to fight, Bandleader Saro leads his men to perform 
their efficacious work of charity on the battlefield, already 
covered with dead and wounded. The hostile guns belch 
forth in rapid fire with the ammunition saved for that purpose; 
a hail of fire pours from all along the covered position of the 
infantry, everywhere are flashes, flames and crackling, even 
the very ground seems to emit fire. 

On the left, in front of the regiment Kaiser Franz, Col- 
onel von Bohn falls mortally wounded; Lieutenant Colonel 
von Bentivegni, assuming command, gallops to the foremost 
firing line, soon his horse is killed and he himself wounded. 
On the right, with the Fusiliers, Major Wittich sinks into 
death; on the left, with the Grenadiers, Major Linsingen is 
seriously wounded, his adjutant, Lieutenant von Kalck- 
stein, being killed by his side, but in spite of his serious 



16 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

wound he remains with the assaulting line. Under the de- 
structive fire nearly all the officers are soon killed or wounded, 
the ranks of the Fusiliers and Grenadiers become thinner 
and thinner, but only after having bought with their blood 
2,000 paces of ground does the onset slacken. The remainder 
of the Grenadiers oblique toward the road, seeking cover in 
the ditches, and a group gathered up by Captains Bardeleben 
and Coin opens fire against the covered enemy at a range of 
about 400 paces. Major Linsingen, unable to walk due to 
his painful wound, had lain down behind a pile of stones on 
the road, and with a rifle taken from a dead soldier fired 
round after round deliberately and with precision. Lieuten- 
ant Nordenflycht led a group of Fusiliers, the remnants of 
the half-battalion of the fallen Captain Bentivegni, up to 
the Grenadiers and to the road— he being the only officer 
left of that half-battalion. Farther on the right Captain 
Sief ert had pressed up with the other two Fusilier companies 
to the hedge road, strongly held by the enemy. Here Adju- 
tant Count Keller reached him with orders for these isolated 
companies not to advance any farther. His horse having 
been shot under him at that moment, Count Keller assumed 
command of the Fusiliers— they having lost almost all their 
officers. 

Thus the Kaiser Franz Regiment stood in two groups on 
the dearly purchased field of honor south of the road, about 
400 paces from the enemy's most advanced line and 900 
paces from St. Privat. All the field officers were killed or 
wounded, only a very few officers were still standing, and 
the final loss amounted to 38 officers and more than 1,000 
men; but in spite of this the remnant of the regiment stuck 
tight to the fire-swept slope, eyes and guns directed on the 
enemy, all senses alert on coming events. 

On the right with the Queen Augusta Regiment, Colonel 
Count Waldersee had at the start only two battalions at his 
disposition, the 2d and the Fusilier; but when Major Rosen- 
berg with the 1st Battalion, which had been detached as a 
guard for the artillery, saw the other two battalions charg- 
ing the enemy, he could not remain behind, but followed 
them into the rain of bullets. Major Seckt, sent with his 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 17 

battalion by Colonel Knappe to Habonville, also brought up 
two companies of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment; thus a 
total of fourteen companies participated in the attack on the 
ridge. In the center, Count Waldersee personally led the 
onset with seven Grenadier companies, farther to the right, 
Captain Falckenstein pressed against the southern foot of 
the hill with three Grenadier companies. Both officers strike 
the junction between the corps of Canrobert and the Cissey 
Division, and here the attempt is pressed to make the first 
breach in the closed wall-like line of the enemy. 

The Grenadiers charge across the field of distruction at a 
run. Count Waldersee is seriously wounded but remains at 
the head of his column, Majors Rosenberg and Seckt are hit, 
everywhere the officers are falling killed or wounded, the 
companies are disorganized, but the advance never falters. 
Now, only one more rush with the force remaining, a loud 
hurrah, and the ridge is gained. The enemy retreats in a 
dense mass and in haste, but from the other side fresh forces 
direct their fire over here. To secure possession of the ridge 
Colonel Waldersee quickly gathers the remnants together; 
but, his energy being exhausted through loss of blood, he found 
himself constrained to relinquish command to Major von Beer, 
the only unwounded field officer left in the Berger Brigade. 

On the left of the Grenadiers, Major Prince Salm had 
led the Fusiliers at a run to the hedge road mentioned above, 
suffering equally as much as the others. In the stream of 
hostile bullets Major Prince Salm was killed and, with him, 
Lieutenant Prince Salm and many brave men. After con- 
nection had been gained on the left with the half-battalion 
under Captain Siesart of the Franz Regiment, Captain Count 
Keller, already wounded, again pressed forward, but even 
then was unable to carry this ruinous hostile position. 

At that moment, perceiving the predicament of the Fusi- 
liers and paying no attention to his own wound, Captain von 
Trotha, with a group of Grenadiers from all companies, 
hastens up to the support of the single standing officer, Lieu- 
tenant Helft, and charges the left flank of the enemy. At 
the same time the Fusiliers again rise up and charge— the 
two Counts Keller in their front; for fate had brought both 



18 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

brothers together for combined glorious action, one of them 
bleeding from a wound which the other hastily dressed. 
Thus, pressing ahead, they snatch a drum from a falling drum- 
mer, beat the charge, and in spite of all their losses Fusiliers 
and Grenadiers throw themselves with fiery impetus on the 
enemy. The objective is finally reached and some 200 men 
are quickly overcome and captured. 

Thus had the Berger Brigade fought for and gained a 
connected front. Of course the entire ridge was swept by a 
continuous hail of bullets, and in threatening masses the 
columns of the Cissey Division pressed against the right 
wing. Their first charge, however, was defeated by rapid 
fire, ordered by the wounded Captain Falckenstein of the 
Queen Augusta Regiment and Lieutenant Herzog of the Kaiser 
Alexander Regiment, but the danger became more and more 
pressing. However, help now begins to arrive with cheering 
sounds, guns appear on the ridge, and soon Prussian shells 
are exploding in the dense hostile columns. Captain Pritt- 
witz, observing the desperate struggle of the decimated com- 
panies, brought up his heavy battery at the gallop; several 
guns were placed out of action by having their horseslshot; but 
the battery was soon firmly established in a position on the 
storm tossed ridge. A little later an equally audacious de- 
cision brought the Friederici and Seeger Batteries up on the 
ridge farther to the left. In taking this position, Captain 
Friederici was mortally wounded, but the youthful Lieutenant 
Schmalz with tenacity held the battery firmly in the position 
taken against Amanvillers and kept up a hot shell fire on the 
hostile columns. 

Captain Seeger, with his battery, had formed front 
towards Amanvillers and with deadly accuracy plowed bloody 
furrows with his shells through the ranks of General Lad- 
mirault's troops. This decided and effective artillery fire 
was not without good results, for the pressure against the 
German right wing ceased, and from then on the possession 
of the ridge was assured. The connection between the 
French 4th and 6th Corps was nearly broken, the Guard bat- 
teries dominated the country to beyond St. Privat, and their 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 19 

shells already caused anxiety and unrest even among the 
French reserves in rear. 

A brilliant success, which proved very material in the 
final decision, was gained here in the hot strife and was main- 
tained and though the Queen Augusta Regiment lost nearly 
30 officers and 1000 men, the price paid was not too dear. 
The two companies under Major Seckt of the Kaiser Alex- 
ander Regiment paid for their share of the honor 7 officers 
and 120 men. 

In the meantime, toward half after six o'clock, Gener- 
als Budritzky and Berger had received the reiterated order 
from corps headquarters to content themselves with the 
success thus far attained, and not to advance further until the 
left wing, for the moment still held back, was ready to ad- 
vance. Thus the fight came to a standstill here on the ridge 
south of St. Privat. We will now turn our attention to 
Ste. Marie and back to the time when the 1st Brigade began 
its attack. 

In silent determination rose those 6000 selected men; 
they had been picked from the entire country for their ex- 
cellence and physical might. There could be no doubt as to 
the fearful earnestness of the task set them, for on their 
right the battle was then raging in all its fierceness, in 
front the ridge, which had to be stormed, was covered with 
hostile masses. On its crest the crowning walls of St. Privat 
showed here and there through rents in the dense powder 
smoke. These walls, as well as a number of plain field walls 
of masonry in front, were densely crowded with hostile 
sharpshooters, likewise the houses behind from the ground 
up to the roofs. The enemy fired from five or six lines, one 
above the other, sweeping the entire slope as far as Ste. 
Marie. There was on the entire bare slope but a single 
shallow depression some 800 paces in front of St. Privat, 
which was formed by the upper third part of the slope being 
somewhat steeper than the under part. 

The brigade had scarcely crossed the road the other side 
of Ste. Marie before the hostile fire opened with cyclonic 
fury along the entire line up to St. Privat and from there to 
Roncourt. The ridge became a veritable volcano from which 



20 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

the annihilating stream of fire ran down and smothered every 
living and growing thing; the rattle of more than a thousand 
rifles joined by the roar of more than 200 guns produced an 
inferno which caused fear to enter the hearts of even the 
bravest. Commands could no longer be heard and officers 
could only direct the men by their example; that is why so 
many officers fell in such frightfully quick succession. 

Six hundred paces north of the road just taken by the 
Franz Regiment, General Kessel caused a right turn to be 
executed against St. Privat, and battalion after battalion 
proceeded up the hill in such manner that the Fusiliers of the 
3d Guard Regiment were in the lead, on their left the Gre- 
nadiers of the 2d Battalion, on the latter's left in turn the 1st 
Guard Regiment; the 1st Battalion of the 3d Regiment, on 
the other hand, as well as two Grenadier companies of the 
1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, were sent by General Kessel 
against Rancourt in order to cover the left flank. The latter 
force was joined by Captain von Bock with the pioneers and 
thus all seven companies entered the battle on the right of 
the Saxons. 

Ahead of his Fusiliers of the 3d Regiment Colonel Lin- 
singen rode up the ridge, Major von Motz at his side. The 
Fusiliers follow them through the rain of bullets at the double 
time, only halting from time to time to draw breath. Colo- 
nel Linsingen and his adjutant were both wounded. Major 
von Motz fell with his horse which was shot and, while he 
was attempting to get on his feet, a shell carried away his 
head; with him fell his adjutant, Lieutenant von Quast. 
Captain von Rauch, in the firing line, was mortally stricken 
by three bullets, Lieutenant von Sydow, hastening ahead of 
his men, by two. Passing over them and other heroes, the 
battalion was torn to pieces and some 1200 paces from St. 
Privat the unheard of happened and the charge of the first 
line came to a halt. Just then Captain Fabeck led up the 
support, still in close order, and carried forward the thin line 
anew. Captain Fabeck fell almost immediately, struck by 
three bullets. Captain von Herwarth, grasping and holding 
aloft the colors, hastened to the front and led another intrepid 
rush forward in which he also fell mortally wounded. The 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 21 

remnants of the companies gathered around the last 
unwounded officer, Lieutenant von Obernitz. The strength 
of this brave force was broken by the loss of no less than 14 
officers and 450 men. 

In the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Holleben had led up 
the Grenadiers of the 2d Battalion on the left; there also the 
same heroism encountered similar destruction in the desperate 
struggle. The commander was killed together with his ad- 
jutant, Lieutenant von Groben; very soon Lieutenant Kracht, 
bleeding already from one wound, was the only officer 
remaining in front of the small remnant. Once more he led 
the Grenadiers forward in the path of glory, when a second 
bullet brought him to the ground and now the leaderless 
remnant of the battalion, which had more than 400 men, 
crowded into the shallow depression above mentioned to 
gain some protection against the fearful hail of bullets pass- 
ing over them. Desperately do they cling, however, to this 
hard contested spot and, when it comes to the last decision, 
the Grenadiers still feel sufficient strength to snatch a share 
of the honor. 

On their left a similar spirit of determination led the 
Fusiliers of the 1st Guard Regiment up the same heights. 
Far in advance of all, examining the terrain, and indicating 
the direction to be taken, rode Colonel von Roder, one of 
the bravest of the brave. The battalion commander, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Count Finkenstein, on foot because his horse 
had been shot under him, led up the skirmishers of the 
battalion to within 600 paces of the foremost hostile line and 
caused them to open fire. But the enemy, covered to his 
eyes by breastworks, was a most difficult target, while the 
Fusiliers found only a delusive protection in the potato field 
and fell, being without cover, under the mass fire. Count 
Finkenstein again led them forward, but soon was severely 
wounded, and when Captain von Geyr also fell, killed by 
three bullets, the line came to a standstill. Count Schulen- 
burg, however, brought up the support with drums beating, 
and once more carried the line ahead, until he also was 
killed; after Lieutenant von Luck, already wounded, shared 
the same fate, Lieutenants Alvensleben and Bonin vainly 



22 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

endeavored to assemble the debris. Just then the inspir- 
ing beating of drums was heard to the left. It was Cap- 
tain von Roder, who, riding ahead of the Life company, 
brought up that and the second company. To accom- 
pany his audacious charge, Lieutenant Alvensleben rallies 
his men, but, struck by seven bullets, he sinks to the blood- 
soaked ground and, gathered round the last officer, Lieu- 
tenant von Bonin, what is left of the Fusiliers occupies 
a trench abandoned by the enemy. The two Grenadier 
companies also had suffered heavily from the enemy's fire 
and Captain von Roder was forced to conclude that for the 
time, at least, a further advance was out of the question. 
He caused his men to seek the necessary protection against 
the continuing hail in the fold in the terrain above mentioned, 
waiting not in vain for a further opportunity for deeds of 
heroism. 

The other two companies of the battalion had been led 
by Lieutenant Colonel Oppel in a northerly direction to cover 
the left flank. But the left wing of this line, directed against 
St. Privat itself, was overlapped on its immediate left by the 
overpowerful enemy and would have been annihilated had 
the enemy made an attack. In order to meet this serious 
danger with as much force as possible General Kessel had 
ordered Colonel Roder to have the 2d Battalion form a flank 
toward the left. But before this was done Lieutenant Colonel 
von Stiilpnagel, in an endeavor to help the endangered battle 
group under Captain Roder, had led the leading company, 
the 7th, to the heights of fame and destruction. 

In the intrepid advance Lieutenant Colonel Stiilpnagel 
fell and with him Captain Schack, and it was only a small 
remnant which the adjutant, Count Piickler (all the other 
officers having been either killed or wounded), led to the 
assistance of his endangered comrades above on the ridge. 
Here that small group held its own until the final decision. 
Further to the left Captain Schiitz had in the meantime led 
the main body of the battalion against Roncourt and directly 
against the enemy; he fell under the mass fire, to advance 
in which each step had to be paid for with blood. However, 
the Grenadiers succeeded in forming a small flank at an 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 23 

obtuse angle to the front according to orders, beyond which 
Lieutenants Woyrasch and Brause, the former already 
wounded, pressed for a short stretch with glorious insistence. 
This battalion, though disrupted by the loss of twelve officers 
and almost 400 men, held the spot it had gained. Thus we 
see that while one and one-half battalions join the Saxons 
farther to the left, four and one-half battalions of the 1st 
Brigade hold their perilous position 800 paces from St. Privat 
with heroic endurance. Destruction takes its course over 
their heads, a further advance is forbidden by inexorable 
impossibility, but there is no thought of retreat— truly, this 
mere perseverance is equal to the most brilliant valorous 
action. While the brigade was battling for this position 
General von Pape had also brought the 2d Guard Regiment 
from Ste. Marie to close up the gap, about 600 paces wide, 
which had occurred between the 1st and 4th Brigades, so as 
to prevent the opponent from piercing the already thin line, 
should he advance against that gap. It was a quarter before 
seven o'clock when the regiment advanced against St. Privat, 
the deployed battalions alongside each other, though the 
Fusiliers on the right were somewhat in rear of the Grena- 
diers. General von Medem and Colonel Count Kanitz were in 
the lead. The regiment ascended the fated hill, proudly erect, 
loud hurrahs mingling with the sharp beating of drums, the 
ancient colors calling to mind the glorious past and exhorting 
the battalions following to honor and duty. The slope was 
flooded by the sun, already low in the heavens, with its rays 
golden red from the powder smoke and the sharply con- 
trasting dark lines of the enemy became barely visible when 
the rain of fire opened on the new target with redoubled 
fury. General Medem and his adjutant were wounded; 
Colonel Kanitz was seriously wounded; as everywhere else 
the bullets rapidly thinned the line of officers first of all, but 
gap upon gap was also torn by the sheaves of projectiles in 
the ranks of the battalions. Nevertheless, in this proud 
forward movement there was no staggering, no hesitation — 
the dead and wounded in their long rows merely served to 
mark the path of glory thus far trod. In the center, with 
the 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel von Puttkammer had 



24 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

been wounded very early, the officers fell one after another; 
Captain Count Rantzau was struck mortally, Lieutenant von 
Portatius laid low with five bullets in his body, and soon 
Count Hessenstein was the only remaining officer, although 
he also was wounded; all first sergeants and cadets were 
also put out of action. Finally the heights opposite the right 
of the 1st Brigade are reached; one more short advance and 
the last power is broken, and thoroughly exhausted the 
Grenadiers throw themselves on the slope. The 1st Battalion 
has purchased its fame with relatively the heaviest loss on this 
bloody day; besides all officers, first sergeants and cadets it 
lost more than 500 Grenadiers.* On its left, the 2d Battalion 
kept the same pace and position; here also the struggle 
raged; here also the officers fell one after the other— Lieu- 
tenants Count Monts, Count Beust, and von Trotha died the 
death of heroes; the Grenadiers covered the ground by hun- 
dreds. Nevertheless Major Gorne, reckless and heroic, 
led his men a distance beyond the general line and thus 
gained for the battalion the glory of having covered the 
longest stretch toward the objective at one uninterrupted 
charge. Even now the power of the Grenadiers was not 
fully broken, for Lieutenant von Kamptz wanted to keep on 
with a handful of Grenadiers, but Major Gorne, though 
pleased at such intrepid daring, perceived it to be useless 
and ordered him to halt. On the right of the 1st Battalion 
the Fusiliers under Major Passow quickly advanced to the 
line of the Grenadiers; among others a Count Schwerin met 
his fate here, and the ground was strewn with ever fresh 
casualties far and wide. The Fusiliers finally gained the 
right of the Grenadiers, keeping on their side connection 
with the remainder of the Kaiser Franz Regiment on the 
chaussee. 

*In the carefully prepared and instructive casualty lists arranged 
by Dr. Engel, Director of the Bureau of Statistics, the Guard Rifle Bat- 
talion is given as the battalion which suffered the heaviest losses on 
the 18th of August. These lists apparently contradict the above state- 
ment, for the reason that in this tabulation the Rifle Battalion appears 
as an independent battalion and is placed in comparison with other 
independent battalions and with entire infantry regiments, of which, 
in fact, none lost relatively as heavily as the Guard Rifle Battalion. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 25 

Thus the 2d Guard Regiment, in a very thin line, but 
with grim determination, stood ready to hold the captured 
ground. Their sense of comradeship, as well as the tactical 
structure, proved unbreakable in spite of an ultimate loss of 
39 officers and more than 1000 men. General Pape, who had 
posted himself immediately in rear of the first line on the 
road, in a position which was under a continuous rain of 
bullets, saw, like his former commander, with doubled pride 
that in the 2d Guard Regiment no man retreated a single step. 

In the same manner we continually see generals in the 
foremost lines, forgetting their personal safety, thinking only 
of their troops, whose enormous losses might make their 
hearts heavy, but whose achievements and endurance could 
only fill them with exalting wonderment. Generals von 
Pape and von Kessel had by this time lost nearly all their 
staffs; their own horses had been shot under them; 
Lieutenant Daum had been killed, Lieutenant Schlegel was 
mortally, Captain Holleben of the General Staff slightly, 
wounded. Only Lieutenant von Essbeck, a daring rider, who 
could be seen at all points on the battlefield on his white 
horse and who was well known by the troops, was not struck 
by any bullet. 

In the meantime Prince Hohenlohe had caused the artil- 
lery to advance simultaneously with the infantry more to the 
front, and when the designated batteries had gained their 
position on the crest of the ridge, the rest of the bat- 
teries stood more than 1000 paces westward beyond St. 
Ail. Major von Budenbrock had also hastened up to the 
battlefield in the meantime with two horse batteries attached 
to the cavalry and gone into position alongside of the bat- 
teries on the ridge. These batteries of course gained their 
position only under heavy loss from the continuous small 
arms fire. In the advance Captains Mutius and Elern were 
seriously, Captain Gravenitz slightly wounded, but they never 
left their batteries. 

In the subsequent advance Lieutenant Colonel Bychel- 
berg placed his three remaining batteries on the right of 
those of Captain Prittwitz and on his own right were the 
Hessian batteries, so that the artillery in action on this field 



26 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

then formed two large groups: on the left fifty-four guis 
firing on St. Privat and Jerusalem, on the right sixty guns 
firing on the masses under General Ladmirault near Arran- 
villers and also on that village itself. 

While thus on the right wing of the Guard the success so 
fortunately gained by the 4th Brigade was with equal good for- 
tune held, the situation of the unprotected left wing remained 
very precarious. The enemy, however, did not hazard any 
energetic advance from his secure heights against that thin 
line; his infantry appeared to have entirely forgotten the use 
of the bayonet. One regiment of Chasseurs, belonging to the 
Cavalry Division of General du Barail, did ride out from 
Roncourt against the left wing. The decimated Grenadiers 
of the 1st Guard Regiment, though without any cover, de- 
clined to mass together for protection and calmly awaited 
the charge; then, at point blank range, they opened a de- 
structive rapid fire, at which the Chasseurs recoiled and then 
dispersed. On perceiving this Prince Henry of Hesse hastened 
up with the 2d Guard Uhlans kept in readiness behind Ste. 
Marie, but his troopers got into the hail of bullets covering 
the entire field, there was no target to charge, it was im- 
possible to get into any action, and the Uhlans had to be satis- 
fied with having shown a firm will for it. 

In order to reinforce the left wing, still in danger, Gene- 
ral von Pape at about half after six o'clock ordered Colonel 
Neumann to proceed there with the 4th Guard Regiment. 
Colonel Neumann thought it best to take the shortest road 
from Ste. Marie across the fire-swept slope to bring help as 
quickly as possible to his endangered comrades. But Prince 
August of Wiirttemberg, who had personally watched the 
heroic battle of his troops directly in front of Ste. Marie, di- 
rected the colonel to march first along the meadow bottom 
north of the village, which afforded some hope of protection. 
Colonel Neumann led his battalions in the direction designated, 
making proper use of the protection offered by the ter- 
rain, then by a right turn, changed direction into a flat basin 
adjoining the slope, so that the regiment faced the northwest 
corner of St. Privat. From there battalion after battalion 
ascended the ridge to join the left of J the 1st Brigade. But 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 27 

the battalions were no sooner seen by the enemy than 
they fell victims to the fury of his mass fire and this regiment 
also freely poured out its blood and life on that large sacri- 
ficial ridge, consecrated to the fatherland. Colonel Neumann 
first caused the two Grenadier battalions of Wolfradt and 
Sichart to start forward. In the rebuffing shower of bullets 
Lieutenant Colonel Wolfradt received a wound which was 
subsequently to prove mortal but which could not then induce 
him to leave his battalion. Nearly all the mounted officers 
fell at the same time, their horses also shot with them, and in 
quick succession most of the captains were wounded. There 
also a Niederstetter gave his life for his country. In the glow 
of the hostile mass-fire the companies rapidly melted away, 
but paying scarcely any attention to the dying and wounded, 
the unscathed rushed farther and farther ahead. The objec- 
tive pointed out was reached, the left flank of the 1st Brigade 
covered, and now, themselves firefl on from two sides, the 
Grenadiers hug the slope, firing on the hostile sharpshooters 
behind the stone walls. To create a breathing space on their 
left, Colonel Neumann galloped back to bring up the Fusiliers, 
but was struck and seriously wounded just as Major Tietzen, 
perceiving the situation, brought the Fusiliers up to the left 
of the Grenadiers. Against them now turns the threefold 
fury of the fire, striking their front, flank, and rear, but 
they also reach the ridge to the left of their comrades and 
they also hang on tenaciously and open fire. All the losses 
sustained there were unable either to break the power of this 
4th Regiment, or to lessen the frightful momentum of its 
last desperate charge. 

Such hours of distress and such hours of the severest 
trial are also hours of consecration in which the leader, 
hardened by battle, feels himself imbued with rejuvenated 
force and in which the youth, standing for the first time face 
to face with death, quickly ripens into manhood. So stood 
the Guard, awaiting the decision, on the ground they had 
gained with their blood, firm within the realm of annihila- 
tion, like the oak in the hurricane; though its branches are 
splintered and shattered, though its green leaves are ripped 
off in the tempest, the groaning and trembling trunk holds 



28 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

fast by its trusty roots, knowing that to yield will mean 
utter destruction! 

There we see the generals unweariedly, and with un- 
alterable decision, lead the Guard against the enemy again 
and again; we see the enemy being enveloped more and 
more, until the Guard begins to embrace him even from the 
north. The enemy is pressed closer and closer together in 
his last bulwark, and many an eye in his ranks is already 
directed toward the rear. General Pape still had four bat- 
talions at his disposal, which, although they had lost 400 
men, were as good as fresh troops. Therefore, if it had 
been necessary, a last forcible attempt could still have been 
made by the Guard itself to incline the scales of fortune in 
its favor. But the enormous pressure of the movement of 
the Saxons from Montois was already making itself felt; 
already the Guard saw the leading battalions of the Saxons 
advancing on their left against the ridge, and the impulse 
for a renewed advance began to animate the thin lines of 
the Guard. As a matter of fact, the final decision in the 
heavy battle is to be credited to the interference of the 
Saxon Corps, not only to the pressure of its main masses, 
but also to the heroic deeds of the battalions which directly 
entered the battle. The glory due the Saxons must be 
accorded them without reservation; nevertheless an unbiased 
judgment will recognize that it was only in consequence of 
the self-sacrifice of the Guard that the decision came with 
such suddenness and such far reaching consequences as to 
assume the nature of a frightful catastrophe to the enemy. 
For only the fact that the enemy was already greatly shaken 
can explain why, in spite of his strong position, panic overtook 
the reserves in rear even during the final charge, so that 
everyone took to flight. It was in consequence of this that 
the last phase which decided the battle lasted less than an 
hour, and before it was accomplished it was almost dark. 
As a matter of fact, there had not been a single minute to 
spare. 

But before we turn to the last act of this heart-rending 
drama — the assault on St. Privat— we must give an account 
of the achievements and sufferings of the 3d Guard Brigade. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 29 

As soon as General Manstein observed the attack of the 
4th Guard Brigade taking place on his left, he issued orders, 
in obedience to directions given by Prince Frederick Charles, 
to General Wittich and Colonel Knappe to attack the ridge at 
Amanvillers. General Wittich was to execute this with the 
Hessian battalions on both sides of the railroad, Colonel 
Knappe to advance on the right of the latter with the Guard 
from the Bois de la Cusse. 

The battery of Unruhe, attached to the brigade, was 
already engaged on the fire-swept ridge, extending tongue 
shaped from Amanvillers to Verneville, the ridge on which 
the artillery of the 9th Corps had about concluded its victori- 
ous battle; the battery of Unruhe had had its full share in 
that battle, and had suffered severely. Of his infantry 
Colonel Knappe first started the Rifle battalion and the two 
battalions of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment* in the first 
line, the Queen Elizabeth Regiment being kept in rear for 
the present, and with it the pioneer companies. On the 
left, the riflemen worked their way through the dense woods 
of the Bois de la Cusse; on the right, the battalions of the 
Alexander Regiment advanced south of these woods. The 
edge of the woods facing east was held at that time by the 
Hessian battalions under Colonel Stamm; immediately behind 
these latter, within the forest, stood the battalions of the 
18th Division which had battled for hours and hours and 
had suffered great losses — these were the Schleswig-Holstein 
and Magdeburg Fusiliers. The objective of the attack, the 
ridge of Amanvillers, was held by the masses of the Lad- 
mirault Corps and principally by the Lorencez Division. 
Dense skirmish lines filled every available fold in the 
ground; a sunken road leading along the slope was densely 
occupied with an especially destructive firing line. In front 
of that sunken road was a sort of broad glacis on which the 
attacker was completely at the mercy of the defender's mass 
fire. The skirmishers under Major Fabeck had the shortest 
road to the enemy and thus had the precedence in the 

*The 1st Battalion of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment, under Major 
Seckt, had engaged in the battle directly from Habonville with the 
Berger Brigade. 



30 ARNOLDHELMUTH 

battle. As soon as they emerged from the edge of the 
covering woods into the open field a deadening mass fire was 
poured forth from the hostile lines in which and through 
which the leading two companies of the first line advanced 
without hesitation against the ridge held by the enemy. 
The hostile bullets struck the companies in front and on both 
flanks, men fell by squads, but the line continued on and on 
to within 500 paces of the sunken road. Then the second 
line appeared and carried the first line some distance closer 
to the enemy. 

Close to the sunken road the Rifles halted, a thin line, 
steadily getting thinner, hugging the slope under the hail of 
bullets. Many brave men had fallen. Major Fabeck was 
mortally wounded after having had two horses shot under 
him; with this experienced leader two young heroes, Count 
Dohna and Count Langenbeck were killed outright. While 
attending the wounded, Dr. von Lichtenstein shared the 
same fate, and very soon all the officers were either killed or 
wounded and the command fell to Cadet Haugwitz. The 
total loss was 17 officers and more than 450 men. But in the 
midst of all these horrible losses the Rifles never lost their 
calmness, nor did their guns waver in their deadly aim. 
Although the greatly superior enemy was covered up to the 
eyes their bullets found him and, as was subsequently seen, 
his dead lay in rows in the sunken road. 

Immediately after this heroic charge Colonel Knappe 
had led the two battalions of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment 
into the fight farther to the right, during which advance his 
hand was shattered by a bullet and his adjutant, Lieutenant 
von Berg, and his orderly officer, Lieutenant von Hessenthal, 
were also wounded. 

Major Schon intended to lead the Fusiliers to the left of 
the Rifles, but the road to that point was hot and the mass 
fire terribly destructive. Major Schon was killed and with 
him Captains Sack and John and Lieutenants Treskow and 
Petersdorf. At every forward step officers and men fall to- 
gether, and finally, when the line of the Rifles is reached, 
the three companies have but one officer each, the 12th Com- 
pany being led by Sergeant Schulte. Only after a loss of 11 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 31 

officers and 450 men, was the post of honor gained and main- 
tained. 

Keeping to the right from the very start, Major von 
Schmeling had in the meantime brought his Grenadiers to 
the ridge southwest of Amanvillers, having the artillery 
of the 9th Corps on his right. On the ridge itself these 
troops found the remnants of the exhausted Hessian Guard 
Jagers under Captain Daudistel, and, since these troops had 
no ammunition left after the many hours of hot struggle, the 
Guard took their places; the Jagers, however, left but slowly 
the position they had held so long and so gloriously. The 
troops of the Alexander Regiment covered the flank of the 
artillery against the repeated attacks of the hostile infantry. 
The hostile columns charged repeatedly against this thin 
line with trumpet calls and with wild yells, but were each time 
driven back by the destructive rapid fire of the Grenadiers. 
The Grenadiers suffered heavily, however, many of their 
dead covered the ground and in the continuous fire fight the 
ammunition ran out for the second time. All cartridges had 
been taken from the dead and wounded, but still men had to 
be sent to neighboring troops to beg for ammunition to pre- 
vent the position gained from having to be abandoned. It 
would have been impossible to resist the repeated attacks of 
the enemy at Amanvillers had not, shortly after that 
position was taken, the loud beating of drums announced 
that another regiment had taken position on the left of the 
line. In order to fill the additional gap between the battal- 
ions of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment, Colonel Zeuner had 
sent the Queen Elizabeth Regiment from the forest. Only 
its 2d Battalion remained behind as a last reserve and with 
it the pioneers under Captains Krause and Spankeren. 
These latter also entered the battle later on; here, as every- 
where, recourse was had to the last man, and Captain von 
Spankeren proved by an honorable wound that the pioneers 
fulfill the requirements of the firing line equally well as those 
of entrenching. 

On the right of the Fusiliers, the two Grenadier compa- 
nies of the 1st Battalion 1 on the left, the battalions of the 

ir The 1st and 4th Companies had been detached. 



32 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

Queen Elizabeth Regiment under Colonel Zaluskowsky 
hastened forward into the battle. 

Lieutenant Colonel Grolmann led his Fusiliers at the 
charge, with drums beating, through the hail of projectiles 
up the ridge of Amanvillers until he arrived on the left of the 
Grenadiers and immediately in front of the hostile masses. 

Since there was no chance for a further advance Lieu- 
tenant Colonel Grolmann then opened fire. There also the 
ranks were thinned with frightful rapidity. Lieutenant Col- 
onel Grolmann was himself wounded, but remained at the 
front, and by careful control of the fire here proved the an- 
nihilating power of the needle gun. The following day the 
French dead were found lying in rows behind the cover and 
in the furrows of the field. Hotter still and bloodier was the 
road farther to the left taken by the two Grenadier compa- 
nies; for the unbroken fury of the hostile fire struck not only 
their front but also their left flank. There Colonel Zalus- 
kowsky and Major Knobelsdorf set an incomparable example 
and death itself lost its sting. Major Knobelsdorf was 
mortally wounded; soon Lieutenant von During was the only 
officer still on his feet and in the final rush even he fell, 
pierced by three bullets, and only a weak remnant gained the 
firing line under the leadership of First Sergeant Sowade. 

Thus, toward seven o'clock, the brigade formed but a 
thin line, its right wing towards Champenois, its left on the 
sunken road filled by the enemy. Farther to the left the 
Hessians under General Wittich had pushed ahead as far as 
the small waiting house on the railroad. From there Gen- 
eral Wittich had unsuccessfully attempted a desperate rush 
against the sunken road to relieve the sorely pressed Guard. 
In vain also had the Hessian Colonel Stamm, perceiving the 
precarious situation of the Rifles, charged from the forest 
only to find his death. Likewise in vain did the last force of 
Schleswig-Holsteiners give up their blood and life; a further 
advance was and remained impossible for the time being. 

Hostile columns repeatedly charged this thin line, but 
were in each instance driven back decisively; and here again 
the Guard held on without giving way a single pace; it may 
let go its life, but never its post or its trust. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 33 

At about half after seven o'clock the battle at St. Privat 
was renewed with redoubled energy. From the ridge south 
of the village a horrible shell fire overflooded the uncovered 
flank of the Ladmirault Corps; that corps, already badly 
shaken, made desperate attempts to withdraw from the vor- 
tex which was already engulfing the 6th Corps on the other 
side. The Guard at Amanvillers feels the resistance decreas- 
ing in its front. By order of Colonel Zeuner, Lieutenant 
Colonel Bernhardi leads the last battalion of the brigade, the 
2d of the Queen Elizabeth Regiment, to hazard a final 
assault. The final fury of the hostile mass fire overwhelmed 
this battalion, but it reached the firing line with its power 
unbroken and proudly carried that line forward. Darkness 
is already falling; Amanvillers, shot into flames by this time, 
only indistinctly illuminates the variegated scene. In order 
to infuse renewed courage into the men, Colonel Zaluskowsky 
has the trumpeters sound the charge, the drummers beat the 
drums, and with loud hurrahs the entire thinned out line rises 
up. Lieutenant Zimietzky throws himself with the Fusiliers 
of the Queen Elizabeth Regiment into the midst of the enemy. 
Even the Guard Rifles, all shot to pieces, gather together 
in order not to lose their share of the glory. They were 
led by Cadet von Haugwitz, the only remaining officer, 
since Lieutenant von Reclam, who had hastened up again 
after having his wound dressed, had joined the Kaiser Alex- 
ander Regiment. The 2d Battalion of the Queen Elizabeth 
Regiment rushed forward with renewed vigor and Lieutenant 
von Harenberg was the first on the ridge immediately west 
of Amanvillers. There a bitter hand to hand conflict ensued 
and a large number of the Lorencez Division were taken pris- 
oners by the Grenadiers. Thus, the older regiment had not 
remained behind the younger, 1 for no sooner had they per- 
ceived the 2d Battalion of the Kaiser Alexander Regiment 
feeling its way to the front, than the Grenadiers under Cap- 
tain von Rossing charged forward, although they had not a 
single cartridge left either in their rifles or pouches; the bay- 
onet was their sole reliance in the melee. 

^he Kaiser Alexander Regiment was organized in 1814, the Queen 
Elizabeth Regiment not until I860.— Trsl. 



34 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

After a battle lasting nine hours and after having lost 
more than 4,000 men, General Ladmirault's power was broken; 
to gain a breathing space for the fleeing masses, he caused 
several counter charges to be made by troops still able to 
fight, which were energetically repulsed by the left wing of 
the Knappe Brigade. But here also after the final supreme 
effort the last forces were exhausted. 

In the meantime General Manstein had sent orders to 
break off the combat, since a fight in the dark promised no 
good results. Outposts were established and contact with 
the enemy again gained. The latter had the audacity to 
call on the outposts to surrender, but Lieutenant Schuckmann 
made a suitable reply with a volley and thereupon a rapid 
fire was once more opened. Amanvillers itself had in the 
meantime been evacuated by the enemy and was occupied at 
daybreak on the 19th of August, 

The numerous graves of heroes on the ridge of Aman- 
villers indicate the limit of the terrain gained by the Guard 
by force of arms on this day. 

Let us now return again to St. Privat. It was towards 
seven o'clock when the left wing of the Guard perceived the 
advance of the Saxon battalions on St. Privat. About six 
o'clock Prince George had reached Montois with the envelop- 
ing column; about half after six the Crown Prince of Saxony 
rode ahead toward Roncourt because it appeared that the at- 
tack on that place had been commenced. General Craushaar 
and his brigade were already advancing from the west against 
that place and Lieutenant Colonel Oppeln and Major Seegeberg 
had joined that brigade with the seven Guard companies above 
mentioned. But although Marshal Canrobert at the start had 
placed strong forces at Roncourt, later he drew in these 
troops of the right wing to St. Privat, in order to concentrate 
himself more and more against the repeated charges of the 
Guard and in order not to be caught by the envelopment of 
the Saxons whose movements he had observed. Only a rear 
guard remained at Roncourt. Engaged in a sharp fire fight 
with this rear guard, General Craushaar pressed gradually 
forward against that village in conjunction with the Guard 
companies mentioned. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 35 

Steps were already under way for the immediate attack 
on that village, when Lieutenant Essbeck, sent by General 
Pape to gain information of the situation as regards the 
Saxons, again appeared galloping over the battlefield. He 
recounted to General Craushaar in urgent words how desira- 
ble a quick interference at St. Privat would be; hastening on, 
Lieutenant von Essbeck encountered Colonel Schweidnitz 
leading the two battalions from Montois and stated the same 
to him. Although both commanders had definite orders to 
advance on Roncourt, the most noble devotion drew them to 
where the danger was more pressing and where it was worth 
while to bring the help longed for to their imperilled com- 
rades. Thus, in the very hour of the decision, the interfer- 
ance of the Saxons at St. Privat, although arranged for by 
the higher leaders, assumed the character of an act of free 
will emanating from the troops themselves and thus proved 
the finest expression of comradeship-in-arms, heartily 
tendered and as heartily rendered to the Prussian army and 
its consecration on the field of battle. 

Both these men paid with their lives for that decision, but 
the names of both are engraved forever in letters of gold 
in the book of heroes of the New Germany. 

On the left, Lieutenant Colonel Schweidnitz, at the head 
of the two battalions of the 107th, had hardly reached the 
heights near St. Privat when the fatal bullet reached him. 

On the right, the King William and King John regiments 
with their symbolic sounding names, pressed forward shoulder 
to shoulder, immediately beside the Guard, towards the enemy 
and fame. There also, in the hot fire fight, heavy losses 
were sustained and close to this self-imposed objective of 
fame, General Craushaar sank to his death. The 4th Guard 
Regiment received the onrushing Saxons with cheers, rose 
from the ground, and joined in the charge on the village. 

Thus was the final assault made here prepared. Six 
Saxon battalions executed in conjunction with the Guard the 
charge proper directly on the village of St. Privat. Other 
Saxon troops had taken Roncourt in the meantime, together 
with the Guard Grenadiers above mentioned. A Saxon 
brigade was engaged in a hot fire fight east of Roncourt and 



36 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

at the forest of Jaumont and the remaining troops were just 
being brought up by the Crown Prince of Saxony toward the 
foremost firing line to form the necessary reserve for the 
assault. 

After having taken Roncourt Lieutenant Colonel Oppeln 
with a part of the King John Regiment and Major Seegeberg 
with his Grenadiers pressed forward in a southeasterly direc- 
tion; they encountered strong masses of the enemy in rear of 
St. Privat and became engaged in a hot fight. There also the 
bodies of the brave men indicated the limits of the advance, 
and there the knightly commander of the 1st Guard Regi- 
ment, Colonel von Roder, was overtaken by fate. The 
deadly bullet struck him while he, moving everywhere, was 
attempting to bring order into that battle group and, vainly 
attempting to assist him, the Saxon Captain Weber was seri- 
ously wounded while performing this service of comradeship. 
These companies constituted, however, a far off but essential 
protection to the left flank of the main line advancing on St. 
Privat. 

In the meantime the uninterrupted fire of the Guard bat- 
teries had effected its good work within St. Privat as was 
plainly to be seen. At this time, after a quarter before 
eight, almost the entire Saxon artillery joined in the bom- 
bardment, enveloping St. Privat in a wide arc of fire from 
west and north. Jerusalem was already in flames, in St. Privat 
flames broke out and prominent buildings crumbled under 
the rain of shells. Prince August of Wurttemberg gave the 
order for the final rush; Generals Pape and Budritzky gave 
the signal for the start to the nearest troops. But before 
these orders reached them, the entire line of its own will arose 
and, with a premonition of the final victory, threw itself 
against the long denied objective. Every man tries to get 
ahead of the man next him but the same zeal brings all up 
simultaneously and the laurels won by Guards and Saxons in 
conjunction can be regarded only as a jewel worn in common. 

Along the entire line the buglers sound the forward, the 
drummers beat the charge with redoubled vim, the colors 
are in front, their bearers changing five and six times, the 
officers are near them, where there are officers still to be 



THEPRUSSIANGUARD 37 

found standing, all the unwounded and the wounded as well, 
forgetting their pains in the intoxicating onset, rush from 
all sides with joyous hurrahs and throw themselves on the 
desperate enemy within, who in vain pours out against them 
his last rapid fire. 

Opposite the right wing the fire of the Guard batteries 
had shaken the hostile infantry the most, therefore, the ad- 
vance was there the quickest. What there is left of 
the Queen Augusta and Kaiser Franz Regiments, the 
wounded Captains Count Keller, Trotha and von Coin in the 
lead with a mere handful of other unwounded officers, as- 
sault the burning Jerusalem, the garrison of which is quickly 
overcome, that is, that part of it which waited for the assault. 
Other parts of the line assault St. Privat directly and, with 
them, the Grenadiers and Fusiliers of the 2d Guard Regiment 
break into the village and into the midst of the enemy. In 
the village a hand to hand struggle ensues and in the final 
rush Lieutenant Besser of the Kaiser Franz is wounded. 
But while the German shells are still bursting in St. Privat, 
Major von Gorne charges with his troops clear through the 
village to its farther edge. 

Farther to the left the resistance of the enemy is more 
stubborn and the last battle correspondingly more bitter. A 
terrible fire is poured on the rest of the Grenadiers of the 3d 
Regiment led by the wounded Lieutenants Quast and Becher, 
as well as by First Sergeant Koschikowitz — the latter falling 
mortally wounded close to the walls of the village— but the 
embittered Grenadiers break into the houses and throw them- 
selves on the enemy. On their left Captain Roder leads his 
battle group of the 1st Regiment to the assault; he falls 
mortally wounded, pierced by three bullets. Close to the 
village walls Lieutenant Bonin is wounded, but First Sergeants 
Miinchert and Wachholz, to set an example, hasten to the 
front and with Drummer Beyer beating the charge with des- 
perate vigor, all charge the crowded enemy with butt and 
bayonet. On their left, Count Piickler throws himself into 
the melee. Still farther, on that side, the Grenadiers of the 
4th Guard Regiment assault the projecting corner of the vil- 
lage with irresistible fury; but there the enemy is still in con- 



38 ARNOLD HELMDTH 

siderable strength and holds his ground. Under his rapid 
fire every step forward has to be paid for with blood. When 
almost at the goal Captains Briesen and Krosigk are mortally 
wounded. Of the other dying heroes we will mention only 
one name, so dear to the fatherland, for here a York von 
Wartenberg for the fatherland went to his death. But to 
avenge their comrades' death the Grenadiers charge, led by 
Lieutenant Hannemann. Through the gaps in the wall, over 
the high walls of the buildings, the enemy is assaulted with 
a bitterness easily understood and in the first melee no quarter 
is asked or given. In a small quadrangle, stormed by Major 
Sichart's Grenadiers, lay fifty-seven slain Frenchmen. 

From the north, the Fusiliers of the 4th Guard Regiment, 
led by Captain Scholten and Lieutenant Schmeling, charged 
against the village entrance and with them the Saxons, coming 
from all sides. Here, also, a bitter hand to hand struggle 
ensues and, close to the goal, with the colors in their hands, the 
Saxon Captains Pape and Witteren find their death. In the 
rush each one the braver tries to get ahead of his comrades, 
the entrance is blocked by the onrushing assaulters and, in 
order also to gain the village in good time, others, like Lieu- 
tenant Schmeling, break through the enclosure farther to the 
left. Another group, composed of men of the 4th Guard 
Regiment, of the Saxon Regiments King John and King Wil- 
liam, is led, by Captain Rouvroy, carrying the colors aloft, to 
the assault. As these colors disappear in the melee in the vil- 
lage, Lieutenant von Arnim of the 1st Guard Regiment calls 
out to the wounded Lieutenant von Biinau lying alongside: 
"Comrade, your colors are in the village, let us give a cheer 
for your King;" and for a moment the hurrahs for King 
John, of the Prussian and Saxon Grenadiers, rise above the 
steady roar of the battle. 

Man against man, the real zest of fighting awakes in the 
Germans, and joyously the German innate hatred comes into 
play against the enemy. It is a smashing blow, as though 
given with Thor's hammer, and with astonishment we see 
how the original fierce impetuosity of ancient Germanic man- 
hood, which so often made even Rome tremble and whose 
achievements Tacitus, the Roman, relates to us with such 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 39 

undisguised wonderment, breaks through the bonds of custom 
of a more temperate era. Disdaining the use of arms, the 
power of manhood is here seen to assert its rights; in the 4th 
Guard Regiment the Grenadiers throw heavy rocks picked 
off the field into the crowded mass of the enemy, and more 
powerful Grenadiers of the 1st Regiment butt the heads of 
weaker enemies together until they surrender. 

Such a furious onset the enemy could not withstand. In 
vain did Marshal Canrobert show himself again and again 
where danger was greatest, past and beyond him the stream 
of fugitives took its course; beaten and dispersed, in complete 
confusion the corps rolled back toward the valley of the 
Mosel, leaving three thousand dead and wounded and about 
two thousand unwounded prisoners in the hands of the con- 
queror. Though repeatedly entreated by Marshal Canrobert 
and General Ladmirault to send support, Marshal Bazaine 
had thus far not complied with these entreaties, probably be- 
cause he thought that in such strong positions the 6th and 
the 4th Corps were themselves sufficient to hold out even 
against a great superiority. Now, however, still in time, 
the Guard Grenadiers appeared most timely on the edge of 
the woods south of the chaussee with strong artillery pre- 
pared to give proper protection to the fleeing right wing. * 

In St. Privat itself the fight for possession of individual 
houses lasted for a long time, the garrison fighting des- 
perately; but darkness hid the final acts of the Germans as 
well as the flight of the French. Hardly had the infantry 
reached St. Privat when, by orders of Prince Hohenlohe, all 
Guard batteries hastened forward to the ridge south of the 
village and threw their shells with deadly accuracy into the 
dense masses of General Ladmirault's troops north of Aman- 
villers. At the same time the fire of the French batteries, 

General Canrobert's endeavors had resulted only in forming 
troops in the rear into a rear guard at the forest of Jaumont, which 
kept away from the stream of fugitives; that rear guard was engaged 
by Saxon battalions of the extreme left wing and driven back to the 
quarries at Jaumont. Only complete darkness caused the Saxons to 
give up the further pursuit. According to the heated imagination of 
certain French reporters these quarries became a common grave for 
masses of Germans. 



40 ARNOLDHELMUTH 

placed in two tiers one above the other, was replied to and this 
artillery duel again started the horrible battle in all its fury. 
Earlier than this and after a glorious race to take part, 
batteries of the 10th Corps, which had reached St. Ail, 
appeared on the scene. Soon there were 146 guns massed 
together, almost wheel to wheel. The projectiles of the 
guns caused great havoc among the masses under General 
Ladmirault. In order to overcome the fire from those guns 
General Ladmirault with his last forces attempted three 
times to charge against that artillery line, but just as often 
his columns had to fall back torn and cut to pieces by the 
German shells. Simultaneously with this event the assaults 
of the Guard and Hessians against that hostile line occurred, 
as has been previously related, and the last stand of this 
French corps was also broken and General Ladmirault saw 
his own troops also fleeing back in confusion, paying no heed 
to commands. 

On the day after the battle the entire country between 
St. Privat and Amanvillers showed nothing but furrows 
ploughed by the shells and horribly maimed dead bodies, 
which gave the first indication of the horrible destructiveness 
of the German artillery. 

However, the German batteries also had a hard time 
holding their position as the French batteries hurled at them 
from the other side a rapid shell fire, using up all their 
ammunition down to the last shot. It had now become dark 
and the flames of the burning Jerusalem and St. Privat 
lighted up only the nearer terrain. The fire of the hostile 
batteries was mainly concentrated on the Guard batteries of 
Roon and Ising which were in position within this zone of 
light. Captain Ising had his arm shattered by a shell; a 
caisson blew up alongside of Captain Roon, maiming men 
and horses, but Captain Roon himself escaped unharmed. 1 

With the same calmness and endurance with which they 
had opened the fight on this day, the Guard batteries closed 
their activity on this hot and for them so glorious day. The 
Bychelberg Battalion remained on the battlefield during the 
night, close by the outposts, its guns directed toward the 

Captain von Roon received a mortal wound at Sedan. 



THE PRUSSIAN GUARD 41 

enemy, being guarded by the Westphalian battalions of the 
Schwarzkoppen Division, which had been sent over from 
St. Ail by General Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the 10th Corps. 

General von Pape had entered St. Privat with the first 
detachments of the assaulting infantry and at once took 
measures to secure that place. He had brought up a reserve 
during the assault; the Guard Fusiliers under Major Feld- 
mann stood south of St. Privat shortly after the first detach- 
ments had entered the village, and there, unfortunately, a 
deadly bullet reached Major Schmeling just as he was dis- 
mounting to offer his horse to General von Pape, who had 
just then had his second horse shot under him. 

While the fight in the village was slowly dying out, the 
Diringshofen Brigade of the 10th Corps arrived in all haste 
at the decisive point, coming from St. Ail. The Westpha- 
lians and Brunswickers still had a chance, some to participate 
in cleaning out the various houses, others to charge beyond 
the village into the darkness. The Brunswickers fired for 
some time still on the great hostile batteries on the edge 
of the forest. 

It was past ten o'clock before the heat of the battle 
finally subsided, but then very soon love and compassion, 
the ancient inherent qualities of the Germans, made them- 
selves felt. Forgetting personal danger, Guardsmen, 
Saxons and Westphalians hastened into the church, which 
threatened to collapse at any moment, and into the burning 
houses to save from death by fire the seriously wounded 
French soldiers left therein. 

Drums and trumpet signals now called the men, deadly 
tired, to the assembly. For eighteen hours they had been 
active during the unbearable heat of this hot summer day. 
The battle itself had lasted for nine hours, during which 
time each one of the Guard battalions had entered the fore- 
most fighting line, and the very last particle of energy had 
been thrown in by them with incomparable willingness to 
sacrifice themselves. Round the few remaining officers the 
debris of the battalions assembled, and the men camped 
and slept, wherever they assembled, on the blood-soaked 
battlefield of St. Privat, weirdly lighted up— the flames of 



42 ARNOLD HELMUTH 

burning houses battling with the moonlight for precedence. 
The generals remained in the midst of their troops. 

The Saxons camped in the terrain round Roncourt for 
which they had battled so hotly. The Crown Prince of 
Saxony had established his headquarters in that village and 
the giant Grenadiers of the 1st Guard Regiment there formed 
the guard of honor over the body of Colonel von Roder, who 
had been killed. 

As yet no one cared to inquire into the fate of those 
who were absent, but when, later on, the numbers of the 
missing increased and increased, it was found that the roll 
of honor amounted to 1 general, 290 officers and 7,500 men 
out of a total loss by the Germans of more than 19,000 men. 1 

The correctness of that number has often been questioned, 
but was it not absolutely necessary that this had to be so in 
order to save our fatherland? 

It is the very distinguishing mark of an exalted era that 
the generation which bore its burden, seeing far beyond the 
narrow confines of its own mere existence, endeavored 
and sacrificed itself for the welfare of future generations, 
and thus German unity was bound to grow like the oak at 
the heroes' grave. Should the question however again arise, 
as in the case of this heaviest victory of this heavy war, of 
having to take such an unapproachable position when opposed 
by the mass fire of the modern small arms, thousands and 
thousands will have to be sacrificed regardless of everything; 
and the troops, to whose lot this glorious task falls, will have 
to hug death, as did Arnold Winkelried long ago, in order to 
break the road to victory through the hostile wall of arms. 
No matter how great the losses were, the issue and effect 
were far greater. A hostile corps had been completely 
annihilated and driven into flight together with a second 
corps. The entire position had been made untenable for the 
enemy, so that his main army saw itself driven down into the 
valley by Metz, its power shattered, its confidence gone. 
And now only German headquarters could have thought of 

1 According to the statements of their reliable authorities, the loss 
of the French Army was 12,000 men, to which the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) 
and the 6th Corps (Canrobert) contributed a combined total of 9,000. 



THEPRUSSIANGUARD 43 

having Prince Frederick Charles enclose with a solid iron 
ring the very small space, which was still left to the hostile 
army, thus depriving that army of any further chance of 
being a field army. Moreover the royal war lord still had 
three German army corps at his disposal which he could form 
into an additional army, under command of the Crown Prince 
of Saxony, and with which, in conjunction with the army 
under the Crown Prince of Prussia, he was able very soon to 
have a Sedan follow St. Privat. 

To have poured out its heart's blood, and that not in vain, 
for the fatherland, to have struggled and fought for the 
highest achievement and with undying glory, was and will 
always remain the well deserved glory of the Prussian Guard, 
compensating for all its suffering and hardships. 

Just as entire Prussia bled through its Guard, so entire 
Prussia is proud of the laurels gained by its Guard. 

This comforting conviction had necessarily to take the 
bitterness off the tears shed at home, this proud conscious- 
ness had necessarily to cool in the field the many thousand 
burning wounds and had to give rejuvenated power to the 
exhausted Guard for further endeavor and contest. 

On that evening, quite naturally, when darkness covered 
the flight of the enemy, the over-tired men could have no 
idea of the extent of the success attained. But when the 
Germans, facing east, saw the enemy gone from everywhere 
on the 19th of August, they perceived and were glad because 
of the enormous importance of yesterday's victory, and the 
early morning red of the dawn there was typical of the dawn 
of the immense future of the saved fatherland. 



The Operations of the lid Army 

by 
Freiherr von der Goltz 

Captain, Great General Staff 



The 17th of August 1 

* * * 

DRINCE Frederick Charles' intentions therefore were to 
■1 attack the enemy not later than the 18th of August; to 
start on that day as early as possible so that the sun would not 
set before the final decision had been completely fought out. 
However, before lid Army Headquarters could make its dis- 
positions toward this end the approval of His Majesty the 
King had to be secured. This was done, and after Royal 
Headquarters had expressed its approval of the intended 
measures, the Prince issued the following army orders: 

On the Battlefield of Vionville, 17. August, 1870, 1 p.m. 

The enemy appears to draw back in part northwestward 
and in part toward Metz. 

The lid Army and the 8th and 7th Army Corps will look to- 
morrow in a northerly direction for the retreating enemy and beat 
him. 

Today the corps will camp, by corps, on the battlefield of 
Vionville, the 9th Army Corps on the right wing. The outposts 
of the latter corps will seek connection in the forest in front with 
the outposts of the 8th Corps, which bivouacks by Gorze, and will 
extend on the left as far as the Metz — Verdun road in front of 
Flavigny. 

The 3d Army Corps camps at Vionville and Flavigny; its 
outposts, connecting with those of the 9th Corps, will extend on 
the left as far as the western edge of the forest north of Vionville. 

The 12th (Royal Saxon) Army Corps will yet today go into 
bivouac at Mars la Tour and will send its outposts as far as the 
Yron brook; it will also send out a detachment of cavalry to ob- 
serve the road to Verdun through Hannonville. 

The corps furnishing outposts will have officers reconnoiter 
the terrain in their front to ascertain suitable roads for further 
advance, in so far as the enemy permits. 

Published in November, 1873. Prom Chapter V, p. 116. 

45 



46' FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

The 10th Army Corps remains in its camp at Tronville. 

The Guard Corps will go into camp at Puxieux. 

The 2d Army Corps will start from Pont a Mousson at 4 a.m. 
tomorrow and march through Arnaville, Bayonville and Onville to 
Buxi&res, where it will close in mass north of that village and cook. 

Army headquarters is today in Buxieres. 

(Sgd.) Pkederick Charles. 

The following was added to these orders for the 4th 
Army Corps: 

To the right of 4th Army Corps only the Guard Uhlan Brigade 
has been left back with directions to reconnoiter toward the 
Meuse in direction of St. Mihiel. 

4th Army Corps line Boucq — Sanzey — Jaillon. 

The instructions of His Majesty, though already issued 
verbally, were in addition written down briefly by General 
von Moltke. They read as follows: 

The lid Army will tomorrow the 18th start at 5 a.m. and ad- 
vance by echelons between the Yron and Gorze brooks (in general 
between Ville sur Yron and Rezonville). 

The 8th Corps will join that movement on the right wing of 
the lid Army. In the start the 7th Army Corps will have the task 
of protecting the movements of the lid Army against possible 
hostile operations from the direction of Metz. 

Further directions of His Majesty the King will depend on 
the measures of the enemy. 

Reports for His Majesty to be sent for the present to the 
heights south of Flavigny. 

(Sgd.) v. Moltke. 
17. August, 1.45 p.m. 

(Dictated on the battlefield of Vionville). 

Thus the general limits of the task of the lid Army had 
been set for the 18th of August. Special instructions could 
be issued on the morning of that day in conformity with the 
situation then existing - which possibly might be changed. 

Therefore the Prince requested the attendance of the 
commanding generals of the Guard, 10th and 12th Army 
Corps at the bivouac of the Saxons at Mars la Tour at five 
o'clock in the morning to receive verbal orders; the comman- 
ding generals of the 3d and 9th Army Corps, for the same 
object, at 5.30 o'clock at the bivouac of the 3d Corps, west 
of Vionville. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 47 

As there was no expectation of any engagement being 
had today and as His Majesty the King had returned to his 
headquarters in Pont a Mousson, Prince Frederick Charles 
left the battlefield and dismounted about four o'clock in the 
afternoon in the small village of Buxieres. 

As a matter of fact, the directions of Army Headquarters 
had not been carried out completely. Since the Guard Corps 
reported at about one o'clock in the afternoon that it was 
resting at Puxieux, while at the same time the 12th (Royal 
Saxon) Corps was already on the march to Mars la Tour, 
Army Headquarters considered it best to assign the Guard 
Corps a bivouac place at Puxieux, consequently in rear of 
the Saxons. This had been provided for in the above army 
orders. 

However, in obedience to orders from Army Headquar- 
ters received by it on the night of the 16 /17th, directing it to 
Mars la Tour, to the left of the Saxons, the Guard Corps had 
gone into bivouacks at Hannonville au Passage, reporting that 
fact to Army Headquarters. This report crossed, on the way, 
the army orders, being sent at the very moment to the Guard 
Corps. 

That corps remained in the bivouac it had taken, even 
after it had received the orders, so as not to again interrupt 
the rest of the troops after their long fatiguing march. 

The 18th of August 

On the morning of the 18th of August the various parts 
of the lid Army were at the following places: 

1. 9th Army Corps on the plateau west of the Bois de 
Vionville; 

2. 3d Army Corps with the 6th Cavalry Division at 
Vionville — Flavigny; a part of the corps at Buxieres — 
Chambley. a 

3. 10th Army Corps at Tronville, behind it the 5th 
Cavalry Division. 

*To that place the 5th Infantry Division had moved on August 
17th, since water was lacking in its bivouac on the plateau. 



48 FREIHERE VON DEE GOLTZ 

4. The 12th Army Corps south of Mars la Tour and at 
Puxieux. 1 

5. Guard Corps south of Hannonville au Passage. 

6. 2d Army Corps on the march from Pont a Mousson 
(where it had arrived on the 17th) to Buxieres. 

7. 4th Army Corps at Boucq (not far from Toul). 
Shortly before 5 a.m. the commander of the lid Army, 

Prince Frederick Charles, arrived at the bivouac of the 12th 
(Royal Saxon) Army Corps at Mars la Tour. 

The verbal instructions issued here, and half an hour 
later at Vionville, to the corps commanders could of course 
be based only on the information of the situation as regards 
the enemy, which had been gained up to that moment. 

Reports received by the Prince stated that the enemy 
had been on the march toward the evening of the 17th on 
both roads in front of the lid Army leading west and north- 
west respectively. In consequence the estimate of the 
situation formed on the afternoon of August 17th remained 
unchanged. 

The army commander even considered it probable that 
the French bivouac observed the day before east of Grave- 
lotte had disappeared. 

He believed, as stated, that he was not justified in assum- 
ing that the army under Bazaine would take a position for a 
battle against the superior German armies with its rear 
against Metz and the steep sides of the valley of the Mosel. 
He rather considered it probable that the lid Army would 
have, on August 18th, to attack the enemy north in front or 
on the left flank. But this of course was only a temporary 
supposition. 

A short advance in the morning hours must bring cer- 
tainty. During this advance the main thing to be kept in 
mind was that the enemy was unquestionably close at hand 

ir rhe 12th Cavalry Division had passed the night at Parfondrupt 
with outposts on the Metz— Conflans— Etain road. On the 17th three 
persons (among them a Marquis de Marguerie, apparently a high rank- 
ing supply officer) had been stopped as suspicious characters at St. 
Jean les Buzy on that road and had been sent in the evening in charge 
of an orderly officer of the division first to 12th Corps headquarters and 
later to army headquarters. The latter sent them on to Royal Head- 
quarters. Patrols of the 12th Army Corps had gone as far as Jarny on 
the 17th without encountering the enemy. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 49 

and a battle consequently imminent. This necessitated 
making the march not in long march columns, but in large 
masses ready for battle. According to the terrain features 
which could be seen from the map, this procedure seemed to 
offer no difficulties. Army orders of August 17th had in 
addition charged the corps in the first line with reconnais- 
sance of the foreground. For these reasons Prince Frederick 
Charles deemed it correct to have the Saxon Corps start 
first, to be followed by the Guard Corps, though the desig- 
nated march direction of the two corps would cross in the 
vicinity of Mars la Tour. 

The verbal orders of Prince Frederick Charles read about 
as follows: 

The IId Army will continue the march this forenoon. The 
mission remains as heretofore, to drive the enemy off his line of 
retreat on Verdun — Chalons, and to defeat him wherever found. 

The 12th Army Corps will start at once 1 as leading echelon of 
the left wing, in its right rear the Guard Corps, in the right rear 
of the latter the 9th Army Corps ("about 6 a.m.). 

The 12th Corps takes direction on Jarny, the Guard Corps on 
Doncourt. After the 9th Corps has passed between Vionville and 
Rezonville it will continue the advance, passing St. Marcel close to 
its left. 

In the second line, opposite the intervals, the 3d Corps will 
advance on the right, the 10th on the left. In this advance the 6th 
Cavalry Divison will be under the orders of the 3d Corps, the 5th 
under those of the 10th Corps. 

The corps artillery of the 3d Army Corps will remain at the 
disposition of army headquarters as artillery reserve. 

On the right of the IId Army the two corps of the 1st Army 
are advancing, the 8th in the right rear of the 9th Corps, the 7th 
farther towards Metz. 8 

The trains remain where they have passed the night, those of 
the 9th Army Corps between Vionville and Rezonville, where 
water can be had. 

The advance will not be made in long march columns, but by 
divisions massed within themselves, the corps artillery between 

1 These orders were issued at 5 a.m. 

s The cavalry with the corps in the first line was all sufficient for 
reconnaissance purposes during the short march to the front: there 
could hardly be extensive tracts of flat terrain between the IId Army 
and the enemy. The 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions were therefore 
kept in rear. In front was the Saxon Cavalry Division, the Cuirassier 
Brigade of the Guard Corps, the Hessian Cavalry Brigade, as well as 
the divisional cavalry regiments of the 5th Infantry Division. 



50 FEEIHEBR VON DER GOLTZ 

the two divisions. For the present the question is merely one of 
an advance to the front of less than four miles, to occupy the 
northern road to Verdun. A rest will be made during the noon 
hour. 

Finally Prince Frederick Charles explained, in a few 
words to the corps commanders, his estimate of the situation 
as regards the enemy, so as fully to assure in this manner 
unity of action in the subsequent movements of the army. 
The same intention had formed the basis of the orders issued, 
which formed the entire lid Army into one unit, the different 
parts of which were in direct communication. It was in- 
tended to have the army advance as a mass of brigades of 
enormous dimensions and to be able and ready to turn either 
to the right or to the left, according to where the enemy was 
found, thus bringing either the right or the left wing corps 
first into action. 

The Prince himself intended to remain with the point of 
the 3d Army Corps during the advance. 

The execution of the dispositions of the Prince was 
begun by the corps designated to start first. The leading 
element of the 12th Army Corps, the 108th Rifle Regiment, 
which defiled through the village of Mars la Tour in march 
columns, reached in that formation the main highroad Metz 
— Harville— Verdun, with its first section at 5.40 a.m. 

From the place west of Vionville, where orders were 
issued to the commanding generals of the 3d and 9th Army 
Corps, St. Marcel, Doncourt, Bruville, Jarny and the en- 
virons of those villages could be seen. With the aid of 
glasses it was ascertained that the entire terrain there was 
free of the enemy. 

As soon as the 12th Army Corps began its march on 
Jarny, indicating the general advance of the lid Army, 
Prince Frederick Charles sent a report thereof to the King 
on the heights of Flavigny, adding thereto: 

Nothing of the enemy is seen marching on the road from St. 
Marcel to Doncourt. Camp at St. Marcel empty. During the 
night there was marching on that road. 

Thus the enemy who had stood towards the north in 
front of the lid Army had disappeared. The further ques- 



OPERATIONS OP THE IId ARMY 51 

tion now was, what had become of that part of the French 
fighting forces observed yesterday towards the east in front 
of the right wing of the lid Army. 

The first information received from there, through 
a picket standing opposite Gravelotte, indicated that the 
French had marched off. The officer there had reported: 

I was up to within 400 paces of the hostile camp. Security 
measures not taken by the enemy, strength about 6-8 infantry 
divisions. 1 

As far as can be ascertained, the artillery has marched off 
almost entirely; there are 1-2 cavalry regiments with white tunics. 
Everything creates the impression of a hasty marching off to Metz; 
at this time 6-8000 infantry east of Gravelotte. 

18 Aug. 4.50 a.m. 

Shortly thereafter a report arrived from the outposts of 
the 18th Division: 

1. Gravelotte not occupied this morning. 2 

2. In camp general assembly sounded according to Dragoon 
picket, which also reports movements of the enemy toward the 
northwest. 

3. The two companies in Rezonville report hostile infantry 
patrols in the forest north of Rezonville.— 18 August, 5.15 a.m. 

Of great interest in the 1st message was the sentence: 
"Everything creates the impression of a hasty marching off 
to Metz." 

According to the belief then held by the commanding 
general of the lid Army this was not only possible, but 
even very probable. Since there had so far been only a part 
of the enemy immediately west of Metz, it appeared logical 
that that part, considering the German numerical superiority 
ready for the advance, would retreat back under the cannons 
of Metz. 

1 French half- battalions were meant here evidently, as otherwise 
the statement of strength, given below, of 6-8000 infantry could not be 
explained. Furthermore, the sight of 6-8 infantry divisions would 
probably have induced the observing officer to report that he had seen 
the entire French army. In any case, he viewed too small a space to 
be able to gain the impression that he had three army corps in his 
front. That only weaker masses of troops were meant also agrees 
with the statement concerning the artillery and cavalry. 

2 Patrols had already visited the village on the 17th. Still, up to 
the early morning of the 18th, numerous Frenchmen, getting water, 
showed themselves there from time to time. 



52 FREIHERK VON DER GOLTZ 

The statement in the second report became of importance, 
i.e., that the enemy was alarming his camp, and that move- 
ments were taking place toward the northwest. In order to 
gain rapid information of the conditions on that wing, which 
could not be seen from the location of army headquarters, 
Prince Frederick Charles sent an engineer officer of his staff 
to the vicinity of Gravelotte for observation. 

This officer first sent a report from the outposts in posi- 
tion on the north edge of the Bois des Ognons, which also 
spoke of a retreat of the enemy in a northerly and north- 
easterly direction and which was stated as being reliable. 
But very soon his own observations gave a different result. 
The first message quoted above (dated 6.40 a.m.) had been 
received by army headquarters at 7.30 a.m. Forty-five min- 
utes later the second report arrived stating that the camp 
was still there and that no troops had marched away from it. 
These were personal observations, not statements of out- 
posts. It said further that movements had however been 
perceived in the camp since 3 a.m. 

The next report of that officer (dated 8.45 a.m.) confirmed 
the last report. It read: 

Lively movements in camp, apparently concentration of in- 
fantry more to the rear; edge of ridge still occupied by artillery. 

The movements during the night caused by additions arriv- 
ing; new camp fires lighted. At this time casual firing by the 
outposts. 

The enemy still held his place on the heights east of 
Gravelotte and showed no intention of leaving it. Here re- 
connaissance had brought definite information. 

That information was still awaited from the left wing of 
the army. So far no message of importance had been re- 
ceived from there. * 

The first report from that wing had been sent by the 
cavalry of the Guard Corps and arrived at 8.30 a.m. at army 
headquarters: 

1 On account of the importance of the road to Verdun, the 12th 
Army Corps received directions at 7.45 a.m. to order its cavalry de- 
tached on its left wing to send all messages and reports also direct to 
army headquarters. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 53 

Inhabitants of Bruville state that the French left Doncourt 
yesterday at 9.00 a.m. Direction of marching not known to them. 
Some state toward Verdun, others toward Briey, others toward 
Metz. 

Nothing certain could be gained from this report, it only 
proved that during the past night no hostile column had 
marched on the road to Jarny. 

At this time— 8.30 a.m. —Royal Headquarters had reached 
the conclusion that the hostile main force stood in front 
of Metz and that its position extended as far as Amanvillers. * 
An officer of the General Staff brought this information. 

It was considered desirable at Royal Headquarters that 
the lid Army keep to its present march direction. "If the 
northern road to Verdun were found clear of the enemy, the 
12th and the Guard Corps should not be sent too far to the 
left." Should the correctness of the views entertained be 
confirmed, the 1st Army was designated to attack in front, 
the 9th Corps to envelop the hostile right wing, the Guard 
Corps to serve as reserve. The remaining corps were to halt 
for the present. 

The dispositions of Prince Frederick Charles had already 
arranged for this halt, which was also necessary to conserve 
the strength of the troops. Nothing therefore remained ex- 
cept to issue special orders to the 9th Corps, which was 
charged with a special battle task. Consequently that corps 

1 As is known, the French Army on August 18th occupied the fol- 
lowing positions: 

1. The 6th Corps: Roncourt — St. Privat to the small depression 
east of St. Ail. 

2. The 4th Corps: Amanvillers — Montigny la Grange, Cham- 
penois occupied in front. 

3. The 3d Corps: La Folie — Leipzig— Moscou towards Le Point 
du Jour, outposts in the Bois des Genivaux. 

4. The 2d Corps: Le Point du Jour, Roziereulles, Ste. Ruffine 
occupied on the left flank. 

5. The Cavalry Division Fortonat the mill of Longeau. 

6. The Cavalry Division du Barail (two regiments of which had 
escorted the Emperor and were now detached) in the positions of the 
6th Corps. 

7. The Guard in reserve on the heights of the Mont St. Quentin 
and Plappeville. 

The right wing of this position could not be seen from the heights 
of Flavigny. 



54 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

received the following orders, dated Vionville, 18. August, 
1870; 8.35 a.m.: 

As soon as the main body of the infantry has reached Caulre 
Ferme northeast of St. Marcel, the corps will halt, will send out 
cavalry points toward Leipzig and St. Privat la Montagne and for 
connection with the Guard Corps, which will halt at Doncourt. 
Reports of the cavalry sent west will be made direct to General 
von Moltke as well as to me. 

(Sgd.) Frederick Charles. 1 

The Guard Corps received orders to halt at Doncourt, 
the 12th Corps at Jarny. Other orders could not be given 
these two corps at the time, as the strength of the enemy 
standing on the right flank was not yet sufficiently known to 
let it be judged whether other parts of the lid Army be- 
side the 9th Army Corps could be utilized against him. 

The 10th Army Corps was ordered to halt at Bruville as 
soon as it arrived there. 2 The 3d Army Corps had not yet 
begun its movements. 

These were the measures taken by lid Army Head- 
quarters based on the first information from Royal Head- 
quarters. Before making further dispositions, more minute 
information and results of reconnaissance, which would un- 
doubtedly arrive soon, could be awaited. 

First, at 8.50 a.m., came a report from the extreme left 
wing of the army, the 12th (Royal Saxon) Corps, which had 
reached Jarny in the meantime without encountering the 
enemy. It stated: 

North Labry, 8.50 a.m. 3 
West of Valleroy hostile artillery appears to be in position, 
also columns west of Valleroy, also columns north of Doncourt. 

This report was in consonance with the view of H. R. H. 
the commander of the lid Army, that the enemy had divided 
his forces. 

1 A copy of this order was furnished Royal Headquarters with the 
additional information that the 12th Corps would halt at Jarny, the 
10th at Bruville. 

2 At this time the 10th Corps was still at its places of bivouac, but 
that fact could not be perceived from the location of army headquarters. 

"The exact similarity of the date of departure of the message with 
the date of its receipt at Hd Army Headquarters is explained by a 
difference in watches. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 55 

He stood in position on the heights to the right of Le 
Point du Jour and was now also seen on the left, according 
to this report. The lid Army also appeared to be in touch 
with hostile masses on its left wing, such as it also had in 
front of its right wing. Detailed reconnaissances, which 
undoubtedly both wing corps were making, had to be awaited. 

The above report from the Crown Prince of Saxony was 
now declared to be incorrect by a second report which reached 
lid Army Headquarters at 9.30 a.m. It stated that closer re- 
connaissance had shown that Valleroy was not occupied by 
the enemy. Added thereto was that the 12th Army Corps 
would remain at Jarny awaiting further orders and that the 
Saxon cavalry would meanwhile reconnoiter the road to Briey. 

Thus there appeared so far no contact with the enemy 
on the left wing of the army. 

But, as several times stated above, since the army com- 
mander held it very probable that he would find the enemy 
there, he did not believe that a complete mistake had been 
made at first and remained convinced that reports to the 
same effect as the first one, which was now contradicted, 
might again arrive from the 12th Army Corps in its subse- 
quent advance. Perhaps hostile troops had been in Valleroy 
and again disappeared. * 

To this should be added that during the time between the 
receipt of the first and second reports, the 9th Army Corps 
reported from Caulre: "its patrols sent ahead to the north 
and northeast had seen nothing of the enemy." 2 This, like 
prior reports, seemed to indicate that the deployment of troops 
of the enemy immediately west of Metz was not on a large 
scale. 

Consequently Prince Frederick Charles believed the more 
that he would have to await the results of further reconnais- 
sances to the front on the extreme left wing of the army, be- 
fore fully deciding on a turn to the right. 

x In regard to this we will remark, ahead of our narrative, that as a 
matter of fact at least hostile patrols of the enemy were chased later on 
from the vicinity of Moineville and Valleroy. 

'The report from General Manstein, cited further on concerning his 
arrival in Caulre, contained this information. 



66 FREIHERRVONDERGOLTZ 

Shortly thereafter further orders were received from 
Royal Headquarters: 

Unimportant skirmish fight on the right wing of the 7th Corps. 
The troops visible on the heights toward Metz appear to move 
northward, probably toward Briey. It does not appear that the 
1st Army will require larger support than can be furnished by the 
3d Corps frOm Vionville or St. Marcel. 

Heights south of Flavigny, 9.20 a.m. 

(Sgd. ) von Moltke. 

The support directed to be given the 1st Army by the 3d 
Army Corps, in this message, could easily be arranged at any 
moment, as that corps stood in readiness at Vionville. 

In the meantime, General von Manstein, commanding 
the 9th Army Corps, had reported at 9 a.m. (dated Caulre 
Ferme 8.30 a.m.) that he had arrived at Caulre Ferme with 
the 9th Army Corps and would remain concentrated there 
according to orders. 

This halt had been provided for by the commanding 
general of the corps even before arrival of the last orders 
from army headquarters in accordance with the general march 
orders issued in the morning. 

As stated, the 9th Army Corps had been designated by 
Prince Frederick Charles for the support of the 1st Army for 
the present. Royal Headquarters was informed thereof later 
on at 10.10 a.m. 

Three, or possibly four, army corps of the lid Army, 
then present, were still available. 

They were in readiness to attack the enemy on the left 
flank should he actually attempt at this moment to march 
off from his position near Metz. 

The half hour between 9.30 and 10 a.m. had now passed 
without any additional reports arriving from the Saxon Army 
Corps, while the cavalry points of that corps were known to 
be then far beyond Valleroy. This contradicted the suppo- 
sitions held up to this that parts of Bazaine's army ought to 
be looked for there, and the situation now began to clear up. 

Before discussing the further measures of army head- 
quarters, which now had in view the attack on the enemy in 
position immediately west of Metz, we must gain a clear pic- 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 57 

ture of what was actually known at the time in regard to 
the situation. 

At the present day we are much inclined to look back on 
everything as being then as clear as the past years have since 
made the situation, and we judge the measures taken in those 
past hours accordingly. It is better for the proper under- 
standing of events and is truer historically to picture to one- 
self as nearly as possible what was really known at that time. 

The French army stood from Le Point du Jour as far as 
the heights of Roncourt and St. Privat, awaiting the attack 
in a prepared position. So far only the left wing of that 
position had been definitely located. On August 17th a 
French camp had been seen east of Gravelotte consisting of 
several divisions, which meant a part of, not the entire, army 
of Bazaine. Results of observation on the morning of 
August 18th showed the same. They confirmed that a few 
French divisions were on the heights of Le Point du Jour. 
The first information received from Royal Headquarters 
stated that the hostile right wing extended as far as Aman- 
villers, showing thereby the views held at those headquar- 
ters. The patrols sent from Caulre Ferme northeastward had, 
as is known, found nothing of the enemy. Therefore the 
French position did not appear to extend far to the north. 

Thus lid Army Headquarters considered it most prob- 
able at that hour that the enemy stood with his right wing 
about at La Folie. 

Consequently a French battle position on the ridge from 
Le Point du Jour as far as La Folie was now the objective 
for measures to be taken. 

As stated, the lid Army had orders to envelop the hos- 
tile right wing with the 9th Army Corps and to have the 
Guard act as reserve to that corps. 

It therefore appeared justifiable to swing these two corps 
to the right as far north as would bring them opposite the 
supposed extreme right wing of the French position. They 
were to march to Verneville. From that point, should the 
French right be at La Folie, they could attack it in superior 
force in front and on the flank. 



58 FREIHERR VON DBR GOLTZ 

Of course proper care had to be given to the farther 
reconnaissance northward during the movements now to be 
begun. Prince Frederick Charles therefore issued the fol- 
lowing orders: 

1. To the 9th Army Corps, 10 a.m. 

The corps will fall in and begin the march in the direction of 
Verneville and La Folie. Should the enemy stand there with his 
right wing the battle will be opened for the present with a strong 
deployment of artillery. 

2. To the Guard Corps, 10.15 a.m. 

The Guard Corps will continue the march through Doncourt to 
Vern6ville and take position there to support the 9th Army Corps, 
which is advancing on La Folie against the hostile right wing. Re- 
connaissance to the left through Amanvillers and St. Privat-la- 
Montagne as well as early reports are desirable. 

The 12th Royal Saxon Army Corps received copies of 
both these orders. * As stated above, the Crown Prince of 
Saxony had added to one of his reports of that morning that 
he would remain in Jarny until further notice. That corps 
could well be held there for the present at the disposition of 
army headquarters since there was no room on the narrow 
plateau of La Folie for an attack on the enemy by a third 
corps in addition to the 9th and the Guard Corps. It was in 
proper position at Jarny also in case detachments should 
become necessary from the lid Army either towards the 
north or northwest. 

As regards its conduct in the battle the 9th Corps had 
been placed under the restriction for the present of open- 
ing the battle against the enemy with artillery only, but this 
restriction was dependent on the situation. The 9th Corps 
was nearest the enemy; it formed the pivot of the move- 
ments now to ensue. As conditions developed it came 
against the enemy not only first but also materially earlier 
than the wider swinging Guard Corps. It had to be pre- 
vented therefore from becoming engaged in a frontal attack 
against a superior hostile force prematurely and before the 
envelopment of the hostile right wing was completed. 

1 Report also sent to Royal Headquarters, Prince Frederick Charles 
at the same time requesting permission to draw up the 3d Army Corps 
to Caulre Ferme, that corps still being at Vionville. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 59 

At this moment, while the lid Army was entering upon 
a new phase of activity on this day, it is well to follow up 
events with the various corps during the morning hours. 

The advance of the lid Army early in the morning had 
not been without its difficulties and unforeseen obstructions. 

First the 12th Army Corps found serious obstructions 
for the deployment of its divisions in the terrain round Mars 
la Tour, compelling it to defile through Mars la Tour in march 
columns and to take up the formation directed by Prince 
Frederick Charles only north of the village. 1 

Only after the 12th Corps had completed its march 
through Mars la Tour, was the Guard Corps able to begin its 
march. That corps remained in the march-columns forma- 
tion previously adopted, on account of the difficulties of ter- 
rain which had to be overcome in its prescribed line of ad- 
vance on Doncourt. The 10th Army Corps followed at 10 
a.m. and executed its advance by divisions in mass formation. 

Under these conditions the lid Army did not gain ground 
so quickly in the morning hours as had been the intention of 
the army commander. 

At this time, shortly after 10 a.m., the army corps were 
located as follows: 

1. The 12th Army Corps at Jarny. 8 

2. The Guard Corps marching toward Doncourt. 

3. The 9th Army Corps at Caulre Ferme, outposts as far 
as the line BoisdesGenivaux— Verneville— Bois Doseuillons. 

4. The 10th Army Corps and 5th Cavalry Division at 
Mars la Tour— Tronville. 

5. The 3d Army Corps and 6th Cavalry Division at 
Vionville. 

6. The 2d Army Corps marching from Pont a Mousson 
towards Buxieres. 

From this position then began the turn to the right 
ordered, initiated by the 9th and the Guard Corps. 

At this same time progress was made in the information 
obtained concerning the situation and intentions of the enemy. 

! The corps artillery went round on the west side of Mars la Tour. 

2 Its advance guard marching on both sides of the Orne, the cavalry 
division marching from Parfondrupt to Puxe, having left back one regi- 
ment to patrol towards the west and toward Verdun. 



60 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

At the 10th Army Corps some slightly wounded of the 
16th Infantry Regiment arrived from Doncourt, where they 
had been taken after having been captured by the enemy on 
August 16th. They stated that on the morning of August 
17th the French had left that village in all haste— without 
taking them along — and retreated towards Metz. Then a 
report was received from an officer belonging to army head- 
quarters who had been observing the enemy from the Bois 
des Ognons, stating: 

Point of forest opposite Gravelotte, 10.20 a.m. 

The camp now shows a changed appearance. 

The largest part of the troops has retreated toward both sides 
without my being able to state definitely the march direction. 
Halfway up the slope, where headquarters camp was, a battle 
position has been taken. Its right wing, covered by woods, cannot 
be seen. At this moment lively movements of troops in northerly 
direction and more lively fire by outposts. 

For better orientation a sketch of the French position on 
the heights of Le Point du Jour was added. 

Soon thereafter arrived reports of the advancing corps, 
the first coming from the Guard Corps at Doncourt, dated 
10.25: 

Head of Guard Corps just arrived at Doncourt; will go into 
position there and await further orders. 1 

Patrols sent ahead on Ste. Marie and to the road to Briey have 
so far reported nothing of the enemy. 

Almost simultaneously therewith a report arrived from 
the 9th Army Corps, which had been sent in by the outposts 
of the 25th Infantry Division: 

Heights of Batilly, 10.25 a.m. 
Hostile patrols on the heights of Ste. Marie — Amanvillers, 
troops marching on main road, camp at St. Privat-la-Montagne, 
hostile patrols advancing at a trot. 

The commander of the 9th Army Corps forwarded this 
message from Caulre Ferme at 11 a.m. 

*In the meantime, as is known, at 10.15 a.m. the order from Prince 
Frederick Charles had been sent for the corps to continue its march 
on Verne ville. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 61 

Besides these important reports a new order was received 
at lid Army Headquarters from His Majesty the King about 
the same time. 

Reports received indicate that the enemy intends to hold his 
position on plateau between Le Point du Jour and Montigny la 
Grange. 

Four hostile battalions have advanced into the Bois des 
Genivaux. 

His Majesty considers it advisable to start the 12th and the 
Guard Corps in the direction of Batilly in order to reach the enemy 
at Ste. Marie aux ChSnes, in case he should march toward Briey, 
and to attack him from the direction of Amanvillers in case he 
should remain on the heights. This attack would have to be made 
in conjunction with the 1st Army attacking from the Bois des Vaux 
and Gravelotte, the 9th Corps attacking towards the Bois des Geni- 
vaux and Verneville, and the left wing of the IId Army attacking 
from the north. 

10.30 a.m. 

(Sgd.) von Moltke. 

The suppositions on which these orders were based were 
in consonance with the views obtaining at Headquarters IId 
Army. The patrols sent by the Guard Corps toward the main 
road from Briey had encountered no enemy. The 12th Corps, 
the main body of which was known to be at Jarny, would 
doubtlessly have discovered through its cavalry and reported 
any parts of the French army which had been on the march 
on the 17th toward the northwest or west. 

Now all dispositions of the IId Army could, more defi- 
nitely than those made at 10 and 10.15 a.m., tend towards one 
end, to attack in full force the enemy on the heights imme- 
diately west of Metz and beat him. All doubts had disap- 
peared. It no longer seemed necessary to hold other forces 
in readiness for action in other directions, as had been the 
case up to this time. 

The conception of the French position on which the new 
dispositions were based had been little changed from the one 
previously held. 

The orders from Royal Headquarters assumed the right 
wing of the French position to be at Montigny la Grange. 
The possibility that the enemy might still attempt to march 
out of this position towards Briey had been considered. 



62 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

The 9th Army Corps had reported a hostile camp at St. 
Privat. But this report was indeed not confirmed by fur- 
ther ones 1 and contained no indication as to whether the 
troops discovered there constituted a body of some tactical 
importance or were merely weak detachments. 

The lid Army Commander decided to have the 12th Corps, 
conforming to and following the right turn of the lid Army, 
advance at once further north to the main Metz— Woippy— 
Briey highroad. Herewith he developed his intention to ex- 
tend the envelopment of the hostile right wing, at least by 
detachments, into the valley of the Mosel north of Metz. 
There, at that time, lay the last secure connection of Bazaine's 
army with France. 

In consonance with orders from Royal Headquarters the 
Guard Corps was to march with the 12th Army Corps toward 
Batilly. But as Prince Frederick Charles had already started 
that corps toward Verneville by his orders of 10.15 a.m., he 
now directed that it proceed from there, or by executing a 
left oblique on its march there, without delay to Amanvillers, 
and from there carry out in a southerly direction its 
enveloping attack against the hostile wing. Should it be 
necessary to support this attack, for which there was but 
little room left on the narrow plateau at Montigny, the 12th 
Corps stood near enough, even though it were now directed 
to Ste. Marie 2 on the Metz— Briey road. 

It now also appeared to be time to draw the corps march- 
ing in the second line, the 10th, 3d and 2d, closer up to the 
corps designated for the attack and to place them so that 
they would be at hand to support the advance of the front, as 
the 12th Corps remained available to support the flank attack. 

*The 9th Army Corps also reported the following between 11 and 
12 o'clock: 

At Caulre Ferine, 10.45 a.m. 

A French laborer, living in Saargemiind and coming from Con- 
flans, states: On Monday and Tuesday a few cavalry regiments, some 
infantry and artillery, coming from Metz, arrived in Conflans, march- 
ing off in the direction of Briey Wednesday morning. 

Our patrols report: Jouaville not occupied, north thereof masses 
of troops according to statements of inhabitants. Reconnoitering 
patrols sent to St. Privat and Ste. Marie. It is further reported that 
cavalry and artillery is northeast of Verneville. 

2 The distance from Ste. Marie to Amanvillers is about 5500 paces. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 63 

At 11.30 a.m. Prince Frederick Charles issued the follow- 
ing orders: 

1. To the Royal Saxon 12th Army Corps. 

The 12th Corps receives orders to march on Ste. Marie aux 
Chgnes, to secure by cavalry towards Briey and beyond Conflans, 
and to send as much cavalry as practicable into the valley of the 
Mosel to interrupt railroad and telegraph to Thionville. 

The 7th, 8th, 9th and Guard Corps will, within two hours, attack 
the enemy, who is in position on the heights from Leipzig to the 
Bois de Vaux, rear towards Metz. 1 

In second line follow as support the 3d, 10th, and 12th, as well 
as the 2d Corps. 

2. To the Guard Corps. 

The enemy appears to stand in battle position on the ridge from 
the Bois de Vaux through Leipzig. The Guard Corps will hasten 
its march through Vern6ville, extend it to Amanvillers, and from 
there advance envelopingly for a serious attack against the hostile 
right wing. 

The 9th Corps will at the same time advance to the attack on 
La Folie. 

The Guard Corps may also take the road through Habonville. 
The 12th Army Corps goes towards Ste. Marie. 

3. To the 9th Army Corps. 

The Guard Corps now receives orders to advance through 
Verneville to Amanvillers, and from there eventually to make an 
enveloping attack on the hostile right wing. A serious engage- 
ment by the 9th Army Corps, in case the hostile front before it 
extends still farther to the north, must be delayed until the Guard 
Corps attacks from Amanvillers. The troops probably will still 
have time enough to boil coffee. 

About 12 noon the following orders were also sent to the 
10th and to the 2d Army Corps: 

4. To the 10th Army Corps. 

The enemy is in position on the heights from Leipzig to the 
Bois de Vaux. He will be attacked there today : 

by the Guard Corps from Amanvillers, 

by the 9th Corps from La Folie, 

by the 7th and 8th Corps in front. 
As support follow in second line : 

the 12th Corps to Ste. Marie, 

x At 9.30 a.m. the Chief of Staff of the 1st Army had come to meet 
Prince Frederick Charles and oriented him concerning the situation of 
the 1st Army. 



64 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

the 10th Corps to Sfc. Ail, 
the 3d Corps to Verneville, 
the 2d Corps to Rezonville. 

5. To the 2d Army Corps. 

The 2d Army Corps will march from Buxieres to Rezonville to 
serve as reserve for the right wing. The 1st and lid Armies will 
attack the enemy today in his position this side of Metz. 

There will be time to cook, no special haste required to reach 
Rezonville. The Saxon Cavalry secures against Verdun. 

Shortly after these orders were issued events took a rapid 
course. 

About 12 noon the first cannon shots were fired in the 
vicinity of Verneville. There the 9th Corps entered the 
battle. It had started from Caulre Ferme about 10.30 a.m. 
Its advance guard, directed through Verneville toward La 
Folie, entered the battle at Chantrenne Ferme. The mass of 
its artillery 1 deployed northeast of Verneville for action 
against the advancing French infantry and against the 
masses camping on the heights between Amanvillers and 
Montigny la Grange, and against the buildings of Champenois 
in front occupied by the enemy. In order to do this the 
corps commander shoved forward the left wing of his line of 
artillery nearly to the farthermost corner of the Bois de la 
Cusse. The German shells took the French camp by surprise. 
But soon the enemy replied to this fire, not only from the 
heights of Amanvillers— Montigny la Grange, but also from 
the line St. Pri vat— Amanvillers. The further extension of 
the hostile line northward beyond Amanvillers could now be 
perceived. 

The French infantry fire at long range commenced 
simultaneously with the answering fire of the guns and 
mitrailleuses and poured a hail of projectiles on the batteries 
of the 9th Army Corps. That corps advanced its main body 
for the protection of the artillery and thus was drawn into the 
battle. 

The battle thus quickly assumed through force of circum- 
stances much larger dimensions than had been intended. 

x The artillery of the 18th Infantry Division and the corps artillery. 
The artillery of the 26th Hessian Division also entered the battle very 
soon thereafter. 



OPERATIONS OF THE I Id ARMY 65 

After the opening of the battle— about 12.30 p.m. —Prince 
Frederick Charles issued orders to the 3d Army Corps to start 
and then proceeded to the vicinity of Verneville, taking his 
position at 1.45 p.m. on the high ground west of that village. 
The course of events with the 9th Army Corps now became 
of the utmost importance to the army leadership. 

Even before the arrival of the lid Army orders of 11.30 
a.m. the Guard and the 12th Corps had taken independently 
measures which were almost identical with those orders. 
Prince Frederick Charles received reports of these measures 
while still en route to Verneville. The Guard Corps reported : 

Doncourt, 18 August, 1870, 11.30 a.m. 

According to a report from the cavalry sent out, dated hill at 
Batilly 10.50 a.m., inhabitants just arriving from Ste. Marie bring 
information that French infantry is in that village, and that many 
French troops are at St. Privat. Consequently the Guard Corps 
will immediately continue the march from Doncourt, in accordance 
with orders received, 1 but the commanding general believes under 
these conditions that he should march for the present not on Vern6- 
ville, but on Habonville. 

Information of this has been sent to the 12th Army Corps. 

The report from the 12th Army Corps read: 

Jarny, 18 August, 11.45 a.m. 
The enemy is in position at Moineville and Ste. Marie aux 
Chgnes. The 12th Army Corps advances therefore on those two 
points. Flank protection towards Valleroy. 

In the orders of 11.30 a.m. the Guard Corps was left dis- 
cretion in regard to taking the road through Habonville 2 — 
the 12th Army Corps had received Ste. Marie as march objec- 
tive. Consequently no new or different orders were required 
to be issued by army headquarters. 

1 This refers to orders from army headquarters of 10.15 a.m.; the 
orders of 11.30 a.m. had not yet been received by the Guard Corps when 
this report was sent. 

8 The Guard Corps had taken the direction on Habonville with only 
the 1st Guard Infantry Division and the corps artillery ; the 2d Guard 
Infantry Division, which first debouched from the first march direction 
to the north at Bruville, marched from the latter place through St. 
Marcel and Caulre Ferme to Verneville. The army commander, who 
was just then riding to Verneville, saw that division and gave it the 
direction on Habonville. 



86 PREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

Concerning further observations of the enemy, the Guard 
Corps reported from Don court at 12 noon. It transmitted a 
report received from its cavalry: 

Hill near Batilly, 11.30 a.m. 

A Saxon cavalry patrol encountered near St. Ail French cav- 
alry— 10 horses. A few shots were just now fired on the road from 
Amanvillers to Vern6ville. It appears that cavalry, about two 
squadrons, and infantry, about one and a half companies, are being 
sent in small detachments from St. Privat towards Habonville and 
St. Ail. 

French infantry, two companies, marching to Ste. Marie. 
Between Ste. Marie and St. Privat a tent camp, which appears in 
process of being broken. 

Through an officer of his staff who rode round Verne- 
ville Prince Frederick Charles learned that French batteries 
were firing from close to the north side of Amanvillers but 
that further north toward St. Privat view was cut off by the 
Bois de la Cusse. Of Amanvillers, situated behind a ridge, 
only the church steeple was visible. 

In the meantime, about 2 p.m., the Prince had sent 
orders to the Guard Corps artillery to advance at a trot 1 and 
go into position alongside, but not in immediate connection 
with, the artillery line of the 9th Corps. 

At 2.05 p.m. the 10th Army Corps reported its arrival at 
Jouaville; answer was returned to that report that its task 
would be to turn against St. Privat— corps artillery in the 
lead. 

Thus sufficient fighting forces could be deployed against 
the hostile wing extending to beyond Amanvillers. 

Three corps of the lid Army, the Guard, 10th and 12th, 
were available for that purpose and were already advancing, 
while the entire 3d Army Corps was still left as a reserve 
for the 9th Corps— the battle of which corps was now con- 
tinually increasing in intensity. 

Shortly after 2 p.m. Prince Frederick Charles proceeded 
through Anoux la Grange to the vicinity westward of Habon- 
ville, in order to get nearer to a solution of the important and 
as yet unsolved question of the location of the French right 

1 This artillery had before this received the same orders from th» 
Guard Corps, 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 67 

wing. From the heights at Habonville, the strong French 
positions at St. Privat were seen. The conception of the 
French battle position now changed very decidedly. 

At this second position Prince Frederick Charles received 
another order from Royal Headquarters. This was dated, 
heights south of Flavigny, 1.45 p.m. and contained the fol- 
lowing: 

The 9th Army Corps is already engaged in an artillery combat 
in front of the Bois Doseuillons. 

The strong general attack along the entire line will not take 
place until material fighting forces can advance from Amanvillers. 

It was evident that events with the 9th Army Corps had 
by this time developed so far that the corps could not now 
be ordered to remain in a waiting attitude. In this corps 
contact with the enemy alone could regulate the conduct of 
the troops. 

The Guard Corps, on the other hand, which had arrived 
in the vicinity of Habonville at 1 p.m. 1 was as yet entirely 
free and not bound down by any engagement. It received 
orders: 

To carry on the battle with artillery only and not to engage the 
infantry until the 12th Army Corps could effectively enter the 
action. 

Since by this time the further extension of the French 
position as far as St. Privat 2 was seen and its extraordinary 
strength perceived, it appeared important that the attack of 
the Guard and of the 12th Corps, as well as that of the 10th 
Corps, according to need, should be made simultaneously, 
there being enough space here for the utilization of large 
masses. 

Of course in view of the greater frontal extension of the 
enemy the destination of the several corps changed. 

The Guard Corps, thus far designed for enveloping the 
hostile right wing, had now to prolong the German main 
front opposed to the French. The 12th (Royal Saxon) Corps 
alone now remained available for that envelopment. By in- 

»The advance guard had arrived there between 12 noon and 1 p.m. 
s As is now known, it extended still further to Roncourt, but that 
could not be perceived from Habonville. 



68 FREIHERRVONDERGOLTZ 

serting the 10th Corps between these two corps the movement 
could to some extent be facilitated and supported. 

A meeting between Prince Frederick Charles and the 
commanding general of the Guard Corps gave an opportu- 
nity in conference to make the latter more conversant with 
the intentions of Royal Headquarters and those of the lid 
Army commander. 

Before pursuing further the course of events, it appears 
desirable to state briefly the situations of the various corps 
of the army between 2 and 3 p.m. 

1. The 9th Army Corps was engaged in battle against 
the hostile center Amanvillers— La Folie. 1 

2. The Guard Corps was concentrating at St. Ail and 
Habonville (the whole 2d Guard Infantry Division was as- 
sembled there at 2.45 p.m.) 

The mass of the artillery of the corps was already en- 
gaged southwest of St. Ail, its left wing touching that vil- 
lage, firing intermittently on the hostile positions at St.Privat. 
To that point the line of battle, as indicated by the powder 
smoke, had quickly been prolonged. 

St. Ail was occupied by the corps and the advance guard 
of the 1st Infantry Division took direction toward Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes, to which point the enemy had towards 12 noon 
advanced parts of his right wing. 

3. The 12th (Royal Saxon) Army Corps was advancing 
toward the line Ste. Marie— Moineville. Its columns were 
in sight north of Batilly. 

4. The 3d Army Corps was just entering Verneville. 

5. The 10th Army Corps arrived at Batilly at 2 p.m. 
and there halted. 

6. The 2d Army Corps was on the march, the 3d In- 
fantry Division and corps artillery from Buxieres, the 4th 

1 In front of the artillery line of the corps the enemy maintained 
himself in Ferme Champenois until about 3 p.m. At 3 o'clock that 
farm was captured. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 60 

Infantry Division from Onville, ' in the direction of Rezon- 
ville. 

First began the battle for the possession of Ste. Marie, 
which the enemy, as just stated, held in front of his line. 
There the left wing of the Guard Corps was to be seen enter- 
ing the battle, as was plainly visible from the position of the 
army commander. Saxon batteries were also seen firing on 
Ste. Marie from the edge of the ravine running from Habon- 
ville to Auboue. 2 

Both corps reported the measures taken by them. 

The Guard Corps reported: 

Behind St. Ail, 18. August, 1870, 2 p.m. 
The infantry of the advance guard of the Guard Corps is en- 
gaged in battle in and at St. Ail against Ste. Marie, which is strongly- 
held by hostile infantry. The corps artillery on the right is firing 
on St. Privat. The main body of the 1st Guard Infantry Division 
is just now advancing on St. Ail. The 2d Guard Division, now ar- 
rived at Habonville, will advance. The 12th Corps is marching on 
Ste. Marie, but not yet near. 8 

The 12th (Royal Saxon) Army Corps reported as follows: 

Batilly, 18 August, 2.30 p.m. 
The Saxon Army Corps advances with the 24th Infantry Division 
on Ste. Marie aux Chenes and envelops the French right wing with 
the 23d Infantry Division by Coinville and the little woods between 
there and Roncourt. 

(Sgd.) Albert 

The Crown Prince of Saxony, having reached Batilly, had 
been able to perceive the extension of the hostile position 
beyond St. Privat north to Roncourt and also its frontal 

1 The division had halted at Onville, since at Buxieres to which 
point it had been directed by order of army headquarters, there was no 
water and no cooking could be done. However the 4th Infantry 
Division did not have any chance to cook, as it soon resumed the 
march. 

3 The Saxon artillery had been preparing the attack on Ste. Marie 
since 2.30 p.m. West of the ravine stood nine, east of it four batteries, 
their right wing on the St. Ail— Ste. Marie road. There was some doubt 
at Headquarters IId Army as to the fire of those batteries for quite a 
long time, whether or not it would endanger the Guard troops which 
appeared already to have entered the village. Officers sent out cleared 
up the situation. 

8 This had occurred, however, by the time the report was received 



70 FREIHBRR VON DER GOLTZ 

strength, in view of which he had independently taken the 
measures indicated in his report. 

From the location of the army commander at Habonville 
the French lines could be seen only as far as St. Privat. 
There, as stated, the enemy's right wing was believed to be. 
The measures taken by the Crown Prince of Saxony were 
the first indication that that wing extended still farther 
northward. 

The report had reached army headquarters at 3 p.m. 

In the meantime the fight round Ste. Marie progressed 
with rapid strides; the village was soon taken by troops of 
both corps engaged. * 

A short report of this fact was sent to army headquar- 
ters as follows: 

Ste. Marie Captured. 

3.30 p.m. Losses small. 18/8. 72. 

(Sgd.) von Pape s 

As soon as this report reached the army commander he 
wrote to the Crown Prince of Saxony: 

18. August, 3.45 p.m., at Habonville. 

I call Your Royal Highness' attention to the fact that the only 
communication of the beaten French army with Paris lies in the 
valley of the Mosel on the left bank. 

It is therefore of the utmost importance for the decision of 
the campaign that cavalry be sent by Your Royal Highness as 
soon as possible to destroy thoroughly the railroad and telegraph 
Metz— Thionville and, if possible, occupy the valley of the Mosel. 

(Sgd.) Frederick Charles 
P.S. Everything goes well so far, thank God. 

The capture of Ste. Marie was a separate action pre- 
ceding the decision on the hostile right wing. 3 
The artillery alone now continued the battle. 

!47th Infantry Brigade and advance guard of the Guard Corps. 

8 Commander of the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 

3 At 11.30 a.m. a General Staff officer of the 12th Army Corps found 
Ste. Marie still unoccupied. Shortly thereafter the 6th French Corps 
sent the 94th Line Regiment to that place. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 71 

The Saxon batteries took up a second position north of 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes and from there opened fire anew. ' 

The great line of artillery of the Guard Corps, at that 
time strengthened to 72 guns, 2 advanced toward 4 p.m. from 
its position Habonville— St. Ail towards St. Privat la 
Montagne. The hostile batteries succumbed very quickly 
under a hot artillery fire. Neither opposite the Guard nor 
the 9th Army Corps was the French artillery able to hold its 
own. Between 4 and 5 p.m. it became silent along the whole 
line from St. Privat to Montigny la Grange 3 . 

The decisive hours of the battle seemed to approach, a 
general attack to be well prepared by now. 

In accordance with the intentions of the King, the com- 
manding general of the Guard Corps, Prince August of 
Wurttemberg, had suspended the further infantry attack 
after the capture of Ste. Marie. The envelopment of the 
hostile right wing by the 12th Corps was first to become 
effective. But now his conception of the situation changed 
in a decisive manner. 

Not only had the 12th (Royal Saxon) Army Corps dis- 
covered through reconnaissance the extension of the hostile 
position north as far as Ron court, but it had also received 
reports (by cavalry patrols of the Guard Corps) that Montois 
la Montagne was also occupied by the French. The Crown 
Prince of Saxony therefore reinforced the 23d Infantry 
Division, which carried on the envelopment, by one infantry 
brigade and the available cavalry. 4 To keep the envelopment 
as much concealed from the enemy as possible with good 
prospects of decisive results, it had to be made under the 
protection of the steep hill ridge west of Montois, in the 

*66 guns were put into position there; 6 others participated in 
the firing from time to time. 

2 5 batteries of the corps artillery, 4 of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division, 3 of the 2d Guard Infantry Division. Two of the Guard Cav- 
alry Division arrived later, so that by that time 84 guns were in action. 

"The extreme right wing of the French artillery line at Roncourt 
was still firing, but that, as noted above, it was impossible to see from 
Prince Frederick Charles' position. 

4 48th Infantry Brigade and 2d Cavalry Regiment of the 24th In- 
fantry Division, Guard and 3d Cavalry Regiment with the 1st Horse 
Battery of the 12th Cavalry Division. 



72 FREIHERRVONDERGOLTZ 

Orne valley, passing close to Joeuf . This road was assigned 
by the commander of the 23d Infantry Division (Prince George 
of Saxony) to the reinforcements sent him. 

Thus it naturally took longer than had been expected for 
the effect of the envelopment to be felt by the enemy. About 
5 p.m., that is after the fire of the hostile artillery between 
St. Privat and Amanvillers had died out, the enveloping col- 
umns of the 12th Army Corps were with their leading ele- 
ments opposite Hautmecourt. x 

Three hours of daylight could still be counted on for the 
action. It was questionable now if it would be possible to 
execute the combined attack intended. An attack beginning 
late could easily remain without result. The nearness of 
approaching darkness undoubtedly would have increased the 
energy of the defense, in any case it precluded all pursuit. The 
silence of the hostile artillery appeared to favor the offensive; 
in 1J— 2 hours the situation might easily be an entirely differ- 
ent one. The condition of the battle on the other points of 
the battlefield made the beginning of the attack against the 
hostile right wing very desirable. Movements of troops 
could be perceived on the side of the enemy on the heights 
of St. Privat. It appeared as though new masses went from 
there to the vicinity of Amanvillers— Montigny la Grange. 
Moreover as early as 4.30 p.m. the army commander had 
been compelled to place at the disposal of the 9th Corps the 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade 2 until then retained at his dis- 

*The individual parts of the 12th Army Corps at 5. 15 p.m. were at 
the following points: 

1. The 47th Infantry Brigade, forming the pivot for the move- 
ments of the corps, was at Ste. Marie aux Chgnes. After Ste. Marie 
had been captured this brigade had at first advanced east beyond the 
village, but was then taken back. 

2. The 45th Infantry Brigade stood in the woods west of Roncourt 
in battle with French outposts of the right wing behind those woods. 

3. The 48th Infantry Brigade with the available cavalry (13 squad- 
rons) and 4 batteries, was on the march to Montois with its leading 
elements at that time south of Hautmecourt. 

4. The 46th Infantry Brigade with one battery was on the march 
from Moineville to Coinville. 

5. The corps artillery, reinforced by the 2d Foot Artillery Bat- 
talion (11 batteries) under guard of one squadron stood north of Ste. 
Marie firing on Roncourt. 

6. One battalion, 10 squadrons were on detached service of various 
kinds. 

2 7 battalions. 1 pioneer company, 1 battery. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 73 

posal. The corps artillery of the 3d Corps was already sup- 
porting the combat there by order of the Prince. It had 
gone into a position between Verne vi lie and the Bois des 
Genivaux. In spite of everything the condition of things 
was precarious. 

However, no doubt was entertained but that the effect 
of the 12th Army Corps would make itself felt during the 
course of the attack on St. Privat, even if not at the beginning 
of it. Therefore the participation of this army corps was 
not at all left out of consideration by taking up the offensive 
attack now. 

The commanding general of the Guard Corps decided to 
attack St. Privat and Prince Frederick Charles gave his 
consent. 

At that time the Prince could not see what caused the 
12th Army Corps to describe so large an arc. The Saxon 
batteries remained in their position north of Ste. Marie in 
action 1 without their target being ascertained. 2 It appeared 
almost as if the corps were in touch with an opponent who 
had appeared on its left flank, preventing it from advancing 
rapidly against the enemy's right. 

Prince Frederick Charles, however, cherished the con- 
viction that the battle had to be decided in any case on 
August 18th. It appeared impossible, after such large 
sacrifices as had already been made, to delay this to the fol- 
lowing day. Had the enemy been left in his position that 
evening, he would have been able to fall back under the pro- 
tection of the forts of Metz by a short night march. In that 
case there would be an almost intact army in Metz and the 
situation confronting the German leadership would then be 
a very difficult one. 

Regard for our own troops also demanded earnest con- 
sideration. The series of bloody battles begun on August 
14th must now be brought to an end. 

1 These were the 66 Saxon guns which fired on Roncourt, from 
the right wing also on St. Privat. 

2 As a matter of fact the Saxon artillery (11 batteries) was advanc- 
ing at this time by echelons against Roncourt, a movement which, as 
the firing was constant, could not be observed from the vicinity of 
Habonville. Five batteries of the 12th Army Corps participated in the 
enveloping movement. 



74 FREIHERRVONDERGOLTZ 

About 5.30 p.m. the Guard Corps advanced against St. 

Privat la Montagne with the 1st Guard Infantry Division 

astride the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road and with the 4th 

Guard Infantry Brigade 1 from the vicinity of Habonville. 

The direction for the advancing masses was the village 

situated on the bare heights and consisting of large massive 

buildings. 

Under the enemy's murderous fire the battalions ascended 

the sloping heights which, like a glacis, slope down from the 

village toward the line Ste. Marie — St. Ail and toward 

Habonville. Only here and there was some unimportant 

protection offered by basins or folds in the terrain. 

The nearer the troops approached the plainer could be 
seen the strength of the hostile position. For the utilization 
of fire effect the enemy was in a situation than which none 
better could be imagined in any campaign. He had in 
addition prepared his position with that same speed and skill 
in fortifying, which he demonstrated throughout the late 
war. The walls were loopholed and the crest of the heights 
lined with trenches. Consequently the defending troops 
showed themselves to have been less shaken than was 
assumed to be the case. The preparatory fire of the artillery 
had up to that time been directed on the hostile batteries 
and the battle with these had occupied its full attention. 
The village of St. Privat and its defenders had thus far not 
suffered from the artillery fire. With fresh forces the gar- 
rison stood behind its unexcelled cover. 

The losses of the Guards charging with rare bravery 
increased rapidly to an alarming extent. The lines of 
advance of the attacking columns were marked by heaps of 
dead and wounded. 

The attack became more and more precarious and bloody 
until it finally came to a standstill. The excellent discipline 
inherent in these troops made it possible, however, to hold 
them steadfast close to the enemy. 

Thereby was the way shortened for the subsequent rush. 

During this hot battle the 12th Army Corps kept on its 

course. After a long march its left wing, the 48th Infantry 

1 The 4th Guard Infantry Brigade started about 15 minutes earlier 
than the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 75 

Brigade, ascended the ridge near Montois la Montagne at 
6 p.m. The village was found clear of the enemy. 1 The 
enveloping attack on Roncourt was then started. 

During the course of the envelopment the 45th In- 
fantry Brigade in front had driven hostile advanced troops 
from the woods between Auboue andRoncourt and then waited 
for the appearance of the 48th Infantry Brigade at Montois. 
The latter now also emerged into the open and by a steady 
advance pressed back the hostile skirmish lines in front of 
Roncourt. In the village itself, where the heads of both 
brigades met, no actual engagement took place. 3 The fire 
of the artillery which had advanced with the infantry had 
already produced such an effect on the enemy's troops that 
they evacuated the village. Shortly before 6.30 p.m. the 
village was occupied by the 12th Army Corps which now 
deployed large forces from the north against St. Privat. 3 4 

The moment had now come for renewing the attack. 

H. R. H. the army commander also ordered the 10th 
Army Corps, the commander of which had come to Habon- 
ville between 4.45 and 5 p.m. to receive verbal orders, to 
support the advance of the Guard Corps. 

The 10th Army Corps advanced from Batilly toward St. 
Ail and first sent the horse batteries of its corps artillery 
ahead to support the Guard batteries. The combined attack 
of parts of all three corps of the German left wing against 
St. Privat was now carried out, having been substantially 
prepared by the previous advance of the Guard Corps. 5 

1 A battalion of the 23d Infantry Division posted at the northeast 
corner of the woods between Aubou6 and Montois had, between 5 and 6 
o'clock, been engaged in a fire fight at long range with the French 
troops then in Montois. 

3 See Note 5. 

"The 45th and 48th Infantry Brigades and the entire artillery, 
which advanced on the village to within 1,200 paces. 

4 A few infantry regiments had executed a right turn before 
reaching the heights of Roncourt and were then, at the time that 
Roncourt was being attacked, advancing independently against St. 
Privat. 

5 The advance of the Guard worked together with the attack by 
the 12th Army Corps in so far as the former induced the 6th Corps of 
Canrobert, on the French right wing, to concentrate its forces at St. 
Privat to meet the attack and thus weakened the garrison at Roncourt, 



76 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 

The artillery of the Guard Corps which, as stated above, 
was busy silencing the hostile batteries up to the time of the 
first attack, now turned its entire activity against the village 
of St. Privat. 

From the location of army headquarters it was clearly 
seen that the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade now began a re- 
newed attack. On the heights south of the village, follow- 
ing the crest, ran a road with a high hedge on one side. 
Looked at from Habonville and judging the terrain from the 
map, this hedge gave the impression of being the edge of 
the forests on the high left bank of the valley of the Mosel. 
There the battalions of the charging brigade disappeared 
and at the same time the right wing of the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Division was seen ascending the heights directly at 
the village. Dense powder smoke then hid the scene of 
battle. But the fire of a strong artillery line between 
Roncourt and St. Privat indicated shortly thereafter the 
interference of the 12th (Royal Saxon) Army Corps. 

The victory seemed there to be decisive. Prince Freder- 
ick Charles then deliberated once more on the extension of 
the envelopment of the hostile right wing as far as the 

thereby materially assisting the advance of the 12th Corps and its 
decisive attack on the flank. 

Quesnoy, Armie du Rhin, page 76: 

"It was about six o'clock; we saw then opposite the 4th Corps a 
thick column of dust rising above the woods and advancing towards 
St. Privat; this dust could be produced only by artillery at a gallop. 
Each of us understood that we were going to receive the shock of the 
last moment according to Prussian tactics. In fact this artillery was 
not long in getting into battery opposite the right of the 4th Corps, 
resting on the left of the 6th. Formidable detonations .... 

"The left of the 6th Corps then made a retrograde movement 
which gradually increased. But the right, led by its chief, marched 
resolutely against the village of St. Privat itself which strong columns 
were striving to carry and repulsed these vigorously with considerable 
loss. The Prussian artillery then directed the fire of its pieces on the 
village itself which immediately took fire at several points. Three of 
our batteries tried to establish themselves there to reply to it, but were 
not able to do so, and as it became impossible to hold this position 
retreat was ordered and was made by echelons, the right supported by 
the 100th of the line and the movements of the cavalry of Generals du 
Barail and de Bruchard." 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 77 

valley of the Mosel. At 6.40 p.m. he wrote to the Crown 

Prince of Saxony: 1 

In spite of isolated infantry counter attacks of the enemy* 
the battle appears to have been won. It is of the utmost impor- 
tance, notwithstanding the great fatigue of the infantry, to advance 
still today on Woippy with at least one infantry brigade of the 12th 
Corps, to make sure of interrupting there the railroad and tele- 
graph. 

(Sgd.) Frederick Charles. 

The occupation of Woippy, could that have been accom- 
plished, would have been of the utmost importance, as thereby 
the retreat of the French troops still fighting on the heights 
of Amanvillers would have been seriously threatened. But 
the assault and capture of the heights south of St. Privat 
along which the hedge road ran had to be accomplished be- 
fore the village could be captured. 

The Crown Prince of Saxony reported back to Prince 
Frederick Charles: 

August 18, 7.10 p.m. 
The cavalry has already received orders to interrupt the rail- 
road at Hagondange and Richemont. In addition cavalry with 
pioneers on wagons has been sent out for the same purpose through 
Briey. 3 

As St. Privat has not yet been taken and as the road is there- 
fore not open, the brigade will be sent through Roncourt and 
Marange to M6zieres. 4 

(Sgd. ) Albert, 

Crown Prince, General of Infantry. 

'This order was written at the Bois de la Cusse. 

2 These took place at that time especially at the Bois de la Cusse 
opposite the 9th Army Corps. 

3 About 4 p.m. two squadrons of the 12th Cavalry Division started 
from Aubou6, following the Orne valley, to Richemont and the railroad 
depot of Uckange, about four miles south of Thionville and there 
destroyed late in the evening the Metz — Thionville railroad, without 
having encountered any enemy there or on the way back. Many ob- 
structions placed on the road made the march so difficult that the 
squadrons were frequently compelled to dismount and march in single 
file. The pioneer detachment, sent by wagon between 4 and 5 p.m. to 
Mercy le Bas, reached the Thionville — Longuyon railroad there at 2.30 
a.m. August 19th (after having covered 16 to 20 miles). Destruction 
was hastened, because of a military train being signalled from Thionville. 
All villages passed by the detachment were found free of the enemy. 
Details of this expedition became known to army headquarters only 
the next day, of course. 

*As a matter of fact the 12th Corps was unable to send off this 
brigade until early on August 19th. 



78 PKEIHEEE VON DER GOLTZ 

It had now become nearly dark and the moment had ar- 
rived for the utilization of the last available reserves for the 
final decision. 

Toward 7 p.m. Prince Frederick Charles had offered to 
General von Manstein as reinforcements an infantry brigade 
of the 3d Army Corps. At 7.10 p.m. he allowed the com- 
manding general of that corps, after repeated requests, to 
have the remaining three brigades also take part in the bat- 
tle to the right of the Bois de la Cusse. 

At 7.15 p.m. he sent orders to the commanding general 
of the 10th Army Corps to advance according to his own 
views, Prince Frederick Charles merely informing him that 
he considered it best for one division to take part between 
the Guard and the 12th Army Corps and for the other divi- 
sion to proceed as reserve to behind the left wing of the 9th 
Corps. 

In the meantime this order had been anticipated by the 
10th Corps which had already taken part in the battle around 
St. Privat. 

The 2d Army Corps had reported at 6. 30 p.m. that it had 
been in readiness with its 3d Infantry Division since 4 p.m., 
its 4th Division since 6 p.m., to take part in the battle and 
this corps was directed by Prince Frederick Charles to report 
directly to Royal Headquarters for orders. Now, however, at 
7.20 p.m., Prince Frederick Charles left it to the discretion 
of the commanding general whether he should also quickly 
take part in the action and if so to report that fact to the 
King. 

Events, however, had also taken their course in the 2d 
Army Corps. 

The army commander had at this time turned his atten- 
tion to the 9th Army Corps fighting in the center and had 
proceeded to the Bois de la Cusse where the battle was rag- 
ing undecided from one side to the other. But at the time 
the last orders to the Crown Prince of Saxony were sent, 
he had once more returned to his former location at Habon- 
ville. The powder smoke still hid the heights of St. Privat. 
But the decisive victory soon made itself known by the turn 
to the right of the large artillery line of the Guard Corps 



OPERATIONS OF THE IId ARMY 79 

and of the corps artillery of the 10th Army Corps, alongside 
of which the Saxon batteries soon appeared between St. Privat 
and the forest. The flash of single pieces exactly pointed 
out the location of the line, which was almost at a right angle 
to the former position of the batteries. The fire was directed 
against the flank of the French center at Amanvillers. 

The French right wing had been unable to hold out 
against the concentric attack. After a bloody battle the 
Guard Corps and the 12th Army Corps had broken into St. 
Privat from the west, north and south. In addition to the 
corps artillery the 20th Infantry Division of the 10th Army 
Corps had followed in support of the Guard Corps and parts 
of that division participated in the fight within the village. 
Between 7.30 and 8 p.m. the last resistance in the houses and 
gardens was overcome. The enemy's columns fled toward 
Metz followed by the fire of the German batteries. ' In the 
meantime the left wing of the 12th Army Corps 2 had suc- 
ceeded in taking the edge of the forest of Jaumont as well as 
the quarries of Jaumont and now pursued the enemy toward 
Bronvaux. But the enemy held with strong forces the edge 
of the forest straight across the St. Privat— Saulny road. 
French batteries were still in action here after dark. 

When Prince Frederick Charles was firmly convinced 
from the movement of the artillery that the envelopment and 
destruction of the hostile right wing was practically complete, 
he again returned to the 9th Army Corps. 

If he could succeed at this moment in driving back the 
enemy's center at Amanvillers, the day's results must be 
great in spite of the approaching darkness. 

The advance of the Guard Corps against St. Privat had 
been the signal for the 9th Corps to assume the offensive. 
As stated above, the hostile artillery opposite the 9th Corps 
was all but silent at that time. The corps commander in- 
formed the army commander of this fact as well as that the 
battle at that time seemed favorable and that ground was 

>The batteries of the 19th Infantry Division also found here an op- 
portunity of participating in the battle. 

8 Battalions of the 48th Infantry Brigade. 



80 FREIHERR VON DER GOLTZ 






being gained. * In conjunction with the 3d Guard Infantry 
Brigade, placed at the disposal of General von Manstein, the 
corps now advanced to the attack against the heights of 
Amanvillers. But the enemy offered the most stubborn re- 
sistance and even made counter attacks. At this time, when 
the army commander had returned for the second time to the 
battlefield of the 9th Army Corps, the rifle fire was exceed- 
ingly heavy. Only after the darkness was complete was the 
terrain west of Amanvillers taken after a bloody battle. The 
right wing of the 9th Corps, at the Bois des Genivaux, did not 
succeed in completely overcoming the enemy. There the 
battle raged in a large clearing in front of Chantrenne. The 
enemy undertook there also repeated counter attacks, but 
was defeated in each instance. 

The 3d Army Corps, as stated above, had supported with 
its artillery the battle of the 9th Army Corps. s 

As soon as the entrance of the infantry of the corps into 
the action had been authorized, General von Alvensleben had 
concluded to lead forward the remaining parts of his corps in 
order here also to bring events to a head by a final offensive 
executed with as much force as possible. However, reports 
from his right flank caused him to delay. At that very mo- 
ment the battle had suddenly increased in intensity farther 
on the right in front of the 1st Army. Reports reaching the 
3d Army Corps from that point led to the assumption that 
the enemy was attempting offensive movements on his left 
wing, as was actually the case at Moscou— Le Point du Jour, 
and he therefore directed the force of his attack towards the 
Bois des Genivaux. General von Alvensleben further paused 
in his movement, already begun, so as to have the forces of 
his corps readily disposable for meeting and defeating that 
probable attack. Before the situation cleared, the very short' 
time remaining before complete darkness set in had elapsed 
and the battle came to a close also in the center. 

The 2d Army Corps also had by this time entered the 
battle on the right wing of the German line of battle, where 

through a General Staff officer of army headquarters, who was 
then with General von Manstein. 

2 The corps artillery of the 3d Corps, brought up first, had been re- 
inforced during the course of the battle by 10 batteries. 



OPERATIONS OF THE I Id ARMY 81 

parts of the 1st Army had been fighting since noon against 
the French positions at Le Point du Jour, Moscou and Leipzig. 

This corps had, as it reported, reached Rezonville in the 
afternoon after having marched twenty miles. At that place 
it received toward evening direct orders from His Majesty 
the King to advance as far as Gravelotte, to be able there to 
participate in supporting the 1st Army. First a part of its 
artillery entered the battle; after it began to get dark the 
corps advanced for an infantry attack on the heights of Le 
Point du Jour, His Majesty having given his approval therefor. 

This action of the corps therefore falls within the sphere 
of events of the 1st Army. ! 

The interference of the 2d Army Corps had given at that 
place, during the final stage of the battle, the great intensity 
to the fight, which had been perceived by the 3d Corps and 
which had increased in that corps the expectation of the 
hostile offensive and caused the decisions arrived at to be 
changed. 

At 8.30 p.m. the battle of the lid Army had ceased; only 
here and there were some single shots heard. Dense dark- 
ness covered the battlefield, dispelled only in places by the 
light of burning villages. 

Prince Frederick Charles now issued the following orders: 

On the battlefield, 18. August, 1870, 8.30 p.m. 

The army corps will bivouac on the places where they find 
themselves at the conclusion of the battle. Infantry outposts will 
be placed out which will have to take up connection with neigh- 
boring corps and be prepared to have a desperate enemy try 
to cut his way through. 

At 5 a.m. tomorrow the chiefs of staff of all five corps will be 
in Caulre on the road to report to His Royal Highness where the 
corps are located and receive orders. 

The attention of the 12th Army Corps is again called to the 
importance of reaching Woippy. 

Army Headquarters will pass the night in Doncourt. 

(Sgd.) Frederick Charles. 

After issuing these orders Prince Frederick Charles rode 
to Doncourt. 

The losses of the lid Army 2 on August 18th amounted to 

'See von Schell, Operations of the 1st Army under General von 
Steinmetz. 

8 Probably a misprint for "German Army".— Trsl. 



82 FREIHERRVONDERGOLTZ 

818 officers and 19,759 men killed, wounded and missing (1 
officer, 939 men missing). * Of this loss the lid Army had 617 
officers and 15,711 men— inclusive of the 2d Army Corps, 
which on the battlefield of the 1st Army at St. Hubert lost 
45 officers and 1311 men. The Guard Corps bore half of that 
loss, 288 officers and 7831 men. Two pieces of the 9th Army 
Corps fell into the enemy's hands during the advance of the 
artillery to the Bois de la Cusse. 

But with these great losses a splendid victory had been 
achieved, the extent of which could be seen as early as the 
evening of August 18th in the unfavorable strategical situa- 
tion in which the enemy's army found itself after its defeat. 

1 Only a small part of this number had fallen into the enemy's hands. 



From My Diary 

BY 

L. VON WlTTICH 

Major General Commanding the 4!Hh Brigade 
25th (Hessian) Division 1 



17th August. The Division was assembled in a bivouac 
north of Gorze. In order to get out of the woods and reach 
this place it had been necessary to follow foot-paths which 
had to be widened by infantry fatigue parties. We 
crossed that part of the battlefield where the 11th Regiment 
of Infantry had attempted an assault on a strong position 
defended by the French Guard. 

Half of the day passed before my orderlies, with my 
horses and equipment, were able to rejoin; they had remained 
at Gorze and had lost track of us. Meanwhile the men, 
having constructed little shacks, proceeded to refreshing 
ablutions in the open air. His Majesty the King, having 
finished his reconnaissance, crossed our bivouac. He had 
the kindness to ask me for an account of what we had done 
the day before and said "Today it is a matter of resting: 
tomorrow it will be more serious." 

The great camps of the enemy round Gravelotte were 
spread out before our eyes. 

The 3d Infantry Regiment was on outpost. 

18th August. The 25th Division, after a short march 
from its bivouac, was assembled south of Caulre facing the 
Metz— Doncourt road. Farther to the right stood the 18th 
Division. Between Vionville and Rezonville we crossed a 

1 Published at Cassel, 1872. The dedication of this work to his 
brave companions in arms of the 22d and 25th Divisions is dated at 
Cassel, 25 November, 1871. 

83 



84 VON WITTICH 

part of the battlefield of the 16th where a hard cavalry con- 
test must have taken place. 

The advance guard of the division was composed of the 
25th Cavalry Brigade (Major General von Schlotheim), the 
horse battery, the 4th Infantry Regiment, two Jager Bat- 
talions and two batteries. The main body, under my 
command, comprised the 1st, 2d and 3d Infantry Regi- 
ments, the 1st Jager Battalion and three batteries, that is, 
seven battalions and three batteries. 

The 3d Infantry Regiment, on outpost, had to remain 
where it was and follow the movement only after the whole 
division had gone beyond the outpost line. That is why it 
arrived a little late. 

At Caulre they were already preparing to bivouac and 
make soup when the order arrived to march immediately on 
Verneville. 

The division started at 11.30 o'clock. The main body 
followed the advance guard without distance in the following 
order: the three batteries under Major von Herget, 3d In- 
fantry Regiment, 1st Jager Battalion, 2d Infantry Regi- 
ment. The batteries marched battery front, the infantry in 
column of attack, battalion after battalion. 

On our approach to Verneville the artillery battle began 
on the other side of that village. The batteries of the main 
body were drawn into it. The infantry of the main body 
received orders to oblique to the left so as to gain the west 
edge of the woods where the 25th Cavalry Brigade had 
gone. According to information furnished by the advance 
guard, the woods of la Cusse were occupied by the 2d Jager 
Battalion. The enemy was holding the heights of Aman- 
villers, St. Privat, Marie-aux-Chenes. 

After having reached the western edge of the woods I 
had the infantry of the main body form east of Jouaville 
and south of Habonville under cover of a projecting corner 
of the woods, each regiment in two lines. The 3d regiment, 
which was nearest the woods, moved forward the wing 
companies of the first line and occupied with its skirmishers 
the northern edge of this corner of woods. The shells of 
the enemy were falling from time to time in this place. By 
orders of the corps commander the main body took position 



FROMMYDIARY 85 

farther forward, with directions to make a vigorous of- 
fensive in the direction of Habonville— Amanvillers as soon 
as the Guard advanced on our left to attack Marie-aux- 
Chenes and St. Privat. 

Soon the 3d Infantry Regiment was taken from the 
main body by the division commander who assigned it a 
special mission in the woods of la Cusse. The other five 
battalions were placed between the railroad and woods, which 
because of recent cutting were readily passable, in such 
manner that the line of the 2d Infantry Regiment was pro- 
longed on its left by the 1st, extending as far as the railroad 
cut. Each regiment was formed in two lines by half bat- 
talions and thus ready at once to take up the offensive. 
The 1st Jager Battalion remained in reserve behind the 
western corner of the woods of la Cusse. Close to these 
woods was, besides, the 4th regiment still intact which had 
formed part of the advance guard. 

Although the battalions were in extended order and the 
men lying down so as to avoid hostile observation, they 
suffered in this place many losses from shell fire, the long 
range chassepots, and even mitrailleuses, the shots from 
which reached them from Amanvillers over the woods of 
la Cusse. One of the first shells killed Major Lautenberger, 
of the 1st Jager Battalion in reserve. Soon after a shell 
burst near corps headquarters which was behind the brigade 
and mortally wounded Major von Doering, Adjutant of the 
corps commander and Lieut. Moeller, Adjutant of the Divi- 
sion. I myself was obliged to dismount, my horse having 
been seriously hurt in the nostrils by a piece of shell which 
cut the bridle. Thus I remained for a time on foot. Another 
horse was brought to me in about an hour, just as I had 
mounted the horse of one of my orderlies who had been 
seriously wounded. 

Though the Guard had engaged its artillery the advance 
of its infantry was delayed beyond all expectations. 

Towards 2 o'clock the 1st Jager Battalion was, by orders 
from higher headquarters, sent to the east side of the woods 
of la Cusse to support the artillery. Later, towards 3 o'clock, 
the 1st battalion of the 2d Regiment had also to be sent 
thither. These two battalions maintained there, at the cost 



86 VON WITTICH 

of considerable losses, glorious combats, crowned with suc- 
cess, after other troops had not sufficed to protect the artil- 
lery. At this moment the Grenadier Brigade of the Guard, 
the 3d Infantry Brigade (Colonel Knappe von Knappstaedt), 
Alexander and Elizabeth Regiments, and the Guard Rifle 
Battalion, passed behind our position coming from the west 
and moved toward the eastern edge of the woods of la Cusse. 

Thus I had remaining at my disposal only three bat- 
talions, the two battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment and 
the 2d Battalion of the 2d Regiment. These three battalions 
I moved close to the woods of la Cusse as far as the railroad 
cut, forming them in company columns one behind the other. 
On the left of the head of the column was the Hessian 
Battery Reh which, with the few pieces still serviceable, 
was doing excellent work both on the thick firing line in 
the meadow south of St. Privat and also on a sunken road 
in the direction of Amanvillers, from which hostile columns 
were trying to debouch but were each time prevented from 
so doing by some well directed shells fired by the Battery 
Reh. 

The deep railroad cut, fenced in on each side by scarcely 
visible wires, ends about fifty paces from the right of the 
corner of the wood and the road then continues towards 
Amanvillers on a fill about 15 feet high. The fill and cut 
were enfiladed by the fire of the enemy. The edge of the 
woods was occupied by the 2d Jager Battalion and the 3d 
Infantry Regiment. Many men had flattened themselves 
against the sides of the fill and were there mistakenly seek- 
ing shelter from the projectiles. 

Towards 4 o'clock, when the Guard made its attack at 
our left, I gave orders to cross the railroad and take position 
beyond in rear of a little wood, front toward Amanvillers. 
The leading company of the 2d Infantry Regiment was sur- 
prised by a heavy fire from the mitrailleuses in position near 
Amanvillers. The losses were insignificant, but it was 
necessary to offset the moral effect produced. Colonel 
Kraus, the regimental commander, himself quickly restored 
order in the company which had crossed the railroad. I had 
the detachments following stopped temporarily, and then 
had them cross this dangerous point by platoons at a run. 



FROMMYDIARY 87 

Thus was the crossing well executed, in spite of the depth 
of the cut and the steepness of the banks, by the 2d Bat- 
talion of the 2d Infantry Regiment and two companies of 
the 1st Infantry Regiment. I then received from the di- 
vision commander orders to halt. Six companies were on the 
other side of the cut, six companies on the near side. The 
terrain beyond was favorable and Colonel Kraus profited by 
it to engage the hostile firing line posted northwest of 
Amanvillers in order thus to assure our batteries better 
protection. Our batteries were then able to continue with 
success their fire on the hostile position. 

Towards about 6 o'clock, the infantry of the Guard ad- 
vanced on my left against St. Privat la Montagne in ad- 
mirable order. Its right wing came under a terrible fire 
and the ranks were thinning rapidly; this wing was not able 
to progress farther and remained halted. I then received 
permission to move forward. The rest of the 1st Battalion 
of the 1st Infantry Regiment under Major Anschtitz crossed 
the railroad; the 2d Battalion under Major Hahn followed 
along the fill and crossed farther to the east. It was there 
that Major Hahn fell. The three battalions advanced to the 
attack on Amanvillers; at the same time the Grenadier 
Brigade, von Knappe, was making an attack east of the 
woods of la Cusse. 

Under a hail of bullets, the three battalions of the main 
body managed to get as far as the house of the crossing- 
keeper; a few companies advanced abreast of the skirmishers 
of the Guard as far as the sunken road which leads to Aman- 
villers. As enormous losses had stopped the attack of the 
Guard, the companies which had penetrated into the sunken 
road were obliged to fall back on the battalions behind the 
house of the crossing-keeper. Major Hoffmann quickly 
gathered a half battalion of the 2d Regiment; I myself 
formed a column of about 150 scattered skirmishers from 
both regiments and led it forward to attempt a new attack 
against Amanvillers in conjunction with Major Hoffmann. 
But these forces were insufficient, too isolated, and, not 
having any fresh troops, I was obliged to content myself 
with the defense of the favorable position near the house of 
the crossing-keeper. During the rallying of the disbanded 



88 • VON WITTICH 

men and their march forward not a single one of them was 
wounded. My horse had one of his fore feet grazed by a 
bullet but it did not disable him for service. Going once 
more to the Battery Reh, I missed my orderly, Fleck. My 
adjutant discovered his horse at the corner of the woods. 
With the firm conviction that Fleck must be either killed or 
wounded we went over to it; there it was, in the most 
dangerous place, tied to a tree and its rider, who had lost 
sight of me in all these goings and comings, was lying there 
—asleep. 

Night now fell and the fire ceased on our side. I went 
to the corps and division commanders to give a personal ac- 
count of the situation. H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles 
also joined us. Firing was no longer heard except far to the 
right. The battle was won. The 4th Infantry Regiment, 
whose colonel, Zwenger, had been mortally wounded while 
in reserve, and the 25th Cavalry Brigade were charged with 
the service of security and pursuit. The battalions of the 
49th Infantry Brigade were brought back to the west side of 
the woods of la Cusse, behind the railroad, where they 
bivouacked. 

Losses of the 1st and 2d Regiments and 1st Jager Bat- 
talion: 

Killed 10 officers, 124 men, 4 horses. 

Wounded 31 officers, 743 men, 4 horses. 

Missing officers, 20 men , horses. 

Total 41 officers, 887 men, 9 horses. 



Military Correspondence 

OF 

Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Inglefingen 1 



Extract from 4th Letter on Cavalry 



ON the 17th of August the Uhlan Brigade of the Guard 
cavalry proceeded to St. Mihiel on the Meuse and 
reconnoitered from there still farther to the west. 
All German corps between the Meuse and Mosel could on 
that day change, in perfect security, their march direction 
from west to north and hasten to the support of the corps 
which had been engaged on the 16th of August, for that 
cavalry had been advanced so far westward that a possible 
annoying interference of the enemy from the west would be 
known two days before that enemy could attack. Similarly 
the Cavalry Division of the XII (Saxon) Corps advanced 
northwestward, secured the army against Verdun, and 
ascertained that only a very small portion of the French 
army had as yet debouched to the west with the Emperor 
and that the entire hostile army was still at Metz. The 
Saxon cavalry scouted as far as Etain and Verdun. Thus 
the activity of the above named cavalry enabled Army 
Headquarters to dispose with certainty and in security of all 
its fighting forces with a view to concentrating them for 
decisive action against the French main army and cut off 
that army's retreat. 

On the 18th of August took place the gigantic struggle 
between the two armies. On this day the cavalry divisions 
did not attract much attention to themselves by efficient 
reconnaissance of the enemy. Before the opening of the 

1 Published in 1884. 89 



90 HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN 

battle the armies stood so close to each other on our right 
wing as to preclude the sending of large cavalry masses to 
the front for reconnaissance. Therefore the cavalry divisions 
still with the army were held in rear in reserve. On the 
left flank the Saxon cavalry division reconnoitered toward 
Verdun and Etain and thus covered the rear. But, though 
less conspicuous, the cavalry divisions nevertheless partici- 
pated in the battle actively and as in duty bound. I still 
clearly remember that the Hussar squadron (Count Groben) 
which had been sent ahead sent a report back to the Guard 
Corps, which had reached Don court and begun its deploy- 
ment there, that a hostile advance guard of all arms of 
about the strength of one brigade was marching from St. 
Privat to Ste. Marie. This report corrected the original 
erroneous view that the hostile army extended with its right 
wing only as far as Amanvillers, and enabled headquarters 
of the Guard Corps to send its infantry on the shortest road 
through Habonville (leaving that on the left) to St. Ail, and 
from there to attack Ste. Marie. 

Under the protection of the advanced Hussars and 
entirely confident of receiving timely reports from them as 
to any possible changes on the side of the enemy, the Guard 
Corps marched against the enemy in mass formation, which 
otherwise would have hardly been possible for troops in the 
immediate proximity of the enemy. It is true that in ac- 
cordance with the old rule an advance guard of four bat- 
talions and one battery was formed, but this advance guard 
was followed by the main body so closely that the entire 
body marched in a single great column, having a breadth of 
three battalions in column, densely closed up, the artillery 
in column of batteries in between. Thus this imposing mass 
marched across country, along the ridge, untill it arrived 
near the effective zone of the enemy's bursting shells, where 
it was then compelled to take up battle formation. 

I just as clearly remember the moment when I had 
posted, for the preparation of the battle, the artillery of the 
1st Guard Division and to its left the corps artillery, its right 
wing at the Bois de la Cusse, its left at the village of St. Ail, 
far in front of the infantry. The right flank was secured 
by troops of the IXth Army Corps which occupied the woods 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 91 

of la Cusse; in my front Hessian troopers had reconnoitered 
the terrain up to the position of the enemy on the heights 
of Amanvillers— St. Privat and now cleared my front, riding 
through the intervals between the guns; but there appeared 
to be no protection for my left flank at St. Ail. Hostile 
groups of skirmishers advanced from Ste. Marie against St. 
Ail and caused me anxiety as to the left wing of my artillery 
line. I hastened to that point and saw to my satisfaction 
the entire Hussar Regiment halted in a depression in the 
terrain, protecting my left flank. I could now confidently 
hold my position until the leading elements of the infantry 
(Guard Fusiliers) had occupied St. Ail and overcome the 
danger to my left wing by driving off the hostile skirmishers 
(later by capturing Ste. Marie). Thus then the divisional 
cavalry reconnoitered at close range in front of our line, 
while the large cavalry masses, the cavalry divisions, took 
over the reconnaissance and protection at long range in our 
rear. In addition the divisional cavalry participated in the 
battle proper by occasional protection of the wings. 

As a general thing, the 18th of August, unlike the 16th 
of August, shows no cavalry charges in mass. On the right 
of the battlefield the ravine between Gravelotte and Point 
du Jour, being in the fire zone of the main hostile position, 
prevented a timely assumption of correct formation, for it 
compelled the troops to break off the formation and deploy 
again under a heavy hostile fire. Therefore the attempt made 
by the 1st Cavalry Division, reinforced by two Hussar regi- 
ments, to advance there, had to come to naught. But on the 
left wing the question was of an assault on St. Privat and 
Amanvillers, and in such action the participation of cavalry 
is precluded. Therefore nothing remained for the cavalry 
except to await in rear the outcome of the battle. 

Critics have missed the pursuit by cavalry at the close 
of the battle of St. Privat. On our right wing, from Le 
Point du Jour to Amanvillers, there could be no question at all 
of cavalry pursuit for the reason that the enemy held himself 
in his main positions. Our infantry entered the village of 
Amanvillers only after dark, and after the capture of St. 
Privat there was nothing there to pursue, for all parts of the 
hostile infantry which had not fled after the assault into the 



92 HOHENLOHE-INGELPINGEN 

woods behind, were annihilated in St. Privat, either killed or 
captured. Moreover during the night the French army 
proceeded to the protection of its fortress walls and thus 
precluded any cavalry pursuit. 

As the battle had lasted with bitterness until dark, the 
main point at daylight on the 19th was to ascertain where the 
enemy's position was. Even before daybreak we saw several 
different cavalry squadrons trotting to the front and as- 
certaining that the enemy had just about completed his 
evacuation of the position. But whatever was kept back of 
the Saxon cavalry division at Auboue (the largest part 
had scouted toward the Meuse as far as Verdun reconnoiter- 
ing and protecting the rear), namely one brigade, hastened 
to Maizieres in the Mosel valley and thus, under the very 
mouths of the cannons of the fortress, completed the 
blockade of the enemy. 

* * * 

Extract from 19th Letter on Strategy 

* * * 

In the course of the 17th August various reports were 
received at German headquarters, speaking now of a retreat 
of the enemy to Metz, another time of one to Verdun, or of 
a divided retreat in both directions. In general the view 
seemed to prevail that the enemy was, on the 18th, still in 
front, in a northerly direction. That was the direction in 
which he had to be attacked. But to push him off his line 
of retreat and throw part or all of his forces into Metz, the 
attack was to be so ordered, that the left wing should ad- 
vance to the assault. This brought about a complete wheel 
to the right during the battle of the 18th, and to a large 
extent even before that battle. For eventually the front of 
the Germans during the action was toward the east. This 
change of front on the part of the German army was greatly 
facilitated by the fact that the French army executed the 
same movement rearward on the afternoon of the 17th and 
morning of the 18th, thus making room for the Germans. 
It did exactly that which the German army meant it to do. 

This was curious! What the German army strove to do 
to ruin the French army, the latter did of its own accord 
and believed to be its salvation. 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 93 

After a bitter and bloody struggle on the 18th the French 
army was pushed from its position and compelled to retire 
under the guns of the fortress. 

The tactical course of this mighty battle does not belong 
to the sphere of strategical considerations. Strategically, 
only the advance of the Germans from the left wing to 
cut the enemy from his base deserves to be mentioned. 
I will, however, deal with one episode of the battle which 
is strategical in character, and proves that the subordi- 
nate leader, especially when he has command of a corps, 
may under some circumstances obey his orders best, not 
by following them to the letter, but by weighing the premises 
on which they are based, and then acting in harmony 
with the general designs of the commander. 

At 10 a.m. Prince Frederick Charles sent an order to 
the Guard Corps to march to Verneville and take up position 
there in support of the 9th Corps. 

When the general commanding received this order, his 
first division was forming at Doncourt and his Hussars re- 
ported that French infantry was at Ste. Marie and large 
bodies of troops at St. Privat. From these reports it was 
inferred that the premises on which the order of Prince 
Frederick Charles was based were incorrect, supposing, as 
they did, that the enemy's right did not extend beyond La 
Folie. 

The Prince of Wiirttemburg therefore did not obey the 
order to the letter, but for the purpose of acting in harmony 
with the general design of turning the enemy's right, ordered 
the 1st Division and the Corps Artillery to march across 
country in mass from Doncourt in the direction of St. Privat 
and Ste. Marie, and sent the 2d Division, on its subsequent 
arrival, in the direction of Verneville. I myself witnessed 
how hard it was for this general, accustomed to unconditional 
obedience, partly to violate a strict order in the midst of 
battle. He reported his action at once. Later on Prince 
Frederick Charles, having received further information of 
the situation, approved of the movement and ordered the 
greater part of the 2d Division to follow in the same di- 
rection. 



94 HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN 

Just imagine the result if the entire Guard Corps had 
marched on Verneville. The attacks on Amanvillers would 
have been turned from St. Privat. There would have been 
a large gap between the Guards and the 12th Corps, which 
latter, marching on Auboue, Montois, and Roncourt, would 
have been isolated and exposed to destruction. 

Extract From 2d Letter on Artillery 



In the decisive battle of Gravelotte— St. Privat the 
artillery came upon the scene at every point in still larger 
masses. This gigantic contest was begun by the fire of the 
artillery of the 9th Corps. That corps commenced by bring- 
ing into action the artillery of the 18th Division and the 
corps artillery. By noon 54 guns were present at this point 
in advance of their infantry, and allowed themselves to be 
carried by their zeal so far to the front under a most effective 
fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry, that one battery 
was destroyed by the hostile missiles, while the others, after 
having fired for two hours, were no longer in a condition to 
continue the struggle. About an hour after these 54 guns, 
the five Hessian batteries of the other division came into line 
on the left of the Bois de la Cusse, and on their arrival this 
line of artillery amounted to 84 guns. This total was in- 
creased to 90 by the arrival of the horse artillery battery of 
the Hessian cavalry brigade, which posted itself to the east 
of Verneville. Almost at the same time the four batteries 
of the 1st Division of the Guard and the Guard corps artillery 
took up their position on the left of the Hessian batteries and 
prolonged the line to St. Ail. From after 1 p.m. there were 
therefore at this point 138 guns which had opened fire before 
the infantry masses had been engaged. During this time 
the 7th Corps supported the 9th in its struggle by bringing 
up its artillery, which after 1 p.m. opened fire with seven 
batteries. At the same time eleven batteries of the 8th 
Corps posted themselves on their left and commenced firing, 
so that the battle was begun by the fire of 108 guns which 
stood before the front of the 1st Army at Gravelotte. 

A very instructive episode, and one very interesting as 
regards the part played by the artillery, was the capture by 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 95 

assault, during the cannonade which then followed, of Ste. 
Marie auxChenes; this took place at 3 p.m. Thirteen Saxon 
batteries and ten guns of the Guard corps artillery, a total 
of 88 guns, were drawn up in a half circle around this village 
and opened fire on it and our brave infantry, attacking with 
the greatest dash, passed without a check through the whole 
village and seized at once the opposite edge. The artillery 
of the 12th Corps came up also to prolong the mass of 
artillery in the direction of St. Privat, while the artillery of 
the 2d Guard Division did the same, by pushing three bat- 
teries into the line of battle at St. Ail and a fourth at the 
center in front of Amanvillers. If we study the plan in the 
official acount, which gives the state of the battle at 5 p.m., 
we find the German artillery acting in three great groups: 
the mass on the right wing at Gravelotte, directed against 
the position of Point du Jour, was composed of 27 batteries; 
that of the center, in action against Amanvillers, had 13, 
and that of the left wing, firing on St. Privat, 30 batteries. 
But five of these batteries had been already brought to the 
front at Gravelotte and were engaged in the middle of the 
infantry fight. Only such batteries had been left in reserve 
as could find no room in the Gravelotte position. In the 
center, on the other hand, the line of artillery had been re- 
inforced by borrowing guns from the 3d Corps, which formed 
a reserve. Seventy batteries, or 420 guns, had thus com- 
menced firing before the masses of infantry were sent 
forward to the decisive attack. The available masses of 
artillery might have been employed as powerfully and 
successfully against the village of St. Privat as they had 
already been against Ste. Marie aux Chenes, if they had been 
informed that the attack was intended. When suddenly the 
masses of infantry, as they advanced to the assault, masked 
the fire of their own batteries, and attacked the as yet un- 
injured village, but were unable to continue their advance, 
the batteries hastened forward into the infantry fire, and so 
overwhelmed the place with shells that its capture became 
possible. 

Wherever the infantry passed to the decisive assault, 
the artillery, as at Gravelotte, advanced absolutely into the 
line of skirmishers and supported the sister arm, fighting 



96 HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN 

with it shoulder to shoulder; it did this at the farm of 
Champenois and on the ground which lies immediately in 
front of Amanvillers, and again on the right of St. Privat 
on the hill which had just been captured. At this point it 
repulsed the numerous counter-attacks of the enemy's 
reserves, and assisted the effect produced by the fire of the 
infantry on the village, which stood like a fortress on its 
hill. When at length this village had been carried, which 
was towards the evening, all the artillery which was within 
reach crowned the chain of heights of which we had taken 
possession. On the left of St. Privat the whole of the bat- 
teries of the 12th Corps (96 guns) took up a position. On the 
right of St. Privat I collected fourteen batteries of the Guard, 
besides which all those which could reach the heights came 
up at once. Colonel Stumpff reported himself to me and 
announced that he had brought up six batteries, and as night 
fell Colonel von der Becke led up to me also four batteries of 
the corps artillery of the 10th Corps, which was held in 
reserve. By these successive arrivals the total of my force 
was so increased that at last I had 24 batteries under my 
command. This total implied nearly 140 guns, for some 
batteries were not at their full strength, since in the previous 
artillery fight some guns had been put out of action and it 
had not yet been possible to refit them. On this height, as 
night fell, there was thus a continuous line of artillery, 
divided only by the village of St. Privat, which comprised 
230 guns; these swept the ground in the direction of the 
Bois de Jaumont and the Bois des Feves so completely that 
the enemy renounced any attempt to recapture the height 
from us. The deafening noise of this cannonade lasted until 
it was altogether dark, and the battle was brought to a close. 

Extract from 4th Letter on Artillery 

* * * 

Need I speak again of St. Privat— Gravelotte and of 
Sedan, those two battles which, during a great part of the 
time that they lasted, were battles of artillery ? It will be 
sufficient for me to recall that the assault on Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes was prepared by the fire of 88 guns in such a manner 
that our infantry was able, with one rush and without a 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 97 

stop, to push its way to the opposite edge of the village to 
that at which it had entered. At St. Privat the attack made 
no progress until the artillery advanced in a mass to the line 
of skirmishers, and bombarded the place. . . . 

At the battle of St. Privat, when the Guard Corps ad- 
vanced in line of battalion columns from Doncourt towards 
the village of St. Privat, it was received by the shells of 
those of the batteries of the enemy which had been pushed 
forward to meet us, from the crest of the heights which run 
from St. Privat to Amanvillers. The four batteries of the 
1st Division of the Guard opened their fire against them in 
succession, that is to say, one after the other, with intervals 
as short as the deployment of the batteries from column would 
permit. Immediately afterwards they were reinforced by 
the corps artillery, and as each of these batteries, according 
to the orders given to them, posted itself 200 paces nearer 
to the enemy than the battery on its flank which had already 
begun to fire, our fire becoming more and more intense and 
accurate (since its efficacy increased in proportion as the 
batteries approached nearer to those of the enemy) very 
soon obliged the latter to retire to their principal position 
on the heights. We continued the artillery fight against 
this position at the very long range of 2500 to 2800 paces, 
since the general commanding the Guard Corps did not wish 
us to go in to a distance at which we might have produced a 
decisive effect; for he had received orders to wait at first 
until the turning movement and the flank attack, which 
were to be carried out by our left wing, should have pro- 
duced their full result. Thus from a little after 2 p.m. until 
a little after 5 p.m. we continued the artillery fight in a 
position of which the left flank (for there were some modi- 
fications in detail), stood a few hundred paces in front of St. 
Ail, while the right flank touched that of the Hessian artil- 
lery, which was posted at the Bois de la Cusse. The result 
of this artillery fight was that the enemy, at the end of only 
an hour, ceased to fire, and disappeared behind the hill of 
St. Privat, which bounded the view in our front. On this 
occasion the fire of our infantry did not annoy the enemy's 
artillery, nor did the latter break off the action on account 
of orders from superior authority, dictated by the general 



98 HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN 

tactical situation. If the enemy's guns were reduced to 
silence, we have the right to attribute this result to the 
effect of our fire, and this result was obtained by us, though 
the enemy was equal to us in number, and superior with 
respect to the very favorable position which he occupied. 
After this first hour had passed, I kept up an extremely 
slow fire. I obeyed the orders which I had received from 
the general commanding the Guard Corps, to lengthen out 
the action and economize my ammunition. In the interval 
the attack on Ste. Marie aux Chenes was prepared; ten guns 
of my left wing, as I have several times mentioned, took 
part in this action, by changing front to the left in front of 
St. Ail, so that, as they opened fire on Ste. Marie, they 
presented their right flank to the enemy's main position at 
St. Privat. But his fire was so kept down that he gained no 
advantage by this circumstance. When one knows one's 
self superior, one can attempt the incredible. 

We could not dare to nurse the illusion that we had 
annihilated the great line of artillery of the enemy, of which 
I estimated the strength at 60 guns, by our fire, which was 
delivered up a slope at a range from 2000 to 3000 paces. 
But his complete silence and the retrograde movements 
which he could be seen making from Roncourt to St. Privat 
proved that he felt the superiority of our fire. When, 
however, between 5 and 6 p.m., the infantry of the Guard 
came out from under cover, and moved against St. Privat, 
the enemy's infantry and artillery recovered their activity 
all along the height, which proves that they had only 
sheltered themselves from our superior fire in order to re- 
open the fight at the decisive moment. Our infantry, rush- 
ing boldly to the attack, very soon masked our batteries, 
which had again opened a violent fire on the enemy who 
were now visible, and I ordered the corps artillery (under 
Scherbening) and that of the 1st Division (under Rychelberg) 
to accompany the infantry. The right wing of this line of 
artillery (4 batteries of the 1st Division and 2 batteries of 
the corps artillery of the Guard) galloped straight forward 
and reached at the same time as the skirmishers the nearest 
edge of the heights between St. Privat and Amanvillers 
at the very moment when the enemy's skirmishers were 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 99 

giving way before our own. The left wing of the line (3 
batteries of the corps artillery, and the batteries of the 2d 
Division of the Guard, to which, later, two other horse 
artillery batteries joined themselves) reinforced the firing 
line of the infantry, which was now firing from the open 
ground against the walls of the village. Farther to the left 
the batteries did the same, but I shall make no further 
mention of them, as they were not under my command. I 
did not myself see the effect produced by the batteries on 
my left wing, as I was with the right, and had ordered 
Colonel Scherbening to lead the other. But some French 
officers, who were taken prisoners, told us afterwards that 
this effect was so murderous that, if the infantry attack had 
taken place half an hour later, we should have found no 
defenders in the village. 

I was then with the right wing and I advanced with the 
2d heavy battery, commanded by Prittwitz. It was the 
first which was ready to start after having limbered up; this 
operation, by the way, takes much longer in a real engage- 
ment than at peace maneuvers: there are shells to pack 
away, horses which have been shot to unharness, or some 
little repair to be done to the gun. On this occasion the 
captain commanding the battery had made up his mind to 
advance before he received my order, and was thus ready 
sooner than the others. The battery galloped up the slope 
of the hill and joined the skirmishers as they moved to the 
assault; only three guns at first reached the top, the three 
others having lost horses as they advanced. At the spot 
where the battery came up, the crest of the hill is so wide 
that it almost amounts to a plateau. The enemy's skir- 
mishers were flying before ours. But at a distance of from 
300 to 500 paces in front of us masses of the enemy, in 
dense columns, were advancing to dispute the crest of the 
height with our skirmishers. You can scarcely imagine the 
effect which the first shot of Prittwitz produced on these 
masses. In an instant they became motionless as if they 
had received a violent electric shock. But when shell after 
shell began to burst in the midst of them, when our line of 
artillery was reinforced by my other batteries as they arrived 
in turn at a gallop, and by the three guns of the first bat- 



100 HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN 

tery, which succeeded in rejoining us, the columns at once 
took to flight. Then my 30 guns set to work to find the 
range by firing trial shots at different points, while on our 
left the fight was raging around St. Privat. The possession 
of our height was of the greatest importance. From it to 
our right we could enfilade Amanvillers, for we could see its 
steeple above a slight undulation of the ground. To our 
front we were sending shell as far as the quarries of Aman- 
villers, near the Bois de Feves, and it was possible for us to 
reach, at a point near the Inn of Marengo, the end of the 
main road from Metz to St. Privat, by which the reinforce- 
ments which the enemy might send from the former to the 
latter place must pass. But at the moment there were very 
few of our infantry on this height. The principal masses 
were engaged in the fight and the attacks directed against 
the village. Only the six companies which the general 
commanding the Guard Corps had sent me during the 
cannonade to serve as our escort, were available for the 
attack on the height to the right of the village. But these 
companies had been cruelly decimated; the battalion com- 
mander who led them lay on the ground severely wounded. 
The captain who succeeded him, though his head was bleed- 
ing from a wound, managed to rally 20 or 30 men round the 
colors. Other small detachments were collected at different 
points, and were divided between the batteries, so that they 
might be ready to open a rapid fire at point blank range 
should the enemy push towards us. When all these arrange- 
ments had been made, I placed myself behind the captain of 
the 4th heavy battery (Seeger), because this officer was the 
quickest at finding the range by his trial shots. As he gave 
me the ranges, I sent them to the other batteries by my 
orderly officers. 

We had not long to wait for the first movement which 
the enemy's infantry was to make in our direction. It 
advanced in closed column from Amanvillers, and attacked 
us energetically. When the head of the column became 
visible over the hill, our trial shots reached it at a range of 
1900 paces, and my 30 guns opened a rapid fire. The enemy's 
infantry was enveloped in the thick smoke which the shells 
made as they burst. But after a very short time we saw the 



MILITARY CORRESPONDENCE 101 

red trousers of the masses which were approaching us appear 
through the cloud. I stopped the fire. A trial shot was 
fired at 1700 paces range; this was to show us the point up 
to which we should let them advance before reopening the 
rapid fire; we did the same for the ranges of 1500, 1300, 1100 
and 900 paces. In spite of the horrible devastation which 
the shells caused in their ranks, these brave troops continued 
to advance. But at 900 paces the effect of our fire was too 
deadly for them; they turned short round and fled; we hurled 
shells after them as long as we could see them. Here was 
an infantry attack which was repulsed purely and simply by 
the fire of artillery. A few years later I had the opportunity 
of talking with an aide-de-camp of General de Ladmirault, 
the very man who had carried the order to make this 
counter-attack, and who had been present during its execu- 
tion. Two regiments of infantry had been dispatched on 
this duty. The French officer said to me, " It was impossible 
to succeed. You have no idea what it is to have to advance 
under the fire of your artillery." 

These infantry attacks were repeated. They continued 
to come from the same direction. Altogether three were 
made, but the two last were not carried out with the same 
energy as the first. They were stopped at about 1500 paces 
in front of our line. A mass of cavalry also appeared, be- 
fore the infantry attacks, with the object of trying to dis- 
engage the defenders of St. Privat from their position. The 
head of the mass showed itself near the farm of Marengo on 
the high road from Metz to St. Privat; it halted while the 
column deployed. As soon as we had found the range with 
the help of a few trial shots, we opened a rapid fire, and our 
shells, falling among the crowded ranks of the cavalry, 
broke up the mass, and it disappeared in the same direction 
from which it had come. At length our infantry made their 
way into St. Privat, and the remainder of the batteries of 
the artillery of the Guard hastened up also, and posted 
themselves on the height to the right of the village. The 
enemy, on his part, deployed a grand line of artillery in 
front of us, in the low ground along the edge of the forest 
near the quarries of Amanvillers. We found no difficulty in 
silencing this artillery (it was that of the Imperial Guard), 



102 HOHENLOHE-INGELPIN6EN 

for we knew our range; we were superior in number (the 
batteries of the 10th Corps and of the Hessian Division had 
reinforced our line), and we had the better position. When 
night came the enemy's artillery had disappeared. 



War Diary of the 1st Squadron, Royal 
Saxon Guard Cavalry Regiment 1 

BY 

W. VON Klenck 
Captain and Squadron Commander 



15 August. March to Cheminot; quarters. 

16 August. Even before it was quite daylight the calls 
for assembly were sounded and toward 5 a.m. the march 
was started with the division. The Mosel was crossed at 
Pont a Mousson and the march objective, Vigneulles, was 
reached toward 3 p.m., after having passed the villages of 
Regnieville, Euvezin, Pannes and Nonsard. It was a very 
hot day and the march was frequently stopped through 
crossings with other columns. 

Two squadrons of our regiment, the 1st and 2d, under 
command of Major von Funcke, camped in Vigneulles; 

1 Foreword 

This Diary was arranged in the Spring of 1871 with the assis- 
tance of Lieutenant v. Broizem (now Colonel and Chief of Staff of the 
Royal Saxon Army Corps) from notes made by me during the war 
every evening when possible. I was under the impression that each 
squadron would have to submit a diary to regimental headquarters 
after the campaign and therefore it was kept brief and to the point 
and recounts events which concern only the squadron. 

My diary slumbered for four and twenty years, only a short 
while ago I again ran across it. When I read the names of all those 
with whom I had lived through that great event, the desire took hold 
of me to make a present of a copy of this diary to each one of my old 
companions -in -arms as a remembrance of those days never to be for- 
gotten, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the day of the declaration 
of war appeared to me the most auspicious day for doing this. 

This diary is printed without any changes, and exactly as 
the notes were written down in those days. May it bring a 
greeting to my old squadron from its captain, who with joy and 
pride thinks of the days when he had the honor and fortune to ride 
at its head! 

W. von Klenck, 
Royal Saxon Major, retired. 

Dresden, 15 July, 1895. 

103 



104 VONKLENCK 

headquarters and the other two squadrons in Heudicourt. 
The regimental commander ordered the 1st Squadron: ''to 
Dlace out outposts and seek connection with the 5th Cavalry 
Division " and allowed Captain v. Klenck to conduct himself 
the patrol designated for seeking the 5th Cavalry Division. 

The outposts consisted of a field picket alongside the 
road to Heudicourt south of Vigneulles; this picket placed 
videttes along the roads to St. Mihiel, Hattonchatel and 
Heudicourt and patrolled these roads as well as the road to 
St. Benoit. 

Since nothing was known of the whereabouts of the 5th 
Cavalry Division, I— Captain von Klenck— decided first of 
all to gain the Thiaucourt— Fresnes en Woe vre— Verdun 
road, going through Doncourt and thereafter to act accord- 
ing to circumstances. Toward 3.30 p.m., accompanied by 
the acting first sergeant Count Wallwitz and six guardsmen, 
I left Vigneulles and after passing Hattonville, Avillers, 
and Woel, met at Doncourt a Prussian supply column which 
could give no information of the location of the 5th 
Cavalry Division but which informed me that heavy cannon 
fire had been heard since morning in a northeasterly di- 
rection. As presumably the 5th Cavalry Division was 
engaged in the fight taking place, I sent acting first 
sergeant Count Wallwitz back to Major von Funcke with 
the message that "I would proceed to the battlefield to 
execute the orders given me " and rode then across country 
with four guardsmen to Harville, turning east at that point 
and following the Metz road. A few thousand paces east of 
Harville I encountered a cavalry patrol led by an officer, 
the latter informing me on my question "that a battle was 
being fought in the vicinity of Mars la Tour, which un- 
fortunately stood against us; he had orders to bring up the 
19th Infantry Division." I immediately decided to pro- 
ceed myself to the battlefield and ask the corps commander 
whether I should bring up the 12th Cavalry Division. 
Toward 6 p.m. I arrived on the battlefield, but unfortunately 
found General von Voigts-Rhetz, commander of the Xth 
Corps, only after an hour's search. To my question 
"whether the Saxon Cavalry Division should be brought 
up" I received the answer "support by infantry would be 



WAR DIARY 105 

more acceptable." I then offered to bring the 23d Infantry 
Division from Regnieville, but asked for written orders. 
When these were written out an adjutant from Prince 
Frederick Charles came to General Voigts-Rhetz and 
brought that general the request "to take the offensive 
with the left wing, the battle stood well on the right." 
General von Voigts-Rhetz answered this request negatively 
with the remark "his troops had suffered too much and he 
had no fresh ones left." 

I now received orders to submit the written orders for 
approval to Prince Frederick Charles. These orders read 
about: "It would be desirable to have all disposable troops 
assemble at Trouville at daylight tomorrow, in case Prince 
Frederick Charles should not make other dispositions." 
Before I took leave of the general I asked for information of 
the eventual route of retreat. He named Thiaucourt. Prince 
Frederick Charles, whose position was on the right wing of 
the battlefield, signed the orders and then I rode alone— my 
four guardsmen had not been able to keep up with me — from 
the battlefield at about 7.30 p.m., but in the next village took 
a lost cavalryman along as orderly, to assure the safe trans- 
mission of the order. 

Before riding off I had requested an orderly from one 
of the gentlemen of headquarters. The answer was : "Ride 
away by yourself and bring up the Saxons as quickly as 
possible." 

Toward 10 p.m., having passed Chambley, Xammes and 
Thiaucourt, I arrived in Regnieville and reported to H. R. H. 
Prince George who ordered the immediate assembly of the 
23d Infantry Division. Prince George charged me with 
carrying a copy of the above orders to the commander of the 
12th Cavalry Division and, after executing this, I rode back 
to Vigneulles, arriving there at 3.30 a.m., August 17th. 

I take the liberty of saying a few words of the work 
done by my horse on that day. The same horse on which I 
made the ride just described I had already ridden on the 
road from Cheminot to Vigneulles (22 miles) and from 3.30 
p.m. to the next morning at 3.30 had covered an additional 
stretch of from 48 to 52 miles. Half an hour after my 
arrival in Vigneulles the advance began and I again rode the 



106 VONKLENCK 

same horse. It showed no signs whatever of the fatigue of 
the previous day, but traveled entirely freshly as usual. It 
was a Hanoverian half-blood mare, Sire Almora, a troop 
horse supplied me as an Hanoverian officer from the Hano- 
verian Queen Hussar Regiment. 

l I am very clear in my own mind why I asked the regimental 
commander for permission to lead personally the patrol to establish 
connection with the 5th Cavalry Division. We had been mobilized for 
the past four weeks, fourteen days on the march, and today the regiment 
came for the first time up to the first fine. Now an opportunity offered 
to get out, to hear something else, to see, to act, instead of riding along 
with the regiment as a figure head. I am also quite clear why I came 
to the decision to ride to the battlefield after meeting the supply 
column. I wanted to see war and as I had to look for the 5th Cavalry 
Division, which could not be found, it gave me, as later on August 26th, 
sufficient justification for going so far away from the regiment. To 
the present day, however, it has remained a mystery to me how I— a 
very simple captain— conceived the idea of offering to the Prussian 
corps the support of the Saxon troops. The statement of the lieuten- 
ant leading the patrol could not have worked on me so overwhelm- 
ingly, and the very dependent and limited position held in time of 
peace by a squadron commander with his monotonous duties could 
certainly not have suggested to me such independent action. 

Let it suffice that 1 did it— and it does not appear that I acted so 
very wrongly — at least no one ever blamed me for it afterwards. 

Sitting at a desk today, and being twenty-five years older, I 
must say that had General von Voigts-Rhetz answered: " Go to the 
devil. If I require help I shall send for it myself," I should quite rightly 
have been richer by one military reprimand or reproof. 

At that time I did not think of such an answer, though I well 
recollect that at the question of the eventual line of retreat the face of 
the general assumed a certain ambiguous expression, but the answer 
then followed in an even, polite tone. 

I came up to the left wing of the line of battle in the vicinity of 
Mars la Tour just as there appeared to ensue a pause in the fight. I 
then learned which corps had been engaged, but nobody could give me 
any information of the location of the general von Voigts-Rhetz. In 
an amiable manner a mounted engineer captain, who at the time had 
nothing else to do, offered to accompany me in my search. And so we 
rode here and there together, one time by mistake towards the French 
position, but rapidly faced about when we heard the whistle of bullets. 
The French still fired off and on but on our side the firing had ceased 
completely. The battlefield with its dead and wounded was a grue- 
some sight, I had seen nothing like it since the battle at Langensalza. 
The most distressing sight to me was a groaning horse, trying to walk 
on three legs, the fourth, half shot away, dangling on the ground. 

How glad I was when finally I found the general. One of the 
officers of the staff had to write down the orders and I am sorry I do 
not know whether he was the chief of staff von Caprivi who was sub - 
sequently Chancellor and one with whom I was in entire accord. The 
present commandant of the Military Riding Institute, General von 
Willich, then 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant of the Xth Corps, could not 
give me any information about it, as he was absent at that moment. 

Leaving General von Voigts-Rhetz, I rode with Prince Frederick 

1 The paragraphs on this and the following pages printed in smaller type were 
added subsequently to the original manuscript. 



WARDIARY 107 

Charles' adjutant to that Prince. H. R. H., in the well known Red 
Hussar uniform and surrounded by a large staff, was on the right wing 
in the vicinity of Flavigny. I reported to him and thereupon he signed 
the order. 

When I now wanted to ride off, I perceived to ray fright, that all 
ray guardsmen had disappeared, and a long ride in the night stared me 
in the face. My request for an orderly was inexplicably refused. I 
rode off in a bad humor and thought in my dull mind: "Why don't 
they send one of the many officers of the staff, who have dozens of 
orderlies at their disposal?" 

Three hours later formal orders were issued by Prince Frederick 
Charles in Gorze, according to which the Xllth and the Guard Corps 
should start at once for the vicinity of Mars la Tour and Tronville 
respectively. 

It was about 16 miles to headquarters of the 23d (Royal Saxon) 
Infantry Division in Regnieville en Haye; the night was very dark. 
As a matter of course I wanted to ride fast, and when I asked the 
cavalryman of the 13th Hanoverian Uhlans, who accompanied me, if 
he had a good mount, he replied that he did not know, that he had 
picked up the horse on the battlefield after his own had been killed. I 
now informed him that in my inner breast coat pocket was an im- 
portant order to be delivered to H. R. H. Prince George of Saxony in 
Regnieville, and also gave him black on white the road to be taken to 
that place, that is, the names of the villages to be passed and added 
that, should any mishap overtake me on the way, he was to pay no 
attention to me but to ride on with those orders. Near Regnieville we 
were suddenly halted by a " Halt, who's there! " After I had given 
my name and regiment to the Saxon infantry sentinel who got ready 
to fire — I heard the click of his hammer — he demanded the parole and 
countersign. I did not know these but my brave Uhlan could help out. 
Even then the sentinel would not let us proceed and only after a non- 
commissioned officer came up, did I receive the necessary permission. 

The only time in this war when the thought came to me in an un- 
pleasant manner that I might be shot was this very time. The sentinel 
standing ready to fire immediately in front of me was much excited 
and I expected every moment that his piece might be discharged by 
carelessness or otherwise. 

Prince George had just retired to rest when I reported at head- 
quarters, but appeared in a few minutes. He requested detailed 
information of what I had seen on the battlefield and what I had heard, 
also of the condition of the roads leading there and the probable block- 
ing of the same by supply and other columns. I was then dismissed in 
the most courteous manner and after I and my Uhlan had been sup- 
plied with something to eat and drink through the kindness of an 
officer of the staff, and after care had also been taken of our horses, I 
again took the road into the night, this time in better humor. 

Unfortunately I did not keep in mind the name of the Uhlan who 
also accompanied me to Vigneulles. During a ride of some 28 miles in 
the night in the enemy's country we get acquainted with most anyone. 
He was a rarely pleasant and agreeable man and a soldier through and 
through. 

As the start on August 17th had been ordered for 4 a.m., I had but 
twenty minutes in which to sleep. My horse was watered and fed (on 
bread) and then I rode it again that day as well as the next, August 
18th, from 7.30 a.m. to August 19th, 7.30 a.m. On the morning of the 
19th my Almora mare was just as fresh as if she had just come from her 
stall in No. 7 Kloster Street, Dresden. She had not been in training of 
any kind before the opening of the campaign; on the contrary, she 
had not worked at all as I had returned but a few days before mobili- 



108 VONKLENOK 

zation from a four weeks' leave. On October 12th the mare received 
a shot in the right hip joint during the battle of Breteuil and, as the 
bullet could not be extracted, had to be shot. 

I wept bitter tears when I saw my fine Hanoverian mount fall 
down under the mortal shot! 

I return now to the consequences of my ride to the battlefield : 

The General Staff Account, Part I, Vol. I, pp. 653, 654 and 655 
states as follows concerning the situation after the battle of Mars la 
Tour: 

" Prince Frederick Charles had taken up his headquarters at Gorze 
on the evening of August 16th. After the issue of the battle the head- 
quarters of the Hd Army had to be prepared for a fresh attempt on the 
part of the French forces, which were evidently superior, to reopen the 
way westward which was now barred to them. Owing to the great 
exhaustion of the troops which had taken part in the struggle, ar- 
rangements had to be made for bringing forward fresh troops as early 
as possible to the battlefield, so as to meet the expected attack in 
sufficient strength. After the Prince had made the needful arrange - 
ments for replenishing the ammunition, he issued the necessary orders 
to the different troops between 10 and 11 o'clock that night. 

" The Hd and IVth Army Corps, which were at Buchy and les 
Saizerais, two long days' march from the battlefield, could not be 
calculated upon for the next day; they were to abide by their previous 
orders (in accordance with which the former was to move up to Pont a 
Mousson, the latter to continue its advance in the direction of the 
Meuse as far as the neighborhood of Boucq). 

"TheXIIth and the Guard Corps were also 18 to 20 miles away 
from the battlefield; nevertheless it was possible to bring them up in 
the course of August 17th. Special notifications were therefore sent 
to them and to the IXth Corps, acquainting them with the events of 
the day, and at the same time giving the following orders for the 17th: 

"The IXth Army Corps, headquarters of which was at Gorze, 
was directed to assemble at daybreak on the heights north of the 
village. The XHth Army Corps was to move off that same night, 
gain the neighborhood of Mars la Tour by way of Thiaucourt, and take 
up a position in rear of the Xth Corps. Lastly, the Guard Corps was 
ordered to march without delay to Mars la Tour by way of Beney and 
Chambley in order to take post on the left of the Saxons, while its 
cavalry was to continue its advance towards the Meuse. 

" Since the most distant troops of the IXth Corps had to march 
not quite nine miles to the prescribed place of assembly, it was possible 
to count upon its arrival in rear of the right wing of the line of battle 
during the early morning. 

" Less certain appeared the timely support of the left wing by the 
XHth and the Guard Corps. The zeal of the commanders, however, 
gave an impetus to the execution of these movements. 

"In consequence of the instructions previously received from 
Royal Headquarters— H. R. H. the Crown Prince of Saxony had re- 
ceived verbal orders from His Majesty King William at 9.30 o'clock the 
evening of August 16th to start the XHth Corps at 3 a.m. August 17th 
by Thiaucourt toward Mars la Tour and to send the cavalry against the 
road to Verdun— the commander of the XHth Army Corps had given 
orders to his cavalry to assemble near Vigneulles at 4 a.m., on the 17th, 
and then to move forward at once in order of battle toward Harville. 
In the event of its not meeting with the enemy so near as that place, 
the division was to move on to the Metz — Etain road, with a view to 
acquiring as precise intelligence as it could with regard to the condition 
of the enemy, and at the same time to endeavor to intercept all troops 
and convoys — arrangements which evidently aimed at striking as 



WARDIARY 109 

rapidly and deeply as possible at the French communications with the 
west. 

"The measures of the commander-in-chief had likewise been 
anticipated by the 23d Division in a suitable manner. Captain von 
Klenck, of the Saxon service, who was deputed to keep up communi- 
cation with the 6th Cavalry Division, and in doing so had been a 
spectator of the engagement of the Xth Army Corps, arrived at di- 
vision headquarters at Regnieville en Haye after 10 p.m. He was 
the bearer of a request from General von Voigts-Rhetz, with the 
sanction of Prince Frederick Charles, for the 23d Division to advance 
to Tronville, the arrival there of fresh forces with the least possible 
delay being intimated as very desirable. Prince George of Saxony, 
commanding the division, ordered his troops to stand to arms at once 
and to move off by way of Thiaucourt. Their own headquarters and 
those of the Guard Corps were apprised of the orders which had been 
issued. 

"When this intelligence reached the latter shortly before mid- 
night, the commanding general, Prince August of Wiirttemberg, 
determined for the present to suspend the advance to the Meuse orders 
for the 17th. Pending orders from the commander-in-chief, he at 
once concentrated in a northerly direction his two infantry divisions 
with the corps artillery at Flirey and Richecourt, the cuirassier brigade 
at Heudicourt. By these anticipatory arrangements the commander of 
the Guard Corps was enabled to comply promptly with the instructions 
from Gorze which reached him in the course of the night. 

"At 5 a.m. the corps commenced its march through Beney in 
accordance with orders. The brigade of lancers of the Guard alone 
remained on the Meuse with a view to watching toward the west from 
St. Mihiel. 

" The report dispatched by Prince Frederick Charles from Gorze 
at 11 p.m. reached Royal Headquarters at Pont a Mousson after mid- 
night, whither at the same time Lieut. Colonel von Bronsart had also 
returned from the battlefield and made his verbal report. It was now 
known that two Prussian army corps had sustained a severe and san- 
guinary struggle against superior hostile forces, and that it was above 
all things necessary to support the former in good time in the positions 
which they now held." 

With this I conclude the citation from the General Staff Account. 

The paragraph " Less certain appeared the timely support of the 
left wing by the XHth and the Guard Corps. The zeal of the com- 
manders, however, gave an impetus to the execution of these move- 
ments" may well be placed to the credit of the orders from Prince 
Frederick Charles, suggested by me in the first place and then carried 
to their destination, and it is due to that fact that these commanders 
took their measures earlier than they would otherwise have done. 

The instructions, approved by Prince Frederick Charles, read 
verbatim : 

" It is desirable that everything, which can in any way be spared, 
appear at Tronville at daybreak tomorrow morning, unless Prince 
Frederick Charles should order other dispositions. 

"von Voigts-Rhetz, 
"Prince Frederick Charles." 

This order was the first information the XHth Army Corps, and 
through it the Guard Corps, had of the situation on the battlefield of 
Mars la Tour. 

Prince George of Saxony was not for a moment in doubt as to the 
situation. "The Prussian forces have encountered superior hostile 
forces and desire immediate support" was the first remark of this 
Prince. The second: "We are to go to Tronville, it is so written 



110 VON KLENOK 

here," when the measures to be taken were discussed with the chief 
of staff. 

The reason why the Royal Saxon Army Corps did not start the 
march at once, can be seen in Konig Albert, 50 Jahre Soldat, where it 
reads : 

"Army headquarters had ordered that all troops were to appear 
at Mars la Tour at sunrise, and starting the 23d Infantry Division at 
once would have made it possible for at least a part of the corps to 
appear, if not at sunrise at least during the forenoon. Royal Head- 
quarters, however, in spite of its having received information of the 
events in the meantime, insisted on adherence to its orders to start not 
earlier than 3 a.m. and sent orders to Crown Prince Albert to await 
with the 23d Division, on the other side of Thiaucourt and in front of 
Xammes, the arrival of the corps commander. Copies of the orders 
received and measures taken were sent to Hd Army headquarters." 

On receipt of the request from Voigts-Rhetz the Guard Corps had 
at once been alarmed, but the march northward was started only after 
the orders sent by Prince Frederick Charles from Gorze between 10 
and 11 p.m., the so-called actual orders, had been received, that is at 
5 a.m. 

But the orders carried by me had at least had the positive useful- 
ness that in consequence of the immediate alarming of the troops they 
were ready to take up the march at once on the receipt of the proper 
orders. 

Personally I shall say nothing as to the value of my action, but 
will quote in that respect from Prince zu Hohenlohe's Strategische 
Brief e, Parti, p. 321: 

" If Bazaine had attacked early on the 17th, then the coming up 
of the Guard Corps, as well as that of the XHth Corps, would have 
decided the fate of the day." 

This "if" did not materialize. Hence the "coming up" of the 
two corps, which my ride caused, had not the practical value which it 
might have had. 

For all that the ride to the battlefield of Mars la Tour will always 
remain for me the brightest and most interesting event in my military 
life. 

For me personally this ride was without any consequences, only 
one lesson have I learned thereby. When the next afternoon the 
regiment was marching in squadron column and the command was 
given to assume bivouac formation, the regimental commander had to 
repeat his command to cause me to give the proper command to my 
squadron. The reason was simple. My squadron was in the lead and 
while waiting for the other to come up, I had fallen asleep. The regi- 
mental commander had not noticed it, and even I should not have 
known it had not one of my officers told me about it later. As I had 
been in the saddle for the past thirty -six hours and had slept only half 
an hour during that time, it was quite comprehensible that my eyes 
closed. 

17 August. The cavalry division was in readiness for 
the start at 4 a.m. at Vigneulles. The 1st Squadron (Guard 
Cavalry Regiment) received orders to cover the right flank 
and seek connection with the 12th Corps. 

The division marched through Hattonville, Avillers, 
Doncourt and Harville on Parfondrupt. 

The 1st Squadron marched through St. Benoit, Woel, and 



WAR DIARY 111 

Jonville to Latour en Woevre and on asking for them re- 
ceived orders to rejoin the division at Parfondrupt. A 
patrol was sent from Benoit through Dampvitoux, Dom- 
martin, Lachaussee and Sponville without however having 
accomplished its mission— establishing connection with the 
12th Corps. 

The commander of the squadron thought it appropriate 
to gain information for the division of the situation on the 
battlefield of the previous day, and proceeded there with a 
patrol. 

The German corps stood then in general south of the 
road between Mars la Tour and Vionville; it was said that 
the French army had fallen back on Metz. 

In the evening the division occupied a bivouac between 
Parfondrupt and St. Jean les Buzy. 

18 August. Battle of St. Privat. The 
bivouac was astir soon after midnight. Our outposts on the 
road to Etain and Verdun had been bothered by French 
patrols, a few shots had been fired, and as we had to be in 
readiness for any possible event, considering our exposed 
position, the men were quietly called and horses saddled. 
Thus everything remained until after 3 a.m., the horses held 
by the reins. At 3.30 a.m. we unsaddled. Everyone made 
use of the few hours until the start to get a little sleep to 
gain strength for the coming fatigue. 

Toward 7.30 a.m. the division started and marched from 
Parfondrupt through Olley into a rendezvous position south 
of Puxe (the 4th platoon, 1st Squadron, under Lieutenant 
Broizem as right flank guard along the right bank of the 
Orne). Soon we saw small white clouds of bursting shrapnel 
above the hills in the east, the sound of cannon increased; a 
battle was in progress. 

About 10.30 a.m., the Guard Cavalry Regiment and the 
3d Cavalry Regiment with the horse battery under Major 
General Senfft left Pilsach, the two Uhlan regiments remain- 
ing behind to watch the Verdun — Etain— Metz road. 

Toward 2 p.m., having marched through Conflans north 
of Batilly, the cavalry brigade arrived on the battlefield and 
formed for battle in platoon columns by squadrons. 



112 VON KLENCK 

The battle seemed here to progress favorably. Every- 
thing seemed to be slowly advancing to attack and there 
were still large masses of infantry and artillery intact in 
reserve. 

Our brigade proceeded slowly from hill to hill. Toward 
4 p.m. the Briey— Metz road between Auboue and Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes was reached. 

There the squadron received the glorious task, in con- 
junction with one squadron of the 3d Cavalry Regiment 
(Captain von Polenz): "to destroy at all costs the railroad 
and telegraph between Metz and Thionville." 

For this task the squadron was specially assigned to the 
road in the Orne valley, Auboue— Grand Moyeuvre— Riche- 
mont. 

Orders for this had come direct from Royal Headquarters 
and it had been left to the discretion of Crown Prince Albert 
whether he should employ the entire 12th Cavalry Division 
for that purpose. 

All the pioneers of the regiment were attached to the 
1st Squadron and followed immediately behind the advance 
guard (4th Platoon under Lieutenant von Broizem). Beyond 
Auboue the squadron met the squadron of the 3d Cavalry 
Regiment, which had started a little sooner. A Saxon 
infantry regiment stood in the valley, the officers of which 
were sure that the valley of the Orne was held in force by 
strong French detachments. 

The road between Auboue and Grand Moyeuvre is a 
continuous defile. On the south the steep wooded hillside, 
on the north the bank of the Orne, falling precipitately 
down to that marshy river. Shortly after leaving Auboue 
the point reported the road blocked by felled trees. As we 
did not expect that these obstacles would continue, it was 
decided not to leave the road but to work our way over the 
obstacles. Soon we had to dismount and proceed in single 
file. For long stretches trees had been felled straight across 
the road, between them ditches dug. One time the horses 
had to jump, another time descend ditches, often having 
to make detours to avoid marshy meadows and wet ditches. 
Very soon the column was extended over an hour in length. 
It seemed as though the obstacles would never come to an 



WAR DIARY 113 

end. Finally, at Grand Moyeuvre, we again gained an open 
road— fortunately not occupied by the enemy— and the 
squadron was slowly reformed. But about an hour and a half 
had been lost and, as Moyeuvre is a telegraph station, it was 
feared that the expedition had been discovered and that its 
progress would be interfered with. 

About 6.30 p.m. the squadron was again formed and a 
quick trot taken up. There were still some single trees 
across the road, but they could easily be avoided. Toward 
7.30 p.m., having marched through Clouange, Vitry and 
Boussange without further trouble, the railroad was reached 
at Richemont. 

This place, the exits of which were barricaded, was first 
completely surrounded, the mayor then arrested, and videttes 
sent out to all sides. The mayor stated that no French 
troops had been in the village for the past three days and that 
the obstructions we had encountered had been placed by 
engineer troops. 

Work was hastily commenced. The pioneers, under 
direction of Acting First Sergeant Doring and Sergeant 
Oehme (3d Squadron), first shoveled off the gravel on the 
railroad bed, then the bolts of the fishplates and the spikes 
were knocked off, which Private Bohme very satisfactorily 
performed with a smith's sledge. Then the rails were pried 
off, with telegraph poles which in the meantime had been cut 
down, and thrown into the water, as well as the ties. The 
result of the work, which soon had to be carried on by 
lanterns, was a complete destruction of the double track 
sixteen paces in length and interruption of the telegraph 
line at several places. 

After two hours of work assembly was sounded and the 
return march began at 10 p.m., after the laborers had had 
some bread and wine. 

The return march led through Boussange, Fameck, 
Morlange and Ranguevaux to Neufchef without stop except 
to water the horses at a few points. This road was chosen 
since it appeared inadvisable, and in fact almost impossible, 
to try and pass the obstacles on the other road in the dark. 

In Neufchef the squadron rejoined the squadron of the 
3d Cavalry Regiment. On the march from there it was 



114 VONKLENOK 

found that the forest roads there also were obstructed by 
felled trees. Forty inhabitants with axes were therefore 
requisitioned and made to march at the head of the column 
and clear the road to some extent at least. 

Thus we proceeded. Of course we had to dismount 
frequently and lead the horses up the steep, slippery hill 
roads. The largest trees had been felled across the road 
and that for miles; it evidently had been the intention to 
make the roads absolutely impassable. The night was bright, 
but damp and cold; our knees commenced to tire out and our 
eyes to close. 

At dawn of day we again reached the open, and, march- 
ing through Avril and Briey, we returned on August 19th at 
7.30 a.m. to the bivouac of the brigade at Auboue. 



Reflections on Army Matters and 
the Conduct of War 1 



BY 



A. VON BOGUSLAWSKI 
Lieutenant General, Reserve List 



4. Movements Leading up to the Battle of 
Gravelotte — St. Privat 

/^\F the three great battles fought under the personal 
^-^ leadership of King William, Gravelotte is the only 
one in which the army designated to carry out the strategic 
object— attack of the army under Marshal Bazaine— was 
tactically assembled before the battle. 2 The 1st Army 
stood with the 7th Corps from the woods of Vaux and 
Ognons to Ars; the 8th Corps at Gorze; the 1st Cavalry 
Division at Corny. 

Of the lid Army the 9th Corps stood at the Bois de 
Vionville; the 3d Corps with the 5th Division at Buxieres, 
with the 6th at Flavigny and Vionville; the 6th Cavalry 
Division behind the 6th Division; the 10th Corps and the 
5th Cavalry Division at Tronville. Of the 12th Corps the 23d 
Division bivouacked at Mars la Tour, the 24th at Puxieux. 
The Guard Corps was at Hannonville. Headquarters of the 
lid Army were in Buxieres. 

The day following the battle of Vionville, August 17th, 
there was great uncertainty as to whether the French army 

1 Publi8hed Berlin, April, 1897. Extracts from Part III— Tactics, 
Chapter XII, p. 209. 

'Except the 4th Corps which was not brought up, and the 2d 
Corps, which, however, came into battle on the evening of the 18th. 

115 



116 VONBOGUSLAWSKI 

in whole or in part was marching off on the Metz— Etain road 
or had taken up a position west of Metz. 

It is now known that the reconnaissance by the cavalry 
on that day did not achieve what could justly have been ex- 
pected of it, that is, ascertaining what direction the French 
army had taken in the forenoon of the 17th from Vionville. 
It is true that the Saxon cavalry division had reached the Metz 
—Etain road at St. Jean les Buzy at 9 o'clock and had found 
no hostile detachments there. Report of this first reached 
the Saxon Corps headquarters at 3 p.m., that is, after Royal 
Headquarters had issued the orders at 2 p.m. for August 18th. 

But even with that report there was nothing definitely 
ascertained as regards the position of the French army. 
The entire cavalry of the 1st and Hd Armies did not partici- 
pate in the reconnaissance. This unusual lack of activity 
of the German cavalry was undoubtedly due to the intention 
of avoiding a resumption of the battle in view of the losses 
suffered the day before (16,000 dead and wounded), especially 
since the concentration of the German armies was affected 
only during the forenoon. Nevertheless, we cannot on 
that account alone, approve the failure to make use of the 
cavalry on August 17th. In case no orders were given for 
it by sub-army headquarters, the chief command could have 
arranged for it. Moreover the 1st Cavalry Division was 
entirely fresh. 

This entire situation is a good example of the fact that 
in actual war conditions will arise in which reconnaissance 
will fail and makes it possible for us to estimate correctly 
the easy reconnaissance performed at our maneuvers so as 
not thereby to become spoiled. 

It is of course true that no report could bring certainty 
as to whether or not the French army would very early on 
the 18th start on its retreat through Etain or Briey, as is 
correctly pointed out in the General Staff Account, page 672, 
in a footnote. Knowing, however, that a large part of the 
French troops had gone into camp between Rozerieulles and 
Montigny la Grange, we might have concluded with great 
probability of truth that the entire army remained stationary 
if similar reports had been received from the vicinity of St. 
Privat and Roncourt. 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 117 

It has been stated that the issuing of orders at 2 p.m. 
and the return of Royal Headquarters to Pont a Mousson 
was incorrect and the criticism has been made that the latter 
should have remained longer at Flavigny, in order to take 
advantage of any further reports which might have been 
received as a basis for further orders. Against this nothing 
can be said; we can only emphasize the fact that the orders 
of the 17th, even had the position of the French been ascer- 
tained on the evening of that day, could hardly have read 
differently than they actually did. For in any event the 
retreat of the French, or at least that of the larger part of 
them, had to be reckoned with in either case. 1 

Prince Frederick Charles had informed the corps com- 
manders at Mars la Tour and Vionville, at 5 and 5.30 p.m. 
respectively, of the march directions which the corps were 
to take. In the first line the 12th Corps was to start at 5 a.m. 
on the left wing toward J amy, the Guard Corps toward 
Doncourt, the 9th Corps to start at 6 a.m. close to the 
left of St. Marcel toward the north. The 3d Corps was to 
follow the 9th and 10th Corps behind the 12th and Guard 
Corps. Prince Frederick Charles assumed that the army 
under Bazaine would start at that very time toward Conflans, 
thus assuming that the enemy would do the most reasonable 
thing. Thus nothing certain was known even then as to the 
situation. The corps artillery of the 3d Army Corps was 
placed at the disposition of army headquarters as an army 
artillery reserve. 

Whether all this will result in a turn to the right or to the left by 
the lid Army, cannot yet be decided. For the present the ques- 
tion is merely one of an advance of less than four miles. This march 
will be made not in long thin march columns but by divisions massed 
within themselves, the corps artillery between the two divisions of 
each army corps. 

For our purpose we will next consider the manner of 
this advance. 

The 12th Corps started from Mars la Tour only at 7a.m. 
Prior to this there was a march crossing. After its arrival 
on the battlefield the 12th Corps was on the right of the 

*The orders, omitted here, will be found on page 46, ante. 



118 VON BOGUSLAW8KI 

Guard Corps. But the Saxons were to advance on the left 
wing and the 24th Division, remaining in march column, had 
to first cross Mars la Tour, thereby causing a delay in the 
march of the Guard Corps, which had started at 5.30 a.m. 
from its bivouacks at Hannonville and shortly thereafter 
reached Mars la Tour. The reason for this measure is 
sought in the fact that the Guard Corps was desired to be in 
the center of the line of battle, according to its peculiar 
destination. Of a "peculiar destination ,, of the Guard 
Corps, about in the sense of a battle reserve like under 
Napoleon I. , nothing had been noticed in 1866 and here there 
could be no question of its utilization as a reserve, since this 
corps was placed in the first line. Other reasons must 
have caused the adoption of this measure. The 10th Corps 
was able to follow the Guard Corps from Tronville only at 
10 a.m. 

It was very strange that the cavalry divisions— except 
the Saxon cavalry division — were left behind the front. This 
probably was done in the certain expectation of very soon 
encountering the enemy and being obliged to open the battle 
with artillery and infantry. The further course of the situa- 
tion justified the measure— but how would it have been had 
the enemy actually retreated along the road to Briey and 
efficiently used his cavalry to cover the retreat? 

The orders directing the formation of the troops were in 
entire consonance with the situation and are in accordance 
with the maxims which have developed concerning deploy- 
ment formations. 



5. The Higher Battle Leadership 

By 10.30 a.m., August 18th, the situation had so far 
cleared that the German Headquarters assumed that the 
enemy intended to hold himself between Point du Jour and 
Montigny la Grange. Orders were therefore issued that the 
12th and the Guard Corps should take the direction of Batilly 
to reach the enemy at Ste. Marie aux Chenes in case he 
should have marched off toward Briey, and to attack him 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 119 

from Amanvillers should he remain stationary on the heights. 

"The attack should be made simultaneously: by the 1st 
Army from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the 9th 
Corps against the Bois de Genivaux and Verneville, by the 
left wing of the lid Army from the north." 

The 1st Army was to be held back until the lid Army 
should be ready to cooperate. 

In the meantime Prince Frederick Charles had gained 
the conviction that the main forces of the enemy were not 
marching off toward Briey— the only route of retreat still 
open to the French— and had sent the 9th Corps as early as 
10 a.m. toward Verneville and La Folie in order — should 
the right wing of the enemy be there,— to 
open the battle by a deployment of strong artillery. The 
Guard Corps was to follow the 9th Corps on Doncourt and 
Verneville, the Saxon Corps to remain for the present at 
Jarny. Reports received later increased the Prince's con- 
viction of the correctness of his views. But it was thought 
that the French right wing did not extend to beyond Aman- 
villers until a new report stated that a French camp was in 
sight at St. Privat. 

In consequence of this report Headquarters lid Army 
ordered the 9th Corps (11.30 a.m.), in case the enemy's 
right wing did reach beyond La Folie, to de- 
lay its attack until the Guard Corps could attack from Aman- 
villers. This latter corps was to advance in all haste to 
Verneville, to reach out as far beyond Habonville as possible, 
and then, from Amanvillers, to attack the right hostile 
wing. These were the orders of 11.30 a.m. The 12th Corps 
was to advance on Ste. Marie aux Chenes; the 10th Corps 
received instructions to march to St. Ail (orders of 12 noon); 
the 3d, with which corps Prince Frederick Charles found 
himself, was to follow the 9th Corps to Verneville; the 12th 
Corps to march on Ste. Marie aux Chenes (12 o'clock) in 
order to envelop St. Privat from there; the 2d Corps, which 
was approaching, was directed toward Rezonville. 

Before these new orders reached General von Manstein, 



120 VONBOGUSLAWSKI 

commanding the 9th Corps, he had begun the battle by the 
deployment of a strong artillery very close to the enemy. 



The commanding generals of the 12th and the Guard 
Corps had partly followed the orders from Prince Frederick 
Charles, mentioned above, and had also supplemented 
them in part, and that correctly. When the 1st Guard 
Division, Pape, arrived at Habonville, its commander per- 
ceived that the attack on Amanvillers could not be executed, 
and decided, even before the arrival of new orders, to march 
off in the ravine running from Habonville north in the di- 
rection of St. Ail— Ste. Marie (about 1 p.m.). He reported 
this to corps headquarters and received its approval; but 
now he had to halt in front of Ste. Marie and wait for orders, 
since that village had in the meantime been occupied by the 
French. 

The artillery of the 1st Guard Division went into position 
at Habonville and later at St. Ail, where it was joined by the 
corps artillery. 

In the meantime lid Army headquarters reached the 
conclusion that St. Privat was strongly occupied by the 
French. This village was now— contrary to the former in- 
tention—to be attacked by the Guard Corps; but the battle 
was to be carried on for the present only by artillery until 
the 12th Corps could envelop the position. 

About 3 p.m. the Crown Prince of Saxony reported that 
he had started the 24th Division on Ste. Marie aux Chenes, 
the 23d on Coinville with directions to envelop the French 
right wing. This independent decision was of great im- 
portance, for thereby the 12th Corps received the march 
direction enabling it to conform to the intentions of the 
army commander. 

About 3.20 p.m. Ste. Marie aux Chenes was taken, after 
a short artillery preparation, by parts of the 23d (47th 
Brigade) and 1st Guard Divisions— Generals von Nehrhoff 
and Pape having consulted together as to ways and means. 
A large part of the 47th Brigade, the commander of which 
was wounded, immediately followed up the retreating French 
to Roncourt, paying no attention to the express orders to 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 121 

hold Ste. Marie, 1 but encountered such a heavy resistance 
in front of that place that the troops were driven back 
to Ste. Marie. 2 This further advance was not in consonance 
with the planned envelopment. 

In the meantime the 2d Guard Division had come up. 
The 3d Guard Infantry Brigade was placed at the disposal 
of Genera] von Manstein and took position at Habonville. 
The 4th marched with the divisional artillery to St. Ail. 
The divisional artillery went into position south of Ste. 
Marie, so that now the entire Guard artillery under Prince 
von Hohenlohe was engaged. 

In the meantime the 23d Division had been sent by Crown 
Prince Albert through Auboue on Roncourt to envelop the 
enemy. The Saxon artillery covered this movement from a 
position north of Ste. Marie. 

The deployment of artillery from the Bois de la Cusse to 
the woods of Auboue consisted of about 180 guns and silenced 
the French artillery at St. Privat and Amanvillers. By this 
time a pause had occurred in the fire— a shot was fired by 
the artillery only here and there. 

As Saxon Corps headquarters believed the vicinity of 
Roncourt too strongly occupied and as the Crown Prince in- 
tended at all hazards to avoid encountering the hostile front, 
he issued orders at 4 p.m. to Prince George (23d Division) to 
reach out farther to the north and for that purpose the latter 
received the 48th Brigade (of the 24th Division). 

In consequence of these orders Prince George sent the 
48th Brigade to advance in the Orne valley through Montois 
on Roncourt. The 45th Brigade was to attack that place 
from the west. At this time the 46th Brigade was between 
Moineville and Coinville. 

The 47th Brigade, however, which had fought at Ste. 
Marie, was drawn from that place north to the south edge of 
the woods by Auboue in order, as the General Staff Account 
states in a footnote, to be in readiness there as a corps re- 
serve. We can hardly consider this movement justified. 
The brigade had better have been directed against Roncourt 
as soon as the enveloping column interfered from the north. 

1 Report of the 12th Corps, 
statement of an eye witness. 



122 VONBOGUSLAWSKI 

Montois was unoccupied. The resistance was every- 
where very slight, as Marshal Canrobert at this time as- 
sembled all his forces in and around St. Privat. 

The Saxon artillery had advanced from its position on the 
Ste. Marie — Hautmecourt road in two rushes to a position 
about 1700 meters west of Roncourt. When the 45th Brigade 
advanced from the west and the enveloping column from the 
north, against Roncourt, they found that village unoccupied. 
The south end of the village, according to the statement of 
a reliable man, had been reached before then by a few com- 
panies of the 1st Guard Brigade, but probably they reached 
there about the same time as the Saxons. The Brigade 
Pechot had before this occupied the forest of Jaumont, 
against which one regiment of the 48th Brigade and parts 
of the 47th were now compelled to turn. Later the Brigade 
Pechot was driven back to behind the quarries of Jaumont. 

We may well doubt whether the reaching out beyond 
Montois was necessary, especially as, according to the re- 
port of the 1st Guard Division, Lieutenant von Byern of the 
Guard Hussar Regiment reported on his return from a patrol 
ride that the vicinity at Montois and Roncourt was free of 
the enemy except some few patrols and this officer had sent 
the same report also to the Saxon corps headquarters. But 
in any case the maxim was adhered to: in enveloping, en- 
velop completely to be on the safe side. 

In the meantime the attack of the Guard Corps had been 
started. This attack has given rise to many comments and 
reflections. 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg considered the immediate 
attack necessary and asked for the approval of the army 
commander, which was granted, according to the General 
Staff Account, page 860. There is no express mention of 
such approval in the report rendered by headquarters lid 
Army. It is said therein: "The advanced time of day did 
not permit of awaiting the completion of the envelopment 
begun through Montois on Roncourt (on the part of the 
Saxons); rather it appeared necessary to bring about the 
decision at once. These considerations induced Prince 
August of Wiirttemberg to attack." But undoubtedly the 
approval was given verbally and General von Pape's state- 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 123 

merits are in accord with this view to the effect that con- 
ditions could not have been overlooked from Habonville. 

The cooperation of the Saxons at this time (5 p.m.) was 
impossible. According to a statement in the Militdr 
Wochenblatt in 1872 by the then chief of staff of the Guard 
Corps, later minister of war, Bronsart von Schellendorf , the 
following reasons for attack are given: 

1. The intention of bringing help to the 9th Corps. 

2. To facilitate the envelopment of the Saxons. 

3. Because hostile movements were seen which could 
be interpreted either as some operation against a neighbor- 
ing corps or as the beginning of a retreat. 

4. Because it was assumed that the French main re- 
serves would be directed toward the right wing, which was 
a fact as was learned later. 

The General Staff Account states, on page 859, that it 
was then believed that the Saxons would interfere directly 
and that the advanced hour of the day demanded a decision. 

The reasons given in the Militdr Wochenblatt are in my 
opinion insufficient and those cited in the General Staff Ac- 
count may be given in explanation as to why the original 
plan — which was certainly correct— to await the envelopment 
of the Saxons was deviated from. 

It is certainly very remarkable that a massed artillery 
fire was not at once directed on St. Privat. This was not 
done at all as a matter of fact. Our long artillery lines had 
silenced the hostile artillery, but not a shot had been fired 
on St. Privat, the main attack objective, when the attack 
was started. And this attack was also no mass attack on a 
large scale. 

Its course was as follows: First the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade advanced from St. Ail against the projecting spur 
of the hill south of St. Privat, took it, but after suffering 
enormous losses was unable to advance further although it 
maintained its hold therein spite of a counter attack, by the 
Division Cissey, against its right flank, which was defeated 
with the help of a few groups of infantry and two batteries 
which had arrived on the ridge. These batteries here per- 
formed a piece of heroism similar to the two batteries which 
held their position at St. Hubert. 



124 VONBOGUSLAWSKI 

As soon as General von Manstein observed the advance 
of the 4th Guard Brigade he caused the 3d Guard Infantry- 
Brigade, placed under his orders, to advance from Habon- 
ville against Amanvillers. Three Hessian batteries also 
were to advance to cover the left flank of the Guard brigade. 

The Guard brigade left the Regiment Elizabeth tempo- 
rarily in the Bois de la Cusse and called it up only after 
the advance of the other battalions had come to a stand in 
front of of Amanvillers, also after suffering enormous losses. 
There was no talk here of a mass attack. Still a stretch of 
terrain was gained in front of Amanvillers and held in spite 
of several counter attacks by the French. In these two 
attacks the effect of the German artillery against the counter 
attacks of the French was a very decisive one. 

In the meantime the attack of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division was started from Ste. Marie, to which place Prince 
August of Wfirttemberg had ridden. He ordered the attack 
to be made along the road, guiding on the highest buildings 
in St. Privat. 

General von Pape very pointedly called attention to the 
fact that the Saxon envelopment column was not yet near 
and that no artillery fire had as yet been directed on St. 
Privat. Prince August replied that the 12th Corps was to 
attack Roncourt about 5 p.m., and that it was now 5.30 p.m. 
and consequently high time for the 1st Guard Division to 
start. On the rejoinder by General von Pape that the 12th 
Corps was still northwest of Ste. Marie, the Prince replied 
that the 2d Guard Division was already advancing against 
Amanvillers, with the addition "everything takes so long a 
time with you." 

The remark that the artillery had not yet fired on St. 
Privat was in consonance with the facts. There was an ab- 
sence of agreement between the artillery and the troop com- 
manders. The artillery, furthermore, had not received the 
necessary orientation as to the imminent attack on St. Privat. 
On the other hand, as already remarked, it had efficiently 
supported the attack on Amanvillers. 

The second motive advanced by General von Pape, con- 
cerning the approach of the Saxons, was correct, though he 
did not estimate correctly the actual location of the Saxons 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 125 

at that moment. After the last rebuff by the Prince, Gen- 
eral von Pape issued at once orders for the advance. He had 
no choice of attack direction. Some of the higher houses 
had been designated as attack objective by the chief of staff 
of the Guard Corps, Colonel von Dannenberg. The 1st Guard 
Infantry Division, southwest of Ste. Marie, now started 
forward. 

The 2d Guard Regiment followed immediately behind the 
right wing of the 1st Brigade, but was very soon drawn 
forward by the general into the first line on the right. 

Each regiment of the 1st Guard Brigade was formed in 
three lines, the first line in column of companies, the other 
two into half-battalions. The brigade under General von 
Kessel first made a left turn with the intention of getting 
near the fortress-like position from the northwest and of 
utilizing the terrain there which was more favorable for the 
attack. In this manner the brigade executed a flank march 
under the hostile fire without any cover and I can only ad- 
here to my statement made in Entwickelung der Taktik that 
this brigade ought to have made that movement west of 
Ste. Marie and to have moved round the northern corner to 
execute the attack. After covering about 600 paces the 
battalions turned successively to the right and then advanced 
to the attack on St. Privat, while a few companies from the 
left wing remained in the direction of Roncourt, where they 
encountered the Saxons. The very weak garrison of Ron- 
court fled from the village. 

Though supported by the 4th Guard Regiment, the attack 
against St. Privat was forced to halt 500 to 600 paces in front 
of the position. The losses here were also enormous and, 
according to General von Pape's estimate, amounted to 3000 
in a very short time. As in the 3d and 4th Brigade there 
were battalions here which lost all of their officers. 

This stage of the battle showed, as it was also shown at 
other points, in what the German soldiers were superior to 
the French, namely, in the stubborn adherence to the attack. 
The troops maintained their foothold in front of St. Privat 
with great tenacity, as they did in front of Amanvillers. 
One thing must be remarked. The Corps Canrobert remained 



126 VON BOGUSLAWSKI 

entirely passive. No counter attack was made. This trial 
was saved the Guard at St. Privat. 

On this glacis-like slope the long range effect of the 
French rifles caused the attacking troops great losses. 
According to the statements of General von Pape the French 
troops fired high above the attackers at 500 to 600 paces. 
Statements differ according to the terrain. For instance, 
the 4th Guard Regiment states— it advanced in a more favor- 
able terrain than did the 1st Brigade — that it had the greatest 
losses at 400 paces. According to my opinion the French 
were given to firing too high at short ranges. 

When the force of the resistance was perceived, General 
von Pape sent back the most urgent appeals to the artillery 
for support. 1 General von Budritski ordered his divisional 
artillery to move ahead. Now only the artillery opened fire 
directly on St. Privat. The artillery line of the Guard Corps 
between Habonville and St. Privat advanced by echelons. 
The remaining batteries of the corps artillery also went into 
position a little to the right of these batteries. A part of 
them, however, was directed to fire on the opponent at 
Amanvillers. This was about at 7 p.m. 2 

About this time help approached through the Saxons. 

The 48th Brigade advanced directly on St. Privat; of 
the 45th Brigade, which as stated above had approached 
Roncourt from the west, several bodies of troops also turned 
against St. Privat on request of the Guard Corps, but in 
doing so crossed their march with parts of the 48th Brigade 
coming from the north. 

Two Saxon batteries were firing on St. Privat. Later 
the entire Saxon artillery line turned to the right and formed 
in a new line about 1400 paces from St. Privat. 

Of course that artillery could not have been in action 
very long, as the assault was now made by the Guards and 

x General von Pape states in his report that he had sent off his 
adjutant with instructions to make it clear that support should be 
rendered, or the artillery be held responsible for any failure. 

2 General von Pape maintains with determination that only five 
batteries, three Guard and two Saxon batteries, fired directly on St. 
Privat. 



REFLECTIONS ON ARMY MATTERS 127 

Saxons and, carried out by both with unusual energy, 
brought this French bulwark into our hands. * 

The following were present in reserve or coming up: 
the 46th and the 47th Brigades, the Guard Fusilier Regi- 
ment, which had been held back in Ste. Marie with the 
Guard Jagers, and the 20th Division. 

Only at 6 p.m. did the 10th Corps receive orders from 
army headquarters to advance on St. Ail. Its artillery in 
part entered the artillery lines of the Guards and Saxons. 

The 6th French Corps retreated in confusion. The 
Grenadier Division of the Guard, sent up by order of Bazaine, 
arrived too late. An enormous German artillery line formed 
itself south and north of St. Privat and kept up the fire fight 
with the hostile artillery, which attempted to cover the 
retreat, until after 9 p.m. 

The entire French position was untenable and the French 
army fell back on Metz during the night. The total losses 
of the Germans were 899 officers and 19,260 men; those of the 
Guard Corps alone 307 officers, 7,923 men. Two guns of the 
9th Corps were lost. 

The French lost 589 officers and 12,273 men. 

The battle leadership of the lid Army at the beginning 
of the afternoon has been characterized as excellent. 

Concerning the orders from that time on the following 
should be noticed: since the battle line had greatly to be 
extended, owing to the movements of the 12th Corps to the 
north, it would probably have been advisable to have drawn 
the 10th Corps toward St. Privat earlier, for security in case 
of a reverse or for participation in the final assault on St. 
Privat. As the 10th Corps reached Batilly at 2.30 p.m., this 
could easily have been done. Had it been done, the 1st 
Guard Division would have been able to have sent in its five 
regiments at once against St. Privat. We may well ques- 
tion whether the preparations for the attack on St. Privat 

General von Pape, who was accustomed to demand the highest 
exertions of his troops, and was a true Spartan in his way of thinking 
and acting, recounted in a letter in 1874 the force of the Saxon attack 
and praised it, and that is saying a great deal for him, for it cannot be 
denied that the achievements of other troops were in his eyes put into 
the background as compared with those of his own troops. 



128 VONBOGUSLAWSKI 

would not have been better regulated by army headquarters, 
either by the army commander himself proceeding to Ste. 
Marie, or by his exactly stating in definite orders the 
time the attack should begin. 

The careful leadership of the 12th Army Corps has been 
generally praised. Still, doubt has been expressed whether 
it was necessary to reach out beyond Montois. As we can 
view things now this was not necessary, as nothing was 
encountered there and almost nothing in Roncourt. But this 
could not be known at that time, the less so since as a matter 
of fact the 47th Brigade, after the capture of Ste. Marie, 
encountered serious opposition in the vicinity of Roncourt. 
Canrobert drew his troops back on St. Privat only in the 
face of the movements of the Saxons. 

On the other hand, as already remarked, there appears 
very little valid excuse for drawing the 47th Brigade from 
Ste. Marie to the woods of Auboue, and the same may be 
said of the delay arising at Montois, caused by the orders 
issued to the 45th Brigade to await the arrival of the 48th 
Brigade. For the fact that Montois was not occupied 
could have been learned by cavalry reconnaissance. 

A military writer held in high esteem by us states that 
the battle would have been lost if the French Guard Grena- 
dier Division had arrived about one hour and fifteen minutes 
earlier. General von Pape is of the same opinion. 1 And, 
as a matter of fact, had Canrobert utilized it correctly for a 
counter attack round the north side of St. Privat on the left 
flank of the 1st Guard Infantry Division at the moment when 
that division was bleeding to death in front of St. Privat, or 
had he utilized it to oppose the Saxons, it is a serious ques- 
tion whether the approaching Saxon reserve brigades and 
the 20th Division would have been or would not have been 
able to change the day into victory. The battle probably 
would have remained undecided and would again have been 
taken up the next day with the help of the army reserves, 
the 2d, 3d, and 10th Corps. 

But all these are suppositions. 



Expressed in his letter of 1877. 



The Initiative of King Albert in the 
Campaign of 1870-71 1 

BY 

Baron von Hodenberg 

General of Infantry 



TN the following articles it is the intention to discuss those 
-^ important events in which the King 8 3 exercised a decisive 
influence in his capacity as commanding general of the Saxon 
Army Corps and as commander of the Army of the Maas, and 
not to give a continuous narrative of the campaign. An at- 
tempt will be made to indicate as clearly as possible the con- 
ditions under which the King arrived at his decisions, also 
the nature of any orders which he may have received from 
higher authorities. Proof will be offered to show that he 
exercised at all times excellent judgment in his independent 
course of action and in council and that he showed on all occa- 
sions a decided preference for energetic offensive measures. 
The course of operations and battles will be only gener- 
ally discussed; with the exception of the battle of St. Privat, 
because in that battle the activity of the King cannot be de- 
scribed without going into details. Military history knows 
the King only as Crown Prince of Saxony and therefore he 
must be so designated in what follows. 

I. The leading of the 12th (Royal Saxon) Corps at 

Gravelotte— St. Privat la Montagne 

on the 18th of August, 1870. 

The corps, which was attached to the lid Army, did not 
arrive on the first line, with the exception of the cavalry 

1 From the Wissenschaftliche Beilage No. 44 to the Leipziger Zei- 
tung, 1898. One of a series under the same title. 

2 Of Saxony— Trsl. 

3 Field Marshal and last possessor of the Grand Cross of the Order 
of the Iron Cross. 

129 



130 BARON VON HODENBERG 

division, until the 17th of August. It passed the succeeding 
night with the 23d Division at Mars la Tour, and Headquar- 
ters and the 24th Division at Puxieux. 

Prince Frederick Charles placed it on the left wing of his 
army for August 18th and assembled the commanding gen- 
erals of the Guard, 10th and 11th Corps at 5 a.m. at Mars la 
Tour and issued to them the following orders: 

Today the lid Army will continue the advance for the purpose 
of carrying out the orders already given, i. e., to drive the enemy away 
from Verdun and Chalons and to attack him wherever found. For 
that purpose the 12th Corps will start immediately as extreme left 
wing, to be followed in the right rear by the Guard Corps, the latter 
being similarly followed by the 9th Corps. The 12th Corps will take 
direction on Jarny, the Guard Corps on Doncourt, the 9th Corps will 
advance between Vionville and Rezonville, thereafter passing on the 
right of St. Marcel. The 3d * * * 10th * * * The enemy is 
said to have been in retreat last evening towards Conflans. It is also 
probable that the three divisions reported to have been in bivouac at 
Gravelotte have started; if not, they may have been attacked by Gen- 
eral von Steinmetz, in which case the 9th Corps may become engaged 
first. Whether all of this may lead to a turn to the right by the lid 
Army cannot yet be determined. For the present it is only a question 
of a march of scarcely four miles. This march will not be made in long, 
thin march columns but the divisions will be closely massed; the corps 
artillery will march between the two divisions of each army corps. x 

Thereupon the 23d Division received orders at 5.20 a.m. 
to start its advance guard at once and to follow it after half 
an hour with one brigade on each side of the road, in assem- 
bly formation, the battalions in column toward the center 
with one-fourth platoon distance; the corps artillery on a 
broad front. The 24th Division was to follow in the same 
formation. The difficulties offered by the ravines (wooded 
in part) on both sides of Mars la Tour and by that village 
itself, caused the massing of the divisions to be delayed to a 
point north of the village. Only the corps artillery went 
round the west of the village. This caused a delay in the 
crossing of the Guard Corps marching from Hannonville to- 
ward Doncourt, which had already been discussed by the 
Crown Prince at Headquarters of the lid Army. 2 But 
that delay made its effect felt in the course of the day only 

1 General Staff Account, Vol. 2, pp. 682, 683. (See p. 49 ante.) 
8 Ibid. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 131 

in the fact that the reconnaissance of the Guard Corps 
was at first made by a single squadron, sent out at 6.30 a.m. 
by the commander of the 1st Guard Division, General von 
Pape. However, north of Mars la Tour, where the 12th 
Corps marched in mass, additional Guard cavalry could at any 
time have trotted through between the advance guard and 
the 23d Divison, as well as between the latter and the 24th 
Division and in the south it could have ridden around Puxieux. 
Much has been written, especially recently, concerning 
this crossing. Anyone who does not take terrain difficulties 
into consideration will be hard to convince, even though 
Schlichting 1 gravely doubts the possibility of movements in 
masses, by troops more than a brigade strong, in assembly 
formation in any terrain. For similar reasons, as prevailed 
at first in the case of the Saxons, according to Operations 
of the lid Army" the Guard Corps remained in the already 
existing march column formation. According to another 
source 3 it marched in columns one behind the other and, as a 
matter of fact, only the 10th Corps appears to have advanced 
massed, 4 which procedure could be only partly adopted later 
on by the 12th. Scherff discusses only the actual and pos- 
sible consequences of blocking the march. In all of his nu- 
merous studies concerning all phases of the battle he gives due 
credit to the 12th Corps and especialy to its illustrious com- 
mander by continuously referring to the fact that the corps 
always acted as one body. Boguslawski does not entirely 
approve of the manner of advance of the corps and considers 
that the sending ahead of an advance guard which took so 
much time was not necessary, since the cavalry division 
was out in front. However, that cavalry division was on the 

x General of Infantry, von Schlichting "Taktische und strategische 
Grundsdtze der Gegenwart ; 1897, vol. 1, p. 97. 

2 Von der Goltz: Operations of the lid Army. (See p. 59 ante.) 

3 General von Boguslawski: Heerwesen und Kriegsfiihrung ; 1897; 
p. 213. In the Letters on Cavalry by Kraft Prince of Hohenlohe, 1884, 
it is stated on page 22 that the Guard Corps advanced from Doncourt 
against St. Ail in one column, three battalions broad and closed in 
mass. (See p. 90 ante.) 

4 General of Infantry, von Scherff: Unsere heutige Infanterie 
Taktik im Spiegel der Augustkdmpfe 1870 um Metz; 1893, p. 41. But in 
place of "23d Division" it should read "12th Corps". The 18th of 
August is also discussed in the third book of his Kriegslehren; 1895. 



132 BARON VONHODENBERG 

left flank, almost eight miles west of Jarny on the Metz— 
Etain road. 

At 5.40 a.m the leading elements of the infantry crossed, 
within the limits of Mars la Tour, the Metz— Verdun road 1 
and after 9 a.m. the road was free for the Guard. The ad- 
vance guard reached Jarny at 8.30 a.m. In the meantime 
it had received orders to continue the march through Labry 
on both sides of the Orne. The main body (23d Division) ar- 
rived at Jarny after 9 a.m. and remained there until 11.30 
a.m. In view of this halt of several hours, ordered by higher 
headquarters, and which would have consumed even more 
hours except for the independent action of the Crown Prince, 
the starting time of the corps from the place of assembly 
north of Mars la Tour is of no importance. And yet the view 
has been expressed, and is still being expressed, that the 
corps could have been at St. Privat earlier if it had hastened 
its advance more. This is also contained in a general state- 
ment made by von Scherff. 2 He says: "Had the enemy's 
position been perceived earlier and had then the lid Army 
started the continuation of its movement from the line Jarny 
(12th Corps)— Doncourt (Guard Corps)— Caulre Ferme (9th 
Corps) 1J to 2 hours earlier and massed, then the (as he ex- 
presses it) unsupported frontal attack of the Guard on St. 
Privat would not have been made; and this early ascertain- 
ment of the position and earlier advance would have been 
made possible had the 12th and Guard Corps (the 9th Corps 
not coming into consideration here) advanced in mass in the 
start and thus avoided the crossing." But, as already stated, 
the reconnaissance need not have been interfered with by the 
crossing and, as far as an earlier start is concerned, the 12th 
Corps could without difficulty have started in mass from 
Jarny 1J to 2 hours earlier, while the Guard Corps as a mat- 
ter of fact reached the vicinity of Habonville— Anoux la 
Grange as early as 2.30 p.m., though the frontal attack on St. 
Privat was not begun until 5.15 p.m. from Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes — St. Ail. 3 Thus both corps, and this is the main point, 
could have been 1J to 2 hours earlier at St. Privat, even in 

1 Operations of the lid Army, (see p. 50 ante.) 

"Infanterie Taktik, p. 44. 

8 General Staff Account, vol. 2; pp. 750, 770, 772, 860. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 133 

the march formation they took, had they received orders to 

do so. 

* * * 

The reports, though contradictory in some instances, re- 
ceived by the Crown Prince up to 11.30 a.m. ought to have 
pointed out the presence of hostile, even if weaker, detach- 
ments at Ste. Marie aux Chenes and Moineville. In addition, 
army headquarters had sent copies of the following orders to 
the 9th and Guard Corps: 

To the 9th Army Corps (at 10 a.m ): The corps will fall in and 
advance in the direction of Vern6ville and La Polie. If the enemy is 
there with his right wing the battle will for the present be opened by 
deploying considerable artillery. 

To the Guard Corps (at 10.15 a.m.): The Guard Corps will continue 
the advance through Doncourt to Verngville and take position there 
for the support of the 9th Corps which is advancing on la Folie 
against the hostile right wing. Reconnaissance to the left through 
Amanvillers and St. Privat la Moutagne, as well as early reports are 
desirable. 

Concerning the Guard, an officer of corps headquarters, 
returning from Doncourt, reported that it had begun its de- 
ployment (Aufmarsch) at 10.25 a.m. 

Therefore the Crown Prince had to assume that not only 
the 9th Corps but also the Guard Corps had already re- 
sumed their advance. As a matter of fact the 1st Guard 
Division had just then started. He therefore decided, al- 
though Army orders directed him to remain at Jarny until 
further orders, to resume his march and advance to the point 
where the enemy was reported to be. But, as there still was 
uncertainty, a deep formation was assumed and the following 
decisions were made at 11.30 a.m. : 

That the advance guard remain in march on Moineville — Valleroy 
on both sides of the Orne; that the 24th Division proceed on the right 
to Ste. Marie aux Chines; that the 23d Division and corps artillery pro- 
ceed between to Bois de Ponty and Giraumont; that the 46th Brigade 
remain at Jarny at disposition of headquarters. 

The report to Army Headquarters, which best shows the 
views of the Crown Prince, is as follows: 

Jarny, 18 August, 11.45 a.m. 
The enemy is reported to be at Moineville and Ste. Marie aux 
Chfcnes; therefore the 12th Army Corps advances against these two 



134 BARON VON HODENBERG 

points. Flank protection against Valleroy. I proceed to Fleury, later 
on to Jouaville. (sgd.) Albert, 

Grown Prince, 

General of Infantry. 

That hereby the intentions of Army Headquarters had 
been anticipated is shown by the following orders, received 
at 12 noon : 

Orders for the 12th Corps. Issued at 11.30 a.m. 1 The 12th 
Corps is ordered to march on Ste. Marie aux Chines, to secure by cav- 
alry against Briey and Conflans and to send as much cavalry as possible 
into the valley of the Mosel to interrupt railroad and telegraph to 
Thionville. The 7th, 8th, 9th and Guard Corps will, within two hours, 
attack the enemy, who is in position on the heights from Leipzick to 
Bois de Vaux, his rear toward Metz. The 2d, 3d, 10th and 12th Corps 
will follow in second line as support. 

As the larger part of the corps had been started toward 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes, and as the uncertainty concerning the 
exact position of the enemy, so far found only in small de- 
tachments at the west of Ste. Marie, had not yet been dis- 
pelled, the Crown Prince kept to the movements already 
taking place and only called up the infantry brigade left at 
his disposition in Jarny and also the main body of the 12th 
Cavalry Division. 

This division, under the orders of the corps commander, 
had been sent as early as the 16th toward the Maas to Nou- 
sard by orders of army headquarters and had taken up con- 
nection by Captain von Klenck with the 10th Corps and with 
army headquarters on the battlefield of Mars la Tour. 2 
This captain, charged with seeking out the 5th Cavalry Divi- 
sion, had ridden toward the sound of cannon and asked orders 
at about 7 o'clock from General von Voights-Rhetz concern- 
ing the bringing up of the division; but instead of orders he 
received the following letter, which was endorsed by Prince 
Frederick Charles' own signature: 

x General Staff Account, vol. 2, appendix 23; page 183 and correc- 
tion of this appendix at conclusion of vol. 2. 

2 Ibid, vol. I, p. 655; Operationen der II Armee, p. 106; War 
Diary of the 1st Squadron Guard Cavalry Regiment, by Captain von 
Klenck; 1895, (See p. 105emie.) 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 135 

lb is desirable that at daybreak tomorrow morning everything 
which is disposable appear at Ti'onville, provided Prince Frederick 
Charles makes no other dispositions. 

(egd.) Prince Frederick Charles and 
General von Voigts-Rhetz. 

This letter was handed to Prince George of Saxony after 
10 p.m. in Regnieville and was published by him to his own 
and to headquarters of the Guard Corps and caused the 
immediate start of the 23d Division for Thiaucourt and the 
assembly during the night of the Guard Corps. The advance 
of these troops and all the others in the second line was made 
early on the 17th by direct orders from army headquarters, 
as well as the advance of the 12th Cavalry Division against 
the road from Metz to Verdun. The Crown Prince in addi- 
tion directed the 12th Cavalry Division that, should no ene- 
my be found on the southern road, it was to at once advance 
to the northern road. The cavalry reached that road (the 
northern) as early as 9 o'clock at St. Jean les Buzy, the Crown 
Prince having set the starting time at 4 a.m., and, to make 
sure of that start, he had personally instructed the lieutenant 
von Trebra carrying these orders during the night to ride 
as rapidly as possible. 1 It was ascertained that the Em- 
peror Napoleon had ridden through the village the preceding 
evening with a strong guard from Metz, but that otherwise 
no troops had passed in the same direction. The division re- 
mained there until early on the 18th of August without see- 
ing an enemy. A few dispersed or lost soldiers had been 
captured, whose statements appeared to be of importance. 
Second Lieutenant von Hiniiber started with these prisoners 
at 3 p.m., August 17th, from St. Jean les Buzy and in Puxieux 
received orders from the Crown Prince to deliver them to 
Army Headquarters in Buxieres. Prince Frederick Charles 
personally conversed with the lieutenant and expressed his 
satisfaction with the achievements of the division. 2 Sev- 

iColonel von Schimpff: Konig Albert 50 Jahre Soldat; 1893; p. 
201. 

2 Operations of the lid Army ; (see p. 48 footnote ante) and Bericht 
des Lieutenants von Hiniiber. 



136 BARON VON HODENBERG 

eral works 1 give the occupation of the Metz— Conflans — 
Etain road as having occurred on the forenoon of August 
17th; it should be stated here, however, that the Metz — Briey 
road was not reached by German cavalry until the forenoon 
of August 18th. 

During the night of August 17-18, General Count Lippe, 
camped with the main body at Parfondrupt, had placed it 
in position at Puxe in consonance with orders given from 
Mars la Tour at 5.20 a.m. and was already marching on 
his own responsibility to the battlefield when he received 
orders to proceed there and at the same time was directed to 
reconnoiter anew towards Briey. The 18th Uhlan Regiment 
was charged with that duty, the 17th Uhlan Regiment contin- 
uing its observation farther toward the west. Therefore 
only the two heavy cavalry regiments and the horse battery 
made connection with the corps at 3 p.m. at the Bois de 
Ponty. The compact part of the cavalry divison soon after 
numbered only six squadrons and one horse battery, because 
in consonance with orders received from headquarters two 
squadrons were detached at 4 p.m. which interrupted rail- 
road and telegraph south of Diedenhofen at Uckange and 
Richemont between 7 and 8 p.m. This caused the first re- 
port from Marshal Bazaine concerning the events of the 18th 
of August to be delayed in reaching the hands of Emperor 
Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon until the 22d of August. 2 
Opportunity should here be taken to anticipate our account 
and add that pioneers destroyed also the railroad and tele- 
graph east of Longuion at Mercy le Bas in the night of 

August 18-19th. 

* * * 

After this digression we now return to the Crown Prince, 
who awaited, eagerly, on the rise south of Batilly, the fur- 
ther developments of the situation, especially as the noise of 
battle in the east became steadily stronger and seemed to 
finally indicate that a greater part of the army was already 

1 H6nig: 24 Stunden Moltkescher Strategie; 1893. — Die Ursachen 
der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870, by Woide, Lieut-General 
of the Russian General Staff, translated, Berlin, 1896; vol. 2; page 9— 
Kunz: Die Thatigkeit der deutschen Reiterei vom 15 — 18 August 1870 
vor Metz; 1891 ; p. 44. 

2 Bazaine's Court- Martial. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 137 

engaged in a heavy battle. Each message reaching his hands 
stated that the hostile right wing was farther north; the last 
ones stated it to be at St. Privat and Roncourt. The corps, 
however, was advancing in just that direction. A new situ- 
ation confronted the Crown Prince at 1.30 p.m., brought 
about by the return of Captain von der Planitz who had been 
sent ahead. He had found Ste. Marie aux Chenes still free of 
the enemy at 12.30 p.m. and had also seen from there that 
St. Privat was held in strong force and that that place, situ- 
ated on a height, offered a remarkable degree of resistance 
against an attack from the west, all of which he reported 
in great detail. 

The Crown Prince, examining the map, listened to Captain 
von der Planitz without saying a word and when the latter 
had concluded spoke about as follows: "In that case we will 
not attack that position in front, but will envelop it," and 
made a corresponding motion with his left arm. The sudden 
decision was then carefully considered in regard to its execu- 
tion, for which there was, in this case, plenty of time. 
The reports which arrived in the meantime from the 23d Di- 
vision stated, that at least one hostile division was at St. 
Privat and Roncourt, but no enemy at Auboue and that con- 
sequently the division had likewise continued its march to- 
ward Ste. Marie. The advance guard reported that it had no 
enemy in front on either side of the Orne and that Briey was 
free of the enemy. All these reports strengthened the esti- 
mate already entertained and now, at 2 p.m., it was ordered 
that the 24th Division and corps artillery should continue 
their movement toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes, that the 23d 
Division should proceed through Coinville and the groves 
east of Auboue towards Roncourt, and that the 48th Brigade 
should halt behind the woods of Batilly and remain at the 
disposition of the Crown Prince. As always, but in this 
case in duplicate, the Crown Prince reported his measures 
to Prince Frederick Charles and also sent information there- 
of to the Guard Corps— proof that he was fully cognizant of 
the importance of the measures taken. This information 
was received at 3 o'clock at army headquarters, which re- 
peatedly directed an occupation of the lower valley of the 
Mosel, but issued no other orders on that day to the 12th 



138 BARON VON HODENBERG 

Corps. This led to the justified assumption even during the 
battle that the independent measures taken then and later 
on were approved. 

The following is a verbatim copy of the report: 

Sent 18th Aug., 2.30 p.m. fromBatilly. The Saxon Army Corps ad- 
vances with its 24th Infantry Division on Ste. Marie aux Chene9 and 
with its 23d Infantry Division envelops the French right wing by way 
of Coinville and the small woods situated between there and Roncourt. 

Albert, 
Crown Prince, 

General of Infantry. 

In the meantime, about 1 p.m., the French 6th Corps, 
Canrobert, in position on the hostile right wing from St. 
Privat to Roncourt, had sent infantry in advance of this line 
as far as Ste. Marie aux Chenes, which place Captain von der 
Planitz had found free of the enemy, and also towards St. 
Ail. Thus the first contact took place there, leading to the 
capture of Ste. Marie aux Chenes at about 3.30 p.m. This 
battle was conducted by General von Pape, the commanding 
general of the 1st Guard Division, and General von Nehr- 
hoff, the commanding general of the 24th Division, after 
they had consulted together. The left wing of the Guards 
pressed forward from St. Ail, the 47th Brigade from the 
west, and both entered the village at 3.30 p.m. Of the 23d 
Division, three batteries and the 3d Battalion of the rifle regi- 
ment No. 108, participated in the battle. The Crown Prince 
found no occasion for interference at any stage of the fight. 
He viewed the excellently conducted advance of the 47th 
Brigade under Colonel von Leonhardi from the Saxon artil- 
lery's main position and enjoyed it. But when a stronger 
part of this brigade became visible on the other side of the 
village and at the same time the advance of new hostile in- 
fantry from the direction of St. Privat was noted, he sent 
definite orders, which in the meantime General von Nehrhoff 
had also issued, that the troops confine themselves to the 
holding of Ste. Marie. General von Pape had also issued sim- 
ilar orders to govern those parts of the Guard which had 
entered the village. An unsupported advance of weak 
forces against the strong hostile front would have led to the 
useless annihilation of the former and would have brought 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 139 

about the most dire consequenses. The Saxon Infantry 
had suffered severe losses in front of the village and had 
been able to hold their own on the wings against the repeated 
French attacks only with great difficulty. The retrograde 
movement of the infantry appeared at the time, as to the 
Guards, to be a forced one, since they were in ignorance of 
the fact that the infantry had been called back— the orders 
for which (issued by the Crown Prince), I personally carried 
— and this view, natural, though incorrect, has not entirely 
disappeared even now. ' Such a view should be combatted. 
The enemy is as ignorant on that point as the General Staff 
Account. 2 

In the meantime 12 batteries went into position immedi- 
ately northwest of Ste. Marie and fired on the offensive ad- 
vances of the enemy and on the French artillery position 
at Roncourt. Batteries of the Guard Corps appeared on the 
other side of Ste. Marie. Throughout all this the conduct of 
the enemy was watched with the greatest attention. Ron- 
court and St. Privat showed themselves to be strongly held. 
From both places fresh troops were drawn forward. French 
infantry several times came close to Ste. Marie, while behind 
it was a numerous line of guns under fire, which appeared to 
prolong itself northward beyond Roncourt. It is said that 
cavalry patrols of the Guard Corps reported to Saxon corps 
headquarters that Montois la Montagne was occupied by the 
enemy. 3 All this gave the Crown Prince the impression 
that under these conditions the movement made by the 23d 
Infantry Division, started through Coinville to Roncourt, 

Account of an eyewitness in Heerwesen und Kriegsfiihrung, p. 
229. A comparison of the two descriptions will clearly indicate the 
other points with which we cannot agree. 

2 Rousset: Histoire g6n6rale de la guerre Franco- Allemande; 
1895; vol. 2, pp. 119, 120. General Staff Account, vol. 2; pp. 761-763. 

^Operations of the lid Army; (see p. 71 ante.) The excellent 
reconnaissance of the Guard Hussars in front of the Saxon front has 
not been forgotten. As is shown they frequently mistook Prince 
George of Saxony for the Crown Prince and this report probably was 
delivered to the former. It is impossible that a report was received 
by corps headquarters or the 23d Division (before the envelopment 
[4.30 p.m.,] through Montois) to the effect that the country around 
Montois and Roncourt was free of the enemy, with exception of a few 
patrols, as is stated in Heerwesen und Kriegsfiihrung, page 231. This 
must be an error. Probably the words "and Roncourt" were uninten- 
tionally added. 



140 BAEON VON HODENBBRG 

would not be an enveloping movement but would still con- 
tinue to be a frontal one, and as he was firmly determined 
to execute the plan already determined upon of enveloping 
the French wing, whatever might happen, he came to the 
conclusion that the movement must be extended and there- 
fore executed with larger forces. Prince George therefore 
received proper orders and the 48th Brigade, thus far kept at 
Batilly at the disposition of headquarters, was also assigned 
to his command. General Count Lippe also received orders 
for that part of the cavalry division which was at hand to 
join the enveloping movement and to try and reach the ene- 
my's rear. The divisional cavalry regiment of the 24th In- 
fantry Division took the same road. The 47th Brigade and 
the artillery of the 24th Division and the corps artillery were 
left north of Ste. Marie for the present. 

From now on everything depended on the success which 
the enveloping troops would have. There were 21 battal- 
ions, 1 13 squadrons, and 5 batteries. At Ste. Marie were 
only 7 battalions, 1 squadron, 2 and 11 batteries. In spite 
of this the Crown Prince remained for the present with that 
small portion of the corps, in order not to lose sight of the 
hostile position and to keep closer touch with army headquar- 
ters and the Guard Corps. Even before the battle at Ste. 
Marie, headquarters of the Guard and 12th Corps had ex- 
changed officers for the purpose of sending reports. 
* * * 

From his position the Crown Prince now saw the renewed 
advance of French infantry from Roncourt against Auboue; 
he caused therefore the 23d Infantry Division to at once ad- 
vance infantry to the woods situated between the two vil- 
lages. 

We shall now turn to the left wing of the corps. 

When Prince George received the first orders for the en- 
veloping movement at 2.45 p.m., he had also already started, 
without orders, with the leading part of his division from the 
Bois de Ponty to Ste. Marie, from where came sound of cannon 

iOne battalion still marching from Pont a Mousson (the 2d Bn. 
106th Regt.), where it had been detached as guard at Royal Headquar- 
ters. 

3 With the corps artillery. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 141 

fire— this in consequence of reports that in the very front of 
the division and at Auboue no enemy was to be seen, but 
that at least one hostile division was at Roncourt— St. Privat. 
From the hill west of Ste. Marie he perceived, however, that 
not only the 24th Division but also troops of the Guards 
were opposite the village. He therefore rightly sought to 
employ his troops farther to the north and turned against 
Auboue, to which point the orders which had just arrived for 
the enveloping movement also called him. With equal inde- 
pendence did General von Craushaar advance with the ad- 
vance guard from Valleroy, because no enemy was found as 
far as beyond Briey. He now received orders, like the 46th 
Brigade, to proceed to Auboue. The parts of the 23d In- 
fantry Division which were engaged in the battle at Ste. 
Marie, did not come up until after the conclusion of the bat- 
tle. 

Woide, 1 who otherwise greatly praises the leadership of 
the Crown Prince and the conduct of the 12th Army Corps, 
at least on this day, disapproves of this marching to the 
sound of cannon and sees therein a disregard of the general 
situation or faults in the orders for the enveloping movement. 
However, during a battle no one knows the entire situation, 
least of all division or brigade commanders; and Prince 
George and General von Craushaar estimated the situation 
quite correctly, as is shown above. The orders for the en- 
veloping movement, however, did not arrive until later. 

The extension of the enveloping movement, ordered by 
the second orders (received 4.30 o'clock), was accomplished 
by the Prince by letting the 48th Brigade which had shortly 
thereafter arrived at Auboue, and three batteries and the 
divisional cavalry, continue their march in the valley of the 
Orne, in order to attack from Montois, while the 46th Bri- 
gade and one battery advanced through Moineville and the 
45th Brigade engaged the enemy in the woods between Au- 
boue and Roncourt, taking those woods at 5.15 o'clock. In 
the further advance it came in touch with the extreme left 
wing of the Guards, which had been forced against Ron- 
court, but waited with its own attack for the enveloping col- 

1 Woide, vol. 2; page 91. 



142 BARON VON HODENBERG 

umn. The 1st Battalion, 2d Grenadier Regiment No. 101 ob- 
served from woods situated opposite them the hostile detach- 
ments in position in Montois and the woods southeast of 
there and replied to the hostile fire with only a few scattered 
shots on account of the long range. An attack, which had 
already been ordered, was countermanded by orders from 
higher headquarters. 

According to Dick de Lonlay 1 one or two companies 
stood in the direction of Montois in the afternoon. Accord- 
ing to Rousset 2 one battalion of the 9th Regiment was sent 
at about 4.30 p.m. at the double time to Montois. According 
to the same writer only the 9th Regiment was at Roncourt, 
and the 94th Regiment from Ste. Marie and the Brigade 
Pechot (7 battalions) were not brought there until later. The 
French troops battling between Roncourt and St. Privat were 
not taken into account. 

In consideration of the conditions which ensued later on 
at St. Privat, it might be well at this point to consider the 
important and much discussed question as to whether or not 
the enveloping movement ought to have been so much ex- 
tended. Aside from the fact that at 4.30 p.m. it could not 
be foreseen at Auboue what shape the battle in which the 
Guards were engaged might assume, this question is an- 
swered by a glance at the map, which shows that the route 
taken was the most natural one. The Operations of the lid 
Army 3 makes the following statement to the same effect: 

If it was the intention that this enveloping movement be executed 
with as much concealment from the enemy as possible and with assured 
hope of decisive results, it had to be done under protection of the steep 
hills west of Montois, passing Joeuf in the valley of the Orne. 

After what is generally recognized to have been a most 
brilliant march the enveloping column ascended at 6 o'clock 
the top of the hill near Montois, which had been evacuated 
by the enemy and, at 6.30 p.m. the 48th and 45th Brigades 

^ick de Lonlay: Francais et Allemands; 1888; IV, 91. 

8 Rousset, vol. 2; p. 212. On page 137 he says that this bat- 
talion had been driven off by parts of the 48th Brigade. This is an 
error. Montois had already been given up when the brigade arrived 
there. Dick de Lonlay and other writers give a different account but 
all seem to believe that at Roncourt about one division went into 
action. 

3 Operations of the lid Army; (see page 71 ante.) 



THE INITIATIVE OP KING ALBERT 143 

came together in and around Roncourt. There was no en- 
gagement for the possession of the village; the French de- 
tachments driven to that place retreated through and past 
Roncourt into the forest, firing but little, since Marshal Can- 
robert in the meantime had drawn back his right wing toward 
St. Privat before the advance of the enveloping column, leav- 
ing behind those parts of his command which were in front of 
Roncourt. This movement, favored by the features of the 
terrain, could not be perceived by the attacking column. 
Otherwise the attack of the 45th Brigade would naturally 
have taken place sooner. 

But General von Craushaar learned of it before the right 
wing of his brigade, with which he was, had reached the 
heights of Roncourt and, being urgently requested by an or- 
derly officer of the 1st Guard Division to interfere at St. 
Privat, turned toward that point at 6.15 p.m. with the near- 
est parts of his brigade, which were followed by the rest. 
The report of his action which he sent by a mounted orderly 
to Prince George went astray. For the same reason Lieu- 
tenant Colonel von Schweinitz, with two battalions of the 
107th Regiment, had remained on the march to St. Privat on 
the direct road past Roncourt. In and around Roncourt oc- 
curred a simultaneous movement to the east and south which 
could not at once be brought into order. In addition, the 
extreme left wing of the 48th Brigade under Colonel von 
Abendroth became engaged on the edge of the forest of 
Jaumont in a serious battle and the flank fire coming from 
there brought the advance of General Senfft von Pilsach with 
the two heavy regiments of divisional cavalry to a stand. 

The Crown Prince had remained atSte. Marie until after 
6 p.m. For the sake of absolute security he had also sent 
orders from there to the 46th Brigade, which reached that 
brigade at Moineville at 5.15 p.m.; thereafter he had moved 
up the 12 batteries, under Colonel Juncke, which were near 
him, closer to Roncourt, so that their left wing touched the 
woods mentioned several times above; and finally, at 5.30 
p.m., he had caused the 47th Brigade to proceed to Roncourt 
also and had finally concentrated his whole corps there, 
where the decision was about to take place. To this place he 
then also proceeded himself. 



144 BARON VON HODENBERG 

Critics have rightly discussed subsequently the possibility 
and the consequences of an offensive counter attack by the 
French army reserve which, however, was not started (by 
the Guard Corps) until afternoon and then only in part from 
the French left to the German right wing and which did not 
come into action there. * The Crown Prince had still more 
reason to reckon with this counter attack at the start and, 
outside of the 13 squadrons assembled on the extreme wing, 
he could count with certainty only on the 47th Brigade. That 
brigade was therefore held in reserve. When he met the 
46th brigade on his way, he directed it to debouch toward St. 
Privat, because from his recent position he had observed the 
driving off of hostile batteries north of St. Privat and move- 
ments of French infantry from Roncourt toward St. Privat. 
He had also observed that the progress of the infantry at- 
tack begun by the Guards about an hour before was dimin- 
ishing on account of the strength of the position and unusual 
losses suffered by the Guards. While still in uncertainty as 
to the situation at Roncourt, General von Montbe received 
orders to proceed to Prince George and ask for his approval, 
which was granted. 

As soon as the Crown Prince, in the continuation of his 
ride, had perceived the change of conditions which had mean- 
while occurred, he supplemented the fire of the 2 batteries, 
firing against the north side of St. Privat, by 12 batteries at 
1400 yards range. The fire of the first battery going into 
position there was opened at 6.45 p.m. He abstained from 
any further interference. Any interference on his part was 
not at all required, for Prince George, after gaining knowl- 
edge of the conditions as we have described them, had shortly 
after 6.30 p.m. issued orders for a general advance on St. Pri- 
vat, which advance was devoid of unity, however, on account 
of the general endeavor to come to the relief of the much suf- 
fering, heroic Guards as soon as possible. The line of attack, 
at the start hardly 6 battalions strong, was gradually in- 
creased to a total of 11 battalions— mixed among them were 
7 Guard companies which had reached Roncourt. Of these, 
5| battalions, supported by 14 batteries, advanced on the 

iFor details of this see Kunz: Zur Geschichte der Kaiserlichen 
franzosischen Garde; 1898; page 51. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 146 

right, straight against the village, 2J battalions against the 
open terrain between the village and the forest, on the left 
3 battalions, supported by 2 batteries, against the stone 
quarries of Jaumont. In the second line followed eight bat- 
talions of the center, 2 battalions and 13 squadrons of the 
left group. In the third line stood seven more battalions in 
readiness behind the right wing. Thus the closed reserves 
consisted of 17 battalions and 13 squadrons. Simultaneously, 
the Guard Corps advanced on the right of the 12th Corps in 
general against the west and southwest side of St. Privat, 
but the interior wings overlapped each other and the advance 
of both corps transformed itself into a combined action. 

The Crown Prince eagerly awaited the decision (he was 
at that time about halfway between Roncourt and St. Privat 
and had there met Prince George 1 ) and felt a sense of 
great relief when he heard, above the terrible thunder of 
cannon and continuous roll of infantry fire, repeated hurrahs 
—St. Privat had been taken after a hot fight. Just as the 
sun was disappearing in the west, at 7.30 p.m., the Guards 
and Saxon troops stormed the village in conjunction and, with 
bayonet and butt, in hand-to-hand conflict, broke the strong 
resistance still stubbornly maintained in the interior of 
the village, which, burning in several places, lighted up 
the evening sky with leaping red flames. As General von 
Craushaar had fallen, General von Pape took command of 
the Saxons in the village. It was not necessary for the re- 
serves to support the Saxon troops. The battle in the 
quarries of Jaumont had also been carried to a victorious 
end without the aid of the reserves. Approaching darkness 
and the forest prevented the pursuit. It is true that two 
Guard cavalry squadrons under Colonel von Carlowitz 
charged ahead, but they saw in their front a new hostile 
artillery line and under these conditions the 46th Brigade 
and the rifle regiment were also forced to halt northeast of 
St. Privat. At that place Saxon artillery soon went into 
action, as it found room. This artillery and numerous 
Prussian batteries the other side of the village kept up the 
fire until complete darkness had set in. Thus ended the day 

1 K6nig Albert, SO Jahre Soldat; page 218. 



146 BAEON VON HODENBEEG 

with a complete victory of the two corps of the German left 
wing. Under the effect of the heavy losses at St. Privat 
the French Army of the Rhine, which in the main had held 
its positions, retreated, in the evening and during the sub- 
sequent night, to the protection afforded by the fortress 
works of Metz. 

Helmuth 1 says: "As a matter of fact the final decision 
of the heavy battle must be credited to the assistance of the 
Saxon corps, carried through both by the pressure of its 
concerted action and by the heroic deeds and immediate 
attack of the separate battalions. Let all due credit there- 
fore be given without reserve to the Saxons; however, im- 
partial judgment will, with equal readiness, acknowledge the 
truth of the statement that only in consequence of the 
situation brought about by the Guards with their own force 
and with so many sacrifices was the victory so quickly and 
completely won." This we fully acknowledge. The con- 
duct of the Guards in the heavy and long baptism of fire, 
which they gloriously endured on the 18th of August, will 
for all time to come excite the admiration of the true soldier. 

In consequence of the situation as described the decisive 
Saxon attack finally took the shape of an enveloping of the 
hostile right wing from the north. General von Moltke had 
directed that movement in a letter to Headquarters of the 
lid Army dated 10.30 a.m. These instructions, issued by 
orders of King William, 2 were based on the assumption 
that the French wing stood south of Amanvillers, and 
ordered the enveloping of this wing by the Guard and the 
12th Corps. They concluded with the following words: 
' ' The attack should be made simultaneously by the 1st Army 
from the Bois de Vaux and Gravelotte, by the 9th Corps 
against the Bois de Genivaux and Verneville, by the left 
wing of the lid Army from the north." It should be men- 
tioned here that the same decision, which General von 
Moltke in the start and before he knew the extension of the 

r The Prussian Guard on the 18th of August 1870. Lecture 
given in the "Wissenschaftlichen Verein," Berlin; by Helmuth, Cap- 
tain of the General Staff, 1873; (see p. 28 ante.) 

2 General Staff Account; vol. 2; page 691. 



THE INITIATIVE OP KING ALBERT 147 

hostile position designated as the final object of the day, 
was arrived at quite independently by the Crown Prince 
from his more intimate knowledge of that extension and 
from the difficulties of a frontal attack, about 3& hours after 
General von Moltke's decision and enlarged on about 5i 
hours later; for in the orders issued about 11.30 a.m. by the 
lid Army to the 12th Corps (as recited above), this basic 
plan of battle was not expressed and was not known at all 
by the 12th Corps the entire day. This seems remarkable 
at the first glance, as well as the fact that army headquarters 
left the Crown Prince such a free hand. Upon closer ex- 
amination, however, this appears quite natural. When 
Prince Frederick Charles sent the last mentioned orders, he 
assumed the hostile wing to be at Leipzick, and could only 
approach the enveloping movement, set as the final objective 
of the day, by stationing the Guard Corps on the left of the 
9th Corps and causing all other corps to follow. Therefore, 
as far as the 12th Corps was concerned, he confined himself 
for the present to directing its march toward Ste. Marie 
which at that time seemed suitable for the enveloping move- 
ment to be undertaken later. There was no need for him 
to add instructions as to how, when and where it should 
attack, because according to the view of army headquarters 
the corps would have arrived in the second line by this 
march, as is indicated in these orders. When these orders 
reached the corps it was already in march on Ste. Marie and 
the later reports of the Crown Prince, who was closer to the 
hostile wing than army headquarters and consequently knew 
earlier the situation than did that headquarters, show that 
the corps executed independently exactly what was laid 
down in Moltke's instructions. Thus army headquarters 
had no reason at all for interference. From its location at 
Habonville it could view the terrain as far as St. Privat 1 
and repeatedly sent officers to the 12th Corps. Thus, at 3 
p.m. Major von Werder arrived to gather information con- 
cerning the battle at Ste. Marie. Thereafter another officer 
delivered the following letter: 

'General Colmar Baron von der Goltz in Krieg und Sieg; page 
169; ibid; page 157; also in his Operations of the lid Army, (p. 69, 70 
ante.) 



148 BARON VON HODENBERG 

18 Aug. 3.45 p.m. at Habonville. 
I call Your Royal Highness' attention to the fact that the only 
communications of the beaten French army with Paris are in the valley 
of the Mosel on the left bank of that river. It is therefore of the 
utmost importance for the decision of the campaign that your High- 
ness' cavalry destroy, completely, the Metz — Thionville telegraph and 
railroad as soon as possible and that you occupy, if possible, the valley 
of the Mosel. So far, thank God, everything is going well. 

Frederick Charles. 

About 7 p.m. Lieutenant von Konig brought the follow- 
ing orders: 

18 Aug., 6.40 p.m. 
In spite of single infantry attacks of the enemy the battle ap- 
pears to have been won. 1 It is of the utmost importance to advance 
without delay today, in spite of the great exhaustion of the infantry, 
with at least one infantry brigade of the 12th Corps to Woippy in order 
there thoroughly to interrupt the railroad and telegraph. 

Frederick Charles. 

After the close of the battle army headquarters finally 
issued the following closing orders at 8.30 p.m. : 2 

The army corps will go into bivouac in the locations occupied 
at the close of the battle; infantry outposts to be placed which must 
take up connection with the neighboring corps and which must be 
prepared for the possibility that the enemy in desperation may attempt 
to cut his way through during the night. At 5 a.m. tomorrow all chiefs 
of staff will report in Caulre Ferme to report where their corps are 
located and to receive further orders. The attention of the 12th 
Corps is again called to the importance of reaching Woippy. Army 
headquarters proceeds for this night to Doncourt. 

Woippy was not occupied by the reinforced 46th Infantry 
Brigade until the 19th of August, because Crown Prince 
Albert declined to execute a movement through the forest in 
front during the night for the reason that, in spite of the 
enemy's retreat, it could not be ascertained, because of the 
darkness and density of the forest, what the conditions 
were with the enemy who still showed a strong artillery 
line. The evening orders of army headquarters show that 
they estimated the situation after the battle similarly and 

iFrom the location of the Headquarters of the Army this re- 
newed advance of the right wing of the Guard had been observed and 
the interference of the Saxon artillery had also been heard. See Oper- 
ations of the lid Army; (p. 76 ante.) 

2 General Staff Account; vol. 3; page 909. 



THE INITIATIVE OF KING ALBERT 149 

did not expect the advance to be made until the succeed- 
ing day. 

It is not generally known that Moltke's instructions of 
10.30 a.m. were anticipated, independently, by the Crown 
Prince, worked out from the conditions of the enemy and 
carried out by him. ! A few accounts of the battle state 
that the Crown Prince's enveloping movement of the hostile 
right wing was due to higher orders and in ignorance of actual 
conditions. In other accounts the view seems to be held 
that the 12th Corps had received some intimation before the 
beginning of the enveloping movement of Moltke's instruc- 
tions or at least a hint (if not in writing in some other man- 
ner); or, finally, that the enveloping movement had been 
planned in advance and that the corps had knowledge thereof. 
These accounts thus mention the independent action of the 
Crown Prince either not at all, or force it more or less into 
the back ground and thus do him an injustice, for none of these 
suppositions are true. However, every one acknowledges 
the fact that Crown Prince Albert did decide the battle of 
Gravelotte — St. Privat la Montagne— the glorious day of 
victory of the Guards and Saxons. 

*The best account of this is given in Woide, pp. 86, 87 & 94. 
See also Anleitung zum Studium der Kriegsgeschichte; supplementary 
volume— 1894, page 100— von Schimpff, Der Feldzug von 1870-71; 1896; 
page 33; Organ fiir die milit. vxissensch. Vereine, Vienna, 1892; pp. 412, 
413. 



FROM 

The XHth Corps in the 
War of 1870-71 1 

(Chapters VII to XIII) 

BY 

Colonel von Schimpff 



VII. The Day Before the Battle 

'TpHE arrangements made during the night for the march 
-*■ of the XHth Corps to Mars la Tour were carried out 
on August 17th as ordered. The troops of the 24th Division 
quartered in Pont a Mousson were alarmed by signals at about 
2 a.m. by orders of the Crown Prince 2 and proceeded to the 
place of assembly west of the town. After the arrival of the 
parts of the division which had been quartered and in camp 
in the neighborhood of the town, the division started the march 
at 3 a.m. The Crown Prince had mounted his horse at 2 a.m. 
and at 5 a.m. met, beyond Thiaucourt, the main body of the 
23d Division, which had started at 3 a.m., and the corps 
artillery, which had been alarmed and started at 2 a.m., and, 
at Xammes, the reinforced 46th Brigade as advance guard. 

The night had been pitch dark and it had taken a long 
time for the troops to reach their places of assembly from 
the villages and bivouacs. 

The XHth Corps stood assembled the other side of Thiau- 
court. The peculiarity of the conformation of the plateau 
of the Mosel consists in the rolling terrain, in the soft, 
round lines of the ridges, and in the often very steep sides 
of the defiles which they form. Thus the small town of 
Thiaucourt lies one half in a ravine, the other half on the 

'Published Dresden, 1901. 
2 Of Saxony. 

151 



152 VON SOHIMPPP 

slope of a steep ridge which the vehicles had great difficulty 
in ascending. The town has but a single, narrow main street, 
is prettily built, and its general reputation for prosperity is 
not belied by its exterior aspect. The town is famed for its 
wine, and although its Saxon guests had no opportunity to 
enjoy any, there was time to build quick fires with poles 
from the vineyards and cook coffee which infused renewed 
warmth into the men, for the night had been remarkably 
cold for August. Wagons with wounded had already arrived 
in Thiaucourt. Nothing was learned of the engagement of 
the day before except that it had been very bloody and 
that the enemy had made no progress; also that a renewal 
of the battle on this day was very probable. To pre- 
pare for this contingency the pieces were loaded, knap- 
sacks were removed for the subsequent march, coats rolled, 
kettles buckled to the coatrolls and the ammunition cases 
removed from the knapsacks and placed in the haversacks. 
The march was continued by the corps as a unit. The 
cold morning had been succeeded by a hot August day. 
The air was sultry, the ground hard. The Crown Prince 
rode with the advance guard, followed by the 23d Divison, 
the corps artillery, the 24th Division and the trains. The 
march led from Xammes to south of Hageville, passed south 
of Chambley and, beyond Buxieres, made a right angled turn 
northward toward Mars la Tour. The general opinion pre- 
vailed that the corps would today finally encounter the 
enemy. It was expected that the thunder of cannon in the 
distance would be heard at any moment. Wagon trains 
with wounded were met, as well as ammunition and pro- 
vision columns going back to replenish. In spite of the heat 
and in spite of exhaustion— easily accounted for by the long 
and continuous marching— every man pressed forward im- 
bued with the knowledge that not a moment was to be lost 
in bringing the looked for support to the hard pressed 
comrades in arms. No one desired to remain behind when 
in the more open country the columns of the Guards became 
visible, urged by the same desire, moving toward the same 
objective. These movements of enormous masses of troops, 
executed without any crossing, created a heart-thrilling 
impression on all. With that noble spirit, inherent even in 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 153 

the private soldier in regard to the orders of his superior, 
everyone perceived the excellence and the surety of the 
measures taken by highest headquarters. 

At 1 p.m. the advance guard arrived at Mars la Tour 
where the 23d Division went into bivouac while the corps 
artillery and the 24th Division camped in the vicinity of 
Puxieux. On the right, the Xth Corps had remained in its 
positions at Tronville; on the left, the Guards arrived at 
Hannonville. 

Crown Prince Albert rode for a consultation with Gen- 
eral von Voigts-Rhetz at the bivouac at Tronville, where 
great seriousness reigned after the hard and bloody battle of 
the preceding day, and made his headquarters in an un- 
pretentious little house of the unimportant village of Puxieux. 
Mars la Tour, situated on the great military road from Metz 
to Verdun, covers with its solid buildings a large cross road 
and takes its name undoubtedly from an old, thick, round 
tower standing in the village and which appears to be very 
ancient. 

During the afternoon the last troops arrived in their 
bivouacs. They had been en route for more than 12 hours 
and had covered a distance of 35 kilometers. The iron 
rations were used, as the provision wagons arrived only late 
in the evening. There was a general absence of water on 
the plateau. 

For the operations in the vicinity of the enemy, during 
which teams and company wagons must remain behind and 
only the combat wagons of the battalions could be taken along, 
it was found advisable to load on these half or even only 
quarter rations of bacon and rice, which might be cooked at 
some longer halt. Because of the abundance of rations on 
hand, it was not difficult to supply the necessary amount. 
It is of great value to let the tired men know that ar- 
rangements have been made for their needs, and nothing 
raises the spirits of men in the field more than the welcome 
diversion of preparing a meal and having a sprightly fire. 
Even if the preparations are interrupted, on account of 
some unforeseen start, hope remains of securing the meal 
at the next halt. Nothing, on the other hand, is more de- 



154 VON SOHIMPPP 

pressing than the knowledge that there are no means at 
hand for rapid refreshment. t 

Major von Einsiedel established outposts between the 
woods of Vionville and Ville sur Yron with the 3d Battalion, 
102d Infantry Regiment, and the 5th Squadron, 1st Cavalry 
Regiment, under Captain von Stammer. They were not in 
touch with the enemy. 8 

1 Von Einsiedel. 

2 Major von Einsiedel writes in his Memoirs : General von Montbe 
showed to me on the map a small watercourse running parallel with 
the Metz — Verdun road as the probable line of direction of the position 
of the outpost and charged me with seeking connection with the Hid 
Corps, which stood on our right at Vionville and with the Guard, which 
ought to arrive on our left in Hannonville in the course of the day. 

Just outside of Mars la Tour we saw the first dead — Prussian 
dragoons and their horses. At a mill which we passed the small mill 
pond was surrounded with dead and much swelled up horses which in 
their death agonies had sought the water, and at this very time a Prus- 
sian Hussar squadron was watering its horses, the live horses stepping 
carefully between the dead ones to reach the water, in which many 
dead horses lay. Further on we came across the dead in rows and piles. 
It was one of the wildest parts of the battlefield to which we went on 
outpost. Here the 16th and 57th Regiments (Brigade Wedell of the Xth 
Corps) in their attack from Mars la Tour in the direction of Bruville had 
suffered enormous losses, as had also the 1st Guard Dragoon Regiment, 
which, by their self-sacrificing charge on the hostile infantry, had 
saved the beaten and pursued brigade from annihilation. 

The position I took with the battalion was very simple. I formed 
the latter into two half battalions and directed each one to place one 
company on picket and one in support; patrols were sent to the front 
as far as Ferme Greyere and to the right into the forest of Vionville, 
thus keeping connection with the outposts of the Hid Corps. The 
squadron was on the road leading to Jarny and patrolled toward that 
place, taking up connection on the left toward Ville sur Yron with the 
Guard Corps which had arrived a few hours later. In addition, a 
platoon of infantry was attached to the squadron and a platoon of 
cavalry to the battalion, the latter platoon bivouacking alongside of 
the company in support on the Mars la Tour — Bruville road, where I 
also remained. The terrain was open and but few sentinels were re- 
quired. I remained mounted until evening. The patrols did not bring 
any information of the enemy, who could nowheres be seen, and 
everything was just as tranquil with the neighboring corps. The only 
inconvenience was that this was the first time we were on outpost and 
that, in consequence, all higher commanders visited us and contin- 
ually made suggestions for the improvement of our outpost disposition. 
When we have to establish an outpost in a foreign country, without loss 
of time, and on a line of about 5000 paces, the disposition will but seldom 
be at first in accordance with all rules, but, on getting better acquainted 
with the terrain, many improvements can be made later. It is my 
opinion that when the outpost position is but temporary and the enemy 
not in sight, it is permissible to overlook some irregularities, so as not 
to interrupt the men's rest and not confuse all in their just gained 
orientation by changes which require renewed instructions and mes- 
sages to neighboring posts. Of course this is entirely different with 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 155 

A splendid, clear summer evening preceded the tranquil 
night. On the quiet field could be seen the fearful serious- 
ness of the battle. The dead were lying in long rows. Men 
were busy late into the night digging trenches between 
these rows to serve as graves. In those trenches the fallen 
heroes were laid to rest. There brooded a wonderful still- 
ness above the camping army. The surroundings and the 
impressiveness of the battlefield were well suited to demon- 
strate the seriousness of the situation. Until late into the 
night the immediate situation was discussed around the 
bivouac fires. It was now known that the Hid and Xth 
Corps had fought against a considerable superiority on 
August 16th and had suffered enormous losses; that the 
battle was without any decision; that the enemy, after 
having spent the night on the battlefield, had retreated 
early on the 17th in the probable direction of Metz. Every 
one lay down in apprehension— many for their last slumber. 

The cavalry division, alarmed and concentrated toward 
its right wing at Vigneulles, started at 5 a.m., August 17th. 
It marched through Hattonville, Avillers, Woel and Doncourt 
to Harville, arriving there at 7.30 a.m. As the wide Metz— 
Verdun road was completely clear of the enemy here, the 
division reported that fact at once to corps headquarters by 
two orderlies, resumed its march to the Metz— Etain road, 
and reached St. Jean les Buzy through Pareid, Villers and 
Parfondrupt. Patrols sent out in all directions during the 
march did not encounter any closed bodies of the enemy- 
permanent outposts, for instance as at Paris, where we have to assume 
that none of our weak spots will escape the enemy's observation. 

During my frequent inspections I came to all points where the 
battle had raged on this wing on August 16th. This side of the small, 
lower lying part of the valley which bounded our position Prussian 
infantrymen and dragoons lay as though mowed down with a scythe— 
the number of dead Frenchmen apparently being no less. There had 
been so much to do that not all wounded had been carried away, and 
therefore after we arrived our sanitary detachments were directed to 
help out. They remained on that duty until late at night before being 
able to state that there were no living left among the heaps of dead. 
Farther to the left only dead troopers and horses were seen. Patrols 
from the troops which had fought here came along to identify the 
dead and to kill wounded horses. In the graveyard near the mill 
officers of the Guard Corps were assembled to attend the burial of their 
dead comrades, whose bodies were lying alongside of the newly dug 
large grave. To keep guard in the midst of these pictures and scenes 
was the first illustration our men had of the seriousness of war. 



156 VON SOHIMPPP 

only a few stragglers were seen at Jeandelize who gave 
themselves up as prisoners after a few shots had been ex- 
changed. At St. Jean les Buzy the cavalry division learned 
from the clergyman, who was much confounded by the 
sudden appearance of hostile cavalry, that Emperor Napo- 
leon had passed through that village the previous day with 
a strong escort and proceeded westward. The division took 
position at St. Jean les Buzy and secured against Etain, 
Metz and Verdun. The vidette posted on the main road 
brought in a higher French financial officer, M. Marguerie, 
who was on his way to Metz, and stated that he was a 
physician. In the afternoon the 3d Squadron of the Guard 
Cavalry, under Captain Platzmann, reconnoitered toward 
the north. It found Etain and the roads toward the east 
as far as the Orne free of the enemy. At 4 p.m. the division 
went into bivouac and procured rations by requisition. The 
23d Brigade was at St. Jean, the 24th at Parfondrupt. At 
12 midnight the division saddled up because the outposts 
had seen large bivouac fires in direction of Metz— fires of 
our own troops as ascertained later. 

On the evening of August 17th and until the march was 
resumed on the 18th, Corps Headquarters had no definite 
information as to the enemy's situation, as it had only 
negative reports of reconnaissances in front and on 
the left flank. It was known that the terrain was clear 
of the enemy some few thousand paces in front of the 
outposts and that on August 17th the enemy had not re- 
treated along the road to Fresnes, on which the corps 
bivouacked, nor along that through Etain, on which the 
cavalry division had been since 9 a.m. At 7 p.m. Lieutenant 
von Hinuber of the cavalry division arrived in Puxieux with 
prisoners whose statements appeared of importance. He 
was sent on with them to Prince Frederick Charles at 
Buxieres, where he informed that Prince at the same time 
that no columns of the French were marching on the Metz— 
Etain road. The army commander expressed his approba- 
tion of the achievements of the 12th Cavalry Division. 

Toward evening verbal orders from army headquarters 
reached Puxieux to the effect that the Crown Prince should 
report for a consultation with Prince Frederick Charles at 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 157 

4.45 a.m., August 18th, at the southern exit of Mars la 
Tour and that at the same time the troops, after having 
cooked coffee, should be in readiness to start. 

VIII. The Advance along the Metz— Etain Road 

The morning of August 18th was magnificently beautiful 
and was followed by a bright, breezy day, not too hot. At 
Mars la Tour Prince Frederick Charles verbally issued his 
instructions to the assembled commanders of the Guard, 
Xth and Xllth Corps. The lid Army 1 was to continue for 
the present its advance along the Metz— Etain road, to drive 
the enemy away from Verdwn and Chalons and to attack 
him wherever found. For that purpose the Xllth Corps 
was to start immediately as extreme left wing, the Guard 
Corps in its right rear and the IXth Corps in the right rear 
of the Guard Corps. The march objectives of the corps were 
Jarny, Doncourt and Caulre Ferme. The present object 
was only a march of about four miles or less; it could not 
yet be stated whether the army would then make a turn to 
the right or to the left. 2 The advance was not to be made 



Hd Army in the battle on 


August 18th: 








RIFLES 


SABERS 


GUNS 


Guard Corps 


26,000 


3,000 


90 


lid Corps - - - 


22,000 


1,100 


84 


Hid Corps 


14,000 


1,100 


84 


IXth Corps 


19,000 


1,600 


90 


Xth Corps 


17,000 


1,000 


84 


Xllth Corps 


24,000 


2,000 


96 


5th Cavalry Division 




3,600 


12 


6th Cavalry Division 




2,300 


6 



Relative strengths in the Franco-German war of 1870-71 to the 
Fall of the Empire. — Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 1889; Part 11. 

2 The battle of August 16th did not bring about a final decision. 
The German troops were exhausted on the battlefield on the evening of 
the day of battle. Fresh troops had to be brought up to permanently 
prevent the retreat of the French, thus far hindered at such great 
sacrifice. Thanks to the leaders' swiftness of decision and the energy 
of the troops, shortly after noon on August 17th five army corps had 
arrived alongside the Hid and Xth Corps : the VHth and VIHth Corps 
from the 1st Army on the right wing; the IXth Corps from the lid 
Army in the center; the Guard and the Xllth Corps on the left wing. 
These fresh troops were joined also by two fresh cavalry divisions (1st 
and 12th). The Hd Corps also was approaching. Royal Headquarters, 
which had arrived at Flavigny, considered the question of an offensive 
to be immediately made on the evening of August 17th, but abandoned 
that plan and decided to bring about the decision on August 18th. 

After the battles of August 16th Bazaine had decided to fall back 
to a position, impregnable according to his opinion. This position was 



158 VON SCHIMPPP 

in long, thin march columns, but by divisions massed, the 
corps artillery to march between the two divisions of each 
army corps. 

taken up on a ridge running northward and sloping gently to the west; 
the left wing touching the Mosel at Ste. Ruffine and Rozerieulles, 
about 6 km above Metz; the right wing coming close to the Orne at 
Roncourt. The broad slope of the position, facing the enemy, rein- 
forced by battery embrasures and infantry trenches, 12 km in extension, 
fell down, glacis-like and was open, while the short and steep slope in 
rear offered good protection to the reserves. Villages and farms had 
been prepared as supporting points. During the course of August 17th 
the French troops occupied their assigned positions: the 6th Corps 
on the right wing at St. Privat; the 2d Corps on the left wing at Le 
Point du Jour; the 4th Corps between them at Amanvillers; the 3d 
Corps on the heights of Leipzick; the Guards in reserve behind the left 
wing at Plappeville. 

The two opposing armies spent the night of August 17 -18th in a 
remarkable position — their wings, i. e. the German right and the French 
left, were in close touch, while their fronts were almost at right angles, 
that of the French being directed toward the west, that of the Germans 
toward the north. The opposite wings were about 20 km apart from 
each other. 

The Germans had not kept the French army under sufficient ob- 
servation on August 17th. The larger part of it had been lost sight of 
and its position was unknown on August 18th. There even was doubt 
whether the army was still at Metz or, at least in part, marching west- 
ward. Therefore King William ordered the lid Army to start at 6 a.m. 
August 18th, advancing by echelons from the left wing between the 
Yron and Gorze creeks. Of the 1st Army the VHIth Corps joined the 
right wing of the lid Army near Gravelotte ; the Vllth Corps securing 
the movement still farther to the right against possible hostile opera- 
tion from Metz. Should the enemy be found marching off toward the 
northwest, the left wing was to reach him and compel him to stand; 
should he be found in front of Metz then a turn against him was facili- 
tated by the march in echelons. 

The Vllth Corps, in close touch with the enemy on the extreme 
right wing, remained at the start on the strict defensive; and the 
enemy did not attack. Four German army corps (Xllth, Guard, IXth 
and VHIth) advanced from the base line Mars la Tour — Gravelotte in 
a northerly direction; behind them in second line the Xth and Hid 
Corps, on the powers of which latter not much reliance could be placed 
on account of the enormous losses suffered on the 16th of August; the 
lid Corps was coming up behind from Pont a Mousson. 

On the German side it was clear from the start that the left wing 
of the French position touched the Mosel; but there was an absence 
of information as to the right wing of that position. Prince Frederick 
Charles was inclined to the belief that a part of the French army was 
retreating toward the Maas. During the slow advance movement of 
the Hd Army toward the north highest headquarters believed it had 
ascertained with certainty that the French right wing was at Aman- 
villers, and the Hd Army was ordered to execute a right turn for the 
purpose of attack. King William, present on the battlefield with the 
1st Army, ordered the corps of the right wing — Vllth, VIHth and IXth 
— to keep the French occupied in front; the left wing of the Hd Army 
to envelop the French right wing. The 1st Army was not to attack in 
the front until the Hd Army was ready for co-operation. But this in- 



XIlTH CORPS IN THE WAR OP 1870-71 159 

As according to these orders the Xllth Army Corps, 
advancing through Mars la Tour, was to take up the extreme 
left wing, while at that moment the Guard Corps was on its 
left in the vicinity of Hannonville, the Crown Prince and 
Headquarters of the Guard Corps called attention to a pos- 
sibly resultant crossing in the march. In the belief, how- 
ever, that the extreme left wing of the army would receive 
the task of operating independently, 1 Army Headquarters 
preferred to have the Guard Corps closed up and more in the 
center of the probable line of battle. Prince Frederick 
Charles probably also considered the place assigned the 
Guard Corps in the center of his army as too important to 
give to the Saxons who had not yet been tried in the field. 
He also considered that the disadvantages of a march cross- 
ing were sufficiently offset by directing the advance to be 
executed in closed masses. The orders issued were adhered 

to. 

A lucky star brought it about that by this transposing of 

the two corps the Guard was called to extremely bloody and 
glorious achievements, but that Crown Prince Albert had 
the opportunity to bring about the main decision in the bat- 
tle by his intrepid interference with the Xllth Corps on the 
extreme French right wing. 

Everybody was astir in the earliest morning hour in the 
bivouacs. The coffee, drunk from the covers of the field 
kettles, tasted excellent. Whether caused by the premoni- 
tion many hearts had of coming death, or by a something 
uncertain in the air, a peculiar, solemn earnestness pervaded 
the spirit of the troops, generally so joyous, full of life, 
and given to cracking jokes. But when the officers informed 
the men that the Saxons would today have a chance to battle 
with the enemy, when they called on everyone to show him- 
self brave and uphold the traditional honor of the Saxon 
arms, all hearts beat with renewed fervor and willingness to 
perform the utmost. 

tended enveloping movement of the supposed right wing turned into a 
frontal attack, as the IX th and VIHth Corps did not remain in a wait- 
ing attitude, and as it was found that the French position extended to 
beyond Roncourt, far more to the north than had been supposed on 
the German side. 

According to the General Staff Account. 



160 VONSOHIMPFP 

At 5.20 a.m. Crown Prince Albert issued orders to the 
23d Division to start out its advance guard immediately and 
follow it half an hour later in assembly formation, one 
brigade (45th) on the right and one (46th) on the left of the 
Mars la Tour — Jarny road, battalions in column toward the 
center with one-quarter regulation platoon distance; the 
corps artillery in broad front behind the 46th Brigade; and 
the 24th Division to follow the latter in the same formation 
as the 23d, 47th Brigade on the right, 48th on the left. The 
difficulties in the march offered on both sides of Mars la 
Tour by the partly wooded ravines and the village itself 
prevented the massing of the troops until north of the village. 
This increased the duration of the crossing with the Guards 
coming from Hannonville and marching on Doncourt, with- 
out, however, influencing the later course of the battle, as a 
halt of several hours was made further on at Jarny. From and 
after 9 o'clock the road was free for the Guard Corps. The 
cavalry division received orders to draw up from Parf ondrupt 
in an easterly direction toward Puxe, but to leave one regi- 
ment west of that village in continual observation of the 
roads from Etain and Briey. 

The advance guard (1st Cavalry Regiment, Rifle Regi- 
ment, 2d Light Battery, 2nd Pioneer Company, Sanitary 
Detachment No. 1) of the Xllth Corps under Major General 
von Craushaar reached Jarny and thus the Metz — Verdun 
road at 8.30 a.m. As a message sent from the vicinity of 
Labry stated that it was believed that hostile infantry and 
artillery could be seen west of Valleroy and other infantry 
columns north of Doncourt, the 1st Rifle Battalion took up a 
position in and near Labry; the 3d occupied the convenient 
hill toward Doncourt and Moncel-Chateau; the 2d remained 
in reserve at Jarny, sending the 5th Company as left flank 
guard to Conflans. But no hostile attack took place. The 
reconnoitering detachments of the 1st Cavalry Regiment re- 
ported that they had encountered only hostile patrols at 
Moineville, Valleroy and Batilly, which quickly retired. 
Captain von Treitschke 1 had ridden ahead to Valleroy and 
encountered there only a hostile patrol which immediately 

iLeo von Treitschke; now (1901) General of Infantry and com- 
manding general of the XlXth (lid Royal Saxon) Army Corps. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OP 1870-71 161 

retired. He found the entire country as far as Briey free 
of the enemy. 

As movements of troops above brigade strength en- 
counter great difficulties in the terrain when operating in 
assembly formation many obstacles were encountered in the 
massed advance of the Xllth Corps as far as the Metz— Ver- 
dun road. The march led across the battlefield of the cav- 
alry of both sides of August 16th. The troops soon encountered 
dead horses and troopers, here Prussians and there French. 
The number of dead soon increased and the columns often 
had to divide to pass around these obstacles. Large clumps 
of woods compelled breaking into sections, to resume the 
formation after passing. After 9 o'clock the 23d Division 
reached Jarny, which was entirely empty of inhabitants. 
The 24th Division, which had started from Puxieux at about 
7 o'clock, reached Moncel-Chateau after 10 a.m. The corps 
assembled by 11 o'clock and utilized the short time before 
noon for rest and eating breakfast. 

Crown Prince Albert had executed the orders of army 
headquarters and reported to it the corps' arrival on the 
Metz— Etain road. 

The 1st Cavalry Regiment reconnoitered in front of the 
Xllth Corps. One platoon of the 1st Squadron, under Lieu- 
tenant von Posern, encountered, at about 11 a.m., at Batilly, 
a body of hostile infantry and cavalry which retreated. 
Another platoon of that squadron encountered hostile patrols 
at Coinville. For the rest the vicinity appeared free of 
the enemy. 

In Jarny the Crown Prince received copies of orders 
from army headquarters, which Prince Frederick Charles 
had issued to the IXth and Guard Corps. 1 

Captain von Hodenberg of corps headquarters, on his 
return from the Guard Corps, reported that it had commenced 
its deployment at Doncourt at 10.25 a.m. 

The Crown Prince consequently had to believe that not 
only the IXth but also the Guard Corps had resumed their 
advance. As a matter of fact, the 1st Guard Division started 
at that very moment. He therefore decided, in spite of the 

x See p. 58 ante. 



162 VON SOHIMPFP 

fact that army orders bound him down to Jarny until the 
receipt of further orders, to also continue his march in the 
direction in which the enemy was reported to be. Because 
of the still existing uncertainty a formation more in depth 
was taken and at 11.30 a.m. the following orders were 
issued: 

The advance guard will advance on both banks of the Orne on 
Valleroy and Moineville. The 23d Division will proceed with the 45th 
Brigade to Tichemont and occupy the Bois de Ponty. The 46th Brigade 
remains at Jarny at the disposition of the commanding general. The 
24th Division will march through Moncel- Chateau, Jouaville and Batilly 
toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes. The corps artillery will proceed to 
Giraumont en Jarnisy. 

The report to army headquarters which explains the 
thoughts of the Crown Prince best, reads: 

Jarny, 18 August, 11.45 a.m. The enemy is said to be at Moine- 
ville and Ste. Marie aux Chenes. Therefore the Xllth Corps advances 
on those two points. I proceed to Fleury, later on to Jouaville. 

That these measures were in consonance with the in- 
tentions of army headquarters, though taken prior to them, 
is shown by orders issued from there at 12 noon, as follows: 

Orders for the Xllth Corps, issued at Vionville, 11.30 a.m. The 
Xllth Corps is directed to march on Ste. Marie aux Chenes; to secure 
by cavalry against Briey and Conflans and to send as much cavalry as 
possible ahead into the valley of the Mosel, to interrupt railroad and 
telegraph leading to Thionville. The Vllth, VHIth, IXth and Guard 
Corps will, within two hours, attack the enemy who is in position on 
the heights from Leipzick to the Bois de Vaux, his rear toward Metz. 
The lid, Hid, Xth and Xllth Corps will follow in second line as sup- 
port. 1 

As the larger part of the corps had been started toward 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes, and as the uncertainty concerning 
the exact position of the enemy, so far found only in smaller 
detachments at and west of Ste. Marie, had not yet been 
removed, the Crown Prince adhered to the orders he had 
previously issued, merely drawing the 46th Brigade, which 
had been left at Jarny at his disposition, and the main body 
of the 12th Cavalry Division to behind the Bois de Ponty. 

The cavalry division had started with its main body at 
9 a.m. and had arrived at Puxe toward 11 a.m. Requisitions 

*In the General Staff Account, appendix p. 183, these orders are 
given wrong; correction is made in part 7. 



XIlTH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 163 

had just been ordered when rising clouds of smoke in the 
east indicated a battle west of Metz. General Count zur 
Lippe left the 17th Uhlan Regiment back for observation 
against Verdun and, on his own responsibility, had already 
started the march to the battlefield when he was ordered to 
do so, at the same time being directed to reconnoiter toward 
Briey. The 18th Uhlan Regiment was charged with recon- 
noitering toward Briey and Etain. 

Major General Krug von Nidda 1 , who commanded 
the temporarily organized Uhlan brigade, held the main 
body of the brigade in readiness between Villers sous Pareid 
and Puxe during the day and from there had squadrons, 
sent far to the front, observe the three great roads from 
Metz to the Maas, recognizable at a distance because of the 
long rows of poplar trees which edged them. He also sent 
patrols toward Briey. The two heavy cavalry regiments 
were consolidated into a provisional brigade under Major 
General Senfft von Pilsach 2 and the horse battery attached 
to it. The brigade trotted via Conflans to the Bois de Ponty, 
arriving there at 2.45 p.m. 

IX. Preliminary Arrangements for the Battle 

In the Xllth Corps, resting not far from Jarny, the com- 
mands " To arms; Carry Arms; Right Shoulder Arms" were 
given and the movements ordered by the Crown Prince 
commenced. 

It was shortly before noon when the first sounds of 
cannon fire were heard by the corps coming from Verneville. 
The battle had begun with the IXth Corps. All tiredness and 
disgust with the long marching disappeared as if by magic. 
The nearby thunder of cannon increased the mental activity. 
Everyone saw and heard more distinctly. It seemed as if 
nerves and muscles received an increased power of tension; 
as if thoughts came doubly fast; as if the will could decide 
more energetically. 

The dispositions of the Crown Prince led the corps nearly 
four miles farther forward and to the points where the 

x Died as Lieutenant General and Adjutant General in 1880. 

s Hugo Senfft von Pilsach. Now (1901) General of Cavalry, active 
service, a la suite of the 2d Koniginhussar Regiment No. 19. 



184 VONSCHIMPFF 

enemy had shown himself. The main direction of the march, 
however, was toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes and only the 
advance guard remained along the Orne. Thus, toward 
1 p.m., the Xllth Corps moved forward in the following for- 
mation and directions: 

On the left flank, in the valley of the Orne, the former 
advance guard toward Valleroy and Moineville; in its right 
rear the advance guard of the 45th Brigade; followed by the 
46th Brigade, from Jarny toward the Bois de Ponty. On 
the right wing the 24th Division toward Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes and behind it the corps artillery toward Giraumont. 

In the advance guard the 2d Rifle Battalion marched 
through Labry and Hatrize, crossing the Orne there, thence 
through Beaumont to Moineville; the 3d Rifle Battalion 
through Labry to Valleroy. The 1st Rifle Battalion, which 
was accompanied by the 1st Light Battery, followed the 2d 
Rifle Battalion through Hatrize, but left one company at the 
bridge across the Orne at Hatrize. Here also the 2d Pioneer 
Company remained. Valleroy and Moineville were reached 
at 1.30 p.m. and found unoccupied. 

In the 23d Infantry Division, the 45th Brigade marched 
with the 1st Light and 2d Heavy Batteries through Tichemont 
to behind the Bois de Ponty at Fleury. In accordance with 
the earlier tactics— utilizing villages as supporting and re- 
ceiving points in an advance— this method was observed with 
the Bois de Ponty. The forest was impassable even to 
infantry on account of dense undergrowth and absence of 
roads. * The 2d Battalion Body Grenadier Regiment under 
Major von Brandenstein was designated to occupy the north- 
eastern edge of the forest. The companies distributed 
themselves equally along this edge, which they reached by 
going around the southeastern edge. These companies re- 
mained closed up. 

The 46th Brigade marched with the 1st Heavy Battery 
Rothmaler through Giraumont to behind the northwest corner 
of the Bois de Ponty and took position there. 

'To take the shortest route to the regiment from the most ad- 
vanced companies, Regimental Adjutant von Loeben took a footpath, 
which apparently led through the forest. The path ended and Loeben 
succeeded only after indescribable efforts in reaching the edge of the 
forest, his uniform torn and wet with perspiration. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 165 

The 24th Division attempted to reach its objective, 
Batilly, crossing on its way the Metz- Verdun railroad, then 
under construction. All during the march heavy thunder of 
cannon was heard and small, white clouds were seen appear- 
ing and disappearing on the horizon, caused by the bursting 
French shrapnels. 1 The infantry did its best to keep up 
with the cavalry with which Major von Tschirschky, glass 
and map in hand, rode across country. 

After Crown Prince Albert had issued the necessary in- 
structions at Jarny he proceeded to the ridge between 
Jouaville and Batilly (Hill 842). The thunder of cannon 
from the east became stronger and stronger and the almost 
continuous rattle of volleys and of the mitrailleuses indicated 
the increasing vehemence of the battle, which could be heard 
only and not seen on account of the intervening woods and 
folds in the terrain. But from the ascending powder smoke 
the position of the French batteries was perceived and it 
was evident that the line of batteries was constantly extend- 
ing itself toward the north. Reports from the reconnoiter- 
ing detachments of the 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments, as 
well as those from the Guard Hussars, reconnoitering along 
the entire front of the XIIth Corps, indicated that the enemy 
was not only at Leipzick but even beyond St. Privat and also 
that Roncourt was occupied. 

These reports were strongly confirmed by the verbal and 
very important report of Captain von der Planitz 2 of the 
general staff, who had reconnoitered the hostile position at 
12.30 p.m. from the then still unoccupied Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes and who explained that a frontal attack on St. Privat 
la Montagne would be exceedingly difficult and bloody on 
account of the glacis-like formation of the hill on which the 
village, surrounded by walls, was situated, and on account 
of the total absence of cover afforded the attacker by the 
terrain. 

The Crown Prince, studying the map, listened to Captain 

1 The French shells and shrapnels were not provided with percus- 
sion fuses and only had time fuses, the maximum time period of which 
was 2800 m., thus causing them to explode in the air when the range 
fired at exceeded that limit. 

8 Paul Edler von der Planitz. Now (1901) General of Infantry and 
Minister of State and War. 



166 VON SCHIMPFP 

von der Planitz without interjecting a word, and, when the 
latter had concluded, said: "In that case we shall not 
attack in front, but go arround the position," and made a 
corresponding movement with his left arm. This decision 
thus instantaneously arrived at was then carefully considered 
in regard to its execution, there being plenty of time for 
that. In the meantime reports arrived from the 23d 
Division stating that at least one hostile division stood at 
St. Privat and Roncourt, that no enemy was at Auboue and 
that therefore Prince George had started the troops nearest 
at hand 1 toward Ste. Marie. The advance guard reported 
that it had no enemy in its front on either side of the Orne 
and that Briey itself was unoccupied. 

Prince George had stopped east of the Bois de Ponty 
when he learned of the reports sent to corps headquarters 
concerning the enemy (as given above) and immediately de- 
cided to advance in direction of Ste. Marie. General von 
Craushaar with the troops which up to then had formed the 
advance guard also proceeded, on his own initiative, to the 
battlefield, the location of which was indicated by the thun- 
der of cannon. 

Everything now strengthened the Crown Prince's in- 
tentions to envelop the French right wing. Toward 2 p.m. 
he ordered: 

The 23d Division, which will again have the disposal of the 46th 
Brigade, will move through Coinville and the small wood east of 
Auboue against the position at Roncourt. The 24th Division will pass 
Batilly on the west, then advance in the hollow behind the small wood 
there and will attempt to press forward from there directly against 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes. The 48th Brigade remains behind the small 
wood at Batilly at the disposal of the commanding general. 

As in every case, but this time in duplicate, the Crown 
Prince reported his measures to Prince Frederick Charles 
and also caused the Guard Corps to be informed thereof, a 
proof that he fully knew the importance of the step taken. 

His report read, verbatim: 

Sent from Batilly, 18 August; 2.30 p.m. The Saxon Army Corps 
advances with the 24tb Infantry Division on Ste. Marie aux Chenes 

1 lst and 3d Battalions, 100th Regiment; 1st and 2d Battalions, 101st 
Regiment. 



XIITH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 167 

and envelops with the 23d Division, through Coinville and the small 
woods situated between there and Roncourt, the French right wing. 

This report reached army headquarters at about 3 p.m. 
These headquarters later on again called attention to the 
necessity of occupying the lower valley of the Mosel but 
otherwise issued no orders to the Xllth Corps on that day. 
This justified, during the battle, the assumption that the 
measures taken by the Crown Prince, both now and later on, 
were approved. 

X. The Battlefield and the Enemy 

The long ridge which denoted the main direction of the 
French front line makes, before descending on the north 
into the valley of the Orne, a further rise to a broad, com- 
paratively high table on which the village of St. Privat is 
situated. From this point, which overtops and dominates 
the surrounding country, the plateau extends, gently sloping, 
in a southerly direction toward Amanvillers. From St. 
Privat there runs in a southwesterly direction a smaller 
ridge from which the hill to the south and west descends 
gradually into a long ravine which, running in a north- 
westerly direction from Habonville to St. Ail, turns from 
there sharply to the north and opens into the valley of the 
Orne at Auboue. This ravine, shallow at the start, further 
on deeply cut, with high, steep walls, opens out basin-like west 
of Ste. Marie. A second steep ravine runs parallel to it 
from Ste. Marie to the Orne at Hautmecourt. On the slope 
running from St. Privat and Roncourt to this ravine and which 
falls toward the west glacis-like, only a few more or less 
deep folds offer temporary protection. Toward the north 
the ridge continues, slightly descending, from St. Privat 
through Roncourt to Malancourt. Toward the east the entire 
plateau slopes gradually into the valley of the Mosel. 

The French position between Roncourt and Amanvillers 
was of extraordinary strength. Everywhere room could be 
found for large bodies of troops which could deploy under 
cover and then cross the ridge with great rapidity. The 
weak point of the position was the right flank of the defen- 
sive line which had no natural protection. The attacker could 
find protection against the fire effect of the French guns 



168 VON SCHIMPPP 

and chassepots, which could sweep the open field to the west 

for 3000 paces, only in the villages of St. Ail and Ste. Marie. 

West of these two villages the ravine mentioned provided a 

covered assembly place in front of the enemy. The ground, 

covered with wheat stubble and potato vines, was dry and 

hard. 

Ste. Marie and St. Privat were both large villages, fairly 

well closed up and having massive buildings. Houses and 
gardens were surrounded by masonry walls. Many farms 
had stone walls. On the west and north side of St. Privat 
many stone walls, knee to breast high, running in irregular 
lines, formed protections for the field guns. The small 
woods between Auboue and Roncourt were impassable on 
account of dense undergrowth and fallen trees, limbs, etc. 

The French 6th Corps of the Army of the Rhine occu- 
pied the position of St. Privat. Its commander was Marshal 
Canrobert, the hero of the Crimea, of Africa and Italy, a 
noble character, a brave general. Although superior in 
rank to Bazaine, he had placed himself without a word under 
the latter' s orders when the Emperor gave him command of 
the French army, renouncing his rank to conduce to the 
best, and thereby proving his high-mindedness and patriotism. 
The 6th Corps, organized in the Camp of Chalons, had 
been sent to Nancy August 5th and called back again to 
Chalons on the 7th. On the 9th it had to proceed in all 
haste to Metz. Three of its divisions and one regiment of 
the fourth arrived there. Its cavalry division, reserve ar- 
tillery, three infantry regiments, the engineer park and 
supply corps and officials did not get to that point because 
the railroad had been interrupted in the meantime at 
Dieulouard. Including two batteries attached to it from the 
general artillery reserve, the corps had only eleven batteries. 
It had no mitrailleuses. On August 16th the corps, number- 
ing 31,032, had lost in killed and wounded 1 general, 201 
officers and 5,458 men. 1 As it had no cavalry the newly 
organized division under General du Barail, consisting of the 
2d Chasseurs d' Afrique (which had suffered greatly at Mars 
la Tour) and the three Chasseur regiments of the Brigade 
Bruchard of the 3d Corps, was attached to the corps on 

*F. Quesnoy. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 169 

August 17th. General de Lajaille then commanded the 
brigade composed of the two 2d Chasseur regiments. Gen- 
eral Bruchard and the 3d and 10th Chasseurs reached St. 
Privat only in the afternoon of August 18th. One battery 
(6th of the 19th) was with the division; the other, the 5th, 
had been attached to the 3d Division of the 6th Corps. 

On the evening of August 16th Marshal Bazaine made 
his headquarters in the inn of Gravelotte, where Napoleon 
had passed the previous night, and issued orders from there 
to his army to commence the retreat at 4 a.m., August 17th, 
into the position of Rozerieulles— Verneville. He gave as 
the reason for this that the intended march westward could 
not be executed because of shortage of provisions and am- 
munition. The shortage of provisions should have had no 
weight since the march led through a rich country at a 
favorable season of the year, and as regards ammunition 
there were still 80,000 rounds for the artillery and 16 millions 
rounds small arms ammunition on hand— and the 16th of 
August had required but 26,000 rounds artillery and one and 
one-half million rounds of small arms ammunition. It was 
only necessary to have re-distributed the ammunition among 
the army corps, to equalize the amounts in each, since some 
had expended much more than others. 

It can not be stated with any degree of certainty whether 
the errors committed by Bazaine in his leadership of the 
French army were due to the ambitions of an upstart or to 
the incompetence of the commander in the field. He had 
the chance to gain a victory on the 16th of August and to 
prevent a defeat on the 18th. Up to the beginning of the 
war the army was convinced of his cold-bloodedness, his 
ability, his remarkable memory and the skill with which he 
led troops, as though he foresaw everything and left nothing 
to chance. 

On the morning of August 17th the French Army 1 stood 

x 2d Corps, less Division La- rifles sabers guns & 
veaucoupet and including the Brig- mitrailleuses 

adeLapasset of the 5th Corps 16,000 2,300 78 

3d Corps 30,000 1,800 120 

4th Corps 22,000 1,800 90 

6th Corps 21,000 2,000 76 

Guards 11,000 3,200 72 

Cavalry reserve 1,800 12 

Artillery reserve 72 



170 VON SCHIMPFF 

with the 2d Corps at Gravelotte, the 6th and Guard Corps 
near Rezonville, the 3d Corps at St. Marcel and the 4th 
Corps in front of Doncourt. The corps marched to their 
new positions: the 2d at Point du Jour; the 3d at La Folie, 
Leipzick and Moscou; the 4th at Amanvillers; the Guard 
Corps in the ravine at Lessy between the forts of St. Quen- 
tin and Plappeville. The artillery reserve proceeded to the 
plateau at Plappeville and here the artillery of all army corps 
was to replenish its ammunition. Bazaine's headquarters 
was in Plappeville. The commander-in-chief and the reserves 
found themselves on the wing opposite from the most en- 
dangered side of the position. 

Marshal Canrobert found the terrain assigned his corps 
unsuitable and requested Bazaine to allow him to place his 
corps (the 6th) in prolongation of the line of the other corps 
on the ridge of St. Privat, which request was approved by 
Bazaine. Hardly arrived in Verneville, the 7th Corps 
had to resume its march to St. Privat and the last troops of 
the corps arrived there only at night, having several times 
crossed the line of march of the 3d and 4th Corps. 

While the other corps reinforced their positions by hasty 
intrenchments and rifle trenches the 6th Corps was unable 
to do so on account of absence of time and of the engineer 
park. In addition, the troops sorely needed rest after their 
battle of August 16th. 

During the night of August 17-18th the 6th Corps 
camped in some disorder and dispersed around St. Privat. 
There was no water. Thousands of bivouac fires lighted up 
the slope and the edges of the forest. The troops rested; 
a false alarm disturbed the Division Lafont de Villiers but 
for a short time. Reveille sounded early in the morning in 
the French camp, trumpets sounding and drums beating. 

A total of approximately 100,000 rifles, 13,000 sabers, 520 guns, 
among them 68 mitrailleuses. 

Of these there participated in the battle on August 18th: 84,000 
rifles, 2,000 sabers, 398 guns, inclusive of 54 mitrailleuses. (Relative 
Strengths in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 to the fall of the 
Empire. — Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 1889, part J.1). 

The French battalions and squadrons had a smaller strength than 
those of the Germans. The complete battalions on the German side 
numbered 1000, on the French side 800 men; the German squadrons 
numbered 150, the French 125 horse. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 171 

A warm sun enlivened the soldiers' spirits. Breakfast was 
hastily eaten. It was impossible fully to replenish the am- 
munition expended on August 16th. All available wagons 
started for Metz to bring ammunition and provisions. When 
the battle opened they had not yet returned. 

Small cavalry detachments, consisting of a commander 
and four troopers, were sent out from St. Privat in all 
directions at 7 a.m; and observed German cavalry patrols at 
Montois, Auboue and St. Ail. Toward 9.30 a.m., the 2d 
Chasseurs d'Afrique proceeded to Montois la Mon- 
tagne, the 2d Chasseurs de France to the road be- 
tween Auboue and Ste. Marie. The latter observed the 
advance of the Saxons. On their march back to St. Privat 
these regiments cleaned the villages of the numerous ma- 
rauders. 

After 10 a.m., Marshal Canrobert received a report that 
strong hostile columns were marching along the Orne. He 
immediately forwarded this report to Bazaine and was shortly 
thereafter informed by the latter that the 2d and 3d Corps 
were also threatened by the enemy and that he should stand 
firm at St. Privat. At the same time he was informed that 
ammunition was on the way. 

The 6th Corps had taken its position for battle by 1 
p.m. Most of the troops still found time to cook. Of the 
1st Division, Tixier, the Brigade Pechot was on one wing of 
the corps 500 to 600 meters southeast of Roncourt; the 
Brigade Le Roy de Dais on the other wing south of St. Privat, 
joining there the Division Cissey of the 4th Corps. The 
2d Division, Bisson, composed of only the 9th Line Regiment, 
was in second line between St. Privat and Roncourt. The 
3d Division, Lafont de Villiers, took position between Ron- 
court and St. Privat, the 4th Division, Levassor Sorval, south 
of St. Privat, and the cavalry division, du Barail, at the 
fork of the road northwest of Marengo- Auberge. The bat- 
teries were not kept together, but dispersed: 70 guns stood 
north and west, 10 a south of St. Privat, 6 with the cavalry 
division. 2 

ir The 5th Battery, 8th Regiment, had only four guns; one had been 
lost on August 16th, one had been dismounted. 
•The 6th Corps stood as follows: 



172 VON SCHIMPPP 

Of the French division commanders, Tixier was a brave 
man with more solid than shining attributes; Lafont de 
Villiers and Levassor were handicapped by their age; Bisson 
and du Barail were able and efficient. * 

XI. Ste. Marie Aux Chenes 
After the battle had opened Marshal Canrobert care- 

lst Division, Tixier. 

Brigade Pechot, 4th and 10th Line Regiments, deployed in two 
lines, southeast of Roncourt, one battalion in Roncourt with weak 
detachments sent ahead to Montois. 

Brigade Le Roy de Dais, 12th and 100th Line Regiments, bet- 
ween St. Privat and Amanvillers in mass; in its front the right wing 
of the 4th Corps, in its rear the cavalry division of that corps. — The 
9th Jager Battalion occupied the south and southwest edge of St. 
Privat. 

Of the batteries of the division, the 5th, 8th Regiment, was on 
the left wing pointed at the Bois de la Ousse; the 7th, 8th Regiment, 
south of Jerusalem, its rear against the main Metz — Briey road; 
the 8th, 8th Regiment, west of St. Privat on the right of that road; 
the 12th, 8th Regiment, in reserve north of St. Privat. 
2d Division, Bisson. 

9th Line Regiment in second line between St. Privat and Ron- 
court. In its front the 9th and 10th Batteries, 13th Regiment. 
3d Division, Lafont de Villiers. 

Brigade Colin, in first line; the 93d Line Regiment north of St. 
Privat; the 94th Line Regiment west of St. Privat. When the 94th 
Regiment started toward 1 p.m., to occupy Ste. Marie, the 93d 
Regiment extended itself as far as the St. Privat— Ste. Marie road 
and sent its skirmish lines to the slope about 1000 meters from the 
crest of the ridge. 

Brigade Becquet de Sonnay, in second line; 75th and 91st Line 
Regiments in two lines, about 500 to 600 meters northeast of St. 
Privat. 

The batteries of the division— 5th, 6th and 7th, 14th Regiment 
and 5th, 19th Regiment (of the cavalry division) took position west 
of St. Privat opposite Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 
4th Division, Levassor Sorval. 

Brigade Gibon, 25th and 26tb Line Regiments, in first line south 
of St. Privat, facing St. Ail, 600 meters left of the main road to Ste. 
Marie. Brigade Chanaleilles, 28ih and 70th Line Regiments, in posi- 
tion behind Jerusalem as reserve. 

The batteries of the division, 7th and 8th, 18th Regiment, took 
position in the gap between the Brigade Gibon and the main road to 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 
Cavalry Division, du Barail. 

Brigade de Lajaille, 2d Chasseurs d' Afrique, and 2d 
Chasseurs, in reserve at Marengo. 

Brigade de Bruchard, 3d and 10th Chasseur, had not yet reached 
the corps. The 6th Battery, 19th Regiment. 

All batteries had 4 pounders (86mm, 5), only the 9th and 10th, 
13th Regiment had 12 pounders (121mm, 3). 

There was an engineer company with each infantry division. 

1 According to da Barail. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OP 1870-71 173 

fully observed from St. Privat the movements of the German 
troops in front of the French 4th Corps. He informed 
Bazaine that a serious battle was imminent and that he would 
be compelled to husband his artillery fire on account of 
shortage of ammunition. The commander-in-chief sent reply 
that he would support him with the Grenadier Division and 
the artillery of the Guard. 

Toward 1 p.m. Marshal Canrobert ordered the 94th 
Regiment to proceed from its position in front of St. Privat 
to Ste. Marie aux Chenes and occupy that village, in the ap- 
prehension that the opponent might utilize that place as a 
springboard against St. Privat and also in order to make an 
enveloping of his right wing more difficult. Colonel Geslin 
started with his regiment, ' which had lost 24 officers and 
540 men on August 16th, leaving three companies in St. Privat 
at the disposition of the chief of staff of the corps, General 
Henry. General Colin followed by his orderly officer who 
rode a captured 16th Uhlan Regiment horse, easily distin- 
guished by its housings, accompanied the regiment. Both 
officers were wounded. 

Ste. Marie, solidly built and in appearance more like a 
city than a village, is almost completely surrounded by walls. 
A few hundred paces in its front were at that time hedges 
and wire fences, as well as other obstacles, used by farmers 
in time of peace. Near the center of the village, on an 
open spot, stood the church. It was too late for the French 
to increase the already strong defenses of the place, and 
even the entrances were not barricaded. Of the 94th Regi- 
ment, the 3d Battalion occupied the part of the village toward 
Auboue; the 2d Battalion the opposite part; three companies 
of the 1st Battalion were in the village as reserve. While 
the regiment occupied the walls, hedges and fences in front 
of the villages, a battery (6th, 14th Regiment) went into 
position a few hundred paces east of the village, to support 
the defense. 

Crown Prince Albert caused the 24th Division to advance 
in the direction ordered by army headquarters on Ste. Marie, 

*On August 17th it numbered 41 officers, 1430 men. On the na- 
tional monument at Mars la Tour, Geslin and the 94th Regiment are 
representing theFrench foot soldiers. 



174 VONSCHIMPFF 

in order, by the capture of that village, to gain a supporting 
point for the enveloping movement to be made by the 23d 
Division. Prince George immediately after receiving orders 
for that enveloping movement took the necessary measures 
to concentrate his troops south of Auboue. 1 The advance 
guard, marching from Moineville to Ste. Marie, received 
orders to change direction via Coinville to Auboue, and only 
smaller parts of that advance guard became involved in the 
battle around Ste. Marie. 

The orders of corps headquarters to attack Ste. Marie 
reached the 24th Division at 2.15 p.m., when the 47th Brigade, 
marching in the lead, was east of Batilly. The brigade then 
turned into the ravine west of Ste. Marie and took position 
on both sides of the road leading from Ste. Marie to the 
north corner of the Bois de Ponty, while the 48th Brigade 
remained at Batilly at the disposition of the Crown Prince. 
Shortly before 3 p.m. General von Nehrhoff ordered his 
artillery into position against Ste. Marie and the two heavy 
batteries, Keysselitz and Groh, took up a position northwest 
of St. Ail, immediately at the eastern edge of the ravine, 
the 4th Light Battery, von der Pf orte, taking position farther 
to the right alongside the left wing of the advance guard of 
the Guard Corps. The 3d light Battery, Bucher II, was for 
the present kept in the ravine but later on took position also 
to the left of Ste. Marie. 

The Guard Corps had advanced on the right of the Xllth 
Corps. After 1 p.m. nine batteries of the Guard Corps de- 
ployed between St. Ail and Habonville and fought, facing 

1 At the time the 47th Brigade formed for attack on Ste. Marie in 
the meadow bottom of the ravine west of that place the 45th Brigade 
marched from the south side of the Bois de Ponty, leaving Batilly on 
the west, and passed behind the former brigade. (Report from Lieuten- 
ant General von Loeben, at that time adjutant of the Body Grenadier 
Regiment.) 

Toward 4.30 p.m. the 46th Brigade arrived south of Moineville 
while the 47th Brigade was still fighting in front of Ste. Marie. Prince 
George had directed it toward Coinville, but, through an error in trans- 
cribing the orders, Moineville had been designated as march objective. 
The brigade commander could see from a hill near Moineville that a 
hot battle raged the other side of Ste. Marie, and therefore sent his 
adjutant, Von Schultes, to ask if he should move up closer. During that 
time Captain von der Planitz, of the general staff, who had sought the 
brigade in vain at Coinville, arrived and brought orders from the 
Crown Prince for the further advance through Coinville. (Memoirs of 
General of Infantry von Montbe.) 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 175 

northeast, the French artillery south of St. Privat. Detach- 
ments of the 1st Guard Division occupied Habonville and St. 
Ail. As the division commander, General von Pape, soon 
perceived that Ste. Marie had to be taken before an attack 
on the hostile main position could even be thought of, he 
ordered his advance guard to deploy in front of that place 
without, however, proceeding to the immediate attack. 
Toward 3 p.m. Ste. Marie was almost surrounded on the 
south and southwest side by the Fusilier Battalion of the 
4th Guard Regiment, the Guard Jager Battalion and the 2d 
and 3d Battalions of the Guard Fusilier Regiment; but the 
quality of its defensive works appeared to make it advisable 
to prepare the attack by artillery fire. On the request of 
General von Pape ten guns (4th light and two platoons of 
the 2d Horse Batteries) debouched from the artillery line of 
the Guard batteries to the north, advanced on Ste. Marie and 
directed their fire on the village in conjunction with the bat- 
teries of the 24th Division just then going into position west 
of that village. 

The Saxon and Prussian batteries opened fire on Ste. 
Marie at 1,300 to 1,800 paces range, which appeared to be 
very effective. In the mean time the Saxon corps artillery, 
which had followed the 24th Division, also arrived, and 
with its seven batteries took position along the road leading 
from Batilly across the hill west of the ravine to Auboue. 
It distributed its fire partly against Ste. Marie and partly on 
the open field in the direction of St. Privat and Roncourt, 
where infantry and artillery of the enemy could be seen. 

The three batteries of the 23d Division also came up. 
The 1st Light Battery, Lengnick, had gone into position on 
the hill west of the ravine at 2.30 p.m., but had left that 
position to make room for the corps artillery. It now crossed 
the ravine and took a new position on the left of the heavy 
batteries of the 24th Division, where a hedge in front offered 
protection against rifle fire from Ste. Marie. North of the 
corps artillery, about 1,500 paces distant from it, the 2d 
Heavy Battery, Leonhardi, and the 2d Light Battery, West- 
mann, went into action, the latter battery having hastened 
from the advance guard toward the sound of cannons. 



176 VON SCHIMPPP 

The cavalry of the two German divisions which had met 
each other here, the Guard Hussars and the 2d Cavalry 
Regiment, stood in readiness at the small woods northeast 
of Batilly; the 1st Cavalry Regiment, of the advance guard 
of the 23d Division, under Colonel von Sahr, halted behind 
the left wing of the Saxon artillery. 

Generals von Pape and von Nehrhoff in the meantime 
discussed the necessary measures for a combined and simul- 
taneous attack on Ste. Marie, which the 1st Guard Division 
was to make from the south and southwest and the Saxons 
from the west and northwest. On the Saxon side the seven 
battalions of the 47th Brigade were designated for the 
attack. Colonel von Leonhardi 1 had formed them in the 
following manner: the 12th Jager Battalion in the advanced 
line deployed in column of companies; it was followed by the 
104th Regiment on the right, the 105th Regiment on the left 
wing, the latter two regiments formed in three lines; in the 
first line the 1st Battalions in column of companies, in the 
second line the two 2d Battalions, half battalions close to- 
gether in the center and with wing companies out, in the 
third line the two 3rd Battalions in column toward the center. 

After the combined artillery fire appeared to have been 
sufficiently effective Generals von Pape and von Nehrhoff 
gave orders for the attack on Ste. Marie and the troops desig- 
nated therefor started — those of the Guard Corps and the 
47th Brigade almost simultaneously shortly after 3 p.m. The 
3d Battalion of the Rifle Regiment advanced independently 
on the north edge of the village. 2 

As soon as the 12th Jager Battalion, led by Major Count 
Holtzendorff, left the ravine and appeared on the slope of 
the small hill in front, the hostile fire opened on it from Ste. 
Marie. There was absolutely no cover from the entirely 

x Now (1901) Lieutenant General, active list. 

2 The Guard Fusiliers advanced from the south, their 2d Battalion 
taking direction on the south edge of the village, while on the right the 
10th and 11th Companies turned against the southeast corner and the 
eastern exit; on the left the 9th and 12th Companies in conjunction 
with the Guard Jagers and the Fusiliers of the 4th Guard Regiment ad- 
vanced against the west side. The two Grenadier battalions of this 
regiment and the 1st Battalion of the Guard Fusilier Regiment, which 
had iust arrived from Habonville, followed the attackers as immediate 
reserve. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 177 

concealed enemy and it was necessary now to charge as 
rapidly as possible and without stopping. At the run, led 
by dense skirmish lines followed by small supports consist- 
ing of half platoons, on the right in connection with the 
Guard Fusiliers, the brave Jagers, undismayed by the rain 
of bullets which the enemy poured upon them, charged 
against the west front of Ste. Marie. No shot was fired by 
them; their strength almost gave out; but passion and the 
desire for battle tightened every muscle and, with thundering 
hurrahs, the skirmish lines entered the surrounding walls. 
Here Captain von Dieskau fell, mortally wounded, at the 
head of his company. The enemy awaited the final contact 
only at a few points on the outskirts and interior of the 
village, but here also was soon overcome. All companies of 
the battalion, heedless of a few small detachments of the 
enemy left in the rear, pressed forward without stopping 
through any available gap between houses and gardens after 
the soon completely routed enemy. Almost simultaneously 
parts of all companies left the village in single groups; the 
opposite edge of the village had been reached; the red 
trousers disappeared behind the adjacent hill and now the 
command was "Forward" up the hill; and then "Lie down; 
rapid fire," for all of a sudden a hail of chassepot bullets 
rained around the ears of the pursuing Jagers. Many a 
hostile bullet found its target there and the battalion suf- 
fered much greater loss here than it did in storming the 
village. The fleeing enemy had been received by fresh 
troops and the pursuit stopped. Parts of the battalion 
occupied the walls of the village; skirmishers lay opposite 
the French infantry on a line the right end of which stretched 
to within about 200 paces in front of the eastern exit of St. 
Privat, its left end at the fork on the road where the road to 
the woods on the north leaves the Ste. Marie — Montois 
road. 

The infantry regiments of the 47th Brigade had followed 
the Jager battalion at short distance along the Bois de 
Ponty— Ste. Marie road. Covered in the meadow ground, 
they had had only a few losses by chance shells striking 
there, but after they had crossed the defile and when they 
found themselves on the level slope commanded on the east 



178 VON SCHIMPFF 

by the houses of the village, they received a hot fire. The 
great heat, long marches with but insufficient night rest, 
together with short rations— it had been impossible to cook 
on August 18th — weakened the staying powers of the troops; 
but the valor and sense of duty which imbued them drove 
physical discomfort into the background and only a very few 
men succumbed to exhaustion. With drums beating, com- 
pany and platoon commanders in the lead, in good order and 
perfect alignment, without firing a shot, the brigade ad- 
vanced, marking its trail with dead and wounded. 

The two leading lines of the brigade participated directly 
in the storming of Ste. Marie. 

Of the 104th Regiment, on the right wing, the 1st Bat- 
talion under Major Allmer II charged directly against the 
church in the village and surrounded it, one of its companies 
turning toward the exit leading to Montois. The 2d Bat- 
talion under Major Bartcky stormed the northwest part of 
the village, suffering serious loss. * When the color bearer, 
Sergeant Bohm, fell mortally wounded, the battalion adju- 
tant, 1st Lieutenant von Egidy, grasped the colors and 
carried them held high in front of the 7th Company until 
within Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 

Of the 105th Regiment, on the left wing, the 1st Bat- 
talion under Major von Kessinger, charged immediately 
south of the Bois de Ponty— Ste. Marie road and through 
the village to the other side. The 2d Battalion under Major 
von Tettenborn attacked the walls of the village north of the 
west entrance. Captain Scheffel charged the west entrance 
with his company and fell there mortally wounded. 

Toward 3.30 p.m. Ste. Marie was in the possession of the 
Germans. The garrison, which retreated in good order first 
into the ravine running in front of the village to the north, 
later on in the direction of Roncourt, left a few hundred 
prisoners in the hands of the Germans, amongst them a 
number of marauders of different regiments. 8 

Opposite the batteries of the Guard and the 12th Corps 

1 Captain von Metzsch was seriously wounded. 

2 There were many marauders in that vicinity and thus it hap- 
pened that many prisoners were taken from troops which did not 
participate at ali in this battle. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OP 1870-71 179 

the artillery of the 6th Corps participated in the battle 
mainly from positions south and north of the main road in 
front of St. Privat. 1 

After Ste. Marie had been captured, the troops, which 
had entered from all sides, occupied the edges of the vil- 
lage facing the enemy. 2 Parts of the 47th Brigade pursued 
the retreating French to the glacis of St. Privat and here 
heavy, costly battles ensued in the course of the next few 
hours. 

Marshall Canrobert had taken excellent measures for 
receiving his 94th Regiment. The 93d Regiment, west of 
St. Privat, had advanced its skirmish lines on a large arc, 
the right end of which rested along the road connecting the 
Ste. Marie— Montois and the St. Privat— Roncourt roads, 
and the left end in front of St. Privat. From the Brigade 
Becquet de Sonnay, which stood in the second line in the 
main position northeast of St. Privat, the 75th Regiment 
proceeded to the right wing, the 91st Regiment to the left 
wing of the 93d Regiment. The 75th Regiment left the 1st 
Battalion in front of Roncourt, facing the woods, and pro- 
ceeded with the 2d and 3d Battalions along the Montois— 
Ste. Marie road to the small rise, Hill 827, and sent skirmish 
lines beyond that. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 91st 

J Of the four batteries of the Division Tixier, the 5th, 7th and 12th, 
8th Regiment, stood at St. Privat south of the road, the 8th, of the 
same regiment, north of the road. The batteries of the division Laf ond 
de Villiers, 5th, 6th and 7th, 14th Regiment and 5th, 19th Regiment, 
had been advanced from St. Privat north of the great road toward 
Ste. Marie. The batteries of the Division Levassor Sorval — 7th, 8th, 
18th Regiment, were between the great road and the right wing of 
their division. The 9th and 10th Batteries, 13th Regiment, had gone 
into position, by orders of Marshal Canrobert, as left wing batteries of 
the corps southwest Perme Jerusalem; later the 9th Battery was sent 
to the 9th Line Regiment on the right wing at Roncourt. The 6th 
Battery, 19th Regiment, remained with the cavalry division. 

Canrobert, whose headquarters were in St. Privat, ordered the 
5th Battery, 19th Regiment — when it no longer could hold its position 
against Ste. Marie — into a position with two pieces in a garden on the 
northern edge of St. Privat and with four pieces close to St. Privat 
behind the embankment of the main road. 

2 Of the Guards the company of the Guard Jagers were at the 
eastern edge of the village with small detachments outside of it; with 
them were the 2d and 3d Battalions of the Guard Fusiliers; farther in 
the rear on the south side of the village was the 1st Battalion of that 
regiment, and the 4th Guard Regiment was in the village roads, closed 
up. 



180 VON SCHIMPPP 

Regiment executed an attack on and north of the main St. 
Privat— Ste. Marie road. 

The German troops which had gone to beyond Ste. Marie 
were helpless with their needle guns against the superior 
chassepots. The small meadow ground, situated northeast 
of Ste. Marie, was the only place which offered some sort of 
protection against the direct fire of the enemy standing in 
front of St. Privat. 

Captain von Winckler of the 12th Jager Battalion made 
an attempt with the 2d Company to advance from the 
eastern exit of the village a short distance along the main 
road in order to get a better fire on the enemy which had 
come to within 600 paces, but had to give up the attempt 
and be satisfied with holding the advanced garden walls and 
ditches. 

Two companies (6th and 7th) of the 2d Battalion, 104th 
Regiment, started from the village for St. Privat. They re- 
ceived such hot fire and suffered such loss that a further 
advance was not to be thought of. In this charge 1st Lieu- 
tenant von Egidy, who had carried the colors far forward, 
was severely wounded. 

Captains Panse and von Bunau of the 105th Regiment 
gained a firm foothold with parts of their companies (4th 
and 5th) in the small meadow ground northeast of the 
village; the other companies of the 2d Battalion entered the 
fight on their right. Here also the terrain offered no cover 
against the enemy's volleys and heavy losses were inevitable. 
The inspiriting words of the officers raised the men's courage 
and strengthened their endurance. The regimental com- 
mander, Colonel von Tettau, * gave a shining example in this 
stationary, costly defensive fight, as well as in the previous 
charge, by his display of courage and coolness. He rode 
along his lines as he would have done on the drill ground, 
here encouraging, there ordering. A piece of shell tore off 
his right shoulder strap, another one killed his horse from 
under him, but a few minutes later the colonel was again 
mounted on a fresh horse in front of his fighting detach- 
ments. 

x Died in 1898 as Lieutenant General, active service. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 181 

The brigade commander, Colonel von Leonhardi, contin- 
ually encouraged all those detachments whose zealousness 
had led them to beyond Ste. Marie to press still further 
ahead and with impetuous bravery also decided to bring into 
action the two 3d Battalions of the 104th and 105th Regiments 
which had arrived as reserve on the west side of the village. 
The 3d Battalion, 104th Regiment, went around the north of 
Ste. Marie, reinforced the Saxon right wing in front of the 
village along the main road and for the largest part here 
deployed in skirmish lines. At the very commencement of 
the fight here the battalion commander, Major Zillich, was 
wounded and the battalion could hold its position there only 
under the greatest difficulty. 1 

Brigade adjutant, Lieutenant Wagner, had brought 
orders to the 3d Battalion, 105th Regiment, to deploy on the 
left wing north of Ste. Marie, facing Roncourt. Here the 
situation of the battalion became very precarious, as it re- 
ceived an enfilade fire from the north and could beat off the 
hostile attack only with the greatest difficulty. Its ranks 
were thinning visibly. 2 The battalion commander, Major 
Giinther was seriously wounded on the head by a piece of 
shell. The 3d Rifle Battalion brought help. 

After General von Craushaar had given the advance 
guard direction on Ste. Marie, the Rifle Regiment had 

1 Lieutenant von Schonberg, battalion adjutant, Second Lieutenant 
Burckhardt and acting first sergeant Dorfel were killed. Lieutenant 
Koring, Second Lieutenant and regimental adjutant Pohle, and Second 
Lieutenant Flechsig were seriously wounded. Second Lieutenant 
Freiherr von Miinchhausen and Second Lieutenant of reserve Heynig 
were slightly wounded. 

A shining example of self-sacrifice was Private Siege] of the 9th 
Company when Lieutenant Koring was seriously wounded. The latter 
had declined all proffered aid of his men, so as not to draw any men 
from the firing line. Only after that company had fallen back into the 
village of Ste. Marie would he permit a soldier to accompany him to 
the dressing station. Private Siegel hastened up in spite of the mur- 
derous fire and led Lieutenant Koring back. The French fire became 
heavier and hotter and Koring received a second wound in the arm. 
Then Siegel said : "Lieutenant, I will get behind you, else you surely 
will be hit again; you have enough wounds now." Just as he stepped 
behind the lieutenant a third projectile, passing close to Siegel, struck 
Koring in the thigh, so that the latter said in reply to Siegel's remark: 
"It is not necessary for you to do so, I am struck again already." 

8 At the first advance, battalion adjutant Lieutenant Menz was 
mortally wounded; a chassepot bullet shattered Captain von Rouvroy's 
hand; Lieutenants Blohm and Philipp were mortally wounded. 



182 VON SCHIMPPP 

started with the 2d Light Battery from Moineville and Valle- 
roy toward that place, the 2d Battalion on the right, the 3d 
on the left, the 1st in reserve. The two battalions of the 
first line crossed the ravine running to Auboue and advanced 
along both sides of the main Auboue— Ste. Marie road, 
forming for attack, the 2d Battalion opening fire on the 
village. At this moment Colonel von Hausen 1 received in- 
formation from a Guard Hussar officer that Ste. Marie had 
been taken by Prussian Jagers. It soon transpired, however, 
that the village was still held by the enemy, for the regi- 
mental adjutant von Minckwitz, who had ridden ahead 
toward the village, received from there a wound from which 
he later died; 2 but as almost immediately after word arrived 
that Ste. Marie was being taken by other troops, and that 
the Rifle Regiment should proceed in the ravine toward 
Coinville and from there to Auboue, the battalions were 
ordered to stop the attack and turn to the left. Captain 
von Mangoldt, however, had already become seriously en- 
gaged with the 11th company and Major Allmer, command- 
ing the 3d Battalion, believed that he was justified in not 
obeying the order for the retreat. The 11th Company en- 
tered, under quite a heavy loss, the northwest corner of the 
village simultaneously with the 47th Brigade. 3 

After Ste. Marie had been captured the 3d Battalion 
turned toward the north to rejoin the Rifle Regiment. It 
interfered successfully en route in the battle, between the 
left wing of the 47th Brigade and the French 75th Regi- 
ment, which had ensued the other side of the ravine running 
toward Hautmecourt, and relieved the sorely pressed 3d 
Battalion, 105th Regiment. Major Allmer I, one of the 
bravest, who had been wounded in the breast in 1849, was 
here mortally wounded. 4 Captain von Lossow led the bat- 
talion to the woods situated directly north, chasing off some 

*Died in 1887 as Lieutenant General, active service, a la suite 
Rifle (Fusilier) Regiment Prince George No. 108. 

8 Attention, monsieur, was shouted to the officer from immediately 
in front of the village as he galloped up and at the same time he re- 
ceived a wound in the heel. 

"Lance Corporal Bergmann and Private Mobius were the first to 
enter the village. 

4 Captain Jahn and Lieutenant Jongblut were seriously wounded. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 183 

few French tirailleurs hidden in some folds of the terrain. 

The attack movements of the German Infantry against 
Ste. Marie had caused the Saxon batteries to be completely 
masked in their positions on both sides of the bottom west 
of Ste. Marie and hindered in their fire. As soon as the vil- 
lage had been stormed, the batteries of the corps artillery 
crossed the ravine in their front by echelons from the right. 
While the 4th Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Oertel was 
for the present kept in reserve, Colonel Funke advanced 
with the 3d Battalion into a new position north of Ste. Marie. 
The 6th Heavy Battery, Verworner, went into position near- 
est the village on the main road leading to Auboue. At some 
distance from it the two other batteries took up a more ad- 
vanced position: the 5th Light, von Zeschau, about 500 paces 
east of the road; on its left, the 5th Heavy, Hamner, about 
800 paces east of the road. In the meantime the infantry 
fight ensued between the left wing of the 47th Brigade and the 
French 75th Regiment, as well as reassembled parts of the 
94th Line Regiment, and the two batteries were soon hotly 
fired on by French skirmishers hidden in the bushes and 
folds of the terrain close in front. The battalion commander, 
Major Hoch, was wounded and a large number of men and 
horses disabled. * The two batteries then took a new position 
west of the road from Ste. Marie to Auboue in prolongation 
of the 6th Heavy Battery, but some distance away from it. 

Shortly after 4 p.m. two batteries of the 24th Division, 
which up to then had stood southwest of Ste. Marie, arrived 
on this part of the battlefield. They took position alongside 
of the 6th Heavy Battery, the 3d Light on the left, the 4th 
Heavy on the right. In this position, the right wing of 
which almost touched the village, the 3d Heavy Battery also 
went into action a short time later. These six batteries 
combined their fire mainly against repeated attacks of the 
French infantry, causing it to fall back each time. They 
also took up the battle with French batteries west of St. 
Privat, in position north of the main road. The 4th Light 
Battery, which had taken up connection with the Guards on 
the extreme right wing of the 24th Division, had, by order of 

1 Captain Hamner was seriously wounded. 



184 VON SOHIMPFF 

the battalion commander, Major Richter, gone into position 
southeast of the village after Ste. Marie had been captured 
and from there fired on the enemy's lines at St. Privat and 
Roncourt. » 

The three batteries of the 23d Division, which had par- 
ticipated in the first two stages of the battle around Ste. 
Marie, had followed their division to Auboue without dis- 
tance. 

The two German division commanders had ridden im- 
mediately behind the first detachments into Ste Marie aux 
Chenes. Difficult situations were encountered within the 
village; the Saxons and Prussians, who had charged shoulder 
to shoulder, were crowded together in the narrow village 
streets. The stone houses stood close together and on the 
side toward the enemy had neither doors nor windows so that 
the men could find cover only by crowding through narrow 
gaps between houses to behind the low stone walls. The 
strong fire coming from St. Privat made staying in the vil- 
lage and near the village extremely precarious, but the men 
showed wonderful nerve. The continuous thunder of cannon, 
the rattle of rifles and the peculiar, rasping sound of the mit- 
railleuses from the French 4th Corps shook the ground. In 
front of the village the bullets whistled sharply; high in the 
air burst shells, the pieces of which traveled with a horrible 
noise through the air, striking the roofs and houses. In 
General von Nehrhoff 's staff Adjutant Friedrich of the artil- 
lery was shot through the arm, an orderly through the leg, 
the horse of Adjutant von Carlowitz 1 through a leg. 

Major General von Nehrhoff carefully watched the bat- 
tle which had ensued in front of the village, and which 
at the start appeared to be merely a matter of driving the 
enemy from the vicinity of the captured place. But the 
general soon perceived that the fight was taking on larger 
and larger proportions, not in accord with what he knew to 
be the intentions of the Crown Prince, and that the enemy's 
strength and the unfavorable terrain gave little hope of 
success. He therefore sent orders to Colonel von Elterlein, 
who had taken over the command of the 47th Brigade after 
Colonel von Leonhardi had been wounded, to break off the 

1 Now (1901) Lieutenant General, active service. 



XIITH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 185 

fight and assemble the brigade at Ste. Marie. Captain von 
Hodenberg just then arrived and brought orders to the same 
effect from the Crown Prince to General von Nehrhoff di- 
recting him to confine himself to the holding of Ste. Marie. 
The 47th Brigade was assembled at the northwest corner 
of Ste. Marie, the assembly being finished by 5 p.m. The 
advance troops, hotly engaged in battle and fighting in dis- 
order, were drawn back, the first battalions of the 104th and 
105th Regiments, which had remained in the village, were 
relieved by detachments of the 1st Guard Division, and 
drawn off. As the 12th Jager Battalion assembled on the 
village street, General von Pape greeted it and Guards and 
Jagers cheered loudly. 

XII. Roncourt 

Halted on the hill west of Ste. Marie, near the batteries 
of the corps artillery, Crown Prince Albert had viewed the 
charge on Ste. Marie unfolding itself like a panorama before 
his eyes and rejoiced over the hurrahs with which his 
charging battalions achieved their first success in this cam- 
paign. From here he sent orders to General von Nehrhoff 
not to advance farther but to confine himself to holding Ste. 
Marie. The Crown Prince viewed the battlefield in the 
direction of Roncourt and Montois la Montagne and observed 
the attitude of the enemy with great attention. Roncourt 
as well as St. Privat were occupied. Troops were pushed 
ahead from both places. French infantry several times 
approached close to Ste. Marie, behind it a long line of 
numerous guns in action, appearing to extend way beyond 
Roncourt on the north. This gave the Crown Prince the 
impression that the movement ordered for the 23d Division 
from Auboue through the woods— a straight line on Roncourt 
—might still lead against the front of the enemy. Under 
these conditions he sent, toward 4 p.m., Adjutant Miiller 
von Berneck to Prince George with directions to debouch 
farther to the north with his troops, in order to effect the 
intended envelopment. To give this movement more 
strength and support, the 48th Brigade at Batilly was at 
once started for Auboue to report to Prince George for 
orders. The Saxon cavalry division, which reached the 



186 VON SOHIMPPP 

Bois de Ponty toward 3 p.m. and which in accordance with 
orders had halted in reserve until 4 p.m. at the northwest 
edge of the woods, opposite Ste. Marie aux Chenes, and 
later on had started from there toward Coinville, received 
orders to join the enveloping movement at Auboue and to 
make an attempt to gain the enemy's rear by going around 
his extreme right wing. Two squadrons were to be sent at 
the same time into the valley of the Mosel to destroy rail- 
road and telegraph in the vicinity of Maizi&res. 1 

The first orders, to assemble the 23d Division at Coin- 
ville to advance on Roncourt, had reached Prince George at 
2.45 p.m. on the heights north of the Batilly woods. The 
Prince who from his position could see that not only troops 
of the 24th Division but also of the Guards were opposite 
Ste. Marie, had already considered it best to seek employ- 
ment for his troops farther to the north. The advance 
guard and the 45th Brigade, therefore, were directed to- 
ward Coinville, the 46th Brigade, behind the north corner of 
the Bois de Ponty, received directions to proceed to Moine- 
ville. 8 As a place of assembly for the former the ravine at 
Auboue leading to the Orne valley was first utilized, later, 
after Ste. Marie had been taken, a depression in the terrain, 
wider and about 1000 paces east of the Metz— Briey road, 
where French shells 3 greeted the division. Stray chassepot 
bullets also fell amongst the division staff, one horse being 
killed. General von Craushaar again resumed command of 
the three regiments of his 45th Brigade. 

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the Rifle Regiment had 
just arrived at Auboue when Prince George received direc- 
tions from the Crown Prince immediately to occupy the 
woods between Auboue and Roncourt, the Crown Prince hav- 
ing observed from his location that the enemy (1st Battalion, 
9th Regiment) was advancing toward those woods. Prince 
George personally ordered the 1st Battalion under Major 
Freiherr von Lindeman to proceed to the woods at double 

J These were the last orders issued by army headquarters to the 
Crown Prince. (See p. 70 ante.) 

8 See note, page 174 ante. 

'From the 7th and 8th Batteries, 18th Regiment. 



XIlTH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 187 

time. The 2d Battalion under Major von Dziembowsky * 
followed in support a little to the left. The woods between 
Auboue and Roncourt, traversed by a deep, steep-sided 
ravine opening near the Orne, were filled with dense under- 
brush and could be passed through only with difficulty. In 
some parts of the woods a detour was necessary. The two 
rifle battalions found the part of the woods west of the 
ravine unoccupied, but encountered French tirailleurs on 
the other side of the ravine. The 3d and 4th Companies 
suffered some losses by shrapnel fire. 2 

At 4.30 p.m., when the 3d Battalion had arrived from 
its battlefield at Ste. Marie and was partly in and partly be- 
hind the woods, Colonel von Hausen ordered an attack on 
the last clump of woods which the enemy still held and 
which was now taken at the first charge. On the left wing 
of the 45th Brigade the rifle regiment occupied after 5 p.m. 
the nearest part of the hill in front and from there directed 
its fire against the hostile infantry (1st Battalion, 9th and 
1st Battalion, 91st Regiment), which was in the open west 
of Roncourt. 

General von Craushaar directed the Body Grenadier 
Regiment of the Grenadier Brigade assembled at the west 
edge of the woods, to follow the rifle regiment into the 
woods. With the 1st and 3d Battalions in the first line, each 
followed by a half battalion of the 2d Battalion as second 
line, the regiment proceeded partly through the right wing of 
the Rifle Regiment and getting mixed with it and partly 
turning to the right into the open field, in the direction of 
Roncourt. Further on the regiment encountered resistance. 
While the 1st Company carried on a fire fight with a detach- 
ment of the enemy (1st Battalion, 75th Regiment) lying in 
a depression behind a thorn hedge, the 10th and 12th Com- 
panies 3 , on the left wing of the regiment, drove the enemy 
from the nearest depression in front. The 2d Grenadier 
Regiment followed the Rifle and Body Guard Regiments at a 

'Now (1901) Lieutenant General, active service. 

"From the 9th Battery, 13th Regiment, which had been attached 
to the 9th Line Regiment, and the 6th Battery, 19th Regiment, of the 
cavalry division. 

3 Sergeant Boh me of the 12th Company, in spite of a severe wound 
in the head, remained on the spot, encouraging his men. 



188 VONSCHIMPPP 

longer distance, but had advanced its 1st Battalion by orders 
of General von Craushaar to beyond the woods toward 
Montois. On account of the distance this regiment fired 
but few shots. All three regiments received orders to stop 
their advance until the enveloping of the French right wing 
through Montois, ordered by Prince George in the meantime, 
could become effective. 

The most advanced detachments of the enemy had been 
driven from the woods, but were received by strong skirmish 
lines which had gained a firm foothold between the woods 
and Roncourt and which kept up a hot fire on the east edge 
of the woods. On the right was the 1st Battalion, 9th Regi- 
ment, then the 1st Battalion, 91st Regiment, and on the left 
the 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment. 

In the start General Bisson had only the 1st Battalion, 
75th Line Regiment, the 9th Line Regiment, and the 9th 
Battery, 13th Regiment, at his disposal on the extreme 
French right wing. On Canrobert's personal orders when 
the regiment advanced on Ste. Marie the 1st Battalion, 75th 
Regiment, had been kept back opposite the woods between 
Auboue* and Roncourt. With the battery assigned to it, the 
9th Line Regiment held its position between Roncourt and 
St. Privat until after 4 p.m. suffering from fire of the Ger- 
man batteries which finally silenced it. 

When General Bisson perceived with certainty the pre- 
liminary movements of the Saxons for an envelopment he 
sent a report to Canrobert that it was absolutely necessary 
to occupy Roncourt at once. The marshal was of the same 
opinion and sent him the Brigade Pechot, then northeast of 
Roncourt. In the meantime Bisson had sent the 1st Bat- 
talion, 9th Regiment, to the front of Roncourt and toward 
Montois, except one company, which occupied Roncourt and 
prepared it for defense. The 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, 
remained in reserve on the ridge south of Roncourt. 
The 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, had been ordered 
to St. Privat, to occupy the north edge of the village. 
Of the Brigade Pechot, which soon arrived under the 
fire of the Saxon batteries, only the 10th Line Regi- 
ment was kept at the general's disposition; the 4th was 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 189 

called to St. Privat to be utilized against the first charge 
made by the 1st Guard Division on that village. The 10th 
Line Regiment took position in folds of the terrain and be- 
hind stone walls, some distance in front of St. Privat and 
facing Roncourt. The regiments of the Brigade Becquet de 
Sonnay, which had been drawn out of the fight with the 
47th Brigade at Ste. Marie, took station between the 9th 
and 10th Regiments, the 91st on the right, the 75th on the 
left. Thus the front from Roncourt to St. Privat was 
occupied from right to left by the 9th (1st and 2d Battalions), 
91st, 75th, 10th Line Regiments. The 1st Battalions of the 
9th, 91st and 75th Regiments were sent ahead toward the 
woods. The 94th Regiment had used up all of its ammuni- 
tion and fell back through Roncourt to the quarries of Jau- 
mont, where it suceeded in replenishing. 

The visible progress of the 45th Brigade in the direction 
of Roncourt permitted a renewed advance of the Saxon bat- 
teries. Crown Prince Albert, considering it necessary for 
the preparation of the subsequent infantry attack on the 
enemy's main position, ordered Major General Kohler to take 
all available artillery to beyond the main road leading from 
Ste. Marie to Auboue. 

In pursuance thereof the general called up the 4th Battal- 
ion, until then held in readiness, and at 4.30 p.m. took a po- 
sition with the seven batteries of the corps artillery on the 
road from Ste. Marie to Hautmecourt, in which the 3d Bat- 
talion in the start formed the right wing about 400 paces 
north of Ste. Marie. This wing was prolonged later on by 
the four batteries of the 24th Division, which arrived one 
after the other on the new artillery front, while on the left 
wing the 2d Heavy Battery of the 23d Division went into po- 
sition at the south edge of the woods. Thus, before 6 p.m., 
twelve Saxon batteries were in action between Ste. Marie 
and the woods. ' 

The 2d Heavy Battery, Leonhardi, had just gone into po- 
sition at the south edge of the woods when a forward move- 

1 From left to right: 
(23d Division 4th Battalion 3d Battalion 2d Battalion 24th Division) 
2d Heavy 8th,7thHea- 5thLight,5th 3d Heavy, 4th Light 

vy, 6th Light, & 6th Heavy 3d Light, 
2d Horse 4th Heavy 



190 VON SCHIMPFP 

ment of hostile cavalry from Roncourt was perceived and the 
battery took that cavalry as target. At the same time Cap- 
tain Muller, with the 2d Horse Battery, galloped across the 
field in front towards the enemy and fired several rounds 
at him with apparent good effect. He was supported by the 
6th Light Battery, Fellmer, which had followed him and 
gone into position on his left. After that enemy had disap- 
peared, the batteries, being joined on the right by Captain 
von Zeschau with the 5th Light Battery, directed their fire 
on the hostile position between Roncourt and St. Privat. 
The hostile cavalry was part of General du Barail's division, 
which had been deployed on the right wing of the 6th Corps 1 
until 6 o'clock and then made an unsuccessful charge against 
the left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. 

The appearance of the French cavalry had also been ob- 
served by the Crown Prince and, in consequence, the 2d Cav- 
alry Regiment, belonging to the 24th Division and in readi- 
ness southwest of Ste. Marie, had received orders to pass 
around the woods between Auboue and Roncourt in order to 
drive off any cavalry found near Montois. The cavalry reg- 
iment passed the artillery line, left a squadron with it for 
protection, and attempted to pass around the woods on the 
southeast; but it received infantry fire without having seen 
any hostile cavalry. Major Genthe therefore caused the regi- 
ment to debouch to the left and joined the enveloping move- 
ment which in the meantime had been started on Montois. 

While the 45th Brigade pressed through the woods against 
Roncourt, Prince George received at 4.30 p.m. the Crown 
Prince's orders to reach further out to the north with his 
enveloping movement and for this purpose the 48th Brigade 
was placed under his command. 

In pursuance of these orders, the Prince immediately 
took the following measures: 

Colonel von Schulz 8 with the 48th Brigade reinforced by the 1st 
Cavalry Regiment and three batteries of the 1st Foot Battalion (1st, 2d 
Light, 3d Heavy) will take up the march in the valley of the Orne as 

1 From 2.30 to 6 p.m. my cavalry division remained deployed on 
the right of the 6th Corps under fire from obuses and watching the 
deep ravined woods from which an attack might come. — DuBarail; 
Memoir 8. 

z Died in 1895 as Major General, active service. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 191 

far as the heights of Joeuf and Montois and will advance through the 
latter place to Roncourt. 

General von Craushaar with the 45th Infantry Brigade will drive 
the enemy completely out of the woods and advance from the west on 
Roncourt, as soon as Colonel von Schulz's movement from the north 
becomes effective. 

The 46th Brigade remains at my disposition. 

Shortly after these orders had been issued the 48th 
Brigade, coming from Batilly, arrived in Auboue, so that the 
directed movements were in execution by 5 p.m. In order 
for the envelopment to be made unperceived by the enemy 
and decisive results to be gained by it, it had to be executed 
under the protection and cover of the steep ridge west of 
Montois in the valley of the Orne. 

After 5 p.m. the separate parts of the Xllth Corps were 
at the following points: 

The 45th Brigade had taken the woods between Auboue 
and Roncourt; the 46th Brigade and the 1st Heavy Battery 
were south of Moineville and later received orders from the 
Crown Prince to follow up through Coinville. The 47th 
Brigade stood, assembled, at the northwest side of Ste. 
Marie, the mass of the artillery 1 stood with continuous front 
on the road leading from Ste. Marie to Hautmecourt. The 
troops designated for the enveloping movement had started 
the march from Auboue to Joeuf and Montois. These troops 
were the 48th Brigade 2 with the 2d Heavy and the two light 
batteries of the 23d Division under Lieutenant Colonel von 
Watzdorf 3 , the 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments and the still 
available parts of the cavalry division. 4 In order to execute 
the ordered destruction of railroad and telegraph in the val- 
ley of the Mosel, the 1st Squadron of the Guard Cavalry 
Regiment, under Captain von Klenck 6 , had been sent by the 

tCorps artillery and artillery of the 24th Division. 

*The 48th Brigade had one Jager battalion and five infantry bat- 
talions present. The 2d Battalion, 106th Regiment, under Major von 
Mandelsloh, which had been left in Pont a Mousson on August 17th as 
guard for Royal Headquarters, arrived in Verneville in the course of 
the 18th, and there joined the IHd Army Corps temporarily. 

"Lieutenant Colonel von Watzdorf was slighUy wounded in the 
foot but did not leave the troops. He died later of his wound. 

4 Three squadrons of each of the Guard Cavalry and the 3d Cavalry 
Regiment with the horse battery. 

"See p. 112 et seq., ante. 



192 VON 8CHIMPFP 

cavalry division to Uckange, as had also the 2d Squadron of 
the 3d Cavalry Regiment under Captain von Polenz. Rail- 
road and telegraph were interrupted between 7 and 8 o'clock 
and the first reports sent by Bazaine of the events of August 
18th therefore reached Emperor Napoleon only on August 
22d. During the night of August 18-19th Major Klemm, 
with the pioneers of the 4th Company, also destroyed the 
railroad and the telegraph east of Longuion at Mercy le Bas. 

Prince Frederick Charles and his headquarters were on 
the hill west of Habonville, Prince August of Wurttemberg 
and headquarters of the Guard Corps on the hill north of 
that place. Even before the fight at Ste. Marie headquarters 
of the Guard and Xllth Corps had exchanged information 
officers; these were Captain von Ramm of the Guards and 
Captain von Minckwitz 1 of the Xllth Corps who covered the 
2,000 meters distance between the two headquarters on his 
thoroughbred in exceedingly short time and kept the Crown 
Prince constantly oriented by written reports of the events 
with the Guard Corps. 

Toward 5 p.m. the 1st Guard Division was at Ste. Marie; 
the 2d Guard Division had detached its 3d Brigade to the 
IXth Corps; the 4th was at St. Ail; eight batteries were in 
position south and four north of St. Ail. 2 Thus there were 
144 German pieces in action between the woods of Auboue 
and Habonville. Opposed to this enormous display of guns 
the 110 guns of the French artillery between Roncourt and 
Amanvillers, inclusive of the batteries of the Division Cissey 
(1st, 9th Regiment, 5th, 9th and 12th Mitrailleuse Batteries 
of the 15th Regiment), had almost ceased their fire. 3 This 
was not due to the losses suffered by the French artillery for 
in most of the batteries these were slight, but to a realiza- 
tion of the hopelessness of an artillery duel with the German 
guns at long range, knowing the superiority of the German 
artillery as to marksmanship and fire effect, and as they had 

iWilhelm von Minckwitz; now (1901) general of infantry and ad- 
jutant general. 

"Behind the Guards, at Batilly, Btood the Xth Corps, the 5th 
Cavalry Division, the Guard Cuiriassier and Guard Dragoon Brigade. 

8 The 10th Battery, 13th Regiment, (12 pounder) on the hill south 
of Privat fired the longest. The 7th and 8th, of the 18th Regiment (4 
pounder) appeared twice, but then retreated toward Plappeville. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 193 

but little ammunition left, they saved their fire for the im- 
minent charge of the German infantry. 

Towards 5 p.m. a pause in the battle occurred along the 
entire front of the lid Army, during which only the Saxon 
artillery on the left wing kept up an intermittent fire. The 
further operations of the Xllth Corps were dependent on the 
progress of the enveloping movement, especially that of the 
48th Brigade; for in the accomplishment of that brigade's 
task lay the actual enveloping of the hostile right wing as 
intended by the Crown Prince. 

After 5 p.m., the pause before the storm was prema- 
turely brought to an end by orders from Prince August of 
Wurttemberg to the Guards to attack St. Privat. It was 
impossible that, so early as this, the frontal attack of the 
Guards from the west could be supported by an advance of 
the Saxons from the north against St. Privat. 

The first intrepid charge of the Prussian infantry against 
St. Privat led to no decision; the force of the charge was 
exhausted in front of the objective, and thousands of dead 
and wounded covered the blood-soaked ground. But neither 
this fact nor the loss of many higher officers could dampen 
the troops' ardor. With the few still unwounded officers at 
their head, the thinned out ranks had gained a foothold on 
the slope. They held their dearly purchased position with iron 
endurance and self-sacrifice. Of the 11,600 men who exe- 
cuted the charge only about 4,600 effectives were left of the 
Prussian Guard infantry and they surrounded the northwest 
and west front of St. Privat at 700 to 900 paces distance, at 
which range, even, they were still unable to fire effectively 
with their needle guns on the about 8,000 strong garrison of 
St. Privat, which were under good cover. ! 

Shortly before 5.30 p.m. , as soon as the 45th Brigade was 
in possession of the woods of Auboue and had made front 
east of them against Roncourt and Montois, the Crown 
Prince, who had remained on the hill west of Ste. Marie, 
ordered that the corps artillery deployed on the road to 
Hautmecourt should be taken forward about 900 paces in an 
easterly direction. Half an hour later these seven batteries 

1 Major Kunz— Der Kampf um St. Privat la Montague. 



194 VONSCHIMPFF 

took a still more advanced position, facing Roncourt and ex- 
tending on the left to the east corner of the woods. The 
four foot batteries of the 2d Battalion had, in consequence 
of a misunderstanding of orders, joined for a time the 47th 
Brigade which had been drawn up from Ste. Marie to the 
southern edge of the forest, but later on they arrived on the 
left wing of the corps artillery. The artillery poured a hot 
fire on Roncourt and the French right wing. The 46th Brig- 
ade, coming from Moineville, crossed the main Metz— Briey 
road west of the woods. The enveloping column, marching 
from Auboue along the right bank of the Orne, after having 
made a sharp turn to the right from the Orne valley, arrived 
on the plateau at 6 p.m. 

Marshal Conrobert had well perceived the danger threat- 
ening his unsupported right wing. He saw the German 
troops reaching out farther and farther for the envelopment, 
without being able to oppose them with a counter attack in 
force from his center. 

After Canrobert, as already stated, had, at 10.15 a.m., 
informed Bazaine of the enemy's approach, he, at 12.30p.m., 
sent Captain de Bellegarde to report the commencement of the 
hostile attack, with the request to send him reserve troops 
and more ammunition. Bazaine replied that, if conditions 
became more threatening, he would send a division of the 
Guards, and that he would give orders to reinforce Canro- 
bert's force by a battery of 12 pounders, also that Canrobert 
could get ammunition from the reserve park. 

As these promises had not yet been fulfilled by 2.30 p.m., 
Canrobert sent Captain de Chalus to ;Plappeville to explain 
the situation again and renew the marshal's requests. 
Bazaine was in his parlor, where the messenger showed him 
on the map the situation of the 6th Corps. The commander- 
in-chief, however, still refused to send the Guard Grenadier 
Division and only gave consent to have four wagon loads of 
ammunition sent the 6th Corps. After de Chalus had taken 
his leave, Bazaine mounted his horse at 4 p.m., but did not 
ride to the right wing, but to the plateau of Plappeville. 
Here also he received a message from Canrobert, written in 
pencil, describing his endangered situation and again beg- 
ging for support. Canrobert received no answer to this and 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 195 

all that he obtained was the four wagons of ammunition and 
two batteries— which did not reach him until the retreat had 
been commenced. The Guards, the main artillery reserve 
and ten cavalry regiments remained inactive. Only after 
the loss of St. Privat did the Grenadier Division, with the ar- 
tillery reserve of the Guard hastening before it, arrive behind 
the French right wing, just in time to cover the retreat of 
the 6th and 4th Corps. 

Threatened with envelopment, Marshal Canrobert had 
decided to concentrate his forces closer around his last point 
of resistance, St. Privat. The 9th Line Regiment (1st and 2d 
Battalions) retreated, at the appearance of the Saxons in 
front of Montois, from Roncourt to the woods of Jaumont. 
Of the Brigade Becquet de Sonnay, the 1st Battalion, 75th 
Regiment, which earlier had fired away all of its ammunition, 
had been relieved in its advanced position by the 2d Battalion, 
10th Regiment, by orders of General de Villiers. It pro- 
ceeded north around Roncourt to Bronvaux and did not re- 
join its regiment until further back and late at night. The 
91st Regiment, whose 1st Battalion had made a brave stand 
opposite the woods, and the 75th Regiment (2d and 3d Bat- 
talions) who had suffered much by artillery fire were drawn 
back to behind St. Privat by General de Sonnay who formed 
from them and the residue of the 94th Regiment a large 
square, each regiment forming one side, the fourth side be- 
ing kept open for assembly of all stragglers of the 3d Division. 
After order had been reestablished, General de Sonnay rein- 
forced the garrison of St. Privat with a part of these troops 
and, with the other part, almost exclusively of the 94th Regi- 
ment, he fell farther back and occupied the edge of the 
forest of Jaumont; a battery went into position on his right 
at the crossroads, 1200 meters southwest of the Jaumont 
chateau, but had, however, only five rounds left for each 
piece. By advancing a short distance to the front, the 1st 
and 3d Battalions, 10th regiment, received their 2d Battalion, 
and the regiment, almost totally without ammunition, retired 
to behind St. Privat to reestablish order. General Bisson 
had held a few companies of the 10th and 91st Regiments 
back at Roncourt as a weak rear guard. 

Marshal Conrobert had drawn the 12th Regiment, which 



196 VONSOHIMPFP 

at the start had been in reserve on his left wing, up to St. 
Privat. This regiment was part of the brigade Le Roy de 
Dais. The 100th Regiment he sent to the front of his right 
wing, the 1st Battalion, under Major Nee-Devaux, to oppo- 
site Roncourt, the 2d to the hill between Roncourt and St. 
Privat, and the 3d behind them in reserve. 

St. Privat itself was occupied by the 9th Jager Battal- 
ion, with three companies of the 94th Regiment, in the 
churchyard and vicinity; the 93d Regiment and the 3d Bat- 
talion of the 9th Regiment on the north side; the 4th Regi- 
ment on the west side; the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 12th 
Regiment at the entrance from Ste. Marie. This garrison 
was joined later by weak detachments of the 75th and 91st 
Regiments and dispersed detachments of the Division Levas- 
sor Sorval. The 7th Company and a part of the 3d Company 
of the 3d Engineer Regiment also fought in St. Privat. 

The left wing south of Privat was formed by the 
Division Levassor Sorval with which was the 2d Battalion, 
12th Line Regiment. 

A few batteries, still able to carry on the battle, went 
into position east of St. Privat, from where they swept the 
open field in front as far as the woods. Du Barail's cavalry 
had withdrawn along the main road of retreat. 

It was after 6 o'clock when the Saxon enveloping 
column, after having turned to the right in the Orne valley 
and ascended its steep, partly wooded side, appeared on the 
plateau and commenced to deploy west and northwest of 
Montois. The 3d Battalion, 107th Regiment, was led by 
Major von Bosze 1 through the now unoccupied Montois, 
where only a patrol of the French 100th Regiment was cap- 
tured, and to the wooded hill toward Roncourt. The 1st 
and 2d Battalions, 107th Regiment, with the two light bat- 
teries, followed, leaving Montois on the left and proceeding 
in the direction of Roncourt. The 106th Regiment went 
around Montois to the north. Colonel von Abendroth 2 led 
the 1st Battalion and the 12th Company to the northeast 
corner of Roncourt and sent Major Brinkmann with three 
companies of the 3d Battalion to the left against Malancourt, 

!Died in 1895 as Lieutenant General, active service. 
8 Died in 1879 as Lieutenant General, active service. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 197 

from which there had come rifle shots. The 13th Jager 
Battalion followed the 106th Regiment. The 2d Heavy 
Battery Leonhardi took position on the east slope of the 
wooded hill southeast of Montois. The two light cavalry 
regiments stood west, the two heavy regiments of the cav- 
alry division east of Montois. In front of the left wing of 
the latter the 1st Horse Battery Zenker went into position 
and fired on hostile infantry which could be seen on the edge 
of the forest of Jaumont. 

After 6 p.m. Crown Prince Albert went from his prior 
place of observation west of Ste. Marie to the left wing of 
the XIIth Corps in order, as it appeared, personally to 
witness the oncoming decision. It was his intention to 
first take Roncourt and then proceed to the attack on St. 
Privat. Prince George had the same intention and, when 
the 48th Brigade became visible on the plateau, started the 
45th Brigade from the west against Roncourt. He accom- 
panied this brigade with the Rifle Regiment. 

As Marshal Canrobert had evacuated Roncourt and his 
positions north of St. Privat very skillfully, and, because of 
the favoring terrain, almost unnoticed, the 45th Brigade 
encountered in its advance only weak skirmish lines already 
falling back. This brigade had in its first line from left to 
right: the 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, the Rifle Regiment, 
the Body Grenadier Regiment; in its second line: the 2d and 
3d Battalions, 101st Regiment. The right wing of the 
brigade was extended, on the crossroad joining the Ste. 
Marie— Montois with the St. Privat — Roncourt road, by the 
1st Guard Pioneer Company, the 3d and 4th Companies, 1st 
Guard Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 3d Guard 
Regiment as parts of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, from 
which they had separated in the advance northward on St. 
Privat. 

The 48th Brigade pressed against Roncourt from the 
north, the 45th from the west, without encountering any 
material resistance. Major von Bosze reached with the 3d 
Battalion, 107th Regiment, the north side of the village 1 

1 Twenty to thirty men of the French 100th Line Regiment had 
taken a firm stand behind a garden wall on the extreme southeast 
corner of the village, firing on the skirmish line of the 11th Company, 



198 VON SCHIMPFF 

where he made a few prisoners belonging to the 10th and 
91st Regiment, and then went into the open field eastward. 
About the same time the 1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, 
crossed the western part of Roncourt. 

East of the village appeared five companies of the 106th 
Regiment, while two batteries 1 attached to the left Saxon 
wing took up the battle with the French artillery at St. 
Privat. In the meantime the Rifle Regiment had arrived on 
the west side of the village and the 2d and 3d Companies, 
3d Guard Regiment, had reached the southeast corner of 
Roncourt, which they occupied after a light contact with a 
hostile detachment. In the village itself the Guard Pioneer 
Company and a few platoons of the 1st Guard Regiment 
which had remained there after the further advance of that 
regiment, were assembling. Of the cavalry under General 
Count Lippe, which was following up on the left wing, the 
heavy brigade under General von Senfft trotted toward the 
main road east of St. Privat to attack the apparently re- 
treating troops there in flank, but an enfilading fire coming 
from the forest of Jaumont compelled it to remain under 
cover behind a hill. 

Colonel von Abendroth 8 and Major von Bosze simulta- 
neously turned against the forests of Jaumont between the 
quarries and the crossroad on the west edge. The enemy, 
the 100th Regiment and apparently also men on the 75th 

when it appeared from behind a nearby hostile dressing station. The 
commander of that skirmish line, Acting First Sergeant Howard, 
without hesitation stormed the wall with his men, whereupon the 
enemy fled hastily into the forest of Jaumont. 

x 2d Heavy and 2d Horse. 

8 Colonel Abendroth writes: After having somewhat closed up 
my command when nearing Roncourt, during the passing of the cavalry, 
I received orders from Colonel von Schulz that all troops were to turn 
against St. Privat. While experiencing a hot enfilading fire, which 
caused some losses, Captain von Treitschke of the general staff arrived 
and advised me to make a rapid charge against the forest of Jaumont 
on our left flank, which would materially help the corps artillery, which 
was about to take a decisive position. He stated that it would hardly 
be able to hold its position unless the hostile fire was silenced somehow. 
"I surely will," replied I, "but in that case you must at once ride to 
Colonel von Schulz and report to him that T am taking a course contrary 
to his orders, and ask him to support me, as I have but five companies 
here and that force will hardly be sufficient for the purpose." Cap- 
tain von Treitschke went off with this report to the colonel and in con- 
sequence thereof the 13th Jager Battalion very soon arrived at the 
edge of the forest. 



XIlTH CORPS IN THE WAR OP 1870-71 199 

Regiment, had occupied in force the edge of the forest and 
the road embankment immediately in its front, had placed 
skirmish lines behind the stonewalls in front, and received the 
attacking nine companies of the 106th and 107th Regiment 
with a hot fire at long range. Hostile artillery, in position 
east of St. Privat, also took part in this engagement. At the 
very beginning of this attack Colonel von Abendroth and 
Major von der Decken were both wounded. J The color bearer 
of the 1st Battalion, 106th Regiment, Sergeant Albert of the 
3d Company, received a mortal wound in the abdomen. The 
hostile skirmish lines were driven into the forest and, after 
the road embankment was stormed, the sister regiments, at 
7.30 p.m. , charged the edge of the forest. The enemy, whose 
strength appeared to be large, judging from the number of 
knapsacks left behind, retreated into the interior of the for- 
est the dense undergrowth of which made actual pursuit im- 
possible. 

Then a battle ensued in the forest, first turning in 
favor of one and again of the other side. On the left flank, 
in a quarry close to the forest, the enemy offered strong 
resistance for some time, until finally driven from it. On 
capturing the quarry a gun was also captured, which was 
lost again in an unexpected repulse. The pursuit— in which 
three companies under Major Brinkmann also participated 
after having driven a weak detachment of the 100th Regi- 
ment out of Malancourt— and the fight came to an end toward 
8.30 p.m. Captain Schreiber had pressed with several pla- 
toons forward as far as Bronvaux. The 13th Jager Battalion 
and the 3d Battalion, 103d Regiment, which Colonel von 
Schultz had brought from the vicinity of Roncourt in order 
to have a reserve in the originally hot fight in front of the 
road embankment, also arrived at the western edge of the 
forest of Jaumont. 

XII. St. Privat La Montagne 

During the advance on Roncourt first Lieutenant 
Colonel von Schweinitz and then General von Craushaar 

J The mortally wounded were: Captains von Schiitz and 
Frotscher, Lieutenants (of Reserve) Miiller Hid and Landgraf ; acting 
1st Sergeant Behring of the 106th and Lieutenant Knauth of the 107th 
Regiment. 



200 VON SOHIMPFP 

were oriented concerning the situation around St. Privat, 
and requested to bring early support, by an orderly officer of 
the 1st Guard Division, Lieutenant von Esbeck of the Guard 
Hussar Regiment, who was to be seen everywheres indefa- 
tigable on his gray horse. Both of these commanders were 
able to give assurance of early support as no material resist- 
ance had been encountered at Roncourt and as General von 
Craushaar knew from personal information, received from 
Prince George, that St. Privat was to be attacked after 
Roncourt had been taken. Lieutenant Colonel von Schwei- 
nitz immediately led the 1st and 2d Battalions, 107th Regi- 
ment, on the west past Roncourt, east of the road, and in 
straight line from the north against St. Privat. General 
von Craushaar, accompanying the right wing of the 45th 
Brigade, ordered his Grenadier regiments to take direction 
on St. Privat. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Regiment 1 
turned about 1500 paces west of Roncourt to the right and, 
under personal leadership of the general, took direction 
against the northwest corner of St. Privat, thus approaching 
the left wing of the 1st Guard Division. The Body Grena- 
dier Regiment 2 was already close to Roncourt when it 
received orders to turn to the right. These orders were exe- 
cuted by seven companies (4th, 7th, 8th and the 3d Battalion) 
which, in the subsequent advance under Colonel Garten along 
both sides of the road from Roncourt to St. Privat, filled up 
the gap between the 101st and 107th Regiments. As the 
regimental adjutant, von Loeben 3 , had his horse shot from 
under him, the orders for turning to the right did not reach 
the 1st Battalion, which, like the 5th and 6th Companies, 
passing Roncourt kept the southeasterly direction behind 
the 107th Regiment. 

Crown Prince Albert and Prince George attentively ob- 
served the general course of the engagement and made 
provision for giving increased vigor and the necessary sup- 
port to the attack on St. Privat which had been started 

x The 1st Battalion was at Roncourt, not under the orders of the 
regimental commander. 

a The regiment was formed in several lines; the 1st Battalion had 
the 1st, 2d, and 3d Company in the first, the 4th Company in the 2d 
line. 

8 Now (1901) Lieutenant General, active list. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 201 

independently by their subordinate commanders. For this 
purpose, by orders of the Crown Prince, the artillery which 
was in the vicinity of the woods of Auboue had advanced by 
batteries, at the same time changing its front, heretofore 
against Roncourt, against the southeast. In this new ar- 
tillery line, its right wing a few hundred paces north of the 
road from St. Privat to Ste. Marie, its left reaching to near 
Roncourt and surrounding the entire northwest side of St. 
Privat at 1400 paces range, the 1st Heavy Battery, brought 
up from the 46th Brigade, and the two light batteries of the 
enveloping column also took position. Thus there were 14 
batteries 1 in action there, of which the ones first gone into 
position effectively supported the advance of the Saxon bat- 
talions on St. Privat. Ten Prussian batteries had gone into 
position against St. Privat south of the road. 

For the attack on St. Privat and against the forest of 
Jaumont, as well as for a probable offensive advance of the 
French army reserves, strong reserves were kept back. 
These consisted of the Rifle Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 
101st Regiment at Roncourt and the 47th Brigade west of Ron- 
court. The Crown Prince had also issued orders to the 46th 
Brigade, which he met en route, to abandon its direction on 
Roncourt and proceed toward St. Privat and had given 
directions to Colonel von Montbe to procure Prince George's 
sanction of this movement— which was granted. 

Marshal Canrobert was forced to recognize that his 
situation was hopeless. He and his corps had done every- 
thing possible to hold their important position. Tranquilly 
and coolly the marshal, sitting on his brown mare, directed 
the defense of his last supporting point. Overcome by the 
enormous fire from all sides, with ammunition becoming ex- 
hausted, with no help coming from Metz, St. Privat in 
flames and fresh attackers continually arriving, the retreat 
had to be commenced. In order to be able to lead his troops 
into the gorge towards Metz, he held St. Privat as long as 
possible. He urgently begged the neighboring corps, de 
Ladmirault, for ammunition, as his ammunition wagons, 

1 There stood from Roncourt toward the main road: — 1st Light, 4th, 
8th and 7th Heavy, 2d Light, 5th Heavy, 5th, 6th, 2d Horse, 6th, 1st 
Heavy, 4th, 3d Light, 3d Heavy. 



202 VONSCHIMPPFF 

sent off early for more, had not returned; but only a few 
wagonsful could be spared him. 

In the slowly waning daylight St. Privat, fortress-like, 
burning, cut off on three sides, with its thousands of com- 
batants, presented a magnificent, characteristically colored 
war pieture. From all points came the flash of cannon and 
enormous white balls of smoke ascending from them; more 
in the center red lights and dense pillars of black smoke 
rose from the burning buildings. The hundreds of guns in 
action caused a hideous roar. The death dealing hail flew in 
all directions. The quick, sharp crackle of rifles hurtled 
toward the long, smoke-enveloped opposing lines. Generals 
and staff officers remained mounted at the head of their 
troops; many had their horses killed from under them. The 
chassepot fire was powerfully effective and the circle about 
the hostile position was heaped with the bodies of the storm- 
ing Germans. The roar of cannon and rattle of small arms 
drowned the sound of all commands and a thick powder 
smoke covered the entire terrain. A battlefield is horrible. 
Enormous numbers killed and wounded in so short a time— 
many most horribly mutilated. Each single case of these 
would cause fright and horror in peace— the overwhelming 
number on this battlefield deadened the senses. No one who 
has not gone through such a baptism of fire in the first line 
of charging infantry can form a conception of it. Shells 
scream, "the rustling of the wings of the angel of death" 
as the French expressed it, bullets whistle and hiss, and 
then, when the wounded cry aloud in pain and the dead fall 
on all sides, men's hearts beat fearfully in their breasts and 
each one needs to be alive to this duty, and firmly persuaded 
that even the bullets take their course only in accordance 

with a Higher Will. 

The terrain conditions on the north side of St. Privat 
were entirely similar to those on the west front of attack. 
Here also an entirely open, gradual slope existed, on which 
several field walls (stone) lying immediately behind each 
other formed advanced low defensive lines in front of the 
village walls proper, and were densely occupied. The mass 
fire sent from all these lines by the French infantry was re- 
inforced in addition by the batteries which had gone into 



XIITH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 203 

position between St. Privat and the forest of Jaumont. 

It had fallen to the lot of the men of the 107th Regiment 
and the Grenadiers to bring about the decision in the hard 
struggle for the possession of St. Privat. Simultaneously, 
the Guard Corps charged on the right of the Xllth Corps in 
the general direction of the west and southwest side of the 
village, the inner wings overlapped each other and the 
charge of the two corps took the shape of combined action. 

By the time the 1st and 2d Battalions, 107th Regiment, ' 
the 1st Battalion in column toward the center 2 , the 2d Bat- 
talion in two lines (5th and 8th Companies in the first line) 
had approached to within about 1000 paces of the village, a 
murderous fire was poured on them, without their being 
able to see the enemy. At the run, with loud hurrahs, the 
two battalions charged into the ever increasing rain of 
bullets. The first stone wall was finally reached and here 
Major Thierbach fell, mortally wounded. Lieutenant Colonel 
von Schweinitz immediately placed himself at the head of 
the 1st Battalion. He also fell, pierced by seven bullets. Of 
the 2d Battalion, the second line of which had participated 
in the attack on the stone wall, Major von Cerrini was 
wounded; Color Sergeant Donner, wounded in the left 
thigh, gave the colors to Captain von Pape, who carried 
them on to St. Privat, unmindful of a bullet which pierced 
the staff of the colors and his left arm. The 1st Battalion 
and the second line of the 2d Battalion halted. At this the 
wounded Major Thierbach once more raised himself and 
called in tones which overcame the thunder of cannon and 
rattle of musketry, "Forward, children, forward! " After a 
short fire fight, the attack was carried forward to a bayonet 
charge at the second wall. Captain von Pape fell, mortally 
wounded, with the colors of the 2d Battalion; Sergeant 
Thummel, with the colors of the 1st Battalion, was severely 
wounded; 1st Sergeant Schuman and Lieutenant Hahn, of 
the same battalion, next carrying the colors, were wounded 
in the hand. Then Captain Wichmann placed himself in 

According to Hasse (at that time first lieutenant and battalion 
adjutant, now Professor) in Der Kamerad, edition 1871. 

8 "Column toward the center" of the old drill regulations is in 
general similar to the present day " double column." 



204 VON SOHIMPPP 

front of the battalion, and, carrying the colors, led the 1st 
Battalion to the charge on the stone wall till it was taken 
and a stationary fire opened from there on the gradually 
retreating enemy. In this charge Captain Wichmann fell 
mortally wounded. The battalion adjutant, von Gotz, 
hastened up, raised the fallen colors on high, but very soon, 
also mortally wounded, had to relinquish them into the hands 
of Private Manig. It has never been ascertained who took 
the colors of the 2d Battalion from Captain von Pape and gave 
them to Sergeant Tassler. The latter assembled the men 
around him and continued the charge until seriously wounded. 
A private, whose identity has never been ascertained, 
grasped the fallen colors and carried them until he also fell 
mortally wounded. But the bullet-pierced colors, with 
shattered staff, were not for a moment allowed to remain on 
the ground; Private Gotze raised them again. The history 
of the colors is also that of their brave battalions— an un- 
faltering advance under the heaviest losses. * 

During these double charges against the two stone wall 
sectors the Grenadier battalions had arrived on the hill 
alongside of the right flank of the 107th Regiment, and this, 
arousing ambition to be first in St. Privat, renewed the de- 
sire for battle and the bravery of the men. Another charge, 
a hurrah, and, with streaming, blood-covered colors in front, a 
third wall and the edge of the burning village were reached. 
But the hot day's work was not yet ended. Each single house 
spared by the fire so far, each garden wall, had to be cap- 
tured singly. For the French who had been unable to join 
their retreating organizations made a firm stand at every 
obstacle and defended it with the valor of desperation. The 
color bearer of the 1st Battalion, Private Manig, fell at the 
village wall. Lance Corporal Hoffman grasped the colors 
and, holding them on high, called out: "To me, all who 
love their flag!" Private Gotze carried the colors of the 2d 
Battalion into St. Privat. In single groups, intermixed with 
grenadiers and men from the Guards, the men of the 107th 
Regiment, at their head Lieutenants von Beulwitz, Roderer 

1 There were a large number of one year volunteers, moat of them 
from the University of Leipzig, in the 107th Regiment, all of them 
distinguishing themselves. 



XII th CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 205 

and Heddenhausen as also Ensign Mehlig, pressed into the 
village, fighting hand to hand, and at the church met the 
Guards coming from the other side. 

Between the Prussian Guards and the 107th Regiment — 
advancing almost simultaneously with the latter on St. 
Privat on both sides of the road from Roncourt— the fifteen 
companies of the 45th Brigade 1 also reached the first fighting 
line. The deployed eight companies of the 101st Regiment 
placed themselves immediately beside the grenadiers of the 
4th Guard Regiment which advanced against the northwest 
corner of St. Privat, its Fusilier Battalion finding no room 
for deployment and consequently becoming mixed with the 
Saxon troops in the subsequent assault against the north 
front of the village. The 3d Battalion, Body Grenadier 
Regiment, had to keep also to its formation of column to- 
ward the center on account of lack of room. 

By energetic rushes, interrupted only here and there by 
short halts for rapid fire, the grenadiers stormed the last 
wall section and held it, though not without material losses. 
Lieutenant Colonel Schumann and Major von Brandenstein 
of the Body Grenadier Regiment were wounded, Lieutenant 
Colonel von Kochtitzky of the 2d Guard Regiment was 
seriously hurt by his horse falling with him; many company 
commanders and officers were killed or disabled. The 1st 
and 4th Companies of the 3d Guard Regiment had also 
advanced toward the north entrance of St. Privat and had 
gained a firm foothold opposite it in conjunction with the 
101st Regiment. 

The artillery fire massed against St. Privat now showed 
its enormous effect in the village crowded with French 
troops. Walls and buildings fell under the hail of shells, 
and flames arose from the debris. 

General von Craushaar had his horse shot from under 
him and an orderly officer of the staff, to whom he was just 
dictating an order, was killed at his side. Several horses of 
the staff were wounded. The attack of the Grenadiers 
gained ground in spite of the heavy losses; the skirmishers 
came closer and closer to St. Privat; and grenadiers of the 

'From right to left: 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Regiment; 3d 
Battalion, 7th, 8th, 4th Company, 100th Regiment. 



206 VONSCHIMPFF 

101st Regiment were seen fighting close to the village wall, 
when the general, who was then hastening forward afoot 
was hit by a chassepot bullet which struck his throat, pierced 
his lung toward the spine, and brought him to the ground. 
His eyes dimmed and with the words to his adjutant Schmalz: 1 
" Are our troops entering the village? Take my love to my 
wife," he died in the arms of his brave orderly, Schmeisky, 
at the moment when the grenadiers took the edge of the 
village. 

During the short range fight the officers, imbued only 
with the desire to press forward, supported by efficient non- 
commissioned officers and men, had succeeded in carrying 
along all troops by their inspiring calls and example and 
gaining separate points along the village wall. 

The common objective of the storming grenadiers was 
the north entrance opposite them and here the troops crowded 
together. The sequence in which St. Privat was reached 
cannot be ascertained. In any case it was merely a question 
of minutes. One of the first to enter was the 4th Company 
of the Body Regiment on the left wing of the Brigade, its 
leader, Lieutenant Krabitz, at its head accompanied by the 
wounded Lieutenants von Gregory and Claus. 2 In the half 
battalion — 7th and 8th Companies — Captain von Berlepsch 
was mortally, Captain Mtiller seriously wounded. The bat- 
talion adjutant, von Wangenheim, took command and suc- 
ceeded in getting as far as the eastern wall; from where he 
caused the retreating troops to be fired on. The 3d Bat- 
talion, under Captain Doring, took a farm standing by 
itself 3 and then entered the interior of the village, with 
Lieutenant von Brtick, already twice seriously wounded, lead- 
ing the 10th Company. The 9th Company, under Captain 
von Kliichtzner, other groups under Lieutenant von Griinen- 
wald, the seriously wounded Lieutenant Keller, and Ensign 
von Thielau, arrived at the churchyard. The battalion had 

a Curt von Schmalz, now Lieutenant General and Commandant of 
Dresden. 

8 First Sergeant Lubeck, Acting First Sergeant Host, Lance 
Corporals Kohler and Meding deserve special mention. 

3 This was defended by men of the 2d Battalion, 93d Regiment, and 
the 9th Chasseurs under Major Andrieux. 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 207 

encountered a stubborn resistance and had to resort to the 
bayonet and butt. 

Of the 2d Grenadiers, the 2d Battalion, Captain von 
Engel in the lead, succeeded in taking the first houses west 
of the road to Roncourt and in advancing to the western 
part of the village. The 3d Battalion of that regiment cap- 
tured the houses and outbuildings situated immediately on 
the road. A garden in front, surrounded by stone walls, 
which the French stubbornly defended, here formed the 
main point of attack. Lieutenant von Schwanewede, Lance 
Corporal Konigsheim, Privates Bochmann and Mittag were 
the first on the other side of the wall. Captain von Rouv- 
roy, carrying the colors of the 3d Battalion, urged his men 
with cheers to the charge against the village entrance. 
Regimental Adjutant von Malortie 1 was among the first of 
the attackers. The defenders in the houses kept up a hot 
fire through doors and windows so that a hand to hand con- 
flict ensued. Captain von Rouvroy, Lieutenants von Werl- 
hof, von Malortie and Schneider reached the east side of the 
village. Colonel von Seydlitz assembled a part of the bat- 
talion at the church. 

Of the left wing of the 1st Guard Division, the 12th, 9th 
and 4th Companies, 4th Guard Regiment, had inserted them- 
selves in the Saxon firing line and there participated in the 
storming of St. Privat. A few platoons of the 10th and 
11th Companies had charged in at the north entrance, while 
the remaining parts turned against the east edge. The 
seven Grenadier companies of the Regiment, which had re- 
mained in front of the northwest side, mixed with the 
detachments of the Saxon right wing, made a charge from 
the first captured wall in the field against St. Privat which 
carried them into the village. 

Lieutenant Colonel von Schimpff with the 1st Battalion 2 
Body Grenadier Regiment, whom the orders for debouching 
on St. Privat had not reached, had observed when approach- 
ing Roncourt that that village was no longer held by the 

'Now (1901) Major General, active list. 

2 lst, 2d and 3d Companies. The 4th Company in the second line 
had debouched toward St. Privat and fought on the left flank of the 
Guard Grenadier Brigade. 



208 VONSCHIMPFF 

enemy, while the battle on the right had become heavier 
around St. Privat. On his own initiative he therefore 
turned the three companies to the right. During the sub- 
sequent advance he encountered, north of St. Privat, the 3d 
and 4th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment under Lieutenant 
Colonel von Oppell which had found protection from the 
murderous hostile fire behind a nearly breast-high stone 
wall. A little to the right the 5th and 6th Companies of his 
regiment joined him. These detachments were opposed by 
French troops charged with covering the retreat of the 
troops out of St. Privat, and which, in material strength, 
prevented a further advance in rear of St. Privat. 
After the Saxon and Prussian companies had taken 
a position behind some stone farm walls and after the 
Prussians had bent back the line on the right wing, 
a heavy fire fight ensued with the superior enemy, whose 
repeated charges were defeated with rapid fire. These 
companies formed a flank in the left rear of the German 
attacking line in front of St. Privat. In their well covered 
positions they suffered comparatively little from the hostile 
fire; but Colonel von Roeder, commanding the 1st Guard 
Regiment, who had hastened to that point a short time pre- 
viously, was killed at the opening of the fight there. 

The French had made the bravest resistance against the 
Saxon attack. Opposed to the Saxons at the northwest cor- 
ner of St. Privat were parts of the 9th Chasseur Battalion 
and the three companies of the 94th Regiment which had 
been kept back when the regiment went to Ste. Marie. 
They were followed on the right on the north front by the 
93d Regiment 1 under its brave colonel, Ganzin, who lost 
three horses. It was joined by the 3d Battalion, 9th Line 
Regiment 8 under Captain Aragon, and, farther to the right, 
the 3d Battalion, 100th Regiment, under Major Poilloue de 
Saint Mars, appears to have been engaged. Lieutenant 
Colonel von SchimpfTs command was opposed by: the 2d 
Battalion, 100th Regiment, under Major Pernot, which had 

ir The 93d Regiment numbered on August 17th, 39 officers and 
1550 men. 

2 On August 17th the 9th Line Regiment numbered 30 officers, 
1600 men. 



XII TH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1870-71 209 

retreated from the hill between Roncourt and St. Privat 
against the forest of Jaumont; the 94th Regiment 1 , which 
had been enabled to replenish its ammunition at the forest; 
and the 10th Line Regiment under Colonel Ardant du Picq, 
which had assembled east of St. Privat. 

The 93d Regiment had replenished its ammunition with 
that brought up for the 2d and 3d Chasseurs de France. It 
opened fire on the attackers only at 750 meters range firing 
volleys which soon turned into a murderous rapid fire and 
fire at will. When the attack had been carried to within 
400 meters, Colonel Ganzin received orders to fall back and 
General Pechot personally also ordered the 9th Chasseurs 
to fall back. The retreat to the eastern exits of the village 
succeeded; though many small groups had to continue the 
defense singly. The 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, and the 
2d Battalion, 100th Regiment, found it easier to accomplish 
their retreat. 

Marshal Canrobert, who remained to the last in St. 
Privat and then accompanied the rear skirmish lines, had 
arranged an excellent receiving position for his retreating 
troops in order to gain time to start his troops along their 
proper roads of retreat— that is those troops which were 
crowding themselves in disorder in the defiles, and the troops 
of the Division Levassor which also fled in the direction 
of those defiles. General Pechot with parts of the Chasseurs 
and parts of the 4th and 12th Regiments formed the last 
rear guard. East of St. Privat there is a steep rise to the 
hills of the quarries of Amanvillers. Here the marshal had 
placed ten batteries of his corps 2 under Lieutenant Colonel 
de Montluisant and the 6th and 7th Batteries, 13th Regi- 
ment, of the General Reserve, which had been sent to his 
support; and, as it had been possible to bring up some new 
ammunition, the batteries were able by a rapid fire to stop 
in some degree a quick pursuit by the enemy. To protect 
the batteries the 94th and 100th Regiments occupied the 
edges of the forest while the Brigade of the Chasseurs de 

'On August 17th the 94th Regiment numbered 41 officers, 1430 
men. 

8 5th, 7th, 8th and 12th, 8th Regiment; 5th, 6th and 7th, 14th Regi- 
ment, all 4 pounders; 9th and 10th, 13th Regiment, 12 pounders. 



210 VONSCHIMPFF 

France and the Dragoon Brigade of the 4th Corps, also 
remained in readiness at Marengo Auberge. On the hills 
east of Amanvillers the batteries of the Guard and of the 
4th Corps joined the artillery position of the 6th Corps, in 
order to protect the retreat of the 4th Corps made necessary 
by the loss of St. Privat. Behind them arrived the Grena- 
dier Division of the Guard, too late to be of any use. 

Simultaneously with the Saxons, parts of the Guard 
Corps which were still able to do so had advanced against 
the west and south side of St. Privat and had entered the 
village. The farm Jerusalem was not taken, because it was 
already evacuated and stood in flames. The battle had been 
hottest on the north side of St. Privat. On the French side 
the freshest troops stood here and the attacking German 
troops also were fresh. As a matter of fact the decision of 
the heavy battle should be credited to the interference of 
the Saxon Corps, both through the pressure of its mass and 
the valorous deeds of the battalions which had entered the 
battle directly and by themselves. The glory therefor 
should not be withheld from the Saxons; still an unbiased 
judgment must acknowledge that the decision was brought 
about so rapidly and so thoroughly only in consequence of 
the valor and self sacrifice of the Guards. 

The battle for the possession of St. Privat started at 
approaching darkness and ended in the night. During the 
charge the sun set. When the last rays had disappeared the 
entire western sky turned bloodred. General von Pape had 
ridden directly behind the storming columns into St. Privat. 
Alongside the church, the roof of which was in flames, he 
regulated the further disposition of the troops arriving there 
from all sides. At many places the battle continued to 
rage; but the enemy's resistance proper was broken. To 
insure the possession of the village against all contingencies 
arrangements were immediately made for a rapid and 
strong guard of the eastern edge of the village, while steps 
were taken to straighten out the mixed up battalions in the 
center of the village and carry the wounded French from 
the burning church and other buildings. At 8 p.m., the 
victor was in undisputed possession of this strong bulwark of 
the enemy, which had been defended with so much stub- 



XIlTH CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1780-71 211 

borness. 2000 unwounded prisoners were in the hands of 
the Germans. 

The thunder of battle once more arose, lasting way 
into the night, as the German batteries advanced to take up 
the duel with the French artillery covering the retreat of 
the French 6th and 4th Corps. 23 batteries of the Guard 
and Xth Corps went into position on the ridge running south- 
west from St. Privat, some of them not being able to take 
part until after complete darkness had set in. Colonel 
Funke with five Saxon Batteries (5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Heavy 
and 2d Horse) had advanced by echelon into new positions 
northeast of St. Privat and went into action against the 
French batteries at the quarries of Amanvillers. Here, on 
his right flank, he was joined by four batteries of the 20th 
Division, which had proceeded from St. Ail to St. Privat 1 . 
The 1st Horse and 2d Light Batteries (Saxon), which had 
taken position east of Roncourt after that Village had been 
taken, advanced some distance further after the fall of 
St. Privat and went into action against the French artillery 
southeast of Marengo and fired also on the columns of troops 
descending into the valley of the Mosel. 

The Saxon cavalry regiments drawn back to behind the 
hill had remained at Roncourt in readiness to attack with- 
out having found an opportunity to do so, because the battle 
at St. Privat and in the forest of Jaumont lasted into the 
night. Colonel von Carlo witz 2 at last trotted ahead with 
the 2d and 3d Squadrons of the Guard Cavalry Regiment east 
of St. Privat intending to attack the French artillery; but 
the dense powder smoke and approaching night hid any 
objective of attack and caused him to return. 

The French artillery opened a hot fire on St. Privat and 
the terrain near the village. The air was filled with small 
powder clouds showing where shrapnel was bursting; shell 
after shell hit the ground; the flash of the guns could be 
plainly seen before the shriek of the shells was heard. Vil- 
lages and farms all around were in flames. It was beginning 

General Staff Account I, p. 899. 

*Now (1901) General of Cavalry, active list. 



212 VON SGHIMPPF 

to get dark when Crown Prince Albert and Prince George 

met in the vicinity of this tremendous battle, halfway be- 
tween Roncourt and St. Privat, and exchanged congratula- 
tions over the victory which by the loss of St. Privat had 
driven the French Army of the Rhine— which, in the main, 
had held its positions with great tenacity— back under the 
protecting guns of Metz 1 . 

The decisive Saxon attack had finally turned into an 
enveloping of the hostile right wing from the north. This 
had been the intention expressed by General von Moltke as 
early as 10.30 a.m. in a letter addressed to Headquarters of 
the lid Army. The same thought, which Moltke in the 
start designated as final object of the day, was evolved, but 
entirely independently, by Crown Prince Albert; for in the 
orders issued at about 11.30 a.m. by lid Army Head- 
quarters to the Xllth Corps, mentioned above, this matter 
had not been alluded to and was not divulged by that head- 
quarters to the Xllth Corps on this day. 

Darkness fell more and more on the smoke enveloped 
fields and woods. Soon soft moonlight flooded the country 
in contrast to the fire glow of the burning villages, to the 
blaze of the church spire of St. Privat, showing like a 
glowing torch against the night sky. As in maneuvers, the 
signals "halt" and the recalls were heard. First one and 
then another of the bands took up the anthem. The night 
ended the battle. The German army, after eight hours' hot 
struggle, with great sacrifices and losses had gained a 
decisive victory over a brave enemy. The battle for the 

*No decisive success was gained in the center and on the right 
wing, neither was the movement, undertaken at a late hour, of the lid 
Corps successful in supporting the VHIth Corps. All attempts to 
attack the French main position, against Amanvillers against the 
supporting points on the upper plateau of the ridge, the farms of 
Moscou and Point du Jour, were fruitless. The Germans were thrown 
back in each instance with great loss. 

The German losses on August 18th were approximately 20,000 
men; those of the French 13,000 men. 

On the 18th of August there were opposed to each other: 
Germans, 166,400 rifles; 21,200 sabers; 732 guns. 
French, 99,500 rifles; 13,300 sabers; 520 guns and mitrailleuses. 
Of these were engaged : 

Germans, 109,200 rifles; sabers; 628 guns. 

French, 83,500 rifles; 2,000 sabers; 398 guns and mitrailleuses. 
(Krieg8geschichtliche Einzelschriften, part 11.) 



XIIth CORPS IN THE WAR OF 1879-71 213 

possession of St. Privat had been a battle within a battle. 
The exhaustion of the men was great, as the hot day had 
passed almost without a possibility of getting water. The 
well could endure this, but the wounded, lying on the field, 
suffered much. 

Crown Prince Albert passed the night in a small buil- 
ding in Roncourt; across the street, in a small inn, Prince 
George found accommodation. The camp equipage of the 
French staff and many woolen blankets, camp stools, kitchen 
utensils, rice, bacon and a number of order books fell into 
the hands of General von Nehrhoff, and Division Headquar- 
ters utilized these things for camping in the vicinity of the 
47th Brigade not far from Roncourt. The troops bivouacked 
where they stood, or where they found the most suitable 
place. 1 

Of the Xth Corps the 1st Battalion, 92d Regiment and 
the 10th Jager Battalion went on outpost east of St. Privat. 
The third battalions of the 102d and 103d Regiments and the 
13th Jager Battalion prolonged the outpost line to the north. 
Montois was occupied by the 24th Division by orders of corps 
headquarters. 

1 100th Regiment at Ste. Marie; 101st at St. Privat; 46th Brigade 
between Roncourt and Montois; 47th Brigade and 12th Jagers at Ron- 
court; 106th Regiment and 13th Jagers on the west side of the forest of 
Jaumont; 106th Regiment, 2d Battalion, at Verneville; 1st Battalion 
107th Regiment, close to Ste. Marie; 2d Battalion between St. Privat 
and Ste. Marie; 3d Battalion half ways between Roncourt and the Jau- 
mont forest; 108th Regiment at Roncourt; Corps artillery at St. Privat; 
artillery of the two infantry divisions at Roncourt; cavalry regiments 
at Roncourt and St. Privat. 



EXTRACTS FROM 

The 18th of August, 1870 1 

BY THE 

Great General Staff 

(Historical Section) 



III. To the Opening of the Battle 

DISPOSITIONS OF PBINCB FREDERICK CHARLES FOR THE 
ADVANCE OF THE HD ARMY 

WITH the lid Army the night of August 17— 18th had, on the 
whole, passed tranquilly. Shortly before 5 a.m. Prince 
Frederick Charles, in the bivouac of the Saxons at Mars la 
Tour, issued orders to the commanding generals of the Guard, Xllth 
and Xth Army Corps for the 18th of August. 

A comprehensive view over the terrain in the north, where the 
enemy was supposed to be either resting, prepared for defense, or 
marching off westward, was impossible on account of the low location 
of the village. Only later on, when near Vionville, at the fork in the 
road one kilometer west of that place, was a free and unobstructed 
view gained toward the north. The villages St. Marcel, Doncourt, 
Bruville and Jarny could be distinguished; but a light, early fog still 
covered the country and the sun was only just appearing. Nothing 
was to be seen of the enemy; observation through field glasses brought 
no better result. At Mars la Tour it had been still possible to suppose 
that the enemy was close opposite; at Vionville it could now be ascer- 
tained that the country immediately north of the Metz — Mars la Tour 
road was free of the enemy. Not far from the western exit of Vion- 
ville the commanding generals of the IXth and Hid Corps and their 
staffs awaited the Prince at 5.30 a.m. The instructions the Prince gave 
them were the same he had issued at Mars la Tour, as follows: 

" The lid Army will continue the march this forenoon with the 
same task: to drive the enemy away from his line of retreat on 
Verdun — Chalons and to defeat him wherever found. For that pur- 

'Volume V of Studien zur Krieg»geschichte und Taktik; 1905. 

215 



216 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

pose the Xllth Corps will start as left wing echelon promptly at 5 
a.m. ; the Guard Corps in its right rear; on the right rear of the latter 
the IXth Army Corps, starting at 6 a.m. The Xllth Army Corps will 
take direction on Jarny, the Guard Corps on Doncourt. After it has 
passed between Vionville and Rezonville the IXth Army Corps will 
march past the immediate left of St. Marcel. (The General Staff Ac- 
count, 1875, says, page 682, "leaving St. Marcel on the left."- Ed.) 
The VHIth Army Corps advances in the right rear of the IXth, the 
Vllth farther toward Metz. The Hid Army Corps will follow the 
IXth and will insert itself between that corps and the Guard Corps. 
The 6th Cavalry Division will receive orders from General von 
Alvensleben II. The Xth Army Corps, to which the 6th Cavalry 
Division is attached, will follow the Xllth Corps in such manner as 
to advance in the march direction between the Xllth and the Guard 
Corps. 

"It is difficult to state where the enemy may be found. He is 
supposed to have been marching off toward evening on both roads in 
front of and toward Conflans. " A bivouac of three divisions, observed 
yesterday at Gravelotte, probably also has marched off. If that is not 
the case, General von Steinmetz will attack there. It is possible that 
the IXth Army Corps can interfere first. If all of this demands a turn 
by the Hd Army, either to the right or to the left, cannot be said. The 
trains will remain where they were during the night, those of the IXth 
Corps between Vionville and Rezonville, where water is to be found. 
The corps artillery of the Hid Corps will remain at my disposition as 
army artillery reserve. The Hid Army Corps may find employment 
possibly only in demonstration. 

" The advance will be made, not in long, thin march columns, but 
in divisions massed, the two infantry brigades behind each other, the 
corps artillery between the divisions of each army corps. For the 
present the question is merely one of a short march of less than four 
miles, to occupy the northern road to Verdun. A rest will take place 
during noon. Should a strong enemy oppose us today, we will have 
five army corps in place. At 1 p.m. the Hd Army Corps will be where 
the IXth now is, and thus will be at our disposal in the afternoon. 
General von Steinmetz has 50,000 men. The enemy who day before 
yesterday was opposite us may be estimated at 100,000 to 120,000 men. 
The number has not increased. He was twice as strong as were we — 
about ten to twelve divisions. 

" I shall be with the head of the Hid Army Corps." 8 

The Guard Corps was at Hannonville, the Xllth Army Corps at 
Mars la Tour aud Puxieux; a crossing of the two corps became un- 
avoidable should the former keep to the march direction on Doncourt, 
the latter on Jarny. Therefore the commanding general of the Guard 
Corps asked the Prince's views about this. The Prince held to his 
original instructions, believing perhaps that a crossing in a march in 
mass formation would be of no importance. Possibly also the desire to 

'It is not improbable that the bivouac fires of the 12th Cavalry Division at Par- 
fondrupt conduced to this supposition of the Prince, possibly also scattered firing of 
outposts on the French, which still loitered on the battlefield of the 16th of August. — 
Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, 1870; pp. 119, 120. 

'Arranged from notes made at the time and place by Captain von Biilow of the 
General Staff of lid Army Headquarters and enlarged from von der Goltz in Die 
Operationen der II. Arm6e, 1870-71, page 120. (See also page 49 ante.) 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 217 

have the Guard Corps in the center of the expected battle as an 
especially tried body of troops had its share in the decision. 1 



MARCH OF THE XIITH ARMY CORPS ON JARNY 

The three army corps of the Hd Army which were to advance in 
the first line were in readiness for the march early in the morning. 
The 47tb Infantry Brigade of the XUth Army Corps had had regimental 
and brigade drill at dawn; the ordered movement could therefore be 
commenced at once. The XHth and the Guard Corps started simul- 
taneously; the IXth Corps later on. At 5.20 a.m., immediately after 
the discussion with the commander-in-chief, the Crown Prince of 
Saxony ordered: 

"The 23d Infantry Division will form an advance guard of three 
battalions, the cavalry regiment and one battery north of Mars la 
Tour, which will at once fall in and march on Jarny. The division will 
form north of Mars la Tour in a rendezvous position, the 45th Brigade 
on the right, the 46th on the left of the road to Jarny and execute the 
march in this formation (battalions in column with one-quarter platoon 
distance) a half hour interval behind the advance guard. 3 The corps 
artillery will follow the 46th Brigade with as broad a front as possible." 

Thus the division was to take the directed massing only north of 
Mars la Tour. This was because of the difficulties of movement pre- 
sented by the village and its immediate surroundings which were 
much cut up by ravines and overgrown. 8 

The following final instructions were issued at 5.45 a.m. 

"The 24th Infantry Division will start at once for Mars la Tour, 
form north of that village in the same order as the 23d Infantry Di- 
vision, and follow that division. The ammunition columns will follow 
one hour later behind the 24th Infantry Division through Mars la Tour 
with as broad a front as possible. The trains of the divisions and of 
headquarters will assemble and park south of Mars la Tour. The 
trains of the army corps march through Thiaucourt. I shall be with 
the 23d Infantry Division. 

"The cavalry division will move with its main body by way of 
Puxe, but will leave one regiment four miles west for continuous ob- 
servation of the road from Etain and the one from Metz through 
Fresnes and Manheulles. The observation and threatening of the road 
to Metz, and, if possible, that from Briey to Etain, must not be lost 
sight of." 4 

The advance guard of the 23d Infantry Division received orders 
to advance by way of Jarny and Labry toward Hatrize, reconnoitering 

'General Staff Account, page 683. In his posthumous papers General von Pape 
cites a statement made by General von Stiehle to the effect that headquarters fully 
knew that a crossing between the Guard and XHth Corps would occur, but that Prince 
Frederick Charles was well acquainted with the Guard Corps and desired to have it in 
the center between two army corps with which he was not acquainted. 

2 This was not in consonance with Prince Frederick Charles' directions, accord- 
ing to which the infantry brigades were to march behind each other. 

3 These difficulties were greatly overestimated, as the task of marching in massed 
formation was new. The village could have been passed by columns on the right and 
left and crossed on the broad road to Jarny by a column in half platoon formation. 

4 Royal Saxon War Archives. 



218 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

both flanks, and to take up a battle position there. It thus received a 
march objective more than Ave kilometers beyond the march ob- 
jective, Jarny, set by corps headquarters, and this took it to the left 
bank of the Orne. The advance guard crossed Mars la Tour at 5.40 
a.m. and was followed by the main body of the 23d Division without 
interval. While the corps artillery was following from south of Mars 
la Tour, the 24th Infantry Division from Puxieux, the 23d Infantry 
Division took formation in the manner directed north of the village. 
Only at 7 a.m. did the advance guard again start its march on Jarny. 1 
It was followed at 7.30 a.m. by the 23d Infantry Division, then the 
corps artillery. The outposts were taken up during the march. It 
was nearly 9 a.m. when the 24th Infantry Division completed its con- 
centration north of Mars la Tour so that not till then did the road from 
Mars la Tour to Doncourt become clear for the Guard Corps. 2 

Though the conformation of the terrain necessitated repeated 
changing of the march formation of the infantry brigades and the 
corps artillery moving on the right side, the advance to Jarny was on 
the whole made in broad columns. 

At 8 a.m. the second general staff officer of the 23d Infantry 
Brigade, Captain von Treitschke, hastened ahead of the advance guard 
to Briey with the 5th Squadron of the 1st Cavalry Regiment and re- 
ported at 8.20 a.m. from the vicinity north of Labry that apparently a 
hostile battery and columns were west of Valleroy while hostile in- 
fantry columns were visible east of Jarny, north of Doncourt. 3 This 
report caused General von Craushaar to halt the advance guard, which 
was just then traversing Jarny, and place it in position. The hill and 
the small woods between Doncourt and Jarny as well as Labry were 
occupied by the 3d and 1st Battalions, Rifle Regiment No. 108. The 2d 
Battalion remained in Jarny, sent one company to Conflans, and pre- 
pared itself with the assistance of the pioneer company for the de- 
fense of the village. 4 The 2d Light Battery was about to go into 
position on the heights between Doncourt and Jarny, when reports 
arrived from the squadron in front which caused the advance guard 
commander to doubt the correctness of Treitschke 's report. 5 Although 
these reports were transmitted immediately to the main body, they 
arrived there too late; for the 45th Infantry Brigade had already 
entered the sector Moncel— Bruville which it had been ordered to 
occupy on receipt of the report from Captain Treitschke of the 23d 

'Royal Saxon War Archives. 

"Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

3 This report read: "North Labry, 18 August, 1870, 8.20 a.m. West of Valleroy 
battery appears in position. Also infantry column between Bois d' Abbeville and 
Valleroy. Also infantry columns east Jarny, north Doncourt. Von Treitschke, Capt." 
—Report from the advance guard of Xllth Corps, received 9 a.m., Royal Saxon War 
Archives. (See page 54 ante.) 

*Royal Saxon War Archives. 

"The following report conduced especially to the commander's doubts: "Sent 
18th, 8 a.m. Received 8.45 a.m. Report. The right flank patrol is as far as Tische- 
mont (Tichemont) now and has seen nothing of the enemy. The enemy is said to 
have retreated to Metz. Jouaville has been searched also. Von Posern, Lieut." — 
Royal Saxon War Archives. 



THE 18th OP AUGUST, 1870 219 

Infantry Division. The Grenadier Regiment 100 occupied Chateau 
Moncel, the Grenadier Regiment 101 with ita 1st and 3d Battalions the 
hill east of Moncel and the connecting slope on the south along the 
water course to Bruville. On the hill west of this water course the 2d 
Heavy Battery went into position. The 2d Battalion Grenadier Regi- 
ment 100 remained in reserve. The 46th Infantry Brigade also, which 
had arrived at the same time west of Moncel, prepared for battle on 
the receipt of information that the enemy had been encountered by the 
advance guard, let the Infantry Regiment 102 advance to opposite the 
hill south of Jarny and brought the 1st Heavy Battery to the front. 
The 103d Infantry Regiment remained at Moncel as reserve. 1 The 
corps artillery commenced to go into position immediately south of 
Jarny, later on also the 24th Infantry Division at Moncel on both sides 
of the Mars la Tour— Jarny road. Crown Prince Albert considered 
the orders of Prince Frederick Charles to advance for the present only 
some four miles as obeyed, and directed, as soon as he had gained the 
conviction from the reports of the advance guard that no danger was 
threatening and that Bruville also was clear of the enemy, 2 all detach- 
ments to be called in and the army corps to rest. The front toward 
the north was again assumed and the advance guard directed to seek 
connection with the cavalry division . This order was carried out by 
sending one platoon of the 1st Cavalry Regiment to St. Jean les Buzy. 

Captain von Treitschke himself soon perceived his error and had 
reported at 8.50 a.m. that neither artillery nor columns were to be 
seen west of Valleroy. 3 In the meantime General von Craushaar, 
anticipating an order to this effect from corps headquarters, started a 
reconnaissance toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes, Auboue and Briey, to 
learn if hostile columns had been there and in which direction they 
had departed. Corps headquarters had reported to army headquarters 
its arrival at Jarny, Captain Treitschke's first report, and the cor- 
rection of it. 4 In the last report the assumption was made that the 
enemy had retreated from Valleroy in an easterly direction; and with 
this began a correct perception of actual conditions. 

Little rest had been enjoyed in the 12th Cavalry Division, which 
had passed the night in bivouacs at Parfondrupt. An alarm had been 
given at midnight to be in readiness in case of a hostile retreat west- 
ward or northwestward, because large bivouac fires were seen in the 
direction of Metz. The regiments were dismissed again only at 8 a.m., 

'Royal Saxon War Archives. 

'Colonel von Seydlitz of the Grenadier Regiment 101 reported: "The patrol 
which had been sent to Bruville reports that intrenchments were thrown up there. 
In a vineyard there numerous French equipments— about one to two wagon loads — 
were piled up. According to statements of inhabitants 10,000 French mounted chas- 
seurs departed from there between 7 and 8 o'clock toward Metz and about 1,300 infantry 
in direction of Thoncourt (Doncourt). Col. von Seydlitz." No time stated.— Royal 
Saxon War Archives. 

3 Royal Saxon War Archives. 

4 "XIIth Corps reports advance guard at Jarny. Last report erroneous; Valleroy 
not occupied. Enemy appears to have turned eastward from there. Corps remains 
stationary until further orders."— From notes of Captain von Bulow of lid Army 
Headquarters — War Archives. 



220 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

those bivouac fires having turned out to be those of German troops. 
Shortly after 8 a.m. 2d Lieutenant von Hiniiber arrived with the corps 
orders issued at 5.45 a.m., according to which the division was to ad- 
vance to Puxe, leaving one regiment on the Conflans — Etain road, four 
miles west of Puxe. 

The division left the 17th Uhlan Regiment behind, sent two 
squadrons of the 18th Uhlan Regiment for reconnaissance toward the 
Briey — Etain road, and at 10 a.m. marched through Olley to Puxe, 
arriving there at 11.15 a.m., at a time when the Xllth Army Corps was 
still resting at Jarny. The 17th Uhlan Regiment went into position at 
Villers sous Pareid, one squadron at Buzy and one at Harville. Of the 
18th Uhlan Regiment the 5th Squadron reconnoitered from Thumere- 
ville toward Briey and Fleville; the 4th Squadron stood at Jeandelize. 

THE GUARD AND THE XTH CORPS DELAYED AT MARS LA TOUR 

Headquarters of the Guard Corps originally intended to send the 
1st Guard Infantry Division through Bruville to Doncourt, the 2d 
through Mars la Tour to St. Marcel; but, after joining the IXth Corps, 
which was to march west of St. Marcel, changed this plan and chose 
the direction on Doncourt for the entire corps. At 5.30 a.m. the 1st 
Guard Infantry Division received orders " to immediately fall in on the 
road from Hannonville to Mars la Tour formed as closely as possible 
and with broad front, but in march formation." 1 The division com- 
mander, General von Pape, arriving at Mars la Tour, saw the Xllth 
Army Corps, the leading elements of which just then crossed the road, 
and learned at the same time from the chief of staff of the Guard 
Corps, General von Dannenberg, "that the Saxons were heading for 
Jarny and that the division, as soon as the road was clear, should 
march through Bruville to Doncourt, without touching Mars la Tour." 2 
General von Pape caused the division to march up west of Mars la 
Tour north of the Hannonville — Mars la Tour road and sent under 
guidance of his general staff officer, Captain von Holleben, the 4th 
Squadron of the Guard Hussar Regiment under Captain von der 
Groeben to reeonnoiter the march direction through Doncourt toward 
Jouaville. 8 

At 6 a.m. the 2d Guard Infantry Division received orders through 
Captain von Lindequist of the general staff of the Guard Corps to start, 
and followed with the corps artillery of tbe 1st Guard Infantry Division 
closed up and marched behind it. 

As far as Mars la Tour the infantry of both divisions had marched 
in column of half platoon and platoons, the artillery in column of two 
pieces. The halt at Mars la Tour was utilized by the chaplains for 
field service. 

Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

2 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

3 The squadron received the following orders: First: to seek out the best road 
to Doncourt in the sense of the orders, and to march massed; second: to ascertain 
where other German troops were on the right and left; third: to assure itself if and 
where French troops were in the vicinity. — Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



THE 18 TH OP AUGUST, 1870 221 

The 4th Squadron, Guard Hussar Regiment, utilizing a gap be- 
tween the Saxon columns, had in the meantime crossed the Mars la 
Tour— Jarny road and marched by way of Bruville, Doncourt and 
Jouaville toward Batilly, searching the adjacent country by numerous 
patrols. The first message of the squadron commander arrived at 
corps headquarters at 8 a.m., stating that the enemy had evacuated 
Bruville and Doncourt as early as the morning of August 17th, but that 
the direction of his march could not be ascertained. 1 Shortly there- 
after Lieutenant von Rundstedt of the same squadron reported that St. 
Marcel and vicinity was free of the enemy; 2 a little later the in- 
formation arrived that the Saxons also had encountered no enemy 
anywhere and that the IXth Army Corps was marching toward Vion- 
ville. 8 Thus the advance of the Guard Corps was prevented solely by 
the blocking of the road through the Saxons. 

Arrived on the hill south of Batilly, Captain von der Groeben 
caused his squadron to halt and sent the advance guard platoon under 
Lieutenant von Rundstedt to reconnoiter toward Habonville and St. 
Ail. He himself observed through a good field glass the almost 
treeless plain extending from Batilly to Amanweiler, St. Privat la 
Montagne and Roncourt. He knew that on his right was Hessian, on 
his left Saxon cavalry. 

In the meantime Captain von Holleben had returned to the 1st 
Guard Infantry Division to guide it on its march to Bruville. 4 At 9 
a.m., after a wait of almost three hours, the division took up the 
march again in the formation taken during the advance toward Mars 
la Tour; the infantry marched in the main in double section column. 
The 1st Guard Infantry Division was followed by the corps artillery, 
that by the 2d Guard Infantry Division, mostly in march column, the 
Guard Cavalry Division bringing up the rear. After the start corps 
headquarters received orders from army headquarters to halt for the 
present at Doncourt. As soon as the leading elements of the leading 
division reached the village the corps commander ordered the corps 
to march up in assembly formation and reported that fact at 10.25 a.m. 
to army headquarters, adding that the patrols sent out toward Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes and Briey had so far reported nothing of the enemy. 5 

'Report of Captain von der Groeben: "Inhabitants of Bruville state that the 
French left Doncourt yesterday morning at 9 a.m. Their march direction is not 
known. Some say toward Verdun, others toward Briey, others toward Metz. Yester- 
day forenoon thunder of cannon at Metz. Count Groeben, Captain." Time not 
stated. — War Archives. 

Captain Groeben later reported that tracks of the march of large bodies of troops 
were seen leading toward Amanvillers and Jouaville. When the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division arrived at Doncourt the correctness of this report was evidenced.— Post- 
humous papers of General von Pape. 

'Report of Lieutenant von Rundstedt: "Metz — Verdun road, 9.15 a.m. Villages 
of Bruville, St. Marcel, Doncourt, as well as intermediate farms, clear of the enemy. 
In Doncourt large hospital with Prussian wounded. On my right flank are the 6th 
Dragoons; they have patrols across the road. According to my instructions I remain 
here, requesting further orders. Von Rundstedt, Lieutenant, Hussar Guard Regi- 
ment."— War Archives. 

3 War Archives. 

♦Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

"Report of the Guard Corps: "At Doncourt. 18-8; 10.25 a.m. Head of Guard 
Corps just arrived at Doncourt, will take position there and await further orders. 
Patrols sent out in direction of Ste. Marie on the road to Briey so far have reported 
nothing of the enemy. Three hundred French and Prussian wounded in Doncourt. 
According to a proclamation posted in the villages the Emperor has left Metz. A. B. 
(Signed) von Dannenberg, Maj. Gen. Report of wounded enclosed. Attest: von 
Roon, Major. 



222 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

In the Guard Corps the general opinion was that no battle would ensue 
on August 18th, touch with the enemy having been completely lost. 
The general belief was that the corps would go into bivouac at Don- 
court and officers were already being sent out to the nearby villages to 
requisition supplies and men to get water. 



THE IID ARMY AT 10.30 A.M. 

At 10.30 a.m. the three army corps in the first line had reached 
the line Oaulre — Doncourt — Jarny; the formation in echelons had 
actually ensued as contemplated by Prince Frederick Charles. The 
Guard Corps, which in consequence of the crossing of the march was at 
that time just going into position at its march objective, Doncourt, re- 
mained about one kilometer behind the Xllth Army Corps, already in 
position at Jarny. The IXth Army Corps, also assembled at Caulre, 
was in turn about one kilometer behind the Guard Corps. Of the army 
corps in the second line, the Xth Corps which had been started toward 
Bruville was still at Mars la Tour; the Hid Corps, held at the disposi- 
tion of Royal Headquarters, was at Vionville and Buxieres. These 
corps also having moved into the gaps between the corps of the first 
line, had assumed about the relative position and location intended by 
Prince Frederick Charles when issuing his orders in the morning. 



ROVAL HEADQUARTERS AND THE THREE ARMY HEADQUARTERS 

ON THE MORNING OF THE 18TH OF AUGUST. THE 

SITUATION REMAINS DOUBTFUL 

Royal Headquarters had left Pont a Mousson at 4 a.m. and had 
been since 6 a.m. on the hill near Flavigny, from which at least a part 
of the movements of the troops could be seen. After conversing with 
his commanding generals Prince Frederick Charles had taken his 
position on the road west of and close to Vionville. General von 
Steinmetz had been since 8.20 a.m. on the hill south of Gravelotte, 
from where he attentively observed the enemy on the other side of the 
Mance valley. General von Moltke had sent higher staff officers to 
the different army headquarters as information officers: Major von 
Holleben, of the Saxon General Staff, to the 1st Army; Lieutenant 
Colonel von Brandenstein, Chief of Section of the Great General Staff, 
to the Hd Army. 

At 6.15 a.m. Prince Frederick Charles reported to the King: 

" The Xllth Army Corps, as left wing echelon of the lid Army, 
has started the march to Jarny. The lid Army Corps will have 
reached Buxieres at noon. No enemy marching in the direction of St. 



THE 18 TH OF AUGUST, 1870 223 

Marcel and as far as Doncourt. Their late camp at St. Marcel is 
empty. There was marching on the road during the night. " J 

Thus the lid Army had no enemy in its front. But on the right 
flank firing was heard in the direction of Gravelotte and as that place 
could be seen only in part from the location of army headquarters, the 
Prince sent Captain von Bergen, 2d Engineer Officer of army head- 
quarters, out for reconnaissance to ascertain what had become of that 
part of the French army seen at Gravelotte yesterday. 

The first report sent back by this captain at 7.30 a.m. stated con- 
fidently "The French camp which was seen yeBterday has departed in 
a northerly or northeasterly direction." s 

Shortly before that time the picket under Lieutenant von Rohr of 
the 3d Squadron, 15th Uhlan Regiment 3 reported that, east of Grave- 
lotte, there were still at that time 6,000 to 8,000 infantry; that the ar- 
tillery had nearly all departed; the whole creating the impression of a 
hasty retreat on Metz. 4 

Later reports arrived from the outposts of the 18th Infantry 
Division, stating that Gravelotte was unoccupied, that the "general " 
was being sounded in the hostile camp and that movements could be 
seen of the enemy toward the northwest. 

Thus, as the Prince had told his commanding generals in the 
discussion in the morning might be probable, the enemy here also 
was marching off; but new doubts arose as to his direction, whether 
toward Metz or into the interior of France. Therefore Headquarters of 
the XHth Army Corps was requested at 7.45 a.m. to take due care that 
all reports concerning the important road to Verdun be immediately 
transmitted to army headquarters. Soon, however, other reports 
arrived. Lieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein, information officer 
from Royal Headquarters, arrived at Headquarters Hd Army at 8 a. m. 
and brought information that the French Guard still stood on the left 
wing. 5 Ten minutes later Captain von Bergen reported that the 
hostile camp still was there, because he had seen it himself, though 
apparently the number of troops therein had decreased. 6 

•How he arrived at that supposition cannot be stated.— War Archives; von der 
Goltz, Die Operational der II. Armee, page 122. 

'War Archives; also von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armie, page 124. 

3 Of the 6th Cavalry Division. The picket was in front of the Hid Army Corps. 

4 The complete report read: "I went to within 400 paces of the hostile camp. 
There are no hostile cautionary measures. Strength about six to eight divisions. As 
far as can be seen almost the entire artillery has driven off; one or two cavalry regi- 
ments only with white coats. All indicates hasty retreat to Metz. At this time 6,000 
to 8,000 infantry east of Gravelotte. I ride again forward, will report later. Squadron 
has not yet been watered, no opportunity therefor. South of Gravelotte considerable 
number of wounded of the 56th Regiment; they have had no attention since yesterday. 
4.60 a.m. Von Rohr." War Archives. 

Von der Goltz in Die Operationen der II. Armee, 1870-71, page,122, is of the opinion 
that by the reported six to eight divisions French half-battalions were meant. It is 
evident that an error caused "divisions" to be written instead of "battalions." 

•General von Steinmetz had erroneously reported the day before that hostile in- 
fantry was north of the forest of Vaux. 

"Captain von Bergen's report: " Corner of forest opposite Gravelotte, 7.15. My 
own eyes show me that the camp on the Bois des Gembeaux (Genivaux) hill still re- 
mains. According to reports of outposts and field picket there has been movement 
there since 3 a.m. and the report of the evacuation of the camp to the 30th Brigade 
refers apparently only to a dimunition in numbers there. Captain von Bergen."— 
War Archives; also von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, page 124. 



224 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

DIFFERENCES IN THE ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION HELD BY 

GENERAL VON MOLTKE AND PRINCE 

FREDERICK CHARLES 

Minutely examining the results of August 17th and personal im- 
pressions during the morning hours the general opinion had gained 
ground at Royal Headquarters that the main forces of the enemy were 
to be looked for towards Metz. As early as 7.20 a.m. directions had 
been sent to the Hd Army that in case the northern road to Verdun 
should be found clear of the enemy, the Guard and the XHth Army 
Corps were not to be sent too far to the left and that the Hid Army 
Corps should be stopped at Vionville, to have it support the 1st Army 
in case of need. * 

At 8.30 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel von Verdy, Chief of Section of 
the Great General Staff, arrived at Headquarters lid Army, by di- 
rection of General von Moltke, and stated as follows: 

" General von Moltke is of the opinion that the hostile main force 
is in front of Metz, that its position extends about to Amanvillers. It 
is therefore desired to keep the march in the same direction as before. 
If the correctness of his opinion is proven the 1st Army will attack in 
front. In such case the Guard Corps is designated to serve as reserve, 
the IXth to envelop'the hostile right wing, the remainder of the corps 
to halt for the present. Reports clearing up the situation desired as 
early as possible. 3 

In the first orders which Prince Frederick Charles had issued he 
had already arranged for the halt of the corps of the lid Army which 
Royal Headquarters considered necessary. These orders where now 
repeated. 8 The IXth Army Corps received orders to have the reports 
of its cavalry sent direct to General von Moltke, for it stood nearest 
the enemy. The Prince sent back word to Royal Headquarters, by 
Lieutenant Colonel von Verdy, that in his opinion it was probable that 
the enemy was retreating in a northerly and northeasterly direction on 
account of the railroad from Metz to Diedenhofen. 4 Thus the Prince 
held fast to his theory of the hostile retreat. That such a retreat was 
being made in a northwesterly direction no longer seemed to him 
credible and it appeared to him more probable that the enemy would 
try an evasion through the valley of the Mosel in a generally northern 
direction than that he would make a stand at Metz to accept battle 
there. It still remained uncertain how to utilize the lid Army; further 
reports were awaited. By 8.50 a.m. the reports from Captain von der 
Groeben of the Guard Corps arrived, stating Doncourt to be free of 
the enemy without giving the hostile march direction, also the one 
from Captain von Treitschke of the XHth Army Corps, who erro- 

'This order was sent to the Hid Army Corps direct. 

'When Lieutenant Colonel von Verdy rode away from Royal Headquarters the 
first report from Captain von Bergen concerning the departure from the camp at 
Moskau had not arrived. It came at 8.05 a.m. 

3 Only the IXth Army Corps received these orders in writing. 

4 This view of headquarters of the lid Army was expressed as early as the 15th of 
August in a telegram from General von Stiehle to General von Moltke. In that tele- 
gram is stated that the hostile retreat was being made by rail from Metz and by 
marching. — War Archives. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 225 

neously supposed the enemy in the vicinity of Valleroy, and those 
from the IXth Army Corps, which, arrived at Caulre, had met no 
enemy either in a northern or northeasterly direction. It now again 
became doubtful whether the enemy should not be sought in the 
northwesterly direction. Whatever stood at Metz might be but a part 
of his main force, a sort of rear guard whose position hardly reached 
far to the north, else the IXth Army Corps would have encountered an 
enemy to the northeast. The report from Crown Prince Albert of 
Saxony, which arrived at 9.30 a.m. , and stated that Captain Treitschke's 
first report was erroneous and that in all probability the hostile forces 
had retired in an easterly direction, still gave no basis for a definite 
estimate of the situation. 

Only the fact that the non -receipt of further reports from the 
Xllth Army Corps confirmed in an indirect way the absence of hostile 
forces to the northwest caused the Prince to turn his attention east- 
ward in the course of the next half hour. 

If a part of the enemy had actually marched off, it could now 
hardly be overtaken; but there still stood at Metz another part which 
had to be first reckoned with. It appeared to the Prince now neces- 
sary that the Hd Army should turn against Metz. Of course nothing 
was known so far of the enemy at Metz except as to his left wing. 
Where the right wing was to be sought might be deduced from the fact 
that the IXth Army Corps had not found him northeast of Caulre. 
Thus it would hardly extend to beyond Folie. The enemy had a 
frontal extension west of Metz of not more than five kilometers; that 
could hardly be the entire French army of August 16th, yet certainly a 
large part of it. 

Thus apparently the enemy was considering not a regulation 
defensive, but rather the parrying of a threatened attack since the 
intended retreat with all parts of the army had been impossible. 

Almost simultaneously with the report from Crown Prince Albert 
the chief of staff of the 1st Army, General von Sperling, had arrived at 
Headquarters, Hd Army. He had been sent to the King, to receive 
additional orders for the 1st Army, and, in passing, stopped to consult 
with Prince Frederick Charles. He reported the measures taken by 
and the position of the 1st Army and concerning the enemy added, 
" that he was still in force on the heights and had not moved." 

When he left he was given the last report received from Crown 
Prince Albert, with a few additions, to hand to the King. ' 

At 9.50 a.m. Captain von Bergen reported that it appeared that a 
concentration wa3 taking place in the hostile camp. 2 

'General von Sperling received a paper containing the following: "Crown 
Prince of Saxony reports 8.50 a.m. that the Xllth Corps is at Jarny; thorough recon- 
naissances resulted in ascertaining that the last report sent was erroneous; Valleroy 
was not occupied. Enemy appears to have turned east from there. The Xllth Corps 
will remain at Jarny until further orders. Saxon cavalry will reconnoiter on the road 
toward Briey. General Wraagel (IXth Corps) has a battalion in his front at Caulre 
Ferme." Time, place, signature absent. — War Archives. 

3 The report from Captain von Bergen reads: "Right wing, Vllth Army Corps: 
outpost line; 8.45. Lively movements in the camp, as it appears, concentration of the 
infantry more to the rear, the edge of the hill still occupied by artillery. The move- 
ment during the night in the camp was caused by additions arriving, new bivouac 
fires were lighted. At this time only unimportant firing by outposts. With compli- 
ments of General von Zastrow. Von Bergen, Capt."— War Archives; also von der 
Goltz, Die Operationen der II, Armie, page 124. 



226 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Thus the enemy stood west of Metz; at least there were no 
present indications of a marching off. The following information from 
General von Moltke, received shortly before 10 a.m., was therefore all 
the more surprising to Prince Frederick Charles: 

"On the right wing of the Vllth Corps unimportant skirmish 
firing. The troops visible on the hill toward Metz appear to move 
northward— that is, toward Briey. It does not look as if the 1st Army 
will require support by more than the Hid Corps from Vionville or St. 
Marcel. Hill south Flavigny, 9.20 a.m." 1 

This shows that General von Moltke had finally come to the 
opinion already held by the Hd Army, since he now contradicted what 
he had caused Prince Frederick Charles to be informed of through von 
Verdy and what had been his original thought, namely, that the 
enemy still stood west of Metz. The change in his opinion is easily 
accounted for. The first reports of the day, which had strengthened 
Prince Frederick Charles' belief in the enemy's marching off, had had 
their effect on General von Moltke also. Personal observations of 
movements in the hostile camp, which might be interpreted as a 
march toward the north or northwest, heightened this effect. In any 
case the information sent to the lid Army as to the new estimate of 
the situation was stated very cautiously; its main purpose was to warn 
against over- hasty measures. 

Prince Frederick Charles at once perceived that this information 
had been sent before the arrival of General von Sperling, who could 
have given information of the conduct of the enemy opposite Grave- 
lotte and of the last reports received by the Hd Army. He supposed 
at once also that General von Moltke, after having heard General von 
Sperling, would return to his former estimate of the situation. The 
conviction that at Metz he had opposite him not only a part, but the 
main forces of the enemy, which had had no time to draw off, gained 
more and more ascendance in the Prince's mind. 8 From the vicinity of 
Briey, where he knew the 12th Cavalry Division operated, had come 
no report of any kind of the enemy; most of the reports pointed to- 
wards Metz. Too much time had now been lost in trying to ascertain 
the enemy's whereabouts and, although there still was great un- 
certainty, the Prince decided to act at once on the orders from Royal 
Headquarters which Lieutenant Colonel von Verdy had brought. At 
10 a.m. he issued the following orders to the IXth Army Corps: 

" The corps will fall in and march in direction of Verneville to La 
Folie and, if the enemy's right wing is there, open the engagement by 
for the present deploying a numerous artillery. The Guard Corps will 
follow up to Vernlville." 

A quarter of an hour later the following orders were sent the 
Guard Corps: 

" The Guard Corps continues the advance by way of Doncourt 
to Verneville and takes position to support the IXth Corps which is 

^on Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870-71. No. 177. 
2 War Archives. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 227 

marching toward La Folie against the hostile right wing. Reconnais- 
sance left through Amanvillers and St. Privat la Montagne, as well as 
early reports desired. 1 ' 1 

The employment of these two corps thus was in consonance with 
Moltke's directions. Of the remaining corps of the lid Army, whose 
participation did not appear necessary for the present, the Hid 
received orders to follow from Vionville to Caulre; the Xth to halt at 
Mars la Tour; the Xllth at Jarny. 8 The Xllth Corps received copies 
of the orders issued to the IXth Army Corps and the Guard Corps. 

The information officer of Royal Headquarters, Lieutenant 
Colonel von Brandenstein, undertook to take the Prince's orders to 
the King. With reference to the last information from General von 
Moltke, the Prince caused to be added that he had designated the 
IXth Army Corps for the direct support of the 1st Army and requested 
permission to take control again of the Hid Army Corps now at the 
disposition of Royal Headquarters for that same purpose. 

To the satisfaction of the Prince his estimate of the situation was 
proven correct by the subsequent reports. The Xth Army Corps re- 
ported that, according to statements of wounded French soldiers, the 
French had retreated in great haste at noon on the 17th from Doncourt 
toward Metz; 8 the Guard Corps reported its arrival at Doncourt and 
stated that the country south of Briey was clear of the enemy; and 
Captain von Bergen sent a fourth report, according to which the 
French had taken up a battle position east of Gravelotte. 4 

In the meantime Royal Headquarters had again reverted to its 
original estimate of the situation. The first cause of this was a report 
received at 9.35 a.m. from Major von Holleben, information officer 
with the 1st Army : " The enemy still has important fighting forces at 
the forest of Genivaux and appears determined to accept battle 
there." 5 

At 10 a.m. General von Sperling arrived and reported the same of 
the enemy. He added that the VHth Army Corps still occupied the 
forest of Vaux, which was passable only for infantry, and that it had 
one brigade in the Mosel valley. He also handed over a copy of Crown 
Prince Albert's report, stating the correctness of the report of the 
appearance of hostile forces at Valleroy. The second report from 
Captain von Bergen, according to which the hostile camp east of 
Gravelotte still existed, had also arrived. 6 Like Prince Frederick 

'War Archives; also von d«r Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, page 180. 

a In the orders to the Xth Corps is stated how the Prince intended to employ the 
corps kept back later on. The Xllth Corps, if no interference appeared necessary, was 
to proceed to Ste. Marie aux Chenes; the Xth to Jarny, the lid to Mars la Tour. Thus 
it was intended to place the.corps in a large circle facing east as a support for the IXth 
and Guard Corps fighting for a decision at Verneville.— War Archives. 

'War Archives; also von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, page 182. 

*War Archives; also von der Goltz, Die Operationew der II. Armee, page 132. 

"War Archives. 

"This report had already been received by von Moltke at 8.30 a.m., but appears 
not to have had any material effect, as it simultaneously spoke of a " dimunition " of 
the hostile forces. 



228 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Charles, General von Moltke without delay decided on issuing the 
decisive orders for the battle. Even though these orders were based 
in first line on the fact that the enemy stood east of Gravelotte, the 
possibility of a marching off toward Briey was not entirely lost sight of. 



ROYAL HEADQUARTERS ISSUES ORDERS FOR THE ATTACK — FURTHER 
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE lid ARMY UP TO 12 NOON 

Orders from Royal Headquarters, dated 10.30 a.m., read: 1 2 

* * * 

These orders were addressed to the Hd Army. The chief of 
staff of the 1st Army, General von Sperling, who was present, 
was informed of the contents and received verbal directions that the 
1st Army should attack only when the Hd Army had passed beyond 
its left wing and was in readiness to participate. Soon after 11 a.m. 
General von Sperling returned to the 1st Army. 

Shortly after the orders of Royal Headquarters had been sent to 
the Hd Army General von Moltke received the report of the informa- 
tion officer, Lieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein, concerning the 
latest orders of Prince Frederick Charles. 3 This report showed that 
Prince Frederick Charles had already acted in consonance with the 
estimate entertained at Royal Headquarters. The two headquarters 
thus were of the same opinion as to conditions with the enemy: the 
opponent stood west of Metz, and there lay the decision. While 
Prince Frederick Charles had been cautious in his orders and held 
back the Guard and the XHth Army Corps, because of the instructions 
brought to him by Lieutenant Colonel von Verdy, General von Moltke 
had gone farther and given the enveloping idea a far more definite 
and forcible character by starting the two corps toward Batilly. To 
the request of Prince Frederick Charles, contained in the report which 
Lieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein brought to Royal Headquarters, 
to again be allowed the disposition of the Hid Army Corps, Royal 
Headquarters assented; the lid Army Corps, now marching up, was 
destined, in place of the Hid Corps, for the support of the 1st Army. 

The orders from Royal Headquarters were received by the lid 
Army at 11 a.m. Immediately after their receipt two reports arrived, 
both of which tended to supplement and clear up the hitherto by no 
means definite information concerning the enemy. The first was one 
from General von Manstein stating that inhabitants said that bodies of 

'These orders, omitted here, are as given by von der Goltz, see page 61, ante. 

2 Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870-71, No. 178. 

3 The report read: "Hill west of Vionville, 18-8; 10.10 a.m. His Royal Highness 
is sending orders to the IXth Corps to advance from Caulre through Verneville on La 
Folie, and should the right wing of the enemy be there, to commence the attack with 
strong artillery. His Royal Highness informs me that the IXth Corps is selected for 
the support of the 1st Army and requests permission to draw up the Hid Corps with which 
he will take station. The Guard Corps is marching on Verneville and will halt there. 
No reports so far receive'! from the XHth Corps as to its having encountered the 
enemy. The cavalry of that corps is reconnoitering toward the road through Briey. 
The main body of the corps remains at Jarny for the present. Von Brandenstein." — 
War Archives. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 229 

troops were north of Jouaville and cavalry and artillery northeast of 
Verneville. The second came from Lieutenant Colonel Scholl, reading: 

"Report from hill near Batilly: Hostile patrols opposite Ste. 
Marie — Amanvillers; troops marching on main road; camp at St. 
Privat la Montagne; hostile patrols advancing at a trot. 10.25 a.m." 1 

The second report gave the first definite basis as to where the 
enemy's right wing was to be looked for. So far the Prince had sup- 
posed it to be at Polie; General von Moltke, early in the morning at 
Amanweiler, later at Montigny la Grange; but those were merely 
suppositions. All measures taken up to this time for battle were 
based on uncertainty as far as the decisive operation of enveloping the 
hostile right wing was concerned. In spite of this fact neither the first 
nor the second report found special consideration at Headquarters Hd 
Army. The first in part was based on statements of inhabitants, and 
thus could not be believed in whole; the second did not state how 
strong the enemy was who stood or had stood at St. Privat, and was 
not confirmed by later reports. The thought that the enemy might 
be at St. Privat to defend himself was not considered; the camp there 
and the movements of troops were considered parts of the hostile 
army attempting to march off and getaway from the Germans. Prince 
Frederick Charles' orders, now necessary in consideration of orders 
from Royal Headquarters, were based on this supposition. After he 
knew that his opinion and that of Royal Headquarters were the same 
he intended to carry on the envelopment of the enemy on as large a 
scale as possible. Not only the road leading to Briey but also the one in 
the Mosel valley leading down stream was to be blocked for him. Or- 
ders were sent at 11.45 a.m. to the XHth Army Corps to march to Ste. 
Marie aux Chines, that is as far as the Metz — Woippy— -Briey road, to 
secure against Briey and beyond Conflans, and to send as much cavalry 
as possible into the valley of the Mosel to interrupt the railroad and 
telegraph leading to Diedenhofen. The Guard Corps was ordered to 
hasten its march to Verneville, to extend it to Amanweiler and from 
there proceed envelopingly to attack the right wing of the enemy. 
Discretion was left it to use the road through Habonville. The IXth 
Army Corps was advised that, if the hostile line in its front extended 
farther north, it was to delayaserious engagement until the Guard Corps 
was making its attack from Amanweiler. The general attack was ex- 
pected by the Prince to begin about 1.45 p.m. ; by that time the Guard 
Corps, which had started by his orders at 10.15 a.m., could arrive at 
Amanweiler from Doncourt. 3 These dispositions were reported in 
outline to Royal Headquarters. 

Prince Frederick Charles also now thought of drawing up the 
army corps of the second line. They were to strengthen, in case of 
need, the attack in front. At 12 noon orders were sent to the lid 

'War. Archives; also von der Goltz, II. Armee, page 133. (See page 60, ante.) By 
"Troops marching on main road" movements of hostile infantry from vicinity of 
Amanweiler to St. Privat are meant. — Statement of Colonel Scholl. 

-See pages 58 and 63, ante. 



230 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Army Corps to proceed to Rezonville as reserve for the 1st Army; to 
the Hid Army to proceed to Verneville, the Xth to St. Ail. 1 While 
these orders were written down, the first thunder of cannon was heard 
in direction of Verngville. 

MEASURES TAKEN BY THE CORPS COMMANDER IN PART ANTICI- 
PATE PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES' ORDERS 

At 10.30 a.m. the IXth Army Corps had received the orders of 
Prince Frederick Charles, dated 10 a.m., to advance to the attack in 
direction of Foiie, should the enemy stand there, and the corps had 
started at once. The Guard Corps received the orders, dated 10.15, to 
advance as far as Vern§ville, shortly after 11 a.m. and, a little later, 
the XHth Army Corps received a note from Hd Army Headquarters 
giving information of the orders issued by that headquarters. In 
consequence of progressive reconnaissance these two army corps had 
come to an estimate of the situation differing from that held at Royal 
and Hd Army Headquarters. As corps headquarters received the re- 
ports earlier they could form a clear judgment earlier and, when the 
commanding generals of the Guard and the XHth Army Corps decided 
on independent action based on their estimate of the situation, they 
fortunately anticipated by their actions the 11.30 a.m. orders of Prince 
Frederick Charles. 

When Captain von der Groeben with the 4th Squadron, Guard 
Hussar Regiment, started his observation toward 9 a.m. on the hill 
at Batilly, a light fog still screened the surrounding country. Farther 
south, at the little wood between Jouaville and Habonville, stood a 
platoon of Hessian cavalry under Lieutenant Scholl, with which he took 
up connection. 2 North of Batilly Saxon cavalry was seen advancing 
for reconnaisance. It is true that Captain von der Groeben had orders 
not to go beyond Jouaville, but patrols had been sent to Habonville, 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes and for connection with the neighboring corps, 
and at 9.30 a.m. a patrol of eight horses went toward Auboug for per- 
manent observation there of the road from Briey. The captain him- 
self intended to go farther ahead with the squadron to St. Ail, and had 
already started out the advance guard platoon when the veil of fog 
was suddenly lifted and a large number of white tents shone in the sun 
on the hill between St. Privat and Roncourt. Two farmers, who just 
then arrived from Ste. Marie aux Chines, narrated that troops had 
been there since yesterday afternoon like swarms of ants; all arms 
were in evidence. Immediate report of this was sent to General von 
Pape and a copy sent to Lieutenant Scholl with request to forward 
it to army headquarters, as the Hessian troopers knew the road better. 
Lieutenant Scholl had made the same observation simultaneously and 
had already sent a report of it to headquarters of the IXth Army Corps. 
Shortly thereafter Captain von der Groeben saw the enemy strike the 

1 See pages 68 and 64, ante. 

statement of Captain (at that time) Count von der Groeben. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 231 

tents, one and a half or two battalions departing toward Ste. Marie aux 
Chgnes and smaller infantry detachments and two squadrons marching 
toward St. Ail and Habonville. Saxon troopers, riding toward Ste. 
Marie aux ChSnes, received fire. Then the enemy sent some infantry 
detachments ahead across the ravine running from Habonville to 
Aubou6 as far as the small wood northeast of Batilly. All these events 
were reported. Captain von der Groeben, supported by a platoon of 
the 9th Dragoon Regiment which had just come up, 1 attempted to 
attack a hostile squadron trotting toward Habonville; the latter gave 
way and disappeared into the ravine running from Auboug northward, 
as did also other cavalry detachments which were riding ahead by way 
of Ste. Marie. A platoon, under Lieutenant Count von Liittichau, was 
sent out to ascertain how far the enemy's position extended northward 
and to place relays for the patrol already sent toward Aubou6. In the 
meantime the Guard Hussar Regiment came up and the 4th Squadron 
joined it. 

The first report sent from Batilly by Captain von der Groeben 
arrived at the Guard Corps at 11 a.m. It read: 

"Hill near Batilly, 10.50 a.m. People just arriving from Ste. 
Marie aux Ch8nes bring the information that French infantry is there, 
but especially that many French troopsare at St. Privat la Montagne." 2 

At the same time corps headquarters received the orders from 
Prince Frederick Charles of 10.15 a.m., to follow the IXth Corps to 
Verneville and it had information that that corps was in close touch 
with the enemy. After careful consideration of all circumstances the 
commanding general decided, in order to follow the orders from army 
headquarters as well as to act in consonance with the fact of the pres- 
ence of hostile forces at St. Privat, to advance the leading division 
and the corps artillery toward Habonville, with the other division on 
Verneville. At 11.30 a.m. this decision to debouch toward Habonville 
and the presence of hostile troops at St. Privat was reported to army 
headquarters and information also sent to the XHth Army Corps. 3 

At this time the 1st Guard Infantry Division was assembled at 
Doncourt; behind it the corps artillery was just going into assembly 
formation; the leading elements of the 2d Guard Infantry Division 
were approaching Bruville. 

While heavy cannon fire, interspersed with rifle fire, was already 
heard coming from Verneville the 1st Guard Infantry Division started 
from Doncourt to Habonville, though after some little time had been 
lost in calling back the men sent out to procure water. 4 Toward 12 noon 
the 2d Guard Infantry Division received orders, through Captain von 

•Froni the Xth Army Corps. 

"War Archives.— The report from Lieutenant Scholl, of similar import, reached 
headquarters, IXth Army Corps, at 11 a.m. and was immediately transmitted to army 
headquarters. 

3 At the time this report was sent Prince Frederick Charles, believing the Guard 
Corps marching on Verneville, issued his attack orders, which assigned the Guard 
Corps to Amanweiler giving it permission to go by way of Habonville, which it 
had already done. 

'Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



232 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Stiilpnagel of the general staff of the Guard Corps, "to march through 
St. Marcel and Verneville toward La Folie and attack the enemy 
there." 1 The division sent out an advance guard and turned across 
country from Bruville toward Oaulre; the infantry marched in battle 
formation, the artillery in platoons. 8 The 2d Guard Uhlan Regiment 
trotted ahead to Caulre and soon sent a report concerning the battle of 
the IXth Army Corps at Verneville. 

At the same time that the Guard Corps started its 1st Division 
from Doncourt to Habonville the Crown Prince of Saxony decided to 
lead his corps farther in a northeasterly direction. The 12th Cavalry 
Division, whose patrols mainly reconnoitered on the left bank of the 
Orne in a northwesterly direction, had nowheres encountered an 
enemy. Captain von Treitschke had proceeded with the 5th Squadron, 
1st Cavalry Regiment, by way of Valleroy toward Briey without meet- 
ing anything but a few weak hostile Dragoon patrols. 3 On the thero 
hand, Saxon patrols were fired on from Moineville ; 4 Lieutenant von 
Posern, with a platoon from the advance guard squadron, encountered, 
toward 11 a.m. southwest of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, bodies of French 
infantry and cavalry which retired into the village in front of the 
platoon when it started to charge. 6 

Crown Prince Albert saw no enemy in his front either to the 
north or northwest. He knew, however, that the IXth Army Corps 
and the Guard Corps had been started toward an enemy west of Metz 
and that they probably were now marching. Although his orders still 
confined him to Jarny he decided to lead his corps toward where the 

1 War Archives. 

2 The 4th Guard Infantry Brigade, in the lead, was ordered to take for its march 
objective the red roof of Caulre and to march rapidly; the enemy was found and the 
IXth Army Corps already engaged.— War Archives. 
Order of march of the 3d Guard Infantry Division. 
Advance Guard : 

2d Guard Uhlan Regiment. 
1st Bn., 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment. 
Main Body: 

2d and Fus. Bus., 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment. 
2d Guard Grenadier Regiment. 

1st, 2d and Fus. Bns., 3d Guard Grenadier Regiment. 
1st Guard Grenadier Regiment. 
Guard Heavy Battery. 
2d and 3d Guard Pioneer Companies. 
3d Bn., Guard Foot Artillery. 
1st Sanitary Detachment. 
Field Hospital. 
During the march three lines were formed, and the 5th and 6th Light Batteries 
drawn up to the advance guard. 

3 Royal Saxon War Archives.— Five hostile dragoons fell back at 9 a.m. from the 
vicinity northwest of Valleroy through Mussot toward Lantefontaine. That Valleroy 
was free of the enemy was proven by the following report:— 

"Labry, sent the 18th, 10.15 a.m. According to statement of two Prussian Guard 
Dragoons, who escaped from French bands, and who fled through the small wood 
occupied by the 2d Company, Metz is said to have been evacuated by the French Army. 
A farmer's boy, just returned from Valleroy states that no French soldier was in 
Valleroy. Just now apparently our columns (cavalry) are marching from Verneville 
past Batilly toward Valleroy. Von Lindemann, Lieut- Colon el .—Royal Saxon 
Archives. 

4 Royal Saxon War Archives. — The report originates with the 1st Squadron, 1st 
Cavalry Regiment. 

s Royal Saxon War Archives. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 233 

enemy had been reported, that is in a northeasterly direction. In con- 
sideration of the existing uncertainty, however, he formed the left 
wing division in more depth. At 11.30 a.m. he ordered: 1 



This decision was reported to army headquarters. The 12th 
Cavalry Division received the following orders : 

"To draw immediately closer to the army corps at the Bois de 
Ponty, but to leave one regiment behind and start it toward Valleroy. " s 

Shortly thereafter, soon after 12 noon, at the same time that heavy 
thunder of cannon from Vern6ville turned the attention to the right 
flank, the attack orders from army headquarters, dated 11.45 a.m., 
arrived, directing the corps toward Ste. Marie aux Chines. As the 
larger part of the corps had been started in that direction, and as 
the enemy there was considered to be weak, the Crown Prince ad- 
hered to his measures taken, but caused the 46th Brigade to be drawn 
up behind the 45th Brigade at the Bois de Ponty. On the left wing the 
former advance guard took up the march from Labry in the valley of 
the Orne; to the left of the stream the 3d Battalion, 108th Rifle Regi- 
ment, started for Valleroy; on the right the 2d Battalion, followed by 
the 1st Heavy and 2d Light Batteries, toward Moineville. The 1st 
Cavalry Regiment was ahead, Captain von Treitschke with the 5th 
Squadron having arrived at 11 a.m. at Briey, without meeting the 
enemy there. At 1.30 p.m. the two leading battalions reached Valleroy 
and Moineville; the 1st Battalion of the Rifle Regiment and the 2d 
Light Battery, Beaumont. There was no sign of the enemy. At the 
bridge across the Orne, at Hatrize, an infantry and a pioneer company 
had remained. In the right rear of the advance guard the 45th Bri- 
gade with the 1st and 2d Light Batteries proceeded to Fleury behind 
the Bois de Ponty, the northeast edge of which as well as Batilly was 
already occupied by several companies. The 46th Brigade and the 1st 
Heavy Battery followed up to behind the northwest corner of the forest. 
The 24th Infantry Division crossed the Metz — Etain railroad between 
Jouaville and Giraumont en Jarnisy and, with the leading elements of 
the infantry, reached Batilly about 2.30 p.m.; 3 the corps artillery went 

'Royal Saxon War Archives.— General Staff Account, p. 697.— Von Schimpff, 
Das XII Corps im Kriege, 1870-71., vol. I, p. 75. (The order, omitted here, will be 
found on p. 162 ante.) 

'Royal Saxon War Archives. 
D Order of march of the 24th Infantry Division: 
Advance Guard— Colonel von Leonhardi. 
6th Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment. 
1st Battalion, 104th Infantry Regiment. 
4th Light Battery. 
2d, 3d Battalions, 104th Infantry Regiment. 

Main Body: 

105th Infantry Regiment. 

3d Light, 3d and 4th Heavy Batteries. 

12th Jager Battalion. 

2d Cavalry Regiment (less 5th Squadron). 

48th Infantry Brigade. 

Sanitary Detachment. 

Pioneer Company with light field bridge train. 



234 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

to Giraumont en Jarnisy. The 12th Cavalry Division had started from 
Puxe eastward when the cannon thunder was heard. There the 18th 
Uhlan Regiment remained with orders to continue the reconnaissance 
against the road beyond Briey. The 17th Uhlan Regiment was still at 
Villers sous Pareid. 1 

Between Doncourt and Oonflans the division received the orders 
of corps headquarters to join the corps. It hastened its march and, at 
2.45 p.m., arrived at the Bois de Ponty in strength of two regiments 
and one battery, after General Krug von Nidda, as commander of the 
two detached Uhlan regiments, had been directed to send squadrons 
to Briey. 

PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES PROCEEDS TO VERNEVILLE 
TO THE BATTLEFIELD 

At Headquarters, Hd Army, when the thunder of cannon from 
Verneville was heard, the issuance of orders at 12 noon was finished as 
rapidly as possible. After all orderly officers had been sent off, Army 
Headquarters, at 12.30 p.m., rode from Vionville through St. Marcel to- 
ward Verneville, the battlefield. En route Prince Frederick Charles 
received the reports from the Guard and XHth Army Corps concern- 
ing the measures taken by them independently. 8 

These measures were so much in consonance with his last orders, 
that only the separate march of the 2d Guard Infantry Division to 
Verneville made interference by him necessary. By direct orders from 
army headquarters it was sent after the 1st Guard Infantry Division to 
Habonville, as soon as it was seen from St. Marcel to be marching on 
Verneville and when it was learned from it that it had orders to pro- 
ceed there. 

The reports of the two army corps contained information of the 
enemy which must necessarily make the Prince cautious. They stated 
that the enemy was at Moineville, Ste. Marie aux Chgnes and St. Privat. 
Thus Scholl's report was confirmed. Immediately after a second con- 
firmation arrived : the report of Captain von der Groeben concerning 
events at Batilly . 3 There was now no longer any doubt that the enemy 

>To observe the Conflans— Etain road. 

=The report from the Guard Corps read: 

"From Guard Corps, Doncourt, 18. 8. 70., 11.30. According to report of Captain 
Groeben from the hill at Batilly dated 10.50, people just coming from Ste. Marie bring 
the information that French infantry is there, but especially many French troops at 
St. Privat la Montagne. In consequence the Guard Corps will at once start, in accord- 
ance with orders received, from Doncourt, but under these circumstances the com- 
manding general believes it best not to march on Verneville but on Habonville. The 
XHth Corps has been notified. A. B. : von Dannenberg." 

Crown Prince Albert reported: 

"Jarny, 18.8.70., 11.45 a.m. Enemy said to be at Moineville and Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes. Therefore the XHth Corps advances against these two points. Flank guard 
toward Valleroy. I proceed to Fleury, later on to Jouaville." War Archives. — Von 
der Goltz, lid Army, p. 138. (See p. 65, ante.) 

The report from the Guard Corps was not complete, as the march of the 2d 
Guard Infantry Division toward Verneville was not mentioned. 

3 Captain Groeben's report read:— "Doncourt, 18.8.70. 12 noon. A Saxon cavalry 
patrol has encountered French cavalry, 10 horses, at St. Ail. On the road from Aman- 
villers to Verneville a few shots were fired just now. It appears that cavalry, about 
2 squadrons, infantry, about 1£ companies, have been sent from St. Privat la Mon- 
tagne toward Habonville and St. Ail. My advance guard platoon is halfways between 
Batilly and St. Ail. North of Batilly toward Ste. M arie aux Ch6nes is Saxon cavalry. 
French infantry, two companies, marching toward Ste. Marie. Between Ste. Marie 
and St. Privat a camp, which appears to be about being struck. Hill at Batilly, 11.30 
a.m. From the Guard Corps Doncourt, 18.8.70., 12 noon. Von der Groeben, Captain."— 
War Archives; also von der Goltz, lid Army, p. 189. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 235 

stood north of Amanweiler; thus the IXth Army Corps, which then 
was in contact with the enemy, encountered not his right wing, but 
the hostile front. However, according to orders from Royal Head- 
quarters of 10.30 a.m., this and the flanks were to be attacked simul- 
taneously. 

If the reported enemy was actually in the vicinity of St. Privat 
and was not merely a departing echelon endeavoring to save itself by 
going northward, the envelopment by the guard and the XHth Army 
Corps would take a very long time. It is true that the IXth Army Corps 
had been cautioned by the last orders of 11.30 a.m. to attack earlier 
than the Guard Corps, yet the gradually increasing thunder of cannon 
aroused fear that the corps had become more deeply involved in 
battle than would now be desirable. To gain certainty about this the 
Prince rode on to Verneville and when he arrived there, at 1.45 p.m., 
perceived with certainty that the IXth Army Corps was engaged in a 
hot battle with the enemy whose front toward the north extended to 
beyond Amanweiler. 



GENERAL VON STEINMETZ REPORTS THE DEPARTURE OF THE 
ENEMY AND PROCEEDS TO THE ATTACK 

While early in the morning it was still the opinion at Headquarters, 
1st Army, that the enemy stood in his position of yesterday "with strong 
masses of batteries and infantry", 1 army headquarters, and headquar- 
ters of the VHth Army Corps in observation at Gravelotte, returned 
at 9 a.m. to the idea that the enemy wanted to avoid an attack and 
that his larger part was retreating on Metz. It could be seen that at 
Point du Jour tents were being struck and march columns being 
formed which in part disappeared behind the opposite hills and in part 
moved toward the south and northeast. 8 

A report received at 10.30 a.m. from the 1st Battalion, 77th Infan- 
try Regiment, to the effect that advanced troops were at the forest of 
Vaux near Gravelotte agreed with these observations. 8 Though the 
Quartermaster General of the 1st Army, Colonel Count von 
Wartensleben, expressed serious doubts as to the correctness 
of General von Steinmetz' views, a report was sent at 11.30 to 
Royal Headquarters that "with evident positive certainty" it might be 
assumed that the enemy was retreating with the greater part of his 

'In this sense General von Sperling reported to Royal Headquarters. 

'On August 17th the French camped partly on the west slope of the heights, which 
they later defended, that is, in front of their position proper. In the forenoon of 
August 18th these parts were drawn back. They struck their tents, marched back be- 
hind the heights, and took their positions. 

3 The report read; — "On the road to Thionville, moving to the rear, enormous 
number of vehicle columns, field hospitals; appears to be a movement to Thionville 
and to Metz; stationary columns of troops, head toward Thionville, pretty close in 
our front, and on our right side hostile picket, just posted. 18.8.70., 10.07. B. von 
Viet in ghoff ." Rec'd 10.80 a.m.— War Archives. 



236 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

force to Metz, with a smaller part toward the north and northwest. 1 
General von Steinmetz was firm in his belief that the 1st Army had 
to reckon only with a rear guard. 

As the report was sent, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, General 
von Sperling, returned from his ride to the King and brought the 
orders that the 1st Army was not to attack until the lid Army 
had gone farther to the front and could participate. Concerning the 
neighboring IXth Corps he reported that it would advance against the 
Genivaux forest and Verneville, while the left wing of the lid 
Army was to attack from the north. Thereupon General von Stein- 
metz sent the following orders to the VIHth Army Corps : 

"Near Gravelotte, 18.8.80., 11.30 a.m. When the IXth Corps 
advances, the VHIth Corps will take up the march and occupy the locali- 
ties evacuated by the IXth Corps. The turn of the army is to be made 
by the corps after consulting with each other." 8 

The commanding general of the Vlllth Army Corps, General von 
Goeben, delayed the execution of these orders until the thunder of 
cannon coming from Verneville assured him that the IXth Army Corps 
was in contact with the enemy. At 12.15 he ordered the 15th Infantry 
Division to advance, with one infantry brigade on Gravelotte and from 
there toward and to the right of the road crossing the ravine, with the 
other brigade left of the village to the Mance forest; the 16th Infantry 
Division to follow in reserve, the entire artillery of the corps to go into 
position north and south of the Rezonville — St. Hubert road. As soon 
as the troops came into view south of the Eois Leprince hostile bat- 
teries at Point du Jour and Moskau opened a sharp, but rather ineffec- 
tive fire on the German masses which found cover and room for de- 
ployment in the ravine between Rezonville and Gravelotte. To 
balance the hostile batteries, General von Goeben caused the 1st 
Battalion, Foot Artillery, to go into position north of Gravelotte west 
of the Gravelotte — Malmaison road. 3 In the meantime General von 
Steinmetz, believing the moment had arrived to facilitate the advance 
of the VIHth Corps, issued orders to the VHth Army Corps to insert 
its batteries. The 1st Battalion, Foot Artillery, 14th Infantry Division, 
which stood not far from the northern exit of the deep bottom between 
the forest of Vaux and the Ognons forest, trotted in opened platoon 
column under hostile shell fire to within 200 meters of the south edge 
of Gravelotte, made front on the Ars — Gravelotte road and, almost 
simultaneously with the artillery of the VIHth Army Corps, opened 
fire. Thus the battle had commenced in the 1st Army also at 12.45 
p.m. 

^he report read: — ''Report at Gravelotte, 18.8.70., 11.30 a.m. Though the French 
camp remained during the morning hours in its previous location and strength be- 
tween the Bois de Genivaux and Bois de Chatel and strong columns had started out 
from it, apparently to occupy the former woods, the situation now has materially 
changed. At first it continued doubtful whether the start of troops from the camp 
was not for the purpose of taking up the position on the plateau between Point du 
Jour and Leipzig, since advanced guards and pickets still showed themselves. It can 
now be stated with evident positive certainty that the mass of the hostile troops is re- 
treating in the direction of Metz, a smaller part north and northwest. A rear guard 
still stands on the camping ground and the enemy is keeping up a weak but continu- 
ous skirmish fire on the Bois de Vaux. The 1st Cavalry Division has been ordered to 
the plateau of Rezonville. Von Steinmetz." — Rec. 11.50 a.m. — War Archives, 

2 War Archives. 

3 This battalion belonged to the 15th Infantry Division. 



THE 18TH OP AUGUST, 1870 237 

ROYAL HEADQUARTERS UP TO THE OPENING 
OF THE BATTLE 

When the report from General von Steinmetz of the supposed re- 
treat of the enemy arrived at 11.50 a.m. on the hill at Flavigny, Gen- 
eral von Moltke naturally feared that the 1st Army would let itself be 
carried away to a premature attack on the enemy. At 12 noon thunder 
of cannon was heard coming from Verneville, a proof that the IXth 
Army Corps had prematurely encountered the enemy, since the Xllth 
and the Guard Corps could not by then have executed the march be- 
yond Batilly to envelop the enemy. To prevent the 1st Army from 
joining the advance of the IXth Army Corps, General von Moltke per- 
sonally wrote the following orders to General von Steinmetz: 

Hill south of Flavigny, 18 August, 1870, 12 noon. The battle now 
heard is merely a partial engagement in front of Verneville and does 
not necessitate a general attack by the 1st Army. That army must 
not show strong bodies of troops, and in any event only its artillery for 
the preparation of the subsequent attack. 1 

In spite of these orders the thunder of the 1st Army's cannons 
was heard at 12.45 p.m. General von Steinmetz received these orders 
only at 1 p.m., when the artillery battle was under way. This could 
not be brought into consonance with Moltke's orders; for the infantry 
of the VIHth Army Corps was on its forward movement, so that as a 
matter of fact strong bodies of troops had been shown the enemy, and 
were now no longer kept back. Thus the orders arrived too late. 
Here, as well as in the center with the IXth Army Corps, events opened 
up sooner than was well for the unity of the entire action. 

Royal Headquarters had received at 10.50 a.m., through Lieuten- 
ant Colonel von Brandenstein from the Hd Army, the report of 
the Xth Army Corps that the enemy had marched the day before from 
Doncourt toward Metz and had left back numerous wounded. A re- 
port received from the Guard Corps at 12.10 p.m. gave the organiza- 
tions to which these wounded belonged. 2 

At 12.05 the Hd Army reported in brief the measures taken 
by Prince Frederick Charles and based on orders from Royal Head- 
quarters of 10.30 a.m. for the attack. 3 They were in consonance with 
Moltke's intentions, although the Xllth and Guard Corps, receiving 
Ste. Marie and Amanweiler as march directions, were given farther 
objectives than Batilly, which had been designated as such. In this 
General von Moltke may possibly have been able to perceive the effect 

1 Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870-71. No. 179. 

2 This report was inclosed in the report of the Guard Corps to the lid Army 
of 10.25 a.m. concerning the arrival at Doncourt and had been transmitted to Royal 
Headquarters by itself. The following French organizations were mentioned: 1st, 
4th, 6th, 12th, 33d, 43d, 67th, 64th, 73d, 77th and 90th Line Regiments; 2d and 20th Jager 
Battalions; 2d and 7th Hussar Regiments; the Dragoon Regiment of the Empress; 3d 
and 11th Dragoon Regiments; Guard Lancers Regiment; that is, in the main, troops of 
the 4th Corps which had fought at Bruville. 

3 The report read: "Orders of the lid Army. IXth Corps stopped, provided 
hostile right wing not in its front. Guard Corps to Amanvillers without halt to en- 
velop right flank. Xllth to Ste. Marie aux Chenes. lid to Rezonville. Xth to Aman- 
villers as a reserve (incorrect, it had been ordered to St. Ail). Hid to Caulre— Verne- 
ville; Prince at head of Hid Corps, 12.05."— War Archives. 



238 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

of the reports, received by him at 12.10 p.m., from the IXth Army 
Corps and from Lieutenant Seholl as to the presence of hostile troops 
north of Jouaville and at St. Privat la Montagne. But these reports 
received as little attention at Royal Headquarters as they had received 
at army headquarters. The IXth Corps had not reported anything of 
the enemy north of Amanweiler, and it was not to be assumed that it 
would have opened battle if it had seen itself threatened from that 
side. The general attention was drawn to the increasing thunder of 
cannon. In order to be closer to the events taking their course in 
front, the King desired to change his location; but General von Moltke 
begged him not to do so, in order that the receipt of reports might not 
be delayed. But, after the artillery of the 1st Army had also taken 
up the battle, the noise of the latter became so strong that the King 
could no longer remain contented at Flavigny. It was decided to ride 
ahead to the hill south of Rezonville. At 1.45 p.m., shortly before 
starting, the following report from Lieutenant Colonel von Branden- 
stein was received concerning events with the Hd Army : 

"Hill north of St. Marcel, 1 p.m. 

"His Royal Highness rides to the IXth Army Corps. The Guard 
Corps proceeds with both divisions to the Bois Doseuillons and at 1 p.m. 
is opposite St. Marcel. The Xllth Corps is a little to the left rear." 1 

This report was correct as far as concerned conditions with the 
Guard Corps at that moment, but could give an erroneous impression. 
It was not the Bois Doseuillons which was the objective of the Guard 
Corps, but Habonville for the 1st Division, Verneville for the 2d Div- 
ision. As this report was being sent the 2d Division was also directed 
to proceed to Habonville. As General von Moltke must deduce that 
the Guard Corps was taking position behind, not alongside of, the IXth 
Army Corps— which latter he knew to be in battle at Verneville— the 
execution of his attack order of 10.30 a.m. appeared endangered, the 
more so because now the 1st Army also had encountered the enemy 
sooner than was expected. Consequently he sent the following orders 
to the Hd Army by Captain von Winterfeld: 

"Hill south Flavigny, 18 August, 1870, 1.45 p.m. 

"The IXth Army Corps is already engaged in artillery battle in 
front of the Bois Doseuillons. The actual general attack along the en- 
tire line will not be made until important fighting forces can come up 
from Amanvillers." 3 

This shows that the hostile right wing was still assumed to be 
south of Amanweiler. 

Royal Headquarters then proceeded to the hill south of Rezon- 
ville, from which the artillery battle of the 1st Army could be viewed . 

1 War Archives. 

'Moltke's Military Correspondence, 1870-71; No. 180. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 

IV. The Second Army Up to 5 p.m. 

* » * 

THE 25TH INFANTEY DIVISION AND THE 1ST GUAED INFANTEY 
DIVISION MARCH ON HABONVILLB 



Simultaneously with the arrival of the 25th Infantry Division at 
Habonville from the south, the 1st Guard Infantry Division arrived 
there from the west. In pursuance of the verbal orders brought by the 
chief of staff of the Guard Corps "to advance with the division via 
Anoux la Grange and Habonville on Amanvillers," General von Pape 
had again started from Doncourt. To the north of his march direction 
was the Guard Hussar Regiment in permanent connection with the 
Xllth Army Corps. After the squadron under Captain von derGroeben 
had rejoined, the regiment stood in the ravine west of St. Ail and con- 
tinued the reconnaissance toward Ste Marie aux Chenes, St. Privat la 
Montagne and Auboue. Some of the reports of the results of this re- 
connaissance reached the 1st Guard Infantry Division while it was 
starting from Doncourt and proved conclusively the presenceof hostile 
forces at St. Privat and Ste. Marie. 1 Numerous written and verbal re- 
ports from the Guard Hussars were also received by the commanders 
later on and kept them informed of all important events with the 
enemy and with the Xllth Army Corps. 

In the start the advance guard of the 1st Guard Infantry Division 
utilized for its advance the low ground south of the Metz— Etain rail- 
road and, north of Anoux la Grange, entered the artillery fire zone 
from the heights southwest of St. Privat. 

General von Pape and his staff had ridden ahead of it to the hill 
south of Habonville 2 to gain a view of the probable battlefield. He 
knew from the reports of the Guard Hussars that the enemy was at 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes and at St. Privat la Montagne. He could himself 
now count at the latter place about 20 battalions and could see, in posi- 
tion on the heights west and south of the village, numerous batteries 
which surrounded the left wing of the IXth Army Corps on a large 
arc. The Hessian Division became discernible between the clumps of 

1 The reports read: 

1. "Have already searched Habonville; French cavalry has been there but fell 
back. Shall send patrols toward Amanvillers. On my left the Saxons have received 
Are. In front of Batilly, 11.30 a.m. Von Eundstedt, Lieut. " 

On the back of this message blank: "After thorough examination through field 
glasses at least one French division bivouacks between Ste. Marie and St. Privat. Hill 
at Batilly, 11.50. Count Groeben, Capt."-- War Archives. 

2. "Hill at Batilly, 12.15 p.m. For past 15 minutes heavy infantry and artillery 
fire, also in the Bois de la Cusse. Count Groeben, Capt." 

8. "Habonville, 12.30. Hostile columns, one division, deploying at St. Privat. 
von Hymmen, Lt-Col." 

4. "Hill near Batilly, 12.45. Troops from camp at Roncourt and St. Privat march 
on Ste. Marie aux Chenes, also on Verneville. I see two battalions in both directions, 
about 4 squadrons. Count Groeben, Capt.'* --Eeports 2, 3, and 4 from posthumous 
papers of General von Pape. 

'The location of General von Pape, Hill 306, 700 meters south of Habonville, 
offered a complete view to far beyond St. Privat and Ste. Marie. 



240 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

woods south of Habonville, while other parts of the IXth Army Corps 
appeared to be engaged in a hot battle farther southeast. The Hessian 
cavalry brigade also was seen when, pursued by the hostile shell fire, 
it retreated on Anoux la Grange. Under these conditions it was clear 
to the general that he could not continue his march on Amanweiler, 
during which he would offer his flank and rear to the enemy at St. 
Privat. The decision must of necessity lie on the heights of St. Privat 
— as in 1866 at Chlum — and, concluding that the 2d Guard Infantry 
Division was following him and that the Saxon corps was being brought 
up from Jarny, he decided to march to the left, leaving Habonville on 
the west as also St. Ail and Ste. Marie aux Chines, and to proceed to 
Auboug, Montois, and Malancourt and from there attack the position 
of St. Privat in flank and rear. 1 To cover the march to the left on 
Auboue and to support the 25th Infantry Division, which appeared to 
suffer under the hostile artillery fire and had brought up no artillery of 
its own as yet, the 1st Battalion of artillery under Lieut. Colonel Bychel- 
berg was brought up into position on the ridge between the Bois de la 
Cusse and Habonville. 2 The advance guard was directed to turn off 
toward Habonville, to occupy that place for protection of the artillery 
with its leading battalion and to continue the advance in the ravine 
west of St. Ail to Auboue. The Guard Hussar Regiment was directed 
to protect the march to the left of the 1st Guard Infantry Division in 
the left front. The division adjutant, Major Count zu Ysenburg, car- 
ried the information of the arrival of the division to Headquarters, 
IXth Army Corps. 



HEADQUARTERS OF THE SECOND ARMY ARRIVES 
ON THE BATTLEFIELD 

After Headquarters of the Hd Army had arrived west of Verne- 
ville at 1.45 p.m., an officer of the staff rode around the village and as- 
certained that French batteries were engaged north of Amanweiler; 
the further view was cut off by the Bois de la Cusse. Prince Frederick 
Charles, who rode ahead as far as the southeast corner of the village, 
gained the impression that the battle of the IXth Army Corps swayed 
from first one side to the other, undecided. He consequently con- 
sidered it necessary to bring up the corps of artillery of the Hid Army 
Corps, the reserve army artillery. 3 On the whole the situation of the 

1 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

2 The first shot of the advance guard battery (1st Light) was directed at 12.45 p.m. 
against the French batteries southwest of St. Privat. Shortly after the 2d Heavy Bat- 
tery went into position on its right, the 1st Heavy and the 2d Light Battery on its left. 
Because of losses on the way the 2d Heavy Battery could put but five guns in action. 

3 The Hid Army Corps had been sent to Verneville by verbal orders from the 
Prince. The commanding general had ordered the corps artillery, followed by the 6th 
Infantry Division, to proceed from Vionville through St. Marcel and Caulre to Verne- 
ville; the 6th Cavalry Division, followed by the 6th Infantry Division, to march from 
Tronville through Bruville and Urcourt to Anoux la Grange. But as the corps artillery 
when starting was still occupied in breaking in new animals, it requested permission 
to follow behind the 6th Infantry Division. 



THE 18 TH OF AUGUST, 1870 241 

battle was considered favorable. There were now superior forces as- 
sembled, or coming up, against an enemy who on August 16th could 
not defeat two army corps, and whose intentions — to which he ap- 
parently had held fast up to the last moment — to avoid a German attack, 
had been crossed. J Conditions with the enemy were entirely different 
from what they were believed to be at Royal Headquarters and, until 
lately, at lid Army Headquarters. An envelopment of the enemy at 
Amanweiler was no longer considered. The decisive point was farther 
north, probably in the vicinity of St. Privat la Montagne and, as there 
the decision could be brought about only later on, care had to be taken 
in the meantime that the IXth Army Corps, which encountered the 
enemy prematurely, was not singly beaten. The Guard Corps re- 
ceived orders at 2 p.m. 8 to start the corps artillery and send it into 
position alongside the artillery of the IXth Corps. A few minutes 
later the Xth Army Corps, which had reported its arrival at Jouaville, 
received orders to continue the directed march on St. Ail and to bring 
its corps artillery to the front. 3 After these orders were executed, 
there could be no more danger to the IXth Army Corps. Shortly after 
2 p.m. the Prince proceeded by way of Anoux la Grange to the west- 
ern vicinity of Habonville. 4 



THE ADVANCE OF THE FIRST GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION FROM 

HABONVILLE ON AUBOUE COMES TO A STAND IN FRONT 

OF STE. MARIE— THE GUARD ARTILLERY ENTERS 

THE BATTLE. 

When General von Pape decided to march with the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Division from Habonville to Auboue, he sent information to 
Headquarters of the Guard Corps as to the situation, his decision, and 
the commencement of the execution thereof. After the resumption of 
the march the commanding general had proceeded from Doncourt to 
west of Habonville where he could view the situation of the IXth 
Army Corps and the position of the French 6th Corps as could General 
von Pape from south of Habonville. He next decided to bring up the 
2d Guard Infantry Division, which he supposed about at St. Marcel on 
the march to Verneville, 5 in obedience to his last orders issued at Don- 
court, and sent it orders to take a more northerly direction in its sub- 
sequent advance. When he turned his attention to the 1st Guard In- 

'The reports of Captain von Groeben of the events at Batilly corresponded with 
this view. 

'War Archives. 

3 War Archives. 

4 At Verneville Prince Frederick Charles received a report from Captain von 
Bergen who had been sent to Gravelotte for observation, to the effect that the VHth 
Army Corps had entered the battle with its artillery at 12.25 p.m. against the enemy op- 
posite Gravelotte. (War Archives). The time, 12.25 p.m., is not correct, as fire was 
opened in the 1st Army only at 12.45 p.m. 

"As a matter of fact that division was already marching on Habonville in 
obedience to orders from Prince Frederick Charles. 



242 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

fantry Division at Habonville, he saw its artillery going into position 
south of the railroad cut at Habonville. On recommendation of the 
commander of the Guard Artillery, General Prince zu Hohenlohe, he 
directed the corps artillery to join the artillery of the 1st Guard Division 
in the battle against the enemy at St. Privat. The Guard Cavalry 
Division 1 received orders to secure the left flank of the Guard Infantry 
Division. 

Prince August of Wurttemberg by bringing up the corps artillery 
anticipated the subsequent orders of Prince Frederick Charles to the 
same effect. The commander of the corps artillery, Colonel von 
Scherbening, had also taken measures in advance of the commanding 
general's directions. 

Called to the front by the thunder of cannon of the IXth Army 
Corps, he saw from Jouaville the hostile artillery positions at St. Privat 
and hurriedly brought his batteries to the head of the main body of the 
1st Guard Infantry Division. Thus the corps artillery was at hand. 
Although there had been added to the orders of corps headquarters 
that the Metz— Etain railroad south of Habonville should be crossed 
only when one battalion could secure the left wing, Colonel von Scher- 
bening, when he saw the artillery of the 1st Guard Infantry Division 
again limbering up and continuing toward the village, caused the 
march to be continued the other side of the railroad. The 4th and 3d 
Heavy and the 2d Light Batteries crossed the railroad on the Jouaville 
—Habonville road, followed by the 3d and 4th Light Batteries, which 
had unlimbered south of the railroad but had not fired. The artillery 
of the 1st Guard Infantry Division again went into position north of 
Habonville west of the road to St. Ail, while on its left the batteries of 
the corps artillery commenced to go into position. 2 Farther south, at 
the Bois de la Cusse, Hessian batteries were seen making a change of 
position to the front. Thus strong German artillery was being de- 
ployed on both sides of the Metz— Etain railroad. 3 

Colonel von Scherbening had hastened ahead of his batteries to 
St. Ail. Close to that village he encountered Lieutenant von Esbeck, 
called von Platen, of the Guard Hussar Regiment, orderly officer at 
1st Guard Infantry Division Headquarters, who pointed out to him the 
dangerous proximity of hostile infantry. 4 Colonel von Scherbening 

■Present, the 1st and 3d Guard Cavalry Brigades with two horse batteries. 

3 From right to left: 2d Light, 1st Light, 2d Heavy, 1st Heavy, 3d Heavy, 4th 
Heavy, 3d Light, 2d Horse, 4th Light. 

3 The terrain offered great difficulties to the movements of the Guard batteries. 
The deep railroad cuts were enclosed with wire fences which had to be cut by the 
cannoneers with their sabers; the slopes were so steep that the other side of the cuts 
had to be taken at the gallop. The ravine northwest of Habonville, which also had to 
be crossed, was steep and deep, the bottom marshy; the horses could get through only 
with the greatest of efforts. As the movements, especially that of the divisional 
artillery, offered the flank to the enemy, the hostile fire caused large losses. Three 
pieces and one caisson were left lying behind and were brought up only later on. 

4 At the arrival of Division Headquarters south of Habonville Lieutenant von 
Esbeck, called von Platen, had ridden ahead toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes and seen 
"how everything between St. Privat, Roncourt and Ste. Marie was full of the enemy." 
On his return he was heavily fired on from southwest of St. Privat by advanced troops 
whose leading line had come to within 800 meters of the Habonville--Ste. Marie road. 
He rendered an exhaustive report of his observations to Colonel von Scherbening and 
later on to the division commander. — Report of, at that time, Lieutenant von Esbeck, 
called von Platen. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 243 

himself now perceived the apparently strong garrison of Ste. Marie and, 
north of St. Ail and in the direction of St. Privat, hostile skirmishers, 
who, hidden in the folds of the terrain, hardly 800 or 1,000 meters dis- 
tant, appeared to be in readiness to receive the unsuspecting batteries, 
coming up devoid of infantry protection, with a sudden and surprising 
fire. He estimated this advanced hostile infantry at three battalions. 
He succeeded in holding back the left wing of the corps artillery from 
going into position south of St. Ail, and forbade any further advance 
until Ste. Marie should be in possession of German infantry. 

The advance guard of the 1st Guard Infantry Division, which had 
crossed the railroad south of Habonville simultaneously with the divi- 
sional artillery, had occupied Habonville with the 1st Battalion of the 
Guard Fusilier Regiment. The 2d and 3d Battalions of this regiment 
and the Guard Jager Battalion branched off into the ravine leading to 
Auboue\ The main body of the division deployed its brigades in battle 
lines as soon as they arrived in the fire zone southwest of Habonville 
and marched with the leading brigade to the left, the rear brigade to 
the right around the small woods north of Anoux la Grange. When 
the brigades of the main body perceived the advance guard moving 
from Habonville to the left into the ravine, they also moved to the left, 
to shorten the road and closed up on the advance guard at the ravine 
west of Habonville. From there they followed it without distance, the 
battalions facing to the left about and descending into the ravine. 1 

In the meantime General von Pape had ridden ahead of the 
advance guard to St. Ail and had gained the conviction that a march of 
his division to Aubou§ close by Ste. Marie aux Chenes was impossible. 
Ste. Marie must first be taken. 1 

The advance guard commander, Colonel von Eckert of the Guard 
Fusilier Regiment, received orders, therefore, to deploy the advance 
guard, just then arriving behind the Guard batteries going into position 
southwest of St. Ail against Ste. Marie aux Chines. One house of the 
village, to be seen from far off, was designated as point of direction. 
The Guard Jager Battalion, with the 2d Battalion, Guard Fusilier Regi- 
ment on its right, took the assigned direction, the 3d Battalion follow- 
ing. 

At this moment, just as the last battery of the corps artillery un- 
limbered south of St. Ail, General von Pape personally perceived 
French Infantry, about one battalion 3 , starting from Ste. Marie south- 
ward and charging at a run toward St. Ail. He immediately threw 
the battalion nearest at hand, the 3d Guard Fusilier Regiment, 
against it and this battalion succeeded in getting into St. Ail a 
few minutes ahead of the enemy and driving him back after a short 

'This ravine offered excellent cover. In spite of heavy fire received during the 
entire march, the losses were comparatively small. Advance guard and main body 
lost only about six men per battalion. 

'At St. Ail General von Pape met the chief of staff of the Guard Corps, General 
von Dannenberg, who declared himself satisfied with the intentions of the division but 
pointed out at that time that Ste. Marie was not to be attacked before the arrival of 
the Saxons. 

3 One company, according to French reports. 



244 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

engagement. 1 After the village had been searched, the 9th and 12th 
Companies occupied the east and north edge, the other two companies 
remained in reserve. At 2 p.m. the regulation occupation had been 
completed and thus the left wing of the Guard artillery was secure. 

In the meantime Colonel von Erckert had marched with the re- 
maining two battalions of the advance guard along the edge of the 
ravine — the country southwest of St. Ail being swept by a very hot 
fire — as far as the valley-like opening formed by a neighboring ravine 
running into it from St. Ail, and there deployed the battalions for 
battle. 

The 2d Battalion of the Guard Fusilier Regiment deployed with 
its right flank at the Waschhaus 200 meters northwest of St. Ail 
with the Guard Jager Battalion on its left at the small wood north of 
the fork in the valley. As both battalions while deploying were hotly 
fired on from Ste. Marie at ranges which precluded replying to that 
fire, the skirmishers proceeded farther to the front. The closed up 
units followed. 

In the meantime a heavy artillery battle was waged by the Guard 
batteries south of St. Ail. Here General zu Hohenlohe commanded 
the united divisional and corps artillery, the latter having bent back 
its left wing a little toward Ste. Marie. In the 6tart the hostile artillery 
in position immediately south of St. Privat and that west of it were 
engaged 8 , and, within a very short time, the two heavy batteries of the 
1st Foot Battalion succeeded in silencing a French battery on the St. 
Privat— Ste. Marie road the fire of which had been especially galling 
to the Guard batteries when going into position. 

West of the artillery, on the south edge of the wood north of 
Batilly, stood the Guard Hussar regiment which had evacuated the 
defile west of St. Ail when the Guard Fusilier Regiment came up. 
Later on the 1st and 3d Guard Cavalry Brigades with two horse bat- 
teries took position behind the Guard Hussar Regiment. 8 

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY AT HABONVILLE 

Toward 2.15 p.m. Prince Frederick Charles arrived in the western 
neighborhood of Habonville, taking position about 500 meters south of 
the railroad guard house west of the village, where he had now a good 
view of the connection and extension of the hostile position as far as 
St. Privat as well as of the strength of that position. The tasks set the 
wing corps were found to necessitate a change. The Guard and the 
IXth Corps had to attack the enemy in the front, while the XHth 

'Only a few men of the French 94th Line Regiment reached St. Ail; the mass 
faced about, apparently by higher orders. In St. Ail a few prisoners were taken be- 
longing to the 4th Line Regiment which probably had remained there since the eve- 
ning before. 

2 Five batteries, which aloue replied to the fire of the Guard artillery. The re- 
mainder of the hostile batteries south of St. Privat — Ste. Marie road fired against the 
left wing of the IXth Army Corps at the Bois de la Ousse. 

3 The 3d Guard Cavalry Brigade (Guard Dragoons) had been organized into four 
squadrons since August 16th. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 245 

Army Corps remained available for enveloping the hostile right wing, 
the Hid and Xth Corps being in the second line as reserve. A report 
from the Guard Corps received by army headquarters on its arrival 
showed the situation of the German left wing. 1 



Thus the repeatedly reported fact that Ste. Marie was held by the 
enemy was confirmed. This village could not well be seen from the 
location of army headquarters, being about in line with, and hidden by, 
St. Ail, the two appearing as one village. It was clear that Ste. Marie 
must be taken before an attack against the heights of St. Privat could 
be thought of. 

A little later, at 2.30 p.m., Captain von Winterfeld of the general 
staff of Royal Headquarters, brought the information from General 
von Moltke, sent off at 1.46 p.m., to the effect that the IXth Army 
Corps was already engaged in an artillery battle and that no decisive 
general attack would be made along the entire line until material 
fighting forces could advance from Amanweiler. 

The Prince saw from this information that Royal Headquarters 
was still wrongly informed concerning the enemy; but on the other 
hand the intention of Royal Headquarters to await the envelopment 
of the French right wing was evident. It is true that no waiting 
action could now be prescribed the IXth Army Corps, which was not 
conducting an artillery battle as Moltke believed, but a hot infantry 
fight. The Guard Corps, however, could be ordered to wait; for the 
largest part of its infantry had not yet become engaged. Therefore 
the Prince sent Lieutenant von Maltzahn, adjutant of army headquar- 
ters, with orders to Guard Corps Headquarters to carry on the battle 
only with artillery and to delay the general infantry battle until the 
XHth Army Corps could effectively participate. In the meantime 
Prince August of Wiirttemberg himself had ridden up to the comman- 
der in-chief of the lid Army and stated to him that, considering the 
material strength of the enemy, he also intended to carry on the battle 
only with artillery, as only one brigade of Saxons 8 had so far arrived 
at Batilly, the remainder of the XHth Army Corps still being far in 
rear. Prince Frederick Charles declared himself satisfied with this, 
discussed with the Prince the situation and the intentions of Royal 
Headquarters, and at 2.45 p.m. sent Captain von Winterfeld, after 
having oriented him thoroughly, back to General von Moltke with the 
report that the advancing Saxons were moving on Ste. Marie aux 
Chgnes and that he thought of commencing the attack at about 3.45 
p.m., so as to give the Saxons a little rest first. The main point now 
was to inform the Saxons as quickly as possible. For some time bat- 
teries which could belong only to the XHth Army Corps had been 
seen in position southwest of Ste. Marie aux ChSnes firing on that 

'War Archives; also von der Goltz, lid Armee, p. 142. (The report omitted above 
will be found on p. 69 ante.) 
H7th Infantry Brigade. 



246 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

village. There was no absolute certainty as to whether or not troops 
of the Guard Corps had already entered Ste. Marie and were now 
being fired on by the Saxon artillery. Therefore three officers of 
army headquarters 1 were sent, one after the other, to the Xllth Army 
Corps to inform them of conditions with the Guard Corps and to pre- 
vent the Saxon artillery from firing on a wrong target. 8 

At 3:00 p.m the following message was received from the e Crown 
Prince of Saxony: 

"Sent, Batilly, 18 August, 2:30 p.m. The Saxon Army Corps ad- 
vances with the 24th Infantry Division on Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes and 
with the 23d Infantry Division, proceeding via Coinville and the small 
wood situated between there and Roncourt, envelops the French right 
wing." 3 

Thus the battle developed in the manner planned by Prince 
Frederick Charles and— even if under other assumptions— by Royal 
Headquarters. The envelopment of the French right wing — St. Privat 
having been perceived to be its main point of support— and the capture 
of the advanced position at Ste. Marie aux Chenes appeared secured; 
though of course the enveloping march of the Saxons, according to the 
Crown Prince's report, must take more time than Prince Frederick 
Charles had at first assumed. 



THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION PREPARES FOR ATTACK 
ON STE. MARIE 

After Prince August of Wurttemberg had taken his leave of 
Prince Frederick Charles he proceeded past the railroad guard -s house 
west of Habonville to the ridge north of the railroad, taking his posi- 
tion there, and he then ordered General von Pape "not to continue the 
march farther to the north, but to form the division against Ste. Marie, 
and not to attack that place in earnest before the arrival of the ex- 
pected Saxon corps." 4 Thereupon General von Pape directed his 
advance guard not to undertake an attack for the present. 

After these orders had been sent off the general endeavored to 
bring up his divisional artillery to fire on Ste. Marie, but to repeated 
requests to General Prince zu Hohenlohe received the answer that the 
artillery could not be spared from its position south of St. Ail. Colonel 
von Erckert was directed to deploy the 3d Battalion, Guard Fusilier 
Regiment, which had remained in St. Ail, against Ste. Marie aux 
Chgnes, and received permission to bring up also the 1st Battalion 
from Habonville, as Hessian troops were now in that vicinity. The 
main body of the 1st Guard Infantry Division effected its deployment 
behind the left wing of the advance guard in the ravine west of St. Ail 

•Lieutenant von Normann, personal aid of the Prince; Captain Steffen of the 
general staff, lid Army, and Major von Werder, staff officer and aid of the commander 
of the artillery, lid Army. 

s War Archives. 

3 War Archives; also von der Goltz, II. Armee, p. 143. (See p. 69, ante.) 

4 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 247 

in such manner that both brigades were close behind each other. On 
receipt of a report from the Guard Hussar Regiment that French in- 
fantry was apparently advancing from north ot Ste. Marie to envelop 
the left wing of the Guard Jager Battalion, 1 the 2d Guard Infantry 
Brigade, in the lead, prolonged the line of the Guard Jagers toward 
the left with two companies of the first arriving Fusilier Battalion of 
the 4th Guard Regiment. Very soon, however, these movements of 
the enemy were seen to be counter measures against the Xtlth Corps, 
whose columns became visible east of Moineville and at the Bois de 
Ponty. 

THE Xllth ARMY CORPS ARRIVES AT STE. MARIE 

After Grown Prince Albert of Saxony had issued orders for the 
continuation of the march of his army corps from Jarny to Ste. Marie 
aux Chines and Moineville, he rode ahead toward Batilly. When 
crossing the railroad between Giraumont en Jarnisy and Jouaville be- 
hind the advance guard of the 24th Infantry Division, he was joined 
by Major von Meyerinck of the Guard Hussar Regiment who reported 
the situation of the Guard Corps and called attention to the fact 
that the Saxon troops would enter the fire zone of the enemy when 
getting east of Batilly. 8 The Crown Prince proceeded to Hill 265 3 
between Jouaville and Batilly and there viewed the heights of St. 
Privat where dense powder smoke indicated the location of the hos- 
tile positions. Reports from the advance guard cavalry of both Saxon 
infantry divisions and those from the Guard Hussars, which recon- 
noitered along the entire front of the Xllth Army Corps, stated that 
the hostile position extended in the north to beyond St. Privat and 
that Roncourt also was occupied. These reports were supplemented 
by a verbal report from Captain von der Planitz, of the Saxon General 
Staff, who had reconnoitered at 12.30 p.m. from Ste. Marie (which was 
then still unoccupied) and who was able to report definitely concerning 
the frontal strength of the St. Privat position. The Crown Prince, 
following that report with his eyes on the map, said: " In that case 
we shall not attack in front, but go around," and made a correspond- 
ing movement with his left arm. 4 While ways and means were still 
being discussed, two additional important reports arrived. The 
advance guard of the 23d Infantry Division reported that both banks 
of the Orne and Briey were free of the enemy. Captain von Hoden- 
berg, of the Saxon General Staff, who had been sent for orientation to 
the 23d Infantry Division, brought the following report which had 
been dictated to him by a general staff officer of that division: 

'War Archives. 

'Major von Meyerinck had been sent by General von Pape to the Saxons. The 
Crown Prince asked him how much of the Guard was already engaged, and, as the 
major answered that, when he was leaving, the artillery of the 1st Guard Infantry Di- 
vision had just gone into position, he said to his suite: " See, now, the artillery is just 
starting in; we have come just in time." — Report (at that time) Major von Meyerinck. 

3 Cf. page 165, ante. 

♦Von Schimff, Das XII. Korps im Kriege 1870-71, VoL 1, pp. 79-80. (P. 166, ante.) 



248 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

"Sent, 18 August, 1.40 p.m. A battle rages in and on the other side 
of the forest southeast of Verneville and in Verneville itself. A French 
camp, at least one division, is at St. Privat la Montagne and Roncourt. 
Inhabitants state that there is no enemy at Aubou6 and that weak in- 
fantry detachments are between Batilly and Ste. Marie aux Ch6nes. 
1st Prussian Guard Division at 12 noon from Doncourt to Anoux la 
Grange. French troops in the tent camp at St. Privat and Roncourt 
are marching to the battle at Verneville. — Information from the ad- 
vance guard of the Guard Hussars." 1 

Captain von Hodenberg added to this that the commander of the 
23d Infantry Division, Prince George of Saxony, would proceed with 
his staff toward Ste. Marie. 2 

At 2 p.m. Prince Albert issued the following orders: 

"1. The 1st Division (23d), which will now again have the dis- 
position of the 2d Brigade (46th) in position behind the west corner of 
the Bois de Ponty, will take direction by way of Coinville through the 
small wood east of AubouS and advance against the position at Ron - 
court. 

"2. To the 46th Brigade at Giraumont. The 2d Infantry Brigade 
(46th) will immediately march to the west corner of the Bois de Ponty. 

" 3. The corps artillery will follow the 24th Division from Girau- 
mont. 

"4. The 2d Division (24th) will go around Batilly on the west, 
thence proceed behind the small wood in the hollow toward Ste. Marie 
aux Chgnes and attempt from there to advance directly on Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes. The 4th Brigade (48th) will be left behind the small wood 
of Batilly at the disposition of the commanding general." 3 

These measures were reported to army headquarters at 2.30 p.m., 
two copies being sent; 4 the Guard Corps was also notified. 5 Head- 
quarters of the XHth Army Corps then continued toward Batilly. 

After the orders of the Crown Prince had been received, Prince 
George of Saxony took the necessary measures to assemble, south of 
Aubou6 at Coinville, the troops of the 23d Infantry Division, distributed 
from Batilly to Valleroy. Before the advance guard could be notified, 
its commander, General von Craushaar, knowing that the valley of the 
Orne and Briey were clear of the enemy and that Ste. Marie was in 
hostile hands, had independently decided to advance in the direction 
of the latter. At 2 p.m. the 2d Battalion, 108th Rifle Regiment, was 
started from Moineville, the 3d Battalion from Valleroy through Serry 
toward Ste. Marie; the 1st Battalion was to follow in reserve with the 
2d Light Battery from Beaumont. The 1st Cavalry Regiment received 
orders to reconnoiter toward the thicket north of Ste. Marie aux Chgnes 
and to cover the left flank. Report of these measures was rendered 
to the division commander. Toward 3 p.m. the leading battalions 

■Royal Saxon War Archives. 

"The 28d Infantry Division had up to then had the Bois de Ponty as march ob- 
jective; its advance guard Moineville. 

3 Royal Saxon War Archives. 

'Both copies arrived at army headquarters at 8 p.m. 

6 The adjutant of the Guard Corps, Lieutenant von Ramm, had been at XHth 
Corps Headquarters as information officer since noon; the adjutant of the XHth 
Corps, Captain von Minckwitz, was on the same duty at the Guard Corps also since 
noon; e ach one had four mounted messengers. 



THE 18TH OP AUGUST, 1870 249 

crossed the ravine of Auboui, south of Coinville, under a heavy fire of 
the French batteries at St. Privat, to deploy against the north side of 
Ste. Marie aux Chines. 

When the 46th Infantry Brigade had reached the west side of the 
Bois de Ponty it received, at 2.45 p.m., through an error in issuing 
orders, directions to march to Moineville instead of to Coinville and it 
turned in that direction by way of Beaumont, arriving there at 3.15 
p.m. and halting there. 1 Thus it reached a point more than two kilo- 
meters from Coinville where Prince George intended to assemble his 
troops. 

Because of the distance between its several parts the 45th Infantry 
Brigade could not start the march immediately. The 100th Grenadier 
Regiment had been distributed, when occupying the Bois de Ponty, 
along the entire stretch from Batilly to the northwest corner of the 
forest; the 101st Grenadier Regiment and the 1st Light and 2d Heavy 
Batteries were in reserve along the south side of the forest. Those 
parts at the south corner of the forest had been started on the march 
before arrival of corps orders. 8 They went around the difficult Bois 
de Ponty on the northeast, keeping a northeasterly direction, and de- 
scended into the ravine of Auboui northwest of Ste. Marie aux Chines. 
The remaining troops followed them by battalions and companies. 

The 24th Infantry Division, which in the meantime had sent the 
three batteries of the main body ahead to the advance guard under 
guard of the 2d Cavalry Regiment, received the corps orders for ad- 
vancing on Ste. Marie aux Chines just when its advance guard had 
arrived east of Batilly, 3 and it then descended into the ravine of 
Auboui north of the 1st Guard Infantry Division, where now the entire 
47th Infantry Brigade deployed for the attack opposite the west side 
of Ste. Marie aux Chines. 4 The 48th Infantry Division, kept at the 
disposition of corps headquarters, deployed behind the small wood 
north of Batilly, where the 2d Cavalry Regiment also found room 
alongside the Guard Hussar Regiment. The Guard and the 3d Cavalry 
Regiments of the 12th Cavalry Division, as well as the 1st Horse Bat- 
tery, awaited further orders west of the Bois de Ponty. 5 

The movements of the Xllth Army Corps in obedience to corps 
orders of 2 p.m. produced a right turn from the line Batilly— Bois de 
Ponty toward the ravine south of Auboui. Through this turn two in- 
fantry brigades came up to the ravine; the 47th about 2.50 p.m. north 
of the 1st Guard Infantry Division ; the 45th about half an hour later in 

J The orders read: "2.45 p.m. To Colonel von Montbe. Your brigade comes 
now again under orders of the division commander and will take direction on Moine- 
ville going to the left past the reserve artillery. Schubert, Lt.-Ool." 

3 In execution of the division commander's independent decision to continue the 
march on Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 

3 The orders to go around Batilly on the west could not be executed by the ad- 
vance guard. — Royal Saxon War Archives. 

♦About this time the 45th Infantry Brigade passed behind the 47th, to reach the 
ravine farther to the north.— Von Schimpff, Das XII. Korps im Kriege 1870-71, page 91, 
Vol. I (see page 174, ante) . 

"The Uhlan regiments remained until the 19th of August at Villers sous Pareid 
and Puxe. 



250 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

the vicinity of Coinville. The other two infantry brigades, far separ- 
ated from their sister brigades, remained for the present in two lines, 
the 46th at Moineville, the 48th at the small wood north of Batilly. 
Independent of these movements the former advance guard of the 
23d Infantry Division, the 108th Rifle Regiment, marched at right 
angles through this right turn from Moineville eastward to northwest 
of Ste. Marie aux ChSnes. 

THE ATTACK ON STE. MARIE AUX CHENES IS PREPARED 
BY THE ARTILLERY. 

During the movements of the infantry the entire corps and di- 
visional artillery of the Xllth Army Corps went into position against 
Ste. Marie aux OhSnes, except the 1st Heavy Battery, which followed 
the 46th Infantry Brigade to Moineville. At first the 4th Light Bat- 
tery went into position, having followed the leading battalion of the 
advance guard of the 24th Infantry Division, crossed the ravine of 
Aubou6 west of St. Ail and unlimbered northwest of that village be- 
hind the center of the artillery line of the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 
General von Pape rode to meet this battery and requested it to open 
fire on Ste. Marie. 1 Later on the 3d and 4th Heavy Batteries went into 
position on its left. The last battery of the 24th Infantry Division, the 
3d Light, remained in the ravine of Aubou6, northwest of St. Ail, in re- 
serve, as it found no suitable position for opening fire. 

Going into position was achieved under hostile infantry and 
artillery fire. The fire of the batteries, however, very soon had good 
effect against the south front of Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes. The very 
first shot of the 4th Heavy Battery made a breach in a long garden 
wall which was strongly occupied by the French, and caused that gar- 
rison to retire. Thereafter the battery, in conjunction with the 3d 
Heavy Battery, turned its fire mainly against the stone walls and on to 
the southwest corner of the village, from where the batteries were 
heavily fired on. In a short time a part of these walls was in ruins and 
evacuated by the French. 

The seven batteries of the corps artillery had advanced from their 
positions in readiness at Giraumont en Jarnisy through Batilly to 
Aubou§ and, north of the small wood of Batilly on the Batilly— Aubou6 
road, they made a turn by batteries against Ste. Marie aux Chines. 
Soon after 2.30 p.m. the 6th Heavy Battery, arriving first, opened fire. 
The next two batteries, the 5th Heavy and 6th Light, unlimbered as the 
infantry formed for the charge but fired from 30 to 40 rounds against 
the village garrison. The succeeding batteries, the 6th Light, 8th and 
7th Heavy, turned their fire partly on the village, partly on the French 
troops visible opposite in the direction of St. Privat la Montagne, 
while the 2d Horse Battery, the last to go into position on the left 
wing, shortly before 3 p.m. , fired mainly on the infantry northeast of 
Ste. Marie aux Chgnes. 

Posthumous papers of General von Pape.— Royal Saxon War Archives. 



THE 18TH OP AUGUST, 1870 251 

Of the 23d Infantry Division, the 1st Light Battery had already 
unlimbered just where the corps artillery stood later on, but when the 
latter came up went across the ravine of Auboue and took a new posi- 
tion on the left of the batteries of the 24th Division. The 2d Heavy 
and the 2d Light Battery, the latter of which had come up with the 
108th Rifle Regiment from Beaumont, also went into action north of 
the corps artillery, but ceased fire shortly after when the infantry was 
led to the attack. The batteries received orders to join the infantry of 
the 23d Infantry Division and, with exception of the 2d Light Battery, 
moved towards Coinville. 

Of the Guard artillery south of St. Ail the two batteries on the left 
wing 1 directed their fire against Ste. Marie aux CMnes on the urgent 
request of General von Pape and by orders of Prince zu Hohenlohe. 
The target, however, being hard to discern, the effect was not 
great. 2 This had not escaped the observation of General von Pape; 
and therefore his joy was great when the Saxon batteries arrived, for 
he considered the artillery effect absolutely necessary for preparation 
of the final charge. 3 When he saw this preparation secured he sought 
out the commander of the 24th Infantry Division, General Nehrhoff, 
and decided with him as to the general attack on Ste. Marie. The 
Saxon Infantry was to attack the northwest front and the Guard In- 
fantry the southwest front of the village; but the Guard was to wait 
until the artillery had produced sufficient effect and until the Saxon in- 
fantry was deployed. General von Pape himself was to give the signal 
for the attack. 4 

The nine Guard batteries had successfully continued their battle 
against the five batteries of the French 6th Corps in the vicinity of St. 
Privat, although those batteries had the advantage of a higher, well 
covered position and had fired on the batteries coming up without 
interference. The Guard batteries in addition suffered much from in- 
fantry fire, their losses through which were larger than through artil- 
lery fire. They were of course protected on the left flank after St. Ail 
had been occupied by the 1st Guard Infantry Division; but in front, 
unprotected by infantry, the batteries had to contend permanently 
with hostile skirmishers in the folds of the terrain. In spite of this 
they directed their fire mainly against the hostile batteries and, at 
about 3 p.m., the fire superiority commenced to make itself so much 
felt that the hostile artillery in position on the St. Privat— Ste. Marie 
road had to seek positions more in the rear, some turning back toward 

'A total of 10 pieces: the 4th Light and two platoons of the 2d Horse Battery. 

'War Archives. 

3 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

*In his papers General von Pape stated: "Toward 2.45 p.m. I saw the Saxon 
division commander, General von Nehrhoff, coming up. It at once occurred to me that 
it would be well from a military and from a political standpoint to engage in a serious 
and presumably favorable battle in conjunction with our allies, although I was certain 
that I could carry the fight myself to an end with the advance guard supported by a 
few battalions. I rode to General von Nehrhoff, who was well known to me, greeted 
him and disclosed my intentions to which he at once acceded. We agreed that he was 
to attack the northwest I the southwest front of Ste. Marie, I to wait until he had de- 
ployed his troops against that village, and then I to give the signal for the attack." 



252 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Roncourt and some moving closer to the edge of the village of St. 
Privat. 1 It thus gave the Guard batteries freedom to turn against the 
annoying French infantry. The skirmishers pressing up in front were 
driven back and the road, at least for a short stretch, cleared for a 
subsequent advance. 



MEASURES OP THE FRENCH TO DEFEAT AN ATTACK ON 
STE. MARIE. 

The village of Ste. Marie aux Chines, consisting of massive stone 
buildings, was almost completely enclosed by walls in front of which 
were an additional lot of wire fences and other field and garden walls 
and hedges. Very close to the center of the village was the church; 
on the west side, south of the exit toward Hatrize was a large, chateau- 
like house and several large factory buildings. The road to Hatrize 
forms the western continuation of the road which comes from St. Privat, 
and which turns at the market place in a northwesterly direction to- 
ward Auboug. The road from St. Ail, the only one coming from the 
south, also runs into the market place. The rows of houses, in the 
main, are alongside the roads from St. Privat to Auboue and Hatrize, 
forming the sides of an acute angle open toward the west. There was 
an entirely open stubble field on each front of attack. The French 
had thrown up no special defensive works and had originally thought 
more of defending the foreground than the village itself. 

When the 2d Battalion, 94th Line Regiment, felt itself endangered 
by the approach of the 108th Rifle Regiment, it evacuated the defile at 
the northwestern exit of Ste. Marie and occupied the edge of the vil- 
lage. 8 The five companies of the 93d Line Regiment, which were de- 
ployed about 650 meters southeast of Ste. Marie, front toward St. Ail, 
now changed front toward the west, so that they could flank the attack 
of the Guard Fusilier Regiment coming from the east. General Colin, 
who commanded in Ste. Marie, impressed by the close approach of the 
Saxons, sent word to the commanding general of the 3d Division, 
General La Font de Villiers, that he needed support on his right wing. 
This call for help had at first no result. Only when the Germans were 
already in Ste. Marie and showed themselves at the eastern edge of 
the village where the battalions of the 75th and 91st Line Regiments, 
standing west of the St. Privat— Roncourt road, (except the 1st Bat- 
talion, 91st Regiment which remained at Roncourt) started, and even 
then not to help out General Colin, but to defend for the present the 
country west of Roncourt and St. Privat against the onpressing Ger- 
mans. General Colin received the belated orders to evacuate Ste. 
Marie and to fall back through the ravine running in a northeasterly 
direction from Ste. Marie and to Homecourt so as not to mask the 
fire of the advancing troops. These latter troops spread over the en- 

1 Shortage of ammunition also conduced to this retrogade movement. 
2 This movement led to the apprehension that the Guard Jager Battalion might 
be attacked envelopingly from the north. 



THE 18 th OF AUGUST, 1870 253 

tire space between the thickets at Aubou6 and the St. Privat— Ste. 
Marie road and were accompanied by a horse battery. 

THE 1st GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION STORMS THE SOUTH 
FRONT OF STE. MARIE. 

When the Saxon batteries opened their fire and the 47th Infantry 
Brigade advanced against the west front of Ste. Marie, the first line of 
the advance guard of the 1st Guard Infantry Division commenced to 
advance by rushes across the open country: the 3d and 2d Battalions, 
Guard Fusilier Regiment, from the south along the St. Ail — Ste. Marie 
road; the Guard Jager Battalion and the Fusilier Battalion, 4th Guard 
Regiment, from the southwest. The battalions had deployed two to 
three companies each and when, enveloping the village in a large 
semi-circle, they had approached to within from 450 to 700 meters they 
opened a hot but rather ineffective fire on the edge of the village, be- 
hind the walls of which the hostile skirmishers sought cover after they 
had evacuated the foreground. In this advance a little protection was 
offered the Guard Jager Battalion by a hedge; the Fusilier Battalion, 
4th Guard Regiment, by a small stone wall southwest of the village. 
Up to those protecting obstacles each rush of the Germans was taken 
under effective fire by the village garrison. The rear lines also suffered 
losses from the chassepot bullets; and the fire of the hostile skirmish- 
ers hidden in the folds of the terrain southeast of Ste. Marie caused 
material losses to the right wing of the 3d Battalion, Guard Fusilier 
Regiment. 

The regimental commander, Colonel von Erckert, was, for the 
greater part of the time, personally on the skirmish line and took care 
that the men rose up only for the purpose of firing; only the platoon 
commanders and noncommissioned officers, as well as the company 
commanders who had dismounted, kept their eyes fixed on the enemy; 
only when a wounded man arose to seek the dressing station, did a 
movement occur in the skirmish line. In this situation the Guard 
Fusiliers awaited the orders for the final charge for about a quarter of 
an hour. 

In the meantime Colonel von Leonhardi formed the 47th Infantry 
Brigade against the west side of the village in the ravine of Auboue, 
with its left wing on the Hatrize — Ste. Marie road. The 12th Jager 
Battalion, as first line, formed into line of companies; behind its right 
wing, the 104th Infantry Regiment, formed in three lines; behind its 
left wing, the 105th Infantry Regiment, also in three lines. 

In the first line the two 1st Battalions were formed into line of 
companies; the two 2d Battalions similarly in the second line, but 
with closed up half -battalion in the center; in the third line the two 
3d Battalions in column toward the center. Against the northwest 
side of the village there advanced at the same time the 2d and 3d Bat- 
talions, 108th Rifle Regiment of the former advance guard of the 23d 
Infantry Division, under General von Craushaar. 



254 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

As soon as the fire effect against the enveloping walls became 
plainly discernible, and when also a few houses were afire, General 
von Pape ordered the commander of the 4th Guard Foot Regiment, 
Colonel von Neumann, to lead the two Grenadier battalions of the 
regiment to behind the left wing of the advance guard, to serve as 
support to it in the assault. After the 47th Infantry Brigade had com- 
pleted its deployment west of the village he gave, toward 3 p.m., the 
signal for the attack in which the Guard Jager Battalion was not to 
participate but to remain behind as a receiving point, should that be 
needed. Thereupon Colonel von Erckert first brought the supporting 
troops close to the skirmish lines and caused the Guard batteries 
firing on Ste. Marie to be notified that he would now assault. In the 
meantime the 1st Battalion, Guard Fusilier Regiment, brought up from 
Habonville,took position behind the right wing of the storming line; 
the two Grenadier Battalions of the 4th Guard Foot Regiment behind 
the left wing. As soon as these supporting troops reached the skir- 
mish lines, Colonel von Erckert placed himself in front of the left 
wing of the skirmishers of his 3d Battalion and gave the command in a 
loud tone of voice easily distinguished above the roar of the fire: "Rise! 
Double time!" The entire leading line rose up and after a moment 
the Guard Jagers also were carried forward in the general pressure; 
skirmishers and closed up detachments flung themselves at the village 
with loud hurrahs and without firing a shot. The French defenders 
did not hold out against the storm, though the French batteries, having 
their attention called to the charge by the cheers of the storming troops, 
increased their fire; energetic resistance was offered only here and 
there. While the 2d Battalion, Guard Fusilier Regiment, and the 
Fusilier Battalion, 4th Guard Regiment, reached the edge of the village 
with immaterial losses, the 3d Battalion of the former regiment charged 
along both sides of the St. Ail — Ste. Marie road against a part of the 
hostile front on which the artillery fire had had little effect and was re- 
ceived with a hot fire by the village defenders there and the skirmish- 
ers southeast of Ste. Marie. But here also the enemy did not await the 
hand to hand encounter; the battalion succeeded in gaining the edge 
of the village in a few rushes. There a part of the men remained 
halted for a time, being fully exhausted, until General von Pape, with a 
few words of praise for their gallant conduct, cheered them on to 
pursue the enemy withdrawing from the village. The 10th Company 
in this turned east around the village and poured a hot pursuing fire on 
the retreating adversary. 

General von Pape rode with the Guard Jagers into the village and 
endeavored, in conjunction with Colonel von Erckert and the battalion 
commanders, to establish a regulation occupation of the village of Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes. The 2d and 3d Battalions, Guard Fusilier Regiment, 
occupied the east edge; the 1st Battalion, having come up in the mean- 
time, prolonged that front southeastward; the Guard Jager Battalion 
reinforced them at some important points; the Fusilier Battalion, 4th 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 256 

Guard Foot Regiment, proceeded to the northern exit of the village. 
In front of the northeast edge of the 10th Company, Guard Fusilier 
Regiment, the 3d Company, Guard Jager Battalion, and the 9th 
Company, 4th Guard Regiment, who had followed the retreating 
enemy to beyond the village, formed an advanced group and soon 
entered into a hot fire fight with French battalions now coming from 
St. Privat and Roncourt to hold the foreground of the position of the 
6th Corps against the Germans. 

The two Grenadier battalions of the 4th Guard Foot Regiment 
were led by Colonel von Neumann to the west exit of the village. At 
3.30 p.m. General von Pape sent the following report to Headquarters 
of the Guard Corps: "Ste. Marie has been taken at 3.30 p.m. Losses 
few. 18. 8. 70." Corps Headquarters replied to this report with the 
order that "for the present, possession of the village is to be secured; 
further action is to be taken only on receipt of subsequent orders." 1 

After the assault General von Pape drew up the main body of the 
1st Guard Infantry Division. The 2d Guard Foot Regiment took posi- 
tion to the right of the Grenadier battalions, 4th Guard Foot Regiment, 
so that now the three regiments of the 2d Guard Infantry Brigade were 
assembled in and at Ste. Marie. Toward 4 p.m. the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade commenced to deploy 400 meters southwest of Ste. Marie, 
facing northeast. 



THE 47th INFANTRY BRIGADE ASSAULTS THE WEST SIDE 
OF STE. MARIE 

Simultaneously with the Guard battalions, the 47th Infantry 
Brigade had thrown itself into the village from the west. 

When the 12th Jager Battalion, with dense firing lines in front, 
left the ravine south of Aubou§ and came into the open, it received a 
hot fire and charged at the run, without firing a shot, until the edge of 
the village was reached. Only at a few places of the village wall and 
in the interior was there actual contact with the enemy; the mass of 
the battalion immediately pressed through to the opposite edge of the 
village, but there it suffered material losses from the fire of the French 
troops advancing from the east on Ste. Marie and was compelled to 
halt. Only a few skirmish groups could hold their own in the open 
ground between the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road and the Ste. Marie — 
Montois la Montagne road. Others, mixed with troops of the 1st 
Guard Infantry Division, occupied the edge of the village toward the 
enemy. The first lines of the 104th and 105th Infantry Regiments fol- 
lowed closely, the 1st Battalion, 104th Regiment, wedging itself between 
the Prussian left wing and the 1st Battalion, 105th Regiment, and 
pressing into the gardens on the southwestern village edge. After 
having been reassembled, it cleared a few houses from which fire still 
came and later on reached the north edge of the village where parts of 

'War Archives. 



256 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

it took up the fight with French troops coming up. 1 The 1st Battalion, 
105th Regiment, advanced at once up to the walls of the northwestern 
edge of the village, but was here brought to a stand by the hostile fire; 
one company occupied the east edge of the ravine of Homecourt close 
to the village. 

The second line of the two infantry regiments bad moved to the 
left. The 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry Regiment, reached Ste. Marie 
north of the road from Hatrize, pressed through the village as far as 
the ravine running from it to Homecourt, and occupied its eastern 
edge in conjunction with the remaining groups which had held their 
own in front in the open. 

The 2d Battalion, 104th Regiment, first cleaned out the northwest 
part of the village of the last remaining defenders and with one com- 
pany advanced as far as the Ste. Marie— Aubou6 road; a second com- 
pany was sent there later on, while two companies remained in the 
southeastern part of the village. 8 

The effects of the great strain which the XHth Army Corps had 
undergone in the last few days in the terrible heat and with but scant 
rations, soon made themselves felt in the Saxon battalions. Even during 
the final charge single men fell down from sheer exhaustion ; in the 
village, organizations became disrupted in the general scrimmage and 
the companies which were thrown by the officers against the enemy 
advancing from the east were far from being at full strength. 

BATTLES NORTH AND EAST OP STE. MARIE 

The two 3d Battalions of the 104th and 105th Infantry Regiments 
had received orders from the brigade commander, Colonel von Leon- 
hardi, to go around and attack the village on the north. The 3d 
Battalion, 104th Regiment, as soon as it approached the village, formed 
skirmishers under heavy losses and reinforced the detachments which 
had gained a foothold in the Homecourt ravine near the village. 

The 3d Battalion, 105th Regiment, deployed into company columns, 
reached the ravine with its extreme left wing. Its situation soon be- 
came critical, receiving enfilading fire from the thickets between 
Auboue and Roncourt. There parts of the 75th Line Regiment had 
taken position when that regiment advanced on the right flank of 
the fresh Frencb forces, in order to turn against the Saxons south of 
the bushes as well as against the 23d Infantry Division advancing 
against the thickets from the west. The losses had increased ma- 
terially in a short space of time when the 3d Battalion of the 108th 
Rifle Regiment brought welcome help. 

In the first line of the advance guard of the 23d Infantry Division, 
which General von Craushaar had brought up from Moineville, the 2d 
and 3d Battalions, 108th Rifle Regiment, had advanced along both sides 
of the Coinville —Ste. Marie road. The 2d Battalion on the right had 

1 Royal Saxon War Archives. 
"Royal Saxon War Archives. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 257 

already opened fire with its 7th Company against Ste. Marie when 
General von Craushaar received orders from Prince George of Saxony 
to join the march of the 23d Division on Auboue. The orders issued in 
consequence by General von Craushaar for breaking off the battle 
could be obeyed only by the 2d Battalion and the 1st Battalion follow- 
ing up in second line. The 3d Battalion of the Rifle Regiment, whose 
11th Company had entered the village simultaneously with the 47th 
Infantry Brigade, believed that it could not abandon that brigade. 

Later when the battalion commander, Major Allmer, saw that 
the village was in German hands he marched off in a northerly di- 
rection to hasten up behind his regiment. On the way he perceived 
the difficult situation of the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry Regiment, and 
led his companies, which deployed on the run, to the support of that 
endangered battalion. The enemy, who had the left wing of the Saxons 
at the ravine of Homecourt surrounded with fire, was thrown back 
into the woods between Roncourt and Auboue. 1 The Saxon artillery 
also participated in this fight. This was the 2d Light Battery of the 
23d Infantry Division, which had remained in the vicinity west of Ste. 
Marie. It went into position on the Hatrize— Ste. Marie road and 
turned against a hostile battery 8 which was in position southeast of 
the thickets between Auboue and Roncourt and was greatly harrassing 
the Saxons with its Are. 

In this manner the Saxon infantry succeeded in holding itself 
north of Ste. Marie. However, these were but weak forces which had 
reached the foot of the plateau running from St. Privat to Roncourt 
and to the south edge of the thickets at Auboue. In face of the strong, 
fresh troops of the enemy entering the battle and of the fire which the 
French batteries had resumed, there could be no thought of pursuing 
the garrison of Ste. Marie retreating toward Roncourt. Under the 
effect of the German artillery fire General Colin had already decided 
on the retreat when the German infantry started the assault. What 
remained in the village and continued the battle there was merely a 
rear guard. The larger part of the 94th Line Regiment escaped 
through the ravine of Homecourt to behind the protecting line of the 
75th and 91st Regiments. The regiment was, of course, badly shaken, 
and, after having reached the forest of Jaumont east of Roncourt, had 
to reform its units. 3 

Not less hotly waged, although less bloody than at Homecourt, 
was the battle on the east side of Ste. Marie. Here the 2d Battalion, 
93d Line Regiment, from its position 600 meters southeast of Ste. Marie, 
had poured a steady rapid fire on the troops appearing at the east side 
of the village. When it had fired away its ammunition and was about 

•The battalion commander, Major Allmer, was killed. 

2 This was the horse battery which had joined the advance of the 75th and 91st 
Line Regiments. 

3 The 94th Regiment lost altogether 320 men. Among the numerous prisoners 
taken in Ste. Marie was a large number of marauders of different regiments. 



258 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

to evacuate its position with its first line 1 there arrived north of it the 
91st Line Regiment which had advanced with its 3d Battalion north of the 
St. Privat — Ste. Marie road, its 2d Battalion farther to the right against 
the village. The 1st Battalion followed up somewhat in rear, echeloned 
to the right, and, when it had come up with the other two battalions, 
turned with its right wing toward the ravine of Homecourt, in order 
to sweep the length of that ravine with its fire. 

The assaulting troops of the 1st Guard Infantry Division had just 
been partly reformed and had occupied the edges of the village, 
when General von Pape, toward 4 p.m., observed the approach of 
fresh hostile battalions. He hastily gave orders to the two Grenadier 
battalions, 4th Guard Foot Regiment, to enter the village. The noise 
of battle raging the other side of the village, the return and reassembly 
of single infantry detachments and the large number of wounded gave 
the Grenadier battalions the impression that the battle was turning 
unfavorably and that urgent help was needed. The 1st Battalion 
therefore proceeded from the west entrance of the village to the road 
toward St. Privat with the object of gaining the eastern exit of the 
village. That exit was under a particularly heavy hostile fire; the 
battalion commander, Major von Sichart, quickly caused a second exit 
to be broken through the wall further north and immediately reinforced 
the garrison of the gardens there by the 4th Company. One platoon 
rushed 200 meters eastward from the wall, took position at a field 
hedge and opened a rapid fire on the French which by then had 
approached to within 500 meters of the village. The 2d Battalion, 4th 
Guard Regiment, had received orders from Colonel von Neumann to 
hold the northern exits at all events and, arrived on the village road 
toward Auboue, caused two companies to occupy the edge of the village 
toward Montois la Montagne where the battle appeared to have 
reached its height. But already so many troops, especially of the 
Saxons, were pressing into that part of the village that the battalion 
had great difficulty in forcing its way to the exit toward Auboue and 
arrived there only when the battle had become less fierce. The 
Fusilier Battalion, 4th Guard Regiment, which immediately after the 
assault had turned against the northern exit, had in the meantime 
advanced with three companies into the terrain north of the village, 
but returned along the road from Auboue as soon as the battle was 
observed to decrease in volume. 2 



THE GERMAN ARTILLERY INTERFERES IN THE BATTLE AT 
STE. MARIE 

When at 3 p.m. the French batteries which had been advanced on 
Ste. Marie had fallen back on Roncourt and St. Privat, the two bat- 

'The general procedure in the French army appears to have been to fall back as 
soon as the ammunition gave out. In those days there was nothing known about 
bringing up ammunition from the rear when fighting in the open. 

2 The 9th Company was engaged in battle farther east. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 259 

talions of the Guard artillery in action south of St. Ail advanced by 
echelons from the right wing, each battery by itself, across the 
Habonville— St. Ail road. The change of position was executed very 
slowly, however, as single batteries had to take up intermediate posi- 
tions to fire on and drive back the hostile skirmishers in their front. 

By 3.30 p.m. all batteries were in the new position, the right wing 
of which was about 600 meters northeast of Habonville, the left wing 
touching St. Ail. The 4th Light Battery had advanced 300 meters 
northeast of St. Ail. The French batteries, undoubtedly inferior, still 
held their own in their favorable positions and were supported as 
before by skirmish lines of the 6th and 4th French Corps, which 
continually charged against the German batteries unsupported in front 
by infantry. • Though the batteries in general succeeded in holding 
the hostile infantry at a distance, there remained in the foreground 
single skirmishers and groups whose fire annoyed the batteries 
greatly, and was difficult to control. While the 1st Foot Battalion, 
Guard Artillery, supported by the Hessian artillery, continued the 
fight against the opponent on the heights southwest of St. Privat, the 
corps artillery was enabled to participate in the infantry battle at Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes and gradually take under fire with all its batteries 
the hostile battalions advancing against the village. Although it suc- 
ceeded in this manner in stopping the hostile infantry advance, it was 
not able, on the other hand, because of the long range, to produce any 
material effect against the hostile batteries which, from their position 
northwest of St. Privat, were causing serious losses to the Saxons 
north of Ste. Marie. The continuous threatening by hostile infantry 
chained them to their position. 2 A change for the better occurred 
only when the Saxon batteries, going farther north, approached 
closer to the enemy. 

During the assault on Ste. Marie aux Chenes the batteries of 
the 24th Infantry Division and of the Saxon Corps artillery, being 
masked by the advancing infantry, had ceased firing and temporarily 
awaited in their positions the probable outcome of the assault. Only 
the 3d Battery of the 24th Infantry Division, held in reserve, received, 
during the advance of the infantry, orders from the battalion com- 
mander, Major Richter, to go into position west of Ste. Marie and to 
fire on the hostile batteries northwest of St. Privat, as these batteries 
would undoubtedly turn their fire with increased intensity on the lost 
village. The battery, with some losses, unlimbered west of Ste. Marie 
and in conjunction with the 2d Light Battery of the 23d Infantry 
Division, already in position there, turned its fire on the hostile bat- 
teries southeast of the thickets of Auboue. When these batteries were 
silenced, the 2d Light Battery limbered up to join its division at 
Auboue. The 3d Light Battery remained for the time where it was 
while south of it the 3d Foot Battalion of the corps artillery under 

'War Archives. 

2 For the protection of the artillery the 1st Battalion, 4th Guard Grenadier Regi- 
ment arrived at about this time, taking position sideward and in rear of the artillery. 



260 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Major Hoch 1 crossed the Auboufi ravine to take position to the front. 

Only after Ste. Marie had been taken did the corps artillery re- 
ceive orders from corps headquarters to advance by echelons from the 
right wing, and it at first sent out the 3d Foot Battalion, while the 4th 
was temporarily kept back in readiness west of the Auboue ravine. Of 
the 3d Battalion, the 5th Light and 5th Heavy Batteries unlimbered 
east of the Ste. Marie— Auboue road under a hot infantry fire. In a 
short time a large part of the men and horses had been disabled, the 
battalion commander, Major Hoch, also being wounded. The batteries 
were forced to fall back behind the road to restore order. 8 The 6th 
Heavy Battery had found a better position in the meadow ground 
south of hill 239. On its right the 4th Heavy, on its left the 3d Light 
Battery of the 24th Infantry Division went into position, having 
hastened up from the viciuity southwest and west of Ste. Marie; the 
other two batteries of this division remained south of the village in 
their old position to fire, in conjunction with the Guard batteries, on 
the hostile infantry north of the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road. The fire 
of the batteries which had gone into position on the Ste. Marie — 
Auboue road very quickly decreased the activity of the hostile artillery 
northwest of St. Privat, and were soon able to turn their fire ex- 
clusively on the advancing skirmish lines of the enemy. The result 
was not long delayed; under the combined effect of the Saxon and 
Guard artillery the hostile infantry was forced to halt and, with the 
exception of some weaker detachments, finally fell back to the main 
position at St. Privat. 

In the meantime the 4th Foot Battalion of the Saxon corps artil- 
lery had taken a new position in readiness northwest of Ste. Marie 
behind the 3d Battalion, as it did not appear advisable to go into 
position in the vicinity of the woods of Auboue which were still in the 
enemy's hands. The two last batteries of the 24th Infantry Division 
came up from south of Ste. Marie and joined the leading artillery line, 
so that the Saxon artillery, except the batteries of the 23d Infantry 
Division and the 1st Horse Battery of the 12th Cavalry Division, were 
now assembled on the Ste. Marie — Auboue road. 



THE BATTLE AT STE. MARIE CEASES TOWARD 4 P.M. 

Observing events north of Ste. Marie the commander of the 24th 
Infantry Division, General von Nehrhoff, had gained the impression 
that the battle had assumed dimensions larger than was in consonance 
with the battle objective proper:— the occupation and holding of the 
village. He therefore took measures to break off the battle and was 
confirmed in his view by an order from the Crown Prince directing 
him to confine himself to holding Ste. Marie. 

1 Fifth and 6th Heavy, 5th Light Batteries. 

-The 5th Heavy was very soon able to participate again in the action; the 5th 
Light took a longer time. It had lost one noncommissioned officer, two men and 20 
horses. All the horses of one piece had been hit. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 261 

The calling back of the Saxon infantry occurred at the same time 
as the retreat of the French main forces, so that by 4.30 p.m. the in- 
fantry battle around the village had gradually ceased.' General von 
Nehrhoff agreed with General von Pape that the Saxons should 
evacuate the village and that only the Guard should occupy it. 2 The 
first two battalions of the 101th and 105th Infantry Regiments were 
drawn out of the village and assembled behind the northwest corner. 
To bring the remaining battalions back out of the still hot battle north 
and east of the village was more difficult and took much time; so that 
only after 5 p.m. was the larger part of the 47th Infantry Brigade 
assembled at the northwest corner of Ste. Marie. 

The Guard Jiiger Battalion, the Guard Fusilier Regiment, and 
the 4th Guard Regiment remained within the village. In its proximity 
west and south were the remaining parts of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division which had come up in the meantime, except the artillery. 
The Guard Hussar Regiment also came up. 

The fights around Ste. Marie aux Chgnes had lasted from about 
2.30 to 4.30 p.m. and had required heavy sacrifices at certain places. 
The 3d Battalion, Guard Fusilier Regiment, which in its advance on 
Ste. Marie was heavily fired on not only in front but also in the right 
flank, suffered most. It lost about twice as many as the other Prussian 
battalions participating in the assault. The losses of the Saxon bat- 
talions were comparatively small in the assault proper, but greater in 
the attempts to follow up the enemy in the battles north of the village. 
Single batteries had suffered heavy losses, less through the hostile ar- 
tillery fire than through the infantry fire to which they had been ex- 
posed. 

MOVEMENTS OP TROOPS ON THE FRENCH RIGHT WING 

DURING AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE BATTLE AT 

STE. MARIE AUX CHfiNES 

When Marshal Canrobert gained the impression that the weakly 
occupied Ste. Marie could not be held against the superior and en- 
veloping attack of the Germans, he decided to conduct the main de- 
fense on the plateau of St. Privat and to hold that supporting point 
against the threatened German attack. At 2.30 p.m. five battalions of 
the 1st Division, Tixier, entered the village from the vicinity south of 
St. Privat; two battalions of the 12th Line Regiment reinforced the 
garrison of the west front; 3 three battalions of the 10th Line Regiment 
prolonged that front northward to about halfways between St. Privat 
and Roncourt; while an engineer company prepared the village for 
defense. These measures were taken simultaneously with the move- 
ments of the French batteries at and west of St. Privat into positions 

'One of the last to fall was Colonel von Erckert, commanding the Guard Fusilier 
Regiment. 

^Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

3 Four companies of the 1st Battalion, 98d, and three companies of the 1st Bat- 
talion, JUth Line Regiment. 



262 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

farther in rear. Two of these batteries temporarily disappeared from 
the fighting line. 

The remaining eleven batteries of the 6th Corps formed a new, 
extended artillery front reaching from about halfway between St. 
Privat and Roncourt as far as the right wing of the 4th Corps. Of 
these eleven batteries only six, which stood close to St. Privat, par- 
ticipated in the battles around Ste. Marie; four batteries south of the 
village fired all the time on the troops of the IXth Army Corps at the 
Bois de la Cusse; one battery, farthest to the north, did not partici- 
pate at all in the fight. Because of the superiority of the German 
artillery, the artillery fight was kept up sparingly and at times ceased 
entirely, to be resumed at propitious moments during the battle. The 
great shortage of ammunition made this necessary; not one of these 
batteries had been silenced by the hostile artillery. 

Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Canrobert grave ap- 
prehension. Soon after the opening of the engagement he had sent 
Lieutenant de Bellegarde to the commander-in-chief with request for 
ammunition and support. Marshal Bazaine replied that he must send 
his emptied ammunition wagons to the artillery reserve park in 
Plappeville and promised him a 12-pounder battery and one Guard 
division in case he became engaged in a more serious battle. Toward 
2 p.m. Marshal Canrobert again sent an officer, Captain de Chalus, to 
the commander-in-chief with the repeated demand for as much am- 
munition as possible and immediate starting of the promised Guard 
division; but a timely sending of both was not to be obtained. 

The course and final outcome of the battle at Ste. Marie caused 
additional shifting of troops in the 6th Corps. The advance of the 75th 
and 91st Line Regiments, accompanied by a horse battery, was joined 
in second line by the 10th and one battalion of the 12th Line Regiment, 
going a few hundred meters beyond the west boundary of St. Privat. 
When the battalions of the 75th and 91st Regiments fell back, the 2d 
Battalion, 10th Line Regiment, took a receiving position about 1500 
meters northwest of St. Privat, through which the 2d and 3d Battalions, 
75th Line Regiment fell back, to halt behind the St. Privat— Roncourt 
road. Of the 91st Line Regiment the 2d and 3d Battalions halted about 
600 meters west of St. Privat, the 1st Battalion still more to the west, 
south of the 2d Battalion, 10th Line Regiment. Of the remaining parts 
of the 10th and 12th Line Regiments some returned to their former 
places in the village, while some remained west of it. Of the 93d Line 
Regiment, the retreating parts of which assembled in St. Privat, eight 
companies had remained in the foreground south of the road toward 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 

The interference of the 23d Infantry Division at the woods of 
Auboue, which made its effect felt during the fire fight north of Ste. 
Marie, caused an additional weakening of the left wing in favor of the 
threatened right; the entire rest of the 1st Division, Tixier, was drawn 
up to St. Privat, so that, south of the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road, only 
the infantry of the 4th Division, Levassor Sorval, remained in its old 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 263 

positions. The 9th Jager Battalion took station on the west front of 
St. Privat; the 4th Line Regiment and the 3d Battalion of the 100th 
took position at the northeast corner, while the other two battalions 
of the 100th Regiment remained in reserve at Jerusalem. Roncourt 
at this time received a stronger garrison as the 1st Battalion, 9th Line 
Regiment, which up to then had stood southeast of the village, joined 
the 1st Battalion, 75th Line Regiment already there. 

In the French artillery, also, there was important shifting caused 
by the final arrival of German troops in front of the main position of 
St. Privat. It was believed that it would soon be necessary to take 
measures for the retreat and that the diminishing ammunition oughtto 
be husbanded for that event. Lieutenant Colonel Montluisant gradually 
took five of the batteries which were in position south of St. Privat to 
a receiving position at the quarries of Amanweiler. 

The remaining five batteries w r ere concentrated behind the ridge 
between Roncourt and St. Privat, but kept up only an intermittent 
fire. Of the remaining batteries of the 6th Corps, two had driven back 
to Plappeville to get ammunition, one had sought shelter behind St. 
Privat. 

With the troops which had participated in the battle of Ste. Marie 
and the subsequent fight at the woods of Auboue against the 23d In- 
fantiy Division the movements to the rear into the main position pro- 
ceeded gradually. The battalions of the 91st and 75th Line Regiments 
had in general kept out out of range of the needle guns during the 
battle at Ste. Marie and had utilized the longer range of their chasse- 
pots to good effect. Though it was mainly due to the effect of the 
German artillery fire that they were compelled to fall back, shortage 
of ammunition was also a factor. Yet they evacuated the plateau 
north of St. Privat— Ste. Marie road but slowly, starting with the left 
wing and leaving single groups of skirmishers behind to continue the 
fire fight. At the woods of Auboue where, beside the 2d and 3d Bat- 
talions, 75th Line Regiment, additional forces were inserted to stop 
the advancing 23d Infantry Division the fight lasted longer. This slow 
retrogade movement of the French infantry, connected with the coming 
up of fresh forces, was intended by Marshal Canrobert to stop the ad- 
vance of the Germans by means of the superior fire power of his in- 
fantry. Not much could be expected any longer of his artillery which, 
with the exception of some few batteries, was finally compelled to 
cease action. He still hoped that the promised Guard division would 
soon arrive. 

THE ADVANCE OF THE 23D INFANTRY DIVISION IS STOPPED. 

THE ENVELOPMENT IS EXTENDED FARTHER 

TO THE NORTH 

The assembly of the troops of the 23d Infantry Division in the 
ravine of Aubou6 near Coinville, from which place Prince George of 
Saxony intended to execute the ordered advance through the woods of 



264 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Auboue against Roncourt, made but slow progress. The 46th Infantry 
Brigade, which had, through an error, turned toward Moineville in- 
stead of Ooinville, did not join. Of the 45th Infantry Brigade, at the start 
only two battalions of the former advance guard, the 2d and 3d, 108th 
Rifle Regiment, were present. They had been able opportunely to 
break off the engagement at Ste. Marie, leaving only the 3d Battalion 
there, and now received orders to march toward AubouS and protect 
the left flank of the division. In that direction — toward Homecourt 
and Joeuf — one squadron of the 1st Cavalry Regiment was then recon- 
noitering. Later on the Grenadier Regiments Nos. 100 and 101 arrived 
by detachments. Their march had crossed with other troops west of 
Ste. Marie and they had been fired on by hostile artillery while in the 
narrow ravine of Auboug. 1 

The regiments were directed by detachments, as they arrived, to- 
ward Auboue. In the meantime Prince George had become convinced 
that he could not execute the intended attack on Roncourt from Ooin- 
ville, as the 47th Infantry Brigade was deploying in the space between 
Ste. Marie and the woods of Auboue. He therefore sought room for 
deployment farther north. 

The commanding general of the Xllth Army Corps, Crown Prince 
Albert of Saxony, had ridden ahead from Batilly to the ravine of 
AubouS west of Ste. Marie and from there could view the country as 
far as St. Privat and to beyond Roncourt. The movements of hostile 
troops in front of the line St. Privat — Roncourt did not escape his 
attention and, when he also perceived French infantry advancing in 
the direction of the woods of Auboue, he informed Prince George of 
his observations and directed him to occupy in all haste that part of 
the woods projecting toward Roncourt. This order was transmitted by 
Prince George at about 4 p.m. to the 45th Infantry Brigade, assembled 
in the meantime at Auboue. 2 The 46th Infantry Brigade had been looked 
for in vain. The leading battalion of the 45th Infantry Brigade, the 1st 
of the 108th Rifle Regiment, had just left the northern exit of Aubou6 
leading toward Homecourt when it was called back by the adjutant of 
Prince George and received directions to advance as quickly as possible 
to the woods extending toward Roncourt and get there ahead of the 
enemy. The companies turned to the right, taking direction almost on 
Ste. Marie to reach, going over hill 247, 800 meters east of Auboue, 
the southern part of the woods. Prince George personally called 
the attention of the battalion to the importance of its task and induced 
it to move as rapidly as possible. The 2d Battalion, 108th Rifle Regi- 
ment, was sent by the brigade commander, General von Craushaar, to 
follow up the 1st Battalion, and the remaining parts of the 45th In- 
fantry Brigade were directed toward hill 247, where Prince George 
now intended to assemble his division under protection of the two 
advanced Rifle battalions. 

'The losses were immaterial. 

8 With the exception of the 3d Battalion, 108th Rifle Regiment, which was still 
south of the woods of Auboue. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1879 265 

Corps Headquarters also had searched for the 46th Infantry 
Brigade, but it was found only after 5 p.m., by Captain von der Planitz 
of the Saxon General Staff, at Moineville and was sent from there 
through Coinville. At 6 p.m. it crossed the Ste. Marie — Auboue road. 1 

In the meantime Crown Prince Albert thought he perceived hos- 
tile artillery at Roncourt also and that he saw movements of French 
infantry in the village. 8 He concluded from this that his ordered 
envelopment by the 23d Infantry Division through the woods of 
Auboue on Roncourt would still strike the hostile front. He therefore 
directed Prince George at about 4 p.m. to reach out still farther to the 
north and started the 4Sth Infantry Brigade, which had remained as 
corps reserve at Batilly, to place it at the disposal of the 23d Infantry 
Division for that purpose. 

These events took place while the leading battalions of the 45th 
Infantry Brigade were already engaged in the woods of Auboue with 
the enemy who had entered them from the east. This engagement 
required the gradual insertion of the entire brigade except two bat- 
talions. 

THE 45th INFANTRY BRIGADE TAKES POSSESSION OF THE 

WOODS OP AUBOUE.— THE 48th INFANTRY BRIGADE 

MARCHES ON MONTOIS 

The thickets between Roncourt and Auboue form an irregular 
and densely undergrown stretch of woods, the southern part of which 
is traversed by the steep ravine of Homecourt. The 1st and 2d Bat- 
talions, 108th Rifle Regiment, arriving there first, had great difficulty 
in forcing their way in an easterly direction through the one and one- 
half kilometer wide strip of woods. South of them troops of the 47th 
Infantry Brigade were partly engaged and partly employed in as- 
sembling, among them the 3d Battalion of the 108th Rifle Regiment. 3 
Endeavors to go south around the woods were unsuccessful because of 
the fire of the French battalions in battle northeast of Ste. Marie. 
When the skirmishers in the forest had ascended the steep banks of 
the Homecourt ravine, the 1st Battalion on the right, the 2d on the 
left, they encountered a firm resistance by the French who had 
entered from the east. 4 The 2d Battalion had good protection against 
infantry and artillery fire in the cross ravine running toward Roncourt. 
On its right the 3d Battalion, brought up in the meantime, assembled, 
after having driven back weaker hostile forces toward Montois la 
Montagne. 

■The brigade commander, Colonel von Montbe, arrived at Moineville, hearing 
the sound of battle at Ste. Marie aux Chenes, had sent off his adjutant with a request 
for orders; but he did not return until later —Von Schimpff, Das XII. Korps im Kriege 
1870-71, vol. I, page 91. (See footnote, page 174, ante.) 

2 These were the movements of the 1st Battalion, 9th Line Regiment which was 
drawing up to Roncourt. There were no batteries at Roncourt. 

3 The 3d Battalion had just driven back parts of the 75th Line Regiment, which 
flanked the left wing of the 47th Infantry Brigade, into the eastern part of the woods. 

* Apparently parts of the 75th Line Regiment, also numerous dispersed men. 



266 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

As the hostile resistance appeared to be growing strongei' through 
the reception of fresh detachments, General vonCraushaar decided to 
insert the 100th Body Grenadier Regiment. The 1st Battalion re- 
inforced the right wing of the 108th Rifle Regiment, taking position 
partly in the open ground south of the woods; the 3d Battalion re- 
inforced the left wing; the 2d Battalion followed up in half battalions. 
Of the two wooded strips running southward, east of the Homecourt 
ravine, the first was gained by a rush; the other was voluntarily 
evacuated by the French. 1 

It was impossible, however, to leave the eastern edge of the 
woods as the Saxons met the heavy fire of the French battalions which 
had taken position to support the 75th Line Regiment fighting at the 
woods. The 1st Battalion, 9th Line Regiment, arrived at Roncourt, 
had deployed north of the 1st Battalion, 75th Line Regiment, along the 
woods and hedges between Montois and Roncourt; 2 the 2d Battalion 
remained in reserve south of Roncourt. Farther southwest the 2d 
Battalion, 10th Line Regiment, entered the battle in conjunction with 
parts of the 91st Line Regiment. The eastern edge of the woods was 
thus spanned on a large arc by an infantry line which was supported 
by the fire of a battery in position south of Roncourt. 

The left wing of the 108th Rifle Regiment which came into the 
open north of the woods at the neighboring ravine running toward 
Montois la Montagne suffered especially under the fire of the French. 
Two companies of the 2d Battalion, 100th Body Regiment, were in- 
serted here as support. In the meantime it was believed that Montois 
la Montagne had been occupied by hostile infantry, and it seemed now 
advisable to send forces against that village, especially as French 
detachments appeared to be turning towards it from the Orne valley in 
the north. 3 Of the 101st Grenadier Regiment, which had followed the 
engaged parts of the 45th Infantry Brigade with some interval, the 1st 
Battalion was deployed in the open between the woods of Auboue and 
Montois la Montagne, but fired only a few shots, as the fight was 
broken off when the advanced French infantry retreated into the 
main position at St. Privat. 

Prince George had decided to delay the further advance of the 
23d Infantry Division until the 48th Infantry Brigade, placed at his 
disposal, had enveloped the hostile right wing. 4 By his directions 
General von Craushaar halted the troops of the 45th Infantry Brigade, 
caused the loose battalions to close up and occupied then the east edge 
of the woods of Auboug. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Grenadier 
Regiment, were kept back west of the woods. The artillery of the 

prisoners were taken in the forest from the 75th, 91st, 10th and 4th Regiments 
and the 51st Regiment of the 3d Corps. 

^Whether the troops deployed actually belonged to that battalion is not quite 
clear; according to the French General Staff Account no extension of the front beyond 
Roncourt had taken place at all. 

3 Royal Saxon War Archives.— The belief that Montois la Montagne had been 
occupied by the French was erroneous, according to French statements. 

*Von Schimpff , Das XII. Korps im Kriege 1870-71; vol. I, page 111 (Page 185, ante) . 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 267 

23d Infantry Division, which had arrived in the meantime and had 
been engaged with the 2d Heavy Battery in the infantry combat, firing 
successfully from a position at the southwest corner of the woods, 
received orders to join the the 48th Infantry Brigade. 1 

It was 5 p.m. when the 48th Infantry Brigade arrived from Batilly 
at the 23d Infantry Division, in the vicinity of Auboue. Basing himself 
on orders from corps headquarters Prince George had at 4.30 p.m. 
issued the following orders for the extension of the enveloping move- 
ment around the hostile right wing: 2 

* * * 

The Orne valley with its steep sides offered excellent protection 
for the planned envelopment by the 48th Infantry Brigade. The 2d 
Cavalry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division, which had up to then 
been protecting the corps artillery, finally joined also the enveloping 
movement. Toward 4.30 p.m. it received orders from corps head- 
quarters to turn against the hostile cavalry which was seen between 
Roncourt and Montois la Montagne. 3 For this purpose the regiment 
attempted to go around the woods of Auboue on the south, but, these 
woods being at that time still occupied by the enemy, received such a 
heavy infantry and also artillery fire that it turned about and advanced 
west and north of the woods toward Montois la Montagne. As it could 
discover no hostile cavalry it joined the enveloping march of the 48th 
Infantry Brigade. 

The cavalry brigade of the 12th Cavalry Division at the Bois de 
Ponty also received orders from Crown Prince Albert to join with the 
1st Horse Battery in the enveloping march and gain the extreme 
hostile wing in rear. Two squadrons were at the same time sent into 
the valley of the Mosel to destroy the railroad and telegraph in the 
vicinity of Maizieres. 

These orders were caused by the following orders from Head- 
quarters, lid Army: 4 



HEADQUARTERS, lid ARMY, AFTER THE 
CAPTURE OF STE. MARIE 

The just quoted orders were issued by Prince Frederick Charles 
immediately after the report of the capture by the Guard Corps of Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes had reached him. In them he repeated what had 
been expressed in his orders of 11.45 a.m. to the Xllth Army Corps, 
once more stating his definite desire not to allow the enemy, fortu- 
nately now held, to escape again. The battle appeared to him to be 

l 2d Heavy, 1st and 2d Light Batteries. The 1st Heavy Battery probably was still 
with the 46th Infantry Brigade. 

Q Royal Saxon War Archives.— General Staff Account, page 768.— Von Schimpff , 
Das XII. Korpa im Kriege 1S70-71; vol. I, page 116. (For the order, omitted here, see 
page 190, ante.) 

3 Partsof the Cavalry Division du Barail, changing position. 

4 Royal Saxon War Archives. — Von der Goltz, 77. Armee, page 143; von Schirapff, 
Das XII. Korpa im Kriege 1870-71; vol. I, page 109. (For order see page 70, ante.) 



268 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

progressing favorably. As far as his eyes could reach along the 
enemy's position the latter's artillery was inferior and unable to keep 
up an effective fire. The conditions at Roncourt, of course, could not 
be seen from the vicinity west of Habonville. Under these circum- 
stances the Prince did not hesitate to arrange measures so that the 3d 
Guard Infantry Brigade of the 2d Guard Division, which had arrived 
in the meantime west of Habonville, was placed at the disposal of the 
IXth Army Corps, that corps appearing to be most in want of support.* 
Captain von Bergen sent a report from the German right wing that 
the VHIth Army Corps was in possession of Gravelotte. There also 
then the battle appeared to progress favorably. In the meantime the 
Xth Army Corps had arrived at Batilly and the Prince called the com- 
manding general, von Voigts-Rhetz, to report to him, and then dis- 
cussed with him how he would have to support the Guard Corps in its 
subsequent attack. 

THE LEFT WING AND CENTER OP THE lid ARMY 
COMPLETE DEPLOYMENT 

By this time -it was 4.45 p.m.— the battle in front of the lid Army 
commenced to decrease in volume, and almost entirely ceased after 
the end of the struggle at the woods of Auboue. The French artillery 
was almost completely silent; the German artillery, after completion 
of the infantry fights at Ste. Marie, had kept up only an intermittent 
fire and thus, while the XHth Army Corps executed its enveloping 
movement toward Montois la Montague, a sort of pause had occurred 
on this part of the battlefield. In the Guard Corps as well as in the 
XHth Army Corps the main thought was to await the enveloping of 
the French right wing. Therefore the 1st Guard Infantry Division 
remained in its assembly formation in and at Ste. Marie. The 2d 
Guard Infantry Division was brought opposite to the 1st. It had 
reached the small wood between Anoux la Grange and Batilly at 2 
p.m. and had marched into position with the 3d Guard Infantry 
Brigade on the right, with the 4th on the left of the small wood, just 
at the time when the main body of the 1st Guard Infantry Division 
had started from there towards the left to the ravine at Habonville. 

The continued harassing of the Guard artillery by French riflemen 
had caused Prince Hohenlohe as well as the commander of the corps 
artillery, Colonel von Scherbening, to ask for infantry protection from 
the 2d Guard Infantry Division shortly after its arrival. In compliance 
with this request the 1st Battalion, 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, 
had about 3 p.m. been detailed for that duty. The battalion com- 
mander, Major von Rosenberg, distributed his companies in such 
manner that the 3d took position on the right wing in the basin north- 
east of Habonville, the 4th behind the center, the 1st and 2d on the left 
wing of the Guard artillery which had in the meantime taken up its 

1 A bout this time the impression at Hd Army Headquarters was that the French 
had entered the Bois de la Cusse, but been driven out again by the Hessians. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 269 

second position south of St. Ail. When orders arrived from Prince 
Frederick Charles to send the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade to report to 
the IXth Army Corps the brigade started at 4 p.m., accompanied by 
the Guard Rifle Battalion, the 5th Light Guard Battery and the 2d and 
3d Guard Pioneer Companies, in the direction of Habonville, and en 
route received from Headquarters of the IXth Army Corps directions 
to take up a position in readiness behind the 25th Infantry Division 
south of Habonville; the 5th Light Guard Battery to reinforce the 
artillery at Champenois. In obedience to these orders the brigade 
moved to the southeast of Habonville: in the first line the Guard Rifle 
Battalion and the 2d and the Fusilier Battalions, of the Kaiser Alex- 
ander 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment; in the second line the Konigin 
Elizabeth 3d Guard Grenadier Regiment. The 1st Battalion of the 
Kaiser Alexander 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment was sent into Habon- 
ville, as that place was unoccupied after the Guard Fusiliers had left it. 

Thus the commander of the 2d Guard Infantry Division, General 
von Budritzki, had at the small wood between Anoux la Grange and 
Batilly only the 4th Infantry Brigade, minus the already detached 1st 
battalion, 4th Grenadier Regiment, the 5th and 6th Heavy and the 6th 
Light Batteries, and the 2d Guard Uhlan Regiment. 

At about 4.10 p.m. General von Dannenberg, chief of staff of the 
Guard Corps, personally brought the orders to advance in the direction 
of St. Ail; the attacking object to be pointed out there. 1 The march 
was at once commenced, the railroad crossed west of Habonville and 
the direction of St. Ail taken down the ravine of Aubou6. The battal- 
ions marched in formation of columns toward the center behind each 
other. Between the two leading battalions were the three batteries. 
The 2d Guard Uhlan Regiment trotted on ahead and took position north- 
west of St. Ail at the slope of the ravine of Auboue. When, toward 5 
p.m., the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade approached St. Ail to take a po- 
sition in readiness north of that place General von Budritzki directed 
the artillery to move ahead. Probably left in ignorance of the fact that 
Ste. Marie was in German hands, the three batteries unlimbered against 
that village; but when they perceived their error they proceeded, 
without having fired, further north in order to turn, a few hundred 
meters south of Ste. Marie east of the St. Ail— Ste. Marie road, against 
St. Privat la Montague. The 6th Light Battery was on the right, the 
5th Heavy in the center and the 6th Heavy on the left. By orders of 
the battalion commander the highest houses of St. Privat were to be 
taken under fire; there was no other artillery target, but the batteries 
received from advanced French infantry groups such a heavy fire at 
about 600 meters range, that they had at first to direct their fire on 
these, without having had a chance to get the range of the ordered 
target by sighting shots. This fire fight was continued until the 
Guard infantry started the charge on St. Privat. 

By this time the Xth Army Corps had deployed southwest of Batilly 
'War Archives. 



270 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

where it rested for a short time; the 20th Infantry Division in front; 
between it and the 19th, the corps artillery; farther right, on hill 265 
between Batilly and Jouaville, the 5th Cavalry Division which arrived 
a little later. 



VI. Attack of the Guard Corps on St. Privat la Montagne 

REVIEW OF THE SITUATION OF THE SECOND 
ARMY AT 5 P.M. 

At 5 p.m. the IXth Army Corps held the line from Chantrenne 
through Champenois and the east edge of the Bois de la Cusse as far 
as the Amanweiler — St. Ail road and had weak reserves behind that 
front. Farther in rear, southwest of Verneville, was the 6th Infantry 
Division of the Hid Army Corps, while the 5th Division was still on the 
march to the front. The 6th Cavalry Division was south of Anoux la 
Grange and the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade south of Habonville. 

Of the Guard Corps the artillery, with the artillery of the 1st Guard 
Division, was in its second position southeast of St. Ail x and kept up a 
very desultory fire on live targets showing themselves in the vicinity 
of St. Privat and occasionally fired on the village itself. It was pro- 
tected to some extent at least on the flanks against hostile infantry by 
the 1st Battalion, Konigin 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment. 

The batteries of the 2d Guard Infantry Division between St. Ail 
and Ste. Marie fired on hostile skirmishers in their front and at targets 
at St. Privat. 

Of the infantry of the 2d Guard Division, the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade was deployed in two lines, 2 on the slope north of St. Ail. It 
could perceive only a few advance hostile skirmishers and off and on 
suffered from chassepot fire. 

The 1st Guard Infantry Division occupied Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
with the 2d Guard Infantry Brigade; the Guard Fusilier Regiment and 
the Guard Jager Battalion were deployed on the east front; the 4th 
Guard Regiment in the village and the 2d Guard Regiment behind 
the village. Southwest of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, about 400 meters 
from the village, the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was deployed, facing 
the northeast. The hostile rifle fire fell among its ranks as well as 
those of the 2d Guard Regimeut. 

The divisional cavalry regiments stood behind the infantry of 
their divisions at the ravine running from Habonville to Auboue. The 
Guard Cavalry Division was halted at Batilly, the two attached horse 
batteries with it. 

Of the XHth Army Corps the 47th Infantry Brigade was still en- 
gaged in establishing order in its ranks northwest of Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes. 

1 The 4th Light Battery was by itself about 300 meters southeast of St. Ail. 
2 Only five battalions strong, the 1st Battalion of the Konigin Regiment securing 
the artillery. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 271 

The mass of the Saxon artillery was still in the execution of a 
forward movement. The retreat of the hostile infantry north of the 
Ste. Marie— St. Privat road which had been caused by its fire, and the 
cleaning out of the woods of Auboue gave that artillery a chance— by 
direction of Crown Prince Albert— to make a turn from the Ste. Marie— 
Auboue to the Ste. Marie— Ho mecourt road. The 2d Heavy Battery of 
the 23d Infantry Division was already in position at this road imme- 
diately south of the woods; but it soon left that position as it had orders 
to join the other batteries of the 23d Infantry Division and accompany 
with them the enveloping march of the 48th Infantry Brigade. At 4.45 
p.m. the batteries of the corps artillery and of the 23th Infantry Divi- 
sion took station where the above mentioned heavy battery had stood, 
facing eastward; the corps artillery occupied the line with its left wing 
as far as the woods of Auboue; the right wing of the batteries of the 
24th Division was close to Ste. Marie aux Chenes. This change of 
position took until 5.30 p.m. The 4th Battalion (Foot) of the corps ar- 
tillery, held back until then, was also brought up into this new line. 
Only the 6th Heavy Battery remained in its position on the Ste. Marie 
—Auboue road. The batteries directed their fire on the hostile infantry 
in the foreground and which was falling back for the greater part into 
the main position between St. Privat and Roncourt. 

North of the corps artillery there was, of the 45th Infantry Brig- 
ade, the 108th. Rifle Regiment at the east corner of the woods of 
Auboue; north and south of that regiment the 100th Body Grenadier 
Regiment at the edges of the woods. The 101st Grenadier Regiment 
whose 1st Battalion had executed a short advance in the direction of 
Montois la Montagne, had that battalion within the woods of Auboue 
behind the left wing of the other two regiments, and the 2d and 3d 
Battalions at the west edge of the woods. 

The 46th Infantry Brigade still stood with the 1st Heavy Battery 
at Moineville. The 48th Infantry Brigade, which had been started for 
the envelopment of the hostile right wing by way of Auboue through 
the Orne Valley toward Montois la Montagne, just then passed Auboue 
toward the north and with it marched the 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments 
and the batteries of the 23d Infantry Division, except the 2d Heavy 
Battery which soon thereafter hastened from the south corner of the 
woods of Auboue to rejoin the remainder of the batteries. The 48th 
Infantry Brigade was followed with some distance through Coinville by 
the 3d Cavalry Regiment and the Guard Cavalry Regiment of the 12th 
Cavalry Division, accompanied by the 1st Horse Battery. Each of 
these regiments had sent one squadron into the valley of the Mosel 
north of Metz toward Ueckingen 1 to destroy the railroad and telegraph. 

In consequence of the previous events a remarkable shifting of 
forces had taken place in the Xllth Army Corps. The two brigades of 
the 24th Infantry Division were separated by a continually increasing 

'Uckange— Ed. 



272 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

space caused by the 47th Infantry Brigade remaining at Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes and by the enveloping march of the 48th through Auboue to- 
ward Montois la Montagne. Between them was the 45th Infantry 
Brigade of the 23d Division at the woods of Auboue; behind this latter, 
quite a distance off, the 46th Infantry Brigade at Moineville. 

The Xth Army Corps, held back in the second line, started toward 
5.30 p.m. from Batilly in direction of St. Ail, which direction it had been 
previously ordered to assume. It was followed by the 5th Cavalry 
Division. 

If we scrutinize the entire positions of the lid Army about 5 
p.m. we find the left wing, composed of the Guard and theXIIth Army 
Corps, still carefully kept back from the hostile main position, after the 
right wing, the IXth Army Corps, has encountered the enemy prema- 
turely. The intention of using the Guard Corps simultaneously with 
the Xllth Army Corps, as soon as the latter had completed the envelop- 
ment, is clearly apparent. The front of the German left wing is formed 
by a long artillery line, reaching from the vicinity north of Habonville 
as far as the woods of Auboue, with interruptions at St. Ail and Ste. 
Marie aux Ch§nes. Four infantry brigades are in the center of the 
artillery line, alongside of each other, ready for the attack; a fifth one 
on the north wing; a sixth just about to envelop the enemy; while a 
seventh is still farther behind the front. 

The enemy, after the fights around Ste. Marie aux Chgnes and at 
the woods of Auboue, is engaged in drawing back the troops which had 
been pushed ahead of the main position with the exception of a few 
weaker detachments. This, together with the holding back of the Ger- 
mans, caused the pause in the battle which took place at 5 p.m. on the 
right wing and also included the IXth Army Corps, where all offensive 
movements had ceased for the time being. A moderate artillery fire 
on the German side broke the silence, increasingwhenever some prom- 
ising target appeared in sight, as for instance, toward 5 p.m., when the 
hostile skirmish line advanced from St. Privat a short stretch toward 
St. Ail, apparently followed by a few squadrons. 1 The hostile guns 
were silent; but the infantry kept up the fire, even if only by single 
shot3, with their long range rifles against the German infantry and 
artillery. 

With great tension the leaders of the lid Army awaited the mo- 
ment when a continuation of the attack could be taken up. Prince 
Frederick Charles had halted on the hill southwest of Habonville, south 
of the Metz— Etain railroad; Prince August of Wtirttemberg about 800 
meters farther north on the ridge west of Habonville; the Crown Prince 
of Saxony west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes; and General von Manstein 
viewed the battle field of the Guard Corps from the north edge of the 
Bois de la Cusse. 

1 This observation, several times mentioned in battle reports, was undoubtedly 
incorrect. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 273 

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AT HEADQUARTEES OF THE 

GUARD CORPS AND IID ARMY. DECISION TO 

ATTACK ST. PRIVAT 

Prince August of Wurttemberg had at the very start been of the 
opinion that the Guard Corps should attack only when the Saxons had 
come near the enemy. With this idea in mind he had delayed the 
attack on the enemy's advanced position at Ste. Marie until a Saxon 
infantry brigade could interfere, although the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division was well able to make that attack alone. After the fall of 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes he sent directions to General von Pape to se- 
cure the possession of that village and that further action should be 
taken only on receipt of further orders. 

When between 4 and 5 p.m., the enemy's artillery fire gradually 
ceased and the commander of the artillery of the Guards, General 
Prince zu Hohenlohe asked for further instructions, the reply was sent 
him, to save his ammunition for the critical moment and to keep up 
only a containing fire until one division of the Saxons going by way of 
Auboue and Montois la Montagne had reached Roncourt, from where 
they would attack the enemy in flank. He also informed him that it 
was not the intention to make a premature attack on the strong hostile 
position in front with only the twenty -two Guard battalions, which 
stood in Ste. Marie and at St. Ail. The fire of the artillery was to be 
very slow, unless hostile measures demanded a larger expenditure of 
ammunition. 1 The chief of staff of the Guard Corps, General von 
Dannenberg, had added to this that Prince Hohenlohe was to be no- 
tified as soon as the attack was decided on. 

Thus Headquarters of the Guard Corps was well informed of 
events with the neighboring XHth Army Corps. It was known to it 
that the Crown Prince of Saxony had extended the envelopment, 
originally planned to go around the woods of Aubou6, still farther 
northward to beyond Montois la Montagne. Communication between 
the two corps by means of information officers worked well. The 
addition to the Prince's instructions to Prince Hohenlohe shows that 
it was intended to have the artillery support the subsequent infantry 
attack. 

Corps headquarters had less information concerning the course of 
the battle of the IXth Army Corps. As early as 2 p.m. General von 
Manstein had sent information that it would be well, considering the 
hot battle of the IXth Army Corps, to leave a reserve at Anoux la 
Grange or at Vern6ville. Shortly after 4 p.m. orders had arrived from 
Prince Frederick Charles to have the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade re- 
port to the IXth Army Corps. Thus there was every reason to view 
the situation of the IXth Army Corps as precarious; that conditions had 
materially bettered themselves with that corps in the fifth afternoon 
hour was still unknown. 

Prince August knew that his intention of holding back the attack 

'History of the Guard Artillery, vol. 2; p. 141. 



274 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

for the present coincided with the views of army headquarters and 
also with those of Royal Headquarters, as Prince Frederick Charles had 
personally informed him. It was clear to him that the intended en- 
velopment, as actually being made by the XHth Army Corps, would 
take some time; the day was beginning to decline and the IXth Army 
Corps had made no progress. With easily understood impatience the 
Prince directed his fieldglasses northward in the hope of seeing the 
Saxons appear east of the woods of Auboue. 

From the Prince's location the French position, from the Metz— 
Etain railroad as far as St. Privat, could be distinctly seen; Ste. Marie 
could be distinguished behind St. Ail; and the outlook took in the en- 
tire future battlefield of the Guards south of the road from Ste. Marie 
to St. Privat. The view over the field north of the road was less clear, 
it being veiled by powder smoke. He could not see the vicinity of 
Montois la Montagne or Roncourt, and the great strength of the posi- 
tion at St. Privat was not entirely visible. But after 4.30 p.m. there 
were clearly discerned movements of hostile troops which appeared to 
be marching from Roncourt toward St. Privat. 1 

In conjunction with the total silence of the hostile artillery these 
observations produced in Prince August the certitude that the enemy 
was weakening his main position. The object of this weakening might 
be either to. fall back on Metz and thereby avoid defeat, or to reinforce 
the sorely pressed troops engaged with the IXth Army Corps. Both 
possibilities appeared undesirable: to allow the opponent to withdraw 
unbeaten meant the loss of an entire day filled with fatigue and sacri- 
fices; a defeat of the IXth Army Corps, entailing probably a piercing 
of the center of the German battle line, would endanger the Guard 
Corps to the utmost. This estimate of the situation aroused in the 
already impatient Prince a frame of mind which caused him to look 
longingly forward to the appearance of the Saxons and consequent 
attack by the Guard Corps. 

The Prince's estimate of the situation of the enemy was not shared 
by all officers of Corps Headquarters. The chief of staff, General von 
Dannenberg, also considered the enemy at St. Privat weak, not because 
of his sending troops back to Metz or to the support of the troops en- 
gaged with the IXth Army Corps, but because he believed that there 
were only weak troops there which had disengaged from the battle 
with the IXth Army Corps, probably in order to march off northward. 

An additional mistake now wove itself into the erroneous concep- 
tions which influenced the Prince's frame of mind. Crown Prince 
Albert had caused him to be informed that he would start the march at 
5 p. m. for the envelopment of Roncourt— St. Privat. 2 From this re- 
port which came from the vicinity of Ste. Marie aux Chenes it could be 
calculated that the Saxon envelopment would become effective south 

'These movements in fact were the retrogade movements of the 75th and 91st 
Line Eegiments from the west to the east toward the main position. 

'Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 275 

of Montois la Montagne at about 6.15 p.m. Prince August did not 
calculate thus; he took the information to mean that the Saxons would 
execute the enveloping attack on Roncourt at 6 p.m. His own im- 
patience conduced to this conception and the course of events appeared 
to bear him out in it. 

He saw how, about 4.45 p.m. Saxon batteries were taking position 
in the line between Ste. Marie aux Chines and the woods of Aubou6 
and apparently directing their fire on St. Privat. This apparently was 
the introduction to the immediate attack of the Saxons on Roncourt. 
The Saxon batteries were indeed still very far from the hostile posi- 
tion; the Saxon infantry was nowhere to be seen; but it appeared 
certain that the participation of the main body of the Saxon troops 
could now be counted on. 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg was clear in his own mind that a 
firm attack in front was necessary if this envelopment was to be suc- 
cessful. This meant a hastening of the attack. Other considerations 
also demanded special promptitude. The enemy's position was cer- 
tainly no longer strongly held; it was only a question of a hostile corps 
which undoubtedly had participated in the battle of August 16th and 
probably had suffered heavy losses. It might be possible that the 
pressure of the Saxons against the hostile right flank would suffice to 
cause the enemy to take up his final retreat. Prince August felt a 
justifiable ambition of procuring for his corps its full share in the ex- 
pected victory, especially as this 18th of August was the first chance it 
had had to encounter the enemy. If the Guard Corps was still to inter- 
fere with success quick action was necessary; a combined deployment 
of the Guard infantry and preparation of the attack by artillery could 
not be waited for. There had already been a certain artillery effect 
against St. Privat; the slow fire of the Guard batteries appeared to 
have been mainly directed against that village. 

The Prince believed himself justified in giving the orders for the 
attack, as freedom of action had been left him in the orders from 
Prince Frederick Charles "to wait with his serious infantry attack 
until the XHth Army Corps would be able to effectively interfere." 
He was just about to issue the necessary orders when Colonel von der 
Becke, the commander of the corps artillery of the Xth Army Corps, 
halted at Batilly, galloped up to get information concerning the battle 
situation. The colonel learned the Prince's intention to attack St. 
Privat and took the liberty of asking whether the Prince did not in- 
tend to have the attack prepared by artillery. The Prince replied that 
he could not now bring up his batteries for this, as they were other- 
wise engaged. The colonel urgently requested a short delay as he 
could within twenty minutes bring up the then available ten batteries 
of the Xth Army Corps and place them in position against St. Privat. 
This offer the Prince declined to accept with the remark that he could 
not wait for the bringing up of the batteries and delay the attack until 
they could have produced a suitable effect; for the envelopment of the 



276 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Xllth Corps undoubtedly would have a tactical effect very shortly and 
therefore the attack on St. Privat must be made at once, to prevent 
the enveloping attack from miscarrying. In addition, the day was 
now too far advanced to permit a postponement of the attack for, 
should it be longer delayed, there would be no time before darkness 
set in to gather the fruits of a success. 1 

The Prince was firm in his decision to attack and gave orders for 
the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade to attack from St. Ail ; the 1st Guard 
Infantry Division from Ste. Marie aux Chenes. The chief of staff, 
General von Dannenberg, undertook to report this to army head- 
quarters and to issue proper orders to the troops. 

While thus, in the Guard Corps, the intention of attacking hastily 
took shape and increased in intensity, the expectation at army head- 
quarters that the decisive action would commence very soon, also in- 
creased to impatience. At 2.45 p.m. Prince Frederick Charles had 
sent Captain von Winterfeld to Royal Headquarters with the report 
that he thought of starting the attack at 3.45 p.m. 8 At that time he 
knew only that the hostile position extended to St. Privat and that 
Ste Marie was occupied by the enemy. The first thing then was to at- 
tack the latter village, but the attack on the hostile main position was 
being thought of in connection with this. But very soon there arrived 
the report from Crown Prince Albert of 2.30 p.m., according to which 
the 23d Infantry Division was to attack through Coinville and the 
woods situated between there and Roncourt. and the fact that Saxon 
troops were still seen marching south of Coinville made it plain that 
the enveloping movement would still take a considerable time. 
It could be concluded from the report of Crown Prince Albert that the 
French right wing stood farther in the north than St. Privat, a fact 
which could not be ascertained from Habonville. A rough calcula- 
tion of time and distances showed that the Saxon envelopment would 
become effective about 5 p.m. The subsequent extension of the Saxon 
envelopment to beyond Aubou6 and Montois la Montagne was not 
known to army headquarters. 

Waiting for the decision was not at all pleasant to Prince Freder- 
ick Charles. He remained of the opinion that it must come on August 
18th in order not to leave the enemy time to form new intentions which 
eould have as their objective only a getting away from the German 
envelopment, and now, after a weary march into position, only a very 
few hours of daylight remained to push through the decisive battle. 3 
Though the general situation could be viewed favorably, since the battle 
developed in accordance with the wishes of army headquarters, so far 
no decisive successes had been attained. In the IX th Army Corps, 
which had been engaged since 12 noon, all danger of a reverse appeared 
to have been overcome after strong reserves had been placed in readi- 

1 Personal statement of Colonel von der Becke. 

2 As a matter of fact Ste. Marie aux Chenes was attacked as early as 3 p.m. 

3 Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, p. 147. (P. 73, ante.) 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 277 

ness in its rear. General von Manstein also had sent in the report 
that the battle stood well since the hostile artillery had ceased firing 
and that his infantry was gaining ground. 1 Still the corps had not 
made very much progress and had suffered considerably. The only 
thing, not counting the comparatively easy capture of Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes, which could be viewed as actual success, was the silencing of 
the hostile artillery along the entire front from Folie to St. Privat; 
thus at least was the cessation of Are by the hostile batteries accounted 
for at army headquarters. 8 Therefore there had been accomplished 
at least one of the main requisites for the success of the subsequent 
attack; and this attack was anxiously awaited. 

At army headquarters, as at Guard Corps headquarters, hostile 
movements were seen and taken to mean an evacuation of the country 
between Roncourt and St. Privat. It was believed that these move- 
ments were observed continuing to beyond St. Privat in the direction 
of Amanweiler. 3 The thought once more arose that the IXth Army 
Corps, already in a difficult situation, was again threatened. When 
Prince Frederick Charles ordered von Voights-Rhetz, the command- 
ing general of theXth Army Corps, which had halted at Batilly, to re- 
port to him, he had in mind utilizing that corps also in support of the 
IXth Corps. 4 But other considerations induced him to draw the Xth 
Army Corps up to St. Ail as a reserve for the Guard Corps, as had been 
originally planned. 

As the actual course of the Saxon envelopment remained unknown 
at army headquarters, reasons were sought to explain the non-appear- 
ance of the Saxons. Finally the supposition gained ground that the 
Saxons in their march by Coinville to Auboue had encountered a hostile 
departing echelon which attempted to escape in a northerly or north- 
westerly direction. 5 Thus the old belief kept cropping up that the 
enemy's original intention had been to avoid a German attack by 
marching off to the north or northwest. The original deployment of 
the enemy between St. Privat and Ste. Marie appeared also to indicate 
that while marching between these two places he had been forced by 
the German deployment to make front toward the flank. 6 This was 
the simplest explanation of the non-appearance of the Saxons. For 
some time the Saxon artillery had been noticed firing from the Ste. 
Marie — Auboue road apparently directed toward the north. 7 Thus the 
enemy was there and was holding up the Xllth Army Corps. The 
subsequent change of position of the Saxon artillery to the Ste. Marie — 

'Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee p. 158. (P. 79, ante.) 

^Statement of the (then) 1st Lieutenant von der Goltz, of the general staff of 
army headquarters. 

3 Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, p. 146. 

'War Archives. 

6 Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, p. 147. 

"Statement of the (thenj 1st Lieutenant von der Goltz, of the general staff, II. 
Army. 

'Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der II. Armee, p. 147. 



278 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Homecourt road was made gradually and was not perceived in its fullest 
extent. 

From these impressions army headquarters came to the following 
general conclusions: the envelopment had come to a halt; the enemy 
had shifted troops in his main position at St. Privat to the south against 
the IXth Army Corps; this movement could be stopped only through 
an attack by the Guard Corps; but as that attack could not be sup- 
ported by the Saxons, it was necessary to hold the Xth Army Corps in 
readiness behind the Guard Corps; for the rest, it was high time to 
seek the decision if the day was not to pass uselessly after having cost 
large sacrifices. The attack of the Guard Corps was not expected to 
be too difficult; the hostile artillery apparently had been silenced and 
the Guard batteries had directed their fire against the hostile position for 
an appreciable time even if intermittently. 

Toward 5 p.m. General von Dannenberg rode across the railroad 
and reported to Prince Fredex-ick Charles that Prince August of Wiirt- 
temberg was about to commence the attack. The commander in chief 
at once acquiesced with the intention of lightening the commanding 
general's responsibility for this grave decision. 1 

He had just issued orders to General von Voigts-Rhetz to post 
the Xth Army Corps at St. Ail as reserve for the Guard Corps. 2 

As soon as the Guard infantry was perceived to be advancing on 
St. Privat, army headquarters crossed the railroad and proceeded to 
the plateau west of Habonville, remaining not far from the place where 
Headquarters of the Guard Corps had been. 3 



THE BATTLEFIELD OP THE 4TH GUARD INFANTRY 
BRIGADE AND THE ENEMY 

The battlefield of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade ascended in a 
slightly curved slope from St. Ail toward the high lying village of St. 
Privat and the heights south of it; on the south it was bounded by the 
ravine north of Habonville; on the north by the Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes 
— St. Privat la Montagne road, the densely leaved poplars on both sides 
of which prevented a good view over the terrain on the other side. 
Of the village of St. Privat, the church, some roofs and farm buildings, 
situated especially high on the southwest corner, were seen. Toward 
the east as far as the ridge, and toward the south beyond the ravine 
north of Habonville as far as the Bois de la Cusse, the view was open. 
The entire stretch, 2600 meters, from St. Ail to the heights of St. Privat 
offered no cover worthy of the name. The fields were bare, only a few 
furrows offered slight protection here and there. Of two unimportant 
meadow basins, extending into the field of attack from the north edge 
of the village of St. Ail, only the southern one, east of the St. Ail — Ste. 

'According to a statement of the (then) general staff officers of army head- 
quarters, Count von Haeseler, and Lieutenant von der Goltz. 

2 War Archives. 

3 War Archives. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 279 

Marie road, offered a little protection against fire and sight for a 
stretch of some 200 meters. On August 18th the ground was hard and 
dry, so that striking bullets ricochetted. 

On the enemy's side, the ridge extended prominently from knoll 
328 at the southwest corner of St. Privat to the hill 321 on the south. 
The basin east of this elevation was absolutely covered against fire and 
view. The slope from knoll 328 was gentle and uniform to hill 321, 
sinking from there somewhat more steeply for the next 50 meters to- 
ward the south. This short declivity divided the battlefield of the French 
into two parts with different fronts; north of it were troops of the 
6th Corps facing southwest; south of it troops of the 4th Corps facing 
west. The hostile infantry between the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road 
and the Metz — Etain railroad formed an extended front, supported by 
sufficient reserves. The somewhat advanced wing of the first line was 
formed by eight companies of the 93d Line Regiment, of the 3d Division 
of the 6th Corps, which were distributed about 800 meters from the Ste. 
Marie— St. Ail road in the space between the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road 
and the depression running north from St. Ail. Behind them about 600 
meters from St. Privat was the 3d Battalion of the same regiment de- 
ployed on both sides of the road, forming a connection with the troops 
north of the road. Next, on the left, were the three battalions 35th 
Line Regiment, 4th Division, 6th Coi'ps; next the battalions of the 26th 
Line Regiment, the left wing of which was at the depression between 
the two knolls 328 and 322 south of St. Privat. Farther south to the 
Metz — Etain railroad the companies of the 20th Jager Battalion, 1st 
Division, 4th Corps, had occupied the knoll 322, one kilometer north- 
west of Amanweiler. In front of the entire line were skirmishers 
whose fire was directed on the Guard batteries, on the troops of the 
IXth Army Corps at the Bois de la Cusse, and also on the dense masses 
of the Guard infantry, in so far as they were visible between Ste. Marie 
and St. Ail. 

In the second line were, alongside each other, the 70th and 28th 
Line Regiments, 4th Division, 6th Corps, at knoll 328 immediately south- 
west of St. Privat, the 28th Regiment being about 500 meters behind 
the 26th Line Regiment. South of the 28th Line Regiment the space 
immediately behind the 20th Jager Battalion, as far as the Metz — Etain 
railroad, was filled by the 57th Line Regiment, one battalion of the 
73d and one of the 6th Line Regiments. A few hundred meters behind 
them was another battalion of the 73d Line Regiment. The other parts 
of the 6th and 73d Line Regiments were south of the railroad. 

In the third line was the 1st Line Regiment on the St. Privat — 
Amanweiler road, its left wing near the railroad. The other side of the 
highroad, southeast of Jerusalem, was the Dragoon Brigade of the Cav- 
alry Division de Gondrecourt. 

The batteries which had been in action south of the St. Privat — 
Ste. Marie road still had their fighting power, but were somewhat short 
of ammunition. They had in greater part been taken back to the 



280 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

quarries at Amanweiler; the three batteries of the 1st Division of the 
4th Corps were halted with the 1st Line Regiment at the St. Privat— 
Amanweiler road. Two batteries from the main artillery reserve 
which Marshal Bazaine had sent from St. Quentin for support of the 6th 
Corps were approaching the battlefield. 1 

THE 4TH GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE ATTACKS 

Shortly after 5 p.m. the chief of staff of the Guard Corps, General 
von Dannenberg, accompanied by Captain von Stulpnagel, arrived at 
St. Ail and brought orders to the commander of the 2d Guard Infantry 
Division, General von Budritzki, "to advance now simultaneously with 
the 1st Guard Division, which has already taken the village of Ste. 
Marie, to the attack against St. Privat, directing on the southern portion 
of the village of Jerusalem." 8 He then continued his ride to seek out 
the commander of the 1st Guard Infantry Division at Ste. Marie aux 
Ch&nes. 

This order was transmitted by General von Budritzki to the com- 
manding general of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade, General von 
Berger. About this time that brigade was posted as follows: the 
Fusilier Battalion of the Konigin 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment was 
immediately north of St. Ail; behind it the 2d Battalion, facing east; 
left alongside the Grenadier Regiment was the 2d Grenadier Regiment, 
also in two lines, the 2d Battalion in front, behind it the Fusilier Battal- 
ion, on the left the 1st Battalion. Of the 1st Battalion of the Konigin 
Regiment, which had taken over the protection of the Guard Artillery, 
the 1st and 2d Companies were, in close order, on the east side of St. 
Ail; the 4th Company farther south deployed between the pieces; the 
3d Company in the ravine northeast of Habonville. 

In rear of the Guard Artillery was (of the 3d Guard Infantry Brig- 
ade in Habonville) the 1st Battalion, 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment, 
occupying with its 1st and 3d Companies the eastern edge, with the 4th 
and 2d Companies the village exit toward St. Ail. 

General von Berger assembled the field officers of his brigade in 
the depression north of St. Ail and at 5.15 p.m issued the following at- 
tack orders : 

The brigade will advance south of the road on St. Privat and the 
hill to the south of it; the attack will be supported by the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Division advancing north of the road. Each regiment, on the left 
the Franz Regiment, on the right the Konigin Regiment, will send 
one battalion ahead in column of companies; the remaining battalions 
to follow in half-battalions and take np company column formation 
when entering the effective hostile fire zone. 

There were no special directions given to seek connection with 
the 1st Guard Infantry Division as it was believed that that division 
had parts deployed north of the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road and only 
after entering the hostile fire was it noticed that that division had not 

1 Bazaine had promised Canrobert only one, but he sent two batteries. 
2 War Archives. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 281 

yet started the movement. 1 The deployment of the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade was made on the St. Ail— Ste. Maiieroad with drill ground reg- 
ulation intervals and distances. The entire brigade was to start simul- 
taneously, directing on the high building at the southwest corner of St. 
Privat which was mistaken for Jerusalem. 

During this deployment a minor attack engagement took place on 
the right wing of the Guard artillery. Here the 4th Company of the 
4th Grenadier Regiment Konigin had repeatedly attempted to throw 
back the annoying hostile skirmishers by rushes from between the 
pieces. These hostile skirmishers were about 800 meters in front of the 
artillery and greatly harrassed it with their fire. But each rush was 
called back by the artillery commanders themselves because they 
feared a masking of their fire. About 5 p.m. the fire of the hostile 
skirmishers increased again in volume, being directed by a French 
higher officer who had hastened up for that purpose. 2 The 3d Com- 
pany of the Konigin Regiment, which advanced in the ravine north- 
east of Habonville, succeeded in getting within range of the hostile 
skirmishers and driving them off by a rush forward after a rapid fire. 
This rush the 4th Company participated in on the left wing of the 3d 
Company, though at some distance from it, the attack being made in 
about the direction of hill 321 southwest of St. Privat. The shells of the 
Guard artillery, now once more able to fire actively, fell among the 
retreating French skirmishers. 

This charge, however, would scarcely have succeeded had not other 
troops advanced simultaneously farther southward against the hostile 
skirmishers. The commander of the 2d Heavy Guard Battery, Captain 
von Prittwitz, had asked the commander of the 1st Battalion, Kaiser 
Alexander 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment, Major von Seeckt, then in 
Habonville, to drive off the skirmishers in front of the artillery. The 
latter, complying with this request, caused the 2d and 4th Companies 
to advance from the northern exit of Habonville in the general direc- 
tion of St. Privat in such manner that they entered the fight south of 
the two companies of the Konigin Regiment. A part of the hostile 
skirmishers were driven off toward the east. There remained, how- 
ever, so many hostile skirmish groups still in the foreground of the 
hostile position that the charge of the four companies was brought to 
a stand by their hot chassepot fire. The companies remained with 
their right wing about 1400 meters southeast of St. Ail and took up 
their forward movement again only when the 4th Guard Infantry Brig- 
ade appeared on their left. 

The deployment of the brigade had been completed by 5.30 p.m. 
In the first line of the Konigin 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment the Fus- 
ilier Battalion had deployed the 10th and 11th Companies; behind these 
were the 9th and 12th Companies as a half -battalion; to the right of the 

■War Archives and statement of the (then) brigade adjutant, Lieutenant von 
Twardowski. 

"This was Colonel Gibon, commander of the 1st Brigade, 4th Division, 6th Corps, 
who repeatedly rode down the skirmish line on a white horse encouraging the skir- 
mishers to fire. 



282 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

10th Company the 1st and 2d Companies had halted on the east front 
of St. Ail. In the second line was the 2d Battalion, formed in two 
half-battalions behind each other. The leading half -battalion con- 
sisted of the 5th and 7th; the rear one of the 6th and 8th Companies. 
On the left the 2d Battalion of the Kaiser Franz 2d Guard Grenadier 
Regiment had deployed in the first line like the neighboring Fusilier 
Battalion of the Konigin Regiment: its 6th and 7th Companies deployed 
in front; behind the center the 5th and 8th Companies as a half-battal- 
ion. In the second line were the other two battalions, which subse- 
quently deployed into half -battalions formed from the 9th and 12th, 10th 
and 11th, 1st and 4th, and 2d and 3d Companies. All leading companies 
of the first line of both regiments had deployed skirmishers. They had 
been cautioned against masking the artillery of the 2d Guard Infantry 
Division in position south of Ste. Marie aux Chenes. Thus deployed 
in a line extending from St. Ail north to about half way s to Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes, the start was made at 5.30 p.m., the regimental bands play- 
ing the attack march. General von Berger rode in the center of his 
brigade. He was followed by the division commander, General von 
Budritzki. The commander of the Konigin 4th Guard Grenadier Regi- 
ment, Colonel Count von Waldersee, took the head of his 2d Battalion; 
Lieutenant-Colonel von Boehm of the Kaiser Franz 2d Guard Grenadier 
Regiment rode forward with the deployed skirmishers. 

THE RIGHT WING OP THE 4TH GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE 

CAPTURES THE PROJECTING HEIGHT 321 

SOUTHWEST OP ST. PRIVAT 

When the brigade left the bottom north of St. Ail, the hostile in- 
fantry fire, until then desultory, greatly increased in volume, so that 
the losses quickly augmented. Involuntarily the troops pressed to- 
ward the two depressions leading from St. Ail eastward, though they 
offered little or no protection. On the right wing the 1st and 2d Com- 
panies, Konigin Regiment, entered the southern hollow. The Fusilier 
Battalion marching on their left had first moved ahead between the 
two depressions, but soon sought out the northern one by making a 
left oblique. This caused in the first line of the Franz Regiment also a 
left oblique, which, however, was not executed by the half-battalions 
in the second line. The half-battalion marching on the extreme right, 
consisting of the 9th and 12th Companies, Franz Regiment, under Cap- 
tain Siefart, in this manner got behind the Fusilier Battalion of the 
Konigin Regiment and remained in connection with that battalion dur- 
ing the entire course of the battle. It followed it to the north edge of 
the northern basin and deployed two platoons when the Fusilier Bat- 
talion ahead deployed all the units of its leading companies a few hun- 
dred paces after crossing the St. Ail — Ste. Marie road when entering 
the hostile fire zone. 

Through the manner of advance of the first line of the Regiment 
Konigin a large gap was caused between the 1st and 2d Companies on 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 283 

the light and the Fusilier Battalion on the left. Into this gap Colonel 
Count von Waldersee brought the 2d Battalion out of the second line. 
He had perceived the great strength of the hostile front and decided 
to attempt enveloping the enemy with at least one company. While 
the 6th, 8th and 7th Companies entered the gap, the 5th Company de- 
bouched to the right behind the 1st and 2d. Southeast of St. Ailitmet 
the 3d and 4th companies, Regiment Konigin, and the 2d and 4th Com- 
panies, Regiment Alexander, and joined their left wing. 

Through this shifting among the Regiment Konigin and the near- 
est neighboring parts of the Regiments Franz and Alexander, three 
battle groups were formed. While the northern group, consisting of 
the Fusilier Battalion, RegimentKonigin, and the half-battalion Siefart, 
Regiment Franz, continued its march in and along the northern basin 
of St. Ail, and turned against the plainly visible hedges enclosing the 
field road leading from St. Privat across knoll 328 southwest, the two 
southern groups chose the projecting hill 321 farther southwest as their 
attack objective. The 1st, 2d, 6th, 8th and 7th Companies of the Regi- 
ment Konigin, under leadership of Colonel Count von Waldersee, 
worked toward the west slope, following the southern basin with their 
right wing; the 2d and 4th Companies of the Regiment Alexander, the 
3d, 4th and 5th Companies, Regiment Konigin, under Major Rosen- 
berg, commenced to press forward toward the southwest slope when 
the other group pressed them farther north. 

During their forward movement the companies of the two south- 
ern groups were exposed without any protection to the devastating 
fire of the opponent; yet the hostile advanced skirmishers evacuated 
the field at all points. When the groups had gotten to within 1200 
meters of the smoke enveloped main position of the enemy the com- 
panies threw themselves down and then continued their advance by 
rushes. At a range of about 500 meters from the enemy they com- 
menced to reply to the hostile fire. At this time they formed but a 
single line with very few supporting troops in rear. 

From this firing position the group under Major von Rosenberg, 
together with two companies of the Regiment Alexander, first suc- 
ceeded in closing with the enemy, storming the southeast declivity of 
hill 321 in several rushes and under heavy loss. This success was made 
possible by the support of the Hessian detachments which had been 
advanced north of the Bois de la Cusse and held the enemy in check on 
hill 322 on the Metz— Etain railroad. The hostile infantry fell back 
before the charging Guard companies from the southern part of hill 
321, partly in a northeasterly and partly in an easterly direction 
through the broad meadow ground running in the east into the de- 
pression between knolls 328 and 322 south of St. Privat. The compa- 
nies of the Regiment Alexander on the right wing pressed hotly after 
the French infantry but came under the fire of the fresh hostile forces 
just appearing in the above mentioned depression, were forced to halt, 
and had then to fall back on the group under Major von Rosenberg, 



284 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

leaving a large number of men behind, wounded and killed. The en- 
tire group, reduced now to five companies, crouched close to the 
ground on the southwest slope of the projecting hill 321, bending back 
the wings toward Amanweiler and St. Privat, and entered into a sta- 
tionary fire fight with the superior enemy at 400 to 500 meters range. 

Colonel Count von Waldersee, who, like the other field officers 
and captains had remained mounted and rode amongst the skirmishers 
of the group led by him, could partially overlook these events and 
came to the conclusion that the enveloping movement of Rosenberg's 
group had come to a standstill. As he considered it hardly possible, 
by a direct frontal attack alone, with his five companies to storm the 
west slope of the ridge, he sent the 1st and 2d Companies on the right 
wing of his group orders to draw to the right and turn to envelop the 
enemy. This movement was executed with remarkable order. In the 
meantime the colonel advanced with his three companies in front and, 
when the foot of the ascent was reached, the heights were stormed 
with hurrahs and beating of drums. Here also the hostile skirmishers 
gave way at all points. This charge led up the west slope of the ridge 
to a few hundred meters north of the Rosenberg group. Here the 
companies remained halted 300 to 400 meters from a new hostile line 
which was still advancing and returned the heavy fire which was 
poured on them. But as retrogade movements were observed in the 
dense hostile skirmish lines, Colonel Count von Waldersee now believed 
that success was his and sent orders back to bring up the cavalry to 
cut clown the fleeing enemy. 1 However, the heavy losses which in 
very short time increased gruesomely, following the advance and the 
charge which had already been so costly, especially in officers, soon 
compelled Count von Waldersee to report personally to General von 
Berger that he would of course hold his position but was too weak to 
advance further. At the same time he sent word to the Guard artillery 
asking for support. Immediately thereafter he was disabled by a 
serious wound. 

Though the enemy remained still numerically superior, the needle 
gun fire had a very good effect on his infantry occupying the country 
south of knoll 328 as far as the depression north of knoll 322. The 
east slope of the ridge, the western slope of which had been ascended, 
could in part be held under fire; the country could be overlooked to 
beyond the Amanweiler— St. Privat road. The retrograde movements 
out of the hostile skirmish line continued, especially from the vicinity 
of the previously mentioned depression. 

One moment it appeared as if the advantages thus far gained 
would be endangered by an attack of French forces coming from the 
southeast against the Rosenberg group, but here the artillery inter- 
fered successfully. In spite of this the situation remained precarious 
enough. Farther northward the Fusilier Battalion of the Regiment 

1 The nearest cavalry stood in the ravine of Auboue. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 285 

Konigin made but slow progress towards the hedge road; nothing was 
to be seen of an interference of the 1st Guard Infantry Division. 

THE GUARD ARTILLERY SOUTHEAST OF ST. AJL ADVANCES 
TO THE SUPPORT OF THE INFANTRY ATTACK 

Towards 5.20 p.m. the fire of the Guard batteries under Prince zu 
Hohenlohe had again become more active in order to pursue the hostile 
skirmishers which were driven away from in front of the artillery by 
the charge of the 1st Battalion, Konigin Regiment. Prince zu Hohen- 
lohe and the commander of the corps artillery, Colonel von Scherben- 
ing, observed with satisfaction the effect of the shells on the previously 
annoying opponent. About this time the hostile fire increased at St. 
Privat and the heights south of the village which became enveloped 
in powder smoke. This freshly started fire was however not aimed at 
the corps artillery. The Prince asked the colonel: "What does this 
mean? For God's sake! Our infantry is attacking in front before 
the Saxons have completed their enveloping movement." Both artil- 
lery leaders were of the opinion that a more rapid Are would have to 
be directed on St. Privat. * In the meantime, however, the batteries 
had of their own accord directed their fire on the hostile skirmish lines 
which at first oppor-ted the advance of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade 
and soon all were again engaged in a hot fire fight against the hostile in- 
fantry and the artillery which entered the battle anew. Shell fire 
came from knoll 328 at St. Privat and from the east from knoll 322. 
The advanee of the Guard infantry in the rising terrain soon masked 
the fire of a part of the batteries which did not dare to fire over the 
infantry at that long range. Finally, when the infantry climbed up 
the slope of the ridge southwest of St. Privat, it became necessary for 
these batteries to change position to the front in order to produce some 
effect on the enemy without endangering their own infantry. 

Of the 1st Guard Foot Artillery Battalion which stood on the right 
wing north of the ravine of Habonville, the 1st Heavy Battery had 
turned its fire on the artillery which had just appeared on knoll 322 
north of the Metz — Etain railroad, while the other batteries fired on 
the nearest infantry detachments. Chassepot bullets fell thickly on 
the batteries. When the masking of the fire by the forward moving 
group under Major von Rosenberg became effective, the 2d Heavy 
Battery of the left wing of the battalion first advanced straight to the 
front, but after covering 150 to 1(50 meters halted again under a heavy in- 
fantry fire, as going in this direction the heights in front hid all targets 
from it. With the words: "Here we shall all be killed without a return 
shot; so forward!" the battery commander, Captain von Prittwitz, led 
his battery to the half right past the front of his battalion to the south- 
ern spur of the projecting hill 321 where just then the Rosenberg 
group won a foothold under a heavy hostile fire. The exhausted 
horses dragged the guns partly at a trot, partly at a walk up the 
slope and the battery went into position on the right wing of the 

'History of the Guard Artillery, vol. 2, p. 142. 



286 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Rosenberg group in the very thin skirmish line of the 2d Company of 
the Regiment Alexander. Knoll 322 north of the Metz — Etain rail- 
road, occupied by the enemy, first caught the eye of the battery com- 
mander; then he saw that strong, infantry masses in deep formation 
were marching across the northern slope of that knoll and the depres- 
sion leading to knoll 328. As far as his eye could see toward the east 
the country was covered with advancing troops. It was impossible 
that the thin Prussian lines crouching on the southwestern slope of 
the projecting hill could unassisted oppose that advance. With three 
pieces which first came into position Captain von Prittwitz opened 
fire. The first round, at 600 meters range, struck a closed Up body of 
troops, dispersing it. Hit succeeded hit. The effect increased during 
the further advance of the enemy as the other three pieces took up 
the fire and the neighboring companies of the Regiments Alexander 
and Konigin made excellent use of their rifles. The enemy's leading 
line halted in the bottom west of knoll 322 and in part retreated across 
the depression eastward, pursued by shell fire. All danger however 
was not yet overcome, for the rear lines of the enemy were still pushing 
forward. The commander of the 1st Guard Foot Artillery Battalion, 
Lieutenant Colonel Bychelberg, had observed this and had brought up 
in all haste the 1st and 2d Light Batteries to join the 2d Heavy Battery. 
They unlimbered on the right of the latter battery, leaving between a 
large gap in which the 1st Heavy Battery took position a little later 
after it had abandoned the battle with the hostile artillery on knoll 
322, having in the meantime taken an intermediate position in the di- 
rection of St. Privat. Thus the four batteries of the 1st Guard Foot 
Artillery Battalion were in the third position 1 south of the projecting 
hill 321 and directed their combined fire on the advancing hostile in- 
fantry. The first shots of the two light batteries were fired while the 
two hostile lines still pressed forward ; but very soon the hostile attack 
broke completely under the effect of the batteries which were firing 
at their utmost speed. The French attack was twice repeated, but 
each time — and at longer ranges — broke under the effective fire of the 
Guard batteries. Strong hostile cavalry, forming southeast of St. 
Privat apparently for the advance, suffered a similar fate. With this 
the main task was completed. Still the batteries found opportunity 
again to interfere, farther south in the battle of the 3d Guard Infantry 
Brigade, and to fire on hostile batteries appearing northeast of 
Amanweiler, after the hostile batteries on knoll 322, had toward 7 p.m. 
disappeared for the second time. 

The group of the wounded Major von Rosenberg, now commanded 
by Captain Vogel von Falckenstein, took an essential part in the re- 
pulse of the French attack. After the danger of a superior hostile 
attack had been overcome by the artillery, the infantry took up the 
battle against the enemy and the fight assumed a stationary character 
north of knoll 322. Farther south Hessian troops were seen gaining 

"Not counting a temporary position south of Habonville. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 287 

ground to the front. Some reinforcement came through the 1st and 
3d Companies of the Regiment Alexander, which had accompanied the 
advance of the Foot Artillery Battalion from Habonville as escort. 
They took position behind the artillery line in the bottom and for a 
time suffered heavy losses there, as they formed a butt, so to speak, 
for the bullets intended for the batteries. 

Only a few minutes after the 2d Heavy Battery had taken position 
with the Rosenberg group the 3d Light Battery, under Captain von 
Friederici, also brought direct support to the group under Count von 
Waldersee thus fulfilling the wish of the seriously wounded colonel. 
After the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade had started the batteries of the 
corps artillery had supported the infantry attack, partly from their 
former positions and partly by a change of positions to the front, as 
long as the terrain permitted this without danger to the troops, firing 
on the hostile artillery and infantry at St. Privat. In pursuance of a 
request from General von Budritzki, Colonel von Scherbening caused 
the 3d and 4th Heavy Batteries to follow up the advancing infantry 
into the hot rifle fire and take up a new fire position at the foot of the 
west slope of the projecting hill 321, about 1600 meters from St. Privat. 
The batteries suffered heavy losses while going into position, but were 
enabled to unlimber and direct their fire against the south edge of 
St. Privat. Of course the effect could not be perceived, as knoll 328 
prevented sight. On their left the 2d Horse Battery arrived in a very 
short time and directed its fire on the hostile infantry and artillery south 
of the village. The 3d Light Battery also followed into this new position. 
Before it unlimbered General von Berger came up and called to the 
battalion commander, Major von Krieger, pointing to the half right: 
"My battalions can no longer hold out on that hill over there; artillery 
must go up there." 1 He had just received the verbal report from 
Colonel Count von Waldersee that his troops were too weak for a 
further advance. Captain von Friederici with the 3d Light Battery 
therefore turned at once to the right behind the 3d and 4th Heavy 
Batteries. While he himself fell mortally wounded from his horse the 
battery went into position with five guns about 15 meters in the right 
rear of the right wing of the Waldersee group under the hottest in- 
fantry fire. The cannoneers of the leaderless battery loaded with can- 
ister and commenced to fire on the opposite skirmishers. The last 
remaining officer, 2d Lieutenant Schmalz, hastening up, perceived 
however at a glance the great danger with which the French attack 
from Amanweiler was threatening the success thus far achieved by the 
Guard Infantry. Causing the pieces to be loaded with shells he had 
the guns fire on the more distant but more dangerous target. The first 
shots struck at 800 meters and had the best of effect, so that the nearby 
grenadiers of the Regiment Konigin loudly rejoiced. The fire was 
continued on this target until the French advance from there was 
brought to a halt. Thus this battery took a leading part in the defeat 
of the French counter attack. 

'History of the Guard Artillery, vol. 2, p. 145. 



288 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

All the batteries of the Guard artillery which had been engaged 
southeast of St. Ail had now changed position to the front. Five bat- 
teries participated directly in the infantry battle on a line with the 
skirmish lines of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade on the western slope 
of the projecting hill 321 and its southern extension; three stood 
farther back between hill 321 and St. Ail and directed their fire on 
St. Privat. The 4th Light Battery, which last stood northeast of St. 
Ail. had lost connection with the corps artillery. On the other hand 
the 1st and 3d Horse Batteries, which up to then had been attached to 
the Guard Cavalry Division, hastened from Batilly through St. Ail and 
sought connection with the 2d Horse Battery, so that the entire Horse 
Artillery Battalion was together on the left wing of the corps artillery. 



THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE HEDGE ROAD SOUTHWEST 
OF ST. PRIVAT IS CAPTURED 

The Fusilier Battalion of the Regiment Konigin, executing with 
the half -battalion Siefart of the Regiment Franz the attack in and 
along the northern basin of St. Ail against the hedge road on knoll 328, 
found itself in a very difficult situation, though the hostile skirmishers 
in the foreground retreated without fighting seriously after having 
delivered a severe rapid fire. The hedge road had been occupied by 
infantry and artillery for about 700 meters from St. Privat. A strong 
fire came from there, having a partly flanking effect; enfilading fire 
also came from the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road after a larger part of 
the Regiment Franz had drawn to the left and uncovered the flank of 
the Fusilier Battalion of the Regiment Konigin. Very soon the rear 
companies, the 9th and 12th, except a few platoons, entered the 
skirmish line of the 10th and 11th Companies which was prolonged on 
the left by the half -battalion Siefart. The advance was made by 
rushes during which parts of the skirmish line endeavored to facilitate 
by a hot fire the advance of the rushing parts. In this manner the six 
companies advanced slowly but persistently, in spite of large losses, 
though of course not as rapidly as the other battalions of the Regiment 
Konigin. The closer the Fusiliers approached the enemy, the shorter 
became the rushes, the less the number of those arriving unwounded 
at the new position. Here also the loss in officers was comparatively 
high. About 250 meters from the central part of the hedgeroad the 
advance finally came to a stand, and a hot fire fight ensued on both 
sides. 

At this time— it was between 6 and 6.30 p.m.— the battle stood 
favorably with the neighboring Waldersee group on the south. The 
ranks of the hostile infantry lying opposite it and the Rosenberg group 
became thinner and thinner, retreating in part on St. Privat and in 
part toward the north to knoll 328. The south wing of the hostile 
infantry, which occupied the hedgeroad and was about on a line with 
the left wing of the Waldersee group, parts of the 7th and 8th Com- 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 289 

panics, could not be seen by the Grenadiers hugging the ground on 
the west slope of the ridge. That a strong enemy must be there was 
evident when turning the eyes to the left toward the hotly engaged 
Fusiliers. 

The commander of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade, Major Gen- 
eral von Berger, wished to hasten the course of the battle after the 
artillery had interfered with apparent good effect. He therefore sent 
his adjutant, Lieutenant von Twardowski, the only officer besides 
himself still remaining mounted, to the thin skirmish lines of the 
Waldersee group to urge them to advance. From his horse Lieutenant 
von Twardowski saw the momentarily favorable position and the 
possibility of making an enveloping attack from the south on the 
defender of the hedge road. This appeared the more desirable inas- 
much as the enemy opposed to the Fusilier Battalion was reinforcing 
from St. Privat. The movements of reinforcements were also per- 
ceived by the left wing of the Waldersee group. With renewed 
energy a part of the 7th and 8th Companies charged forward, turned 
toward the north and poured an enfilading fire on the reinforcements 
and now also on the defenders of the hedge road. In the meantime 
Captain von Trotha, encouraged by Lieutenant von Twardowski, 
gathered together the nearest skirmishers on the right wing of the 
Waldersee group and led them at double time from the south against 
the enemy on the hedge road. Supported by the fire of the 7th and 
8th Companies he completely overran the left wing of the opponent. 
The enemy were so surprised that numbers fled distractedly to St. 
Privat and others allowed themselves to be taken prisoner without 
resistance. 1 As soon as the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Konigin, saw 
this flank attack, it and the half-battalion Siefart at once took up the 
attack, advancing as far as the hedge road. Nowhere did the enemy 
offer any material resistance; but an increased fire from St. Privat 
brought the charge to a halt. While the larger part of the French 
who had fought here fled in complete confusion to the protecting 
forest of Marengo, a smaller group still held knoll 328 immediately 
southwest of the village, and was supported there by the village garri- 
son. Its rapid fire swept the ridge as far as hill 321. The hostile 
batteries which had fired for a while from knoll 328 had long since 
departed; but artillery fire still came from the southeast and east. 
Under these conditions it was impossible for the remnants of the forces 
of the Regiment Konigin to continue the attack beyond the captured 
hill; still they kept up the fight, together with the half -battalion 
Siefart, in single groups, along the hedge road to within less than 300 
meters of the south front of St. Privat and compelled the opponent to 
evacuate entirely the terrain in front of the village. 

Between 6.30 and 7 p.m. the half- battalion Siefart, the Fusiliers of 
the Regiment Konigin and parts of the latter's 2d Battalion, especially 
parts of the 7th and 8th Companies, kept the knoll 328 surrounded by 

'From statements of the (then) 1st Lieutenant von Twardowski to whom alone 
four French officers delivered their swords. 



290 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

an arc open toward the northeast and cut through by the hedge road. 
Farther south, on the west and southwest slope of the projecting hill 
321, were the Waldersee and Rosenberg groups still in their old posi- 
tions, supported by five batteries of the Guard Artillery; only the 
Rosenberg group still had, on knoll 322, an opponent opposite it. Its 
attacking power was practically spent in consequence of its extraor- 
dinary losses and fatigue ; but the first important success of the day 
had been achieved: the piercing of the continuous front of the enemy 
south of St. Privat; the separation of the 4th from the 6th Corps and 
therewith the latter' s isolation in the space between Roncourt and St. 
Privat, which now was endangered from north, west and southwest. 

THE ATTACK OF THE KAISER FRANZ REGIMENT, GUARD 

GRENADIERS NO. 2, IS DIVERTED TO THE 

STE. MARIE— ST. PRIVAT ROAD 

The Kaiser Franz Guard Grenadier Regiment No. 2 chose, in 
accordance with orders, the southwest corner of St. Privat for its 
attack objective. As early as the first deployment north of St. Ail the 
regiment received a hot rifle fire with which artillery fire soon became 
mixed. In order not to show a large target, Lieutenant Colonel von 
Boehm caused the half-battalion of the first line, following up the 
skirmishers, to deploy in column of companies and the battalions of 
the second line in half -battalions. As, soon thereafter, the closed up 
companies of the 2d Battalion in the first line also deployed as skir- 
mishers, the regiment extended over a large part of the space between 
the northern depression from St. Ail and the Ste. Marie — St. Privat 
road. Masking the fire of the batteries of the 2d Guard Infantry 
Division, in position south of Ste. Marie, was unavoidable. Through 
the left oblique of the southern neighboring Fusilier Battalion of the 
Regiment Konigin the leading battalion also received an impulse 
toward the left and took up a march direction more to the northeast 
which finally resulted in a separation of the Regiment Franz from the 
Regiment Konigin by a large interval. 

The hostile skirmishers retreated in front of the advancing regi- 
ment from the foreground of St. Privat toward the road and opened a 
very annoying fire from the ditches alongside of it. Other hostile 
skirmishers deployed south of the road, met the regiment, and poured 
a hail of projectiles on it, and then again retreated. Serious losses, 
especially in mounted officers, occurred; but the regiment found some 
support through the effect of the batteries of the 2d Guard Infantry 
Division, farther in rear, in so far as their fire was not masked. 
Though the regiment remained unshaken in its advance, the hostile 
fire and the fatigue of the hot day compelled the skirmishers, as well 
as the following up half-battalions, to lie down from time to time and 
take up the forward movement again by short rushes. 

In the subsequent advance of the regiment the hostile skirmishers 
on the road disappeared; in their place strong garrisons showed them- 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 291 

selves in front of the west edge of St. Privat and knoll 328 south of 
that village, and the farther the regiment pressed forward in the angle 
between the road and ridges 328—321, the hotter became the hostile 
fire. About 1500 meters west of the village, 800 meters from the 
nearest hostile skirmish lines, the Grenadiers of the 2d Battalion 
opened the fire fight, probably without material effect, on account of 
the long range; still the skirmishers showed themselves calm and 
were completely in the hands of their group leaders. Thus later on it 
was not difficult to lead them by rushes closer to the enemy until the 
effect of the needle guns became effective in the hostile ranks. 

The companies of the 2d Battalion were in numerical sequence 
alongside each other, deployed; behind them followed three half- 
battalions, while the fourth had joined the right wing of the Fusilier 
Battalion, Konigin Regiment. 

From the very start the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road with its ditches 
and densely leaved trees had exerted a certain attractive power over 
the Grenadiers without protection under the fire of the enemy. Added 
to this was the fact that the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was seen ad- 
vancing north of the road and the regiment involuntarily sought con- 
nection with it after connection with the Regiment Konigin had been 
lost. The enfilading fire coming from the southern part of the hedge 
road southwest of St. Privat also drove the skirmish line, advancing 
by rushes, to the half left. Thus the 2d Battalion, deployed in a single 
line, after it had come to within 300 meters of the most advanced 
hostile skirmishers pressed toward the road and as far as possible sought 
protection in the ditches alongside the road, although these ditches 
were enfiladed by the enemy. Some single skirmish groups crossed 
the road toward the north. Front was taken partly to the north, 
partly to the east and fire opened against the enemy in front of the 
west edge of St. Privat and against the troops situated north of the 
road in the foreground of the village. The battalion was no longer a 
regular skirmish line, but a horde of skirmishers each one seeking 
cover against the hot hostile fire near the road. This swarm of skir- 
mishers had long since become mixed up with parts of the second line 
One part of the second line, the half -battalion composed of the 
10th and 11th Companies, had followed behind the right wing of the 
2d Battalion and, though formed in time into column of companies, 
suffered just as many losses as that battalion. It pressed with the 2d 
Battalion toward the road but received such a heavy flank fire from 
the hedge road that it was forced to cling to the immediate neighbor- 
hood of the 2d Battalion and front against knoll 328. The flank fire 
continued until the hedge road fell into the hands of the Regiment 
Konigin at 6.30 p.m. ; only then could the half -battalion, with which 
was now only one unwounded officer, turn anew against the enemy 
west of St. Privat. 

Like the Fusilier half -battalion the neighboring (on the left) half - 
battalions of the 1st Battalion after having for a time advanced with 



292 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

it followed like it the general course of the road. While still engaged 
in this movement, they received orders from the rear to halt and lie 
down flat. These orders came from the brigade commander and were 
issued at a time when General von Berger had convinced himself that 
the attack of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade had not yet been started, 
and that a separate advance of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade ap- 
peared fruitless considering the strong hostile front. 1 These orders 
reached only a part of the Regiment Franz, the 1st Battalion and the 
half -battalion Siefart with the Regiment Konigin, as the adjutants 
charged with transmitting them had their horses killed by the hostile 
fire. The orders, however, were impossible of execution, as the hos- 
tile bullets laid down the law then, and thus an actual halt was made 
by the 1st Battalion, Regiment Franz, only when the ditches alongside 
the road behind the 2d Battalion had been reached. 8 A halt occurred 
of itself with the Regiment Konigin and the half-battalion Siefart, but 
only after the edge of the plateau and then the projecting hill southwest 
of St. Privat had been captured. 

By 6 p.m. the entire Regiment Franz was assembled on the road 
about halfway between Ste. Marie aux Chgnes and St. Privat, holding 
the southern ditches on the road and the immediate terrain around in 
a depth extension of some few hundred meters. In front the 2d Bat- 
talion formed with its 10th and 11th Companies a narrow front facing 
St. Privat and knoll 328 and extending toward the north. Though 
heavy fire still came from the northeast and east there was some sort 
of protection against it and the fire could be replied to. There could 
of course no longer be any question of an orderly battle formation and 
connection; the fire had caused enormous losses during the unprotec- 
ted advance. The small groups of men still able to fight gathered 
around the few still umvounded officers and awaited for more than an 
hour the final charge on St. Privat. In the course of time ammunition 
became so short that the dead and wounded had to be searched to help 
out. 

THE GUABD BATTERIES BETWEEN ST. AIL AND STE. MARIE 

ACCOMPANY THE ADVANCE OF THE KAISER FRANZ 

GRENADIER REGIMENT NO. 2 

The 3d Battalion, Guard Foot Artillery 3 , engaged east of the St. 
Ail — Ste. Marie road, followed the advance of the Regiment Franz as 
soon as the regiment had passed it and there were perceived the enor- 
mous losses which the hostile fire caused in the ranks of the infantry. 
The change of positions was made by battery from the right wing, the 
batteries advancing about 400 meters and unlimbering again about 1800 
meters west of St. Privat. The 6th Heavy Battery was very close on 

■War Archives. 

'Guard Corps Headquarters issued no orders for a halt to the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade, even if the battle reports of the participating troops refer to orders from 
Corps Headquarters. The statement contained in the General Staff Account, page 
865, is not correct. (English translation, p. 130.) 

"Less 5th Light Battery, which was with the IXth Army Corps. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 293 

the left wing south of the road and received a heavy infantry fire 
from the ditches alongside the road for some time and until the subse- 
quent advance of the Regiment Franz compelled the enemy to evacu- 
ate the ditches. The battery itself could not participate effectively, 
its fire being masked by the infantry which was continually pushing 
nearer the road. On its right the 5th Heavy Battery fired on the hos- 
tile infantry west of St. Privat, while the 6th Light Battery on the right 
wing turned its effective fire against the batteries which had appeared 
on knoll 328. The hostile artillery fire was not of much consequence. 

South of the 3d Foot Artillery Battalion, the 4th Light Guard 
Battery which had lost connection with the corps artillery advanced 
deployed from the vicinity northeast of St. Ail some 400 meters, when 
the Regiment Konigin had started in its front, and from its new posi- 
tion directed its fire on St. Privat. When the battery commander saw 
that the infantry attack came to a standstill, he again moved 400 
meters forward towards St. Privat and then fired on the hostile bat- 
teries on knoll 328. Dense powder smoke precluded observation of 
the effect. 

When the Regiment Franz pressed against the road the three 
batteries of the 3d Foot Battalion again advanced 400 meters farther 
northward. Personal orders for this advance were issued by the com- 
manding general of the 2d Guard Infantry Division, General von 
Budritzki. This change of position put the battalion a few hundred 
meters behind the Regiment Franz. The 6th Heavy Battery crossed 
the road northward and took position with its right flank on the road. 
It could not fire, as German and French infantry obstructed its view, 
and it suffered from artillery fire coming from Roncourt. The other 
two batteries had remained south of the road and kept firing on the 
hostile infantry at the western entrance to St. Privat until they re- 
ceived orders to set the village afire. 

In the meantime the 1st and 3d Horse Batteries of the Guard had 
arrived farther south on the left wing of the corps artillery. From the 
hedge road they received fire which caused some few losses, but were 
soon enabled — when the hedge road was captured — to turn their fire, 
in conjunction with the 2d Guard Horse Battery, uninterruptedly on the 
hostile infantry at St. Privat. The 2d and 4th Heavy Guard Batteries 
on their immediate right fired on the village itself, that is on the 
southern part, and occasionally on troops appearing in sight there. 
The effect of the fire was hard to determine, and probably was not 
very great. 

Thus, in the second half of the seventh afternoon hour the entire 
Guard artillery was in the space between the Ste. Marie — St. Privat 
road and the Metz — Etain railroad behind the infantry division which 
had to thank the artillery for a large part of the successes so far 
attained. As the artillery was not brought up under one leadership 
the selection of positions as well as the selection of targets was left to 
momentary needs and chance. Still the artillery was able to support 
the reduced infantry, to secure what the infantry had attained, and 



294 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

was in readiness for the final decisive battle around the village of 
St. Privat. 



THE FRENCH DEPEND AND LOSE THE HEIGHTS SOUTHWEST OF 
ST. PRIVAT 

The leading line of the French infantry of the 4th Division, 6th 
Army Corps, which was the first to be struck by the attack of the 
4th Guard Infantry Brigade, had remained inactive in its positions 
since noon, except that some of its advanced skirmishers had gained 
touch with the enemy. This long pause, in connection with the effect 
of the German artillery fire which poured over it from time to time, 
especially since the French batteries kept silence, had a very disadvan- 
tageous effect on the men though the losses were immaterial. To this 
should be added the knowledge that ammunition was very limited. 
When the deployment of German infantry between St. Ail and Ste. 
Marie aux Chines was perceived — the nature of the terrain prevented 
this from being seen by all parts of the French line— the advanced 
skirmishers opened a hot fire, with the intention of falling back as 
soon as the German lines were seen approaching. The companies of 
the 93d Line Regiment, advanced on the right wing, turned back into 
the ditches alongside the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road and from there 
fired with an enfilading effect on the left wing of the 4th Guard Infan- 
try Brigade, as also on the Guard batteries following it, until the 
advance of the Regiment Franz caused them to retreat on St. Privat. 
South of them the 25th Line Regiment deployed three companies of the 
2d Battalion at the eastern end of the northern basin of St. Ail; to the 
right, skirmishers of the 9th Jager Battalion and of the 1st Battalion, 
70th Line Regiment inserted themselves in the space left by the 93d 
Line Regiment between St. Privat and knoll 328. The forward move- 
ment connected with this, which was perceived in its true light by the 
Regiment Franz, soon came to a standstill. A heavy rapid fire was 
delivered and thereafter the retrograde movement began. The power 
of resistance of the 1st Battalion, 25th Line Regiment, on the left wing, 
was the first to give out; it saw itself threatened by the enveloping 
movement of the group Rosenberg of the Regiments Konigin and 
Alexander. The battalion retreated in the direction of St. Privat. On 
its left the 26th Line Regiment, which stood in front of the depression 
between knolls 328 and 322, also gave up all resistance when its skir- 
mishers, sent against the Prussian artillery southeast of St. Ail, re- 
treated in front of the German attack. The movement gained in 
volume toward the right, the 2d Battalion, 25th Line Regiment, retreat- 
ing toward St. Privat after having once attempted, by deploying two 
companies, to support its leading line ; it was joined by the advanced 
portions of the 9th Jager Battalion and of the 1st Battalion, 70th Line 
Regiment. The longest to hold out was, in the center of the 25th Line 
Regiment, a part of the 3d Battalion, which retreated only at the final 
charge of the storming group Waldersee. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 295 

Thus the entire French advanced line had evacuated the field be- 
tween the road and knoll 322 and allowed the attacker to ascend the 
west and southwestern slope of the projecting hill southwest of St. 
Privat. The place of the first French line was promptly occupied by 
the second line to again halt the advancing Germans. The 2d and 3d 
Battalions, 70th Line Regiment deployed on the hedge road and op- 
posed themselves to the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Konigin. On 
their right, on knoll 328, the 3d Battalion, 28th Line Regiment took 
position and directed its fire on the Regiment Franz on the road. On 
the left the other two battalions of this regiment dispersed themselves 
at the north of the depression between knolls 328 and 322 and with a 
destructive fire prevented the progress of the group Waldersee and 
group Rosenberg, the right wing companies of which group had fol- 
lowed up the retreat of the 26th Line Regiment too incautiously. 
Along the entire line an infantry engagement ensued at short range 
supported by artillery fire. Of the batteries of the 6th Corps which 
had early evacuated the position south of St. Privat one returned to 
knoll 328 and took position at the hedge road. Farther south the two 
batteries sent by Bazaine from the artillery reserve went into position. 
They directed their fire only in part on the advancing German infantry 
and mainly on the numerous batteries which were perceived in the 
space south of the road alternately firing and taking position further to 
the front. The sun was so low in the sky that observation of the effect 
of fire toward the west was very difficult. 

South of the 4th Division of the 5th Corps, the commander of the 
1st Division, 4th Corps, General Courtot de Cissey, had again brought 
his three batteries into position on knoll 322 north of the Metz — Etain 
railroad as the Prussian Guard batteries resumed their rapid fire shortly 
after 5 p.m. Of course the French batteries brought their effect to 
bear only in a small measure on these batteries, for they fired mainly 
on the Hessian batteries at the Bois de la Cusse, the shells of which 
played havoc with the infantry of the 1st Division, striking also in the 
rear lines behind that division. In the second half of the sixth after- 
noon hour General Cissey observed the deployment and advance of 
the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade and now took hasty measures to come 
to the help of the left wing of the 6th Corps with an attack by his in- 
fantry. Two battalions of the 57th and one battalion of the 73d Line 
Regiments were drawn up from the second line and, crossing knoll 
322, advanced against the group Rosenberg which had just gained a 
foothold on the southwest slope of the projecting hill 321. The 1st 
Battalion, 28th Line Regiment, joined this forward movement while 
the three batteries directed their fire in the attack direction. Under 
the fire of the German batteries which had hastened to the southern 
spur of hill 321, the attack came to naught halfways in the depression 
between knolls 328 and 322. Renewed endeavors and the throwing of 
three companies of the 1st Battalion, 6th Line Regiment, into the left 
wing of the attacking line were fruitless; the battalion fled back in 
panic. Here also the battle took the shape of a stationary infantry 



296 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

engagement until the battalions of the Division Cissey which were 
participating in the attack were gradually taken back to behind knoll 
322 into the second line. 

In the meantime farther north, more and more parts of the French 
defensive line broke off and turned toward St. Privat; each man who 
had fired away his ammunition considered it his right to leave the 
position. The fire of the nearby German batteries and of the less 
numerous German skirmishers, who worked their rifles effectively 
had its effect. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 28th Line Regiment, were 
the first to leave the field north of knoll 322; the 3d and 2d Battalions 
of the 70th and 3d Battalion of the 28th Line Regiment held their posi- 
tions longer behind the hedge road and on knoll 328. 

There was, however, no intention of holding the position here at 
any price. On the request of the commander of the 70th Line Regi- 
ment the three batteries engaged here fell back; two of them— the ones 
brought up from the artillery reserve — took up a position 1000 meters 
farther east and later, like the third battery, fell back into the receiv- 
ing position of the artillery of the 6th Corps at the quarries of Aman- 
weiler. At 6.30 p.m. the Regiment Konigin took the hedge road; the 
last resistance of the parts of the 70th Line Regiment defending it 
being made without vim. In contrast to that weak defense the 3d 
Battalion, 28th Line Regiment, which had directed an annihilating fire 
on the Regiment Franz on the road, evacuated knoll 328 only when all 
its ammunition had been fired away and then fell back on St. Privat in 
excellent order. 

In this manner, in the second half of the seventh afternoon hour a 
large gap occurred in the French line of battle between St. Privat and 
the depression north of knoll 322. The troops which had filled that 
gap — the 25th, 26th, 28th and 70th Line Regiment, i. e. the entire infantry 
of the 4th Division, 6th Corps, had gradually retreated to behind Jeru- 
salem or were now on the subsequent march toward the forest east of 
Marengo. The Dragoon Brigade of the Cavalry Division de Gondre- 
court also left the vicinity south of Jerusalem, after having gotten 
under German shell fire in a forward movement. That the victorious 
German troops, after the capture of the ridge southwest of St. Privat, 
did not succeed in pressing through the occasioned gap is due on the 
one hand to the exhaustion of the victors and on the other hand to the 
artillery position at the quarries, occupied by numerous and steadily 
arriving French batteries whose fire swept the country south of St. 
Privat. North of the position captured by the Germans the strongly 
occupied village of St. Privat formed an unconquered bulwark while, 
on the south, knoll 322 was in the undisputed possession of the Division 
Cissey of the 4th Corps. Of course the larger part of the infantry of 
that division was badly shaken and the artillery about to drive off and 
the Hessian troops had by now approached that knoll to within a few 
hundred meters. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 297 

THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION RECEIVES ORDERS FOR 
ATTACKING ST. PRIVAT 

Since the cessation of the battle around Ste. Marie aux ChSnes at 
4.30 p.m., the troops of the 1st Guard Infantry Division had enjoyed a 
welcome rest which was not however entirely uninterrupted, as the 
hostile infantry fire continued, though less heavily. Unusual march 
exertions had been demanded in the last few days and the 18th of 
August had already exacted high efforts of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division. On August 17th the Guard Corps had not entered its bivouac 
at Hannonville until 5 p.m.— a part of the corps later than that — after 
having spent half the night and the entire previous day either march- 
ing or waiting to resume the march. In the bivouac, rations had been 
short, the nearest water two kilometers distant. The start was made at 5 
a.m. August 18th with a large part of the thirsty men having been un- 
able to obtain a drink of water. The march from Hannonville to 
Mars la Tour was very fatiguing as a mass of vehicles obstructed the 
road. 1 At Mars la Tour also, where an involuntary halt lasting some 
three hours occurred, there was no water, and the attempt to have the 
men drink at Doncourt was interfered with by the continuation of the 
march. To reach the vicinity of Ste. Marie the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division had had to cover 18 kilometers and then in part had to bear 
the fatigues of the battle around that village. 

General von Pape, commanding the 1st Guard Infantry Division, 
which with its infantry was crowded in at Ste. Marie aux Chenes, was 
in the village itself where he had established order and cared for 
measures of defense. He had instructions to delay further action 
until additional orders arrrived. What the intentions of Army Corps 
Headquarters were he did not know, but, being nearest to the XHth 
Army Corps, he could form a very good idea of the probable course of 
the battle. It was clear to him that an envelopment of the hostile 
right wing would be made and he had already considered that even- 
tuality when he gained his first view of the hostile position from 
Habonville. What role his division would play in this he did not of 
course exactly know as he was ignorant of the plans of his two im- 
mediate commanders. He thought, however, that a frontal attack 
would not take place before completion of the enveloping movement. 
Thus the subsequent order for the attack on St. Privat by the 1st 
Infantry Division came upon him suddenly and, in spite of the 
long wait at Ste. Marie, found the division almost unprepared. 

General von Pape at Ste. Marie had a far better view of the 
German left and of the French right wing than had Guard Corps 
Headquarters or Headquarters of the Second Army at Habonville. 
He knew that the Saxon 47th Infantry Brigade was northwest of Ste. 
Marie, the 45th at the woods of Auboue, the Saxon batteries south 
of those woods. 

Recollections of General von Kessel. General von Pape denies in his posthu- 
mous papers that the road was blocked. 



298 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

There could be no talk therefore of a completion of the envelop- 
ment of the French right wing and still less of an artillery preparation 
of the attack on the hostile main position. He clearly perceived that 
the fire of the Saxon batteries was directed on the hostile infantry in 
the foreground and that the very slow fire of the Guard batteries south- 
east of St. Ail in the fifth afternoon hour was, though occasionally 
turned on St. Privat, unsuited to shake the defender. The general 
sorely missed his own four batteries which had been attached to the 
corps artillery. There was not in his mind the dangerous illusion 
which possessed Prince Frederick Charles as well as Prince August of 
Wiirttemberg who regarded the slow fire of the Guard batteries, the 
effect of which they could not sufficiently perceive, as in the nature of 
a preparation for the attack. To General von Pape who continuously 
observed St. Privat that village with its connecting heights north and 
south seemed to be of extraordinary strength and power of resistance, 
and he was convinced that the opponent would defend it stubbornly. 
He could perceive the strong infantry garrison on the southern heights 
and on both sides of the road in front of the village and saw the de- 
ployment of other hostile forces being made in all tranquility farther 
north between Roncourt and St. Privat. On the other hand he felt 
certain that the enemy had no strong reserves behind his right wing. 
As early as his arrival with the 1st Guard Infantry Division at Habon- 
ville, when he could view the hostile position at St. Privat which he 
thought of enveloping, he had sent two well mounted officers, Lieu- 
tenants von Beyern and von Rundstedt of the Guard Hussar Regiment, 
with a few troopers to Auboue, Joeuf , Montois la Montagne and Malan- 
court to ascertain what if any of the enemy was in that vicinity. By 
3 p.m. he had reports that those places were free of the enemy except 
for some stragglers; that Roncourt also appeared to be only weakly or 
not at all occupied; that immediately east of St. Privat were masses 
of infantry, artillery and also cavalry; that farther east were no re- 
serves. General von Pape had not delayed in transmitting these 
reports to his own and XHth Army Corps headquarters. After having 
observed the hostile deployments and shifting of troops at St. Privat 
he believed himself justified in assuming that the enemy had no re- 
serves to speak of. Concerning the French artillery he was convinced 
that it had been silenced by the superior effect of the Guard batteries. 

General von Pape realized clearly the difficulties of a frontal 
infantry attack without sufficient artillery preparation. Early on 
August 18th the commanding general of the Hid Army Corps, von 
Alvensleben, had told him at Bruville: 

" The cbassepot fire has been underestimated, and to some extent 
also that of the mitrailleuses. It is impossible for us to make any 
progress with our tactics taught on the drill ground. We must 
maneuver more; we must take advantage of every protection the 
terrain affords; and, above all, the artillery must produce a long and 
lasting effect. The French are very touchy on their flanks." 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 299 

A similar view had been expressed on August 7th at Blieskastel 
by Prince Frederick Charles when discussing with him the battle of 
Worth, when the Prince stated that very material losses had been 
caused by the inconsiderate and impetuous pressing forward of the 
troops. He declared that maneuvering should have been more re- 
sorted to and that the bull should not have been taken by the horns as 
it had been. 1 General von Pape had made a successful attempt to 
conform to these counsels and [experiences in the battle around Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes. 

The commanding general of the Guard Corps, Prince August of 
Wiirttemberg, had proceeded with his staff to Ste. Marie as soon as the 
chief of staff, General von Dannenberg, had ridden to St. Ail to start 
the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade into motion. The Prince rode behind 
that brigade's front and, entering Ste. Marie from the west, met Gen- 
eral von Pape on the village street, and said to him: "You will now 
attack St. Privat with your division and capture it." This was exactly 
at 5.30 p.m. General von Pape advanced the objection, due to his 
better knowledge of conditions on the French right wing, that no shell 
had as yet been fired into St. Privat and that the attack would be diffi- 
cult of execution. The Prince replied that the corps artillery had fired 
on the village for the last hour. General von Pape denied this in the 
following words: " Excuse me; the corps artillery has been silent for 
the past hour; St. Privat is entirely intact." Thereupon the Prince 
insisted: " The Crown Prince of Saxony has informed me that he 
would attack Roncourt at 5 p.m. It is now 5.30 p.m.; we will be too 
late. All you have to do is to move forward." Once again General 
von Pape objected that the larger part of the XHth Army Corps was 
not yet in motion and added: " Your Royal Highness can see both 
this as well as the silence of the artillery, if you will ride a short dis- 
tance out of the village." The Prince cut short any further objections 
with the words: " No, no, the Crown Prince has said it, and over 
there"— pointing toward St. Ail — "the other division is now advan- 
cing, it will be isolated; hurry up, now; everything takes so long with 

you." 2 

General von Pape wheeled his horse and left Ste. Marie to ride to 

the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. In front of the village General von 
Dannenberg met him and gave him the most elevated buildings of 
St. Privat as his objective of attack. 

General von Dannenberg had just come from the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Brigade. This brigade, to avoid losses, was lying flat on the 
ground 400 meters southwest of Ste. Marie aux Chenes. On the right 
was the 3d, on the left was the 1st Guard Regiment; all facing the 
village. In both regiments the Fusilier battalions with advanced wing 
companies formed the first line; the second battalions were in half 
columns in the second line, behind them in the third line the also de- 
ployed first battalions. The brigade had been in this place for almost 

1 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 
-Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



300 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

two hours without any knowledge of the battle situation or of the 
intentions of the higher commanders. In view of the march to the 
front and of the present front direction, the brigade commander, 
General von Kessel, had assumed that he would have to advance 
northward or northeastward. He knew that Roncourt and St. Privat 
were occupied by the enemy; both these villages according to his view 
were in the flank of the subsequent attack direction. He did not 
know in what manner the Xllth Army Corps, farther to the north, 
would be utilized, and heard several times that his brigade would have 
to wait on that corps. He could perceive no strong hostile forces 
northward; but he believed it improbable that St. Privat would be the 
next attack objective ; still that possibility was discussed at brigade 
headquarters. As an attack south and east around Ste. Marie was 
considered to be impossible he sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant 
Count von Pf eil, of the 1st Guard Regiment, to reconnoiter the country 
to the west around Ste. Marie aux Chines. This officer rode beyond 
the north edge of the village and viewed the ravine of Homecourt and 
the cross ravines running into it from the east and which appeared to 
favor an approach on St. Privat, but he had to return on being hotly 
fired on by advanced hostile skirmishers. Very soon what was 
thought impossible became an actuality, for a general staff officer of 
the 1st Guard Infantry Division, Captain von Holleben who was 
seeking out the chief of staff of the Guard Corps in the vicinity of St. 
Ail, rode past and said that the brigade would probably very shortly 
receive orders to attack St. Privat. Soon after General von Dannen- 
berg himself rode up to General von Kessel, pointed to the high 
buildings of St. Privat and said: "The brigade will advance on the 
other side of the road and attack together with the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade. That brigade is already engaged; the 1st Brigade must 
hasten to get ahead." General von Kessel replied: "That will 
hardly be possible; the brigade has been halted here for the past hour 
and a half; we have seen several intact battalions of French infantry 
deploying on the heights of St. Privat in line and then apparently 
lying down in skirmish trenches." 

"Those are troops beaten by the IXth Corps!" maintained Gen- 
eral von Dannenberg. 

"No!" answered General von Kessel. "They are intact and 
have not been fired on by artillery." 

General von Dannenberg again declared with great positiveness: 
" We attack. If we do not take St. Privat, the Saxons will get it 
ahead of us. The brigade will reap the harvest of to-day. " 

General von Kessel pointed with his finger in the direction of 
Aubou6: " There the Saxons are marching; they are still far off; I 
am awaiting orders from the division." 

General von Dannenberg continued his ride toward Ste. Marie. 
General von Kessel remained in doubt as to what he meant by "har- 
vest of to-day," and concluded that, contrary to his better knowledge, 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 301 

Corps Headquarters was under the impression that at St. Privat it 
would have to do with defeated, thoroughly shaken troops. 1 

Shortly after 5.30 p.m. General von Pape rode up to the right 
wing of the brigade and ordered General von Kessel " to start for the 
attack with the brigade, directing on the highest building in St. 
Privat." General von Kessel inquired what would be utilized for the 
support of this attack and received the answer: "Only the 4th 
Brigade on your right flank. The 2d Brigade and advance guard re- 
main at Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes." Captain von Holleben repeated the 
same orders to the brigade adjutant. 

While General von Kessel turned to the officers of the brigade 
who had been called together General von Pape directed the com- 
mander of the 2d Guard Regiment, Colonel von Kanitz who was with 
him, to follow with the 2d Guard Regiment the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade, overlapping it on the left, 400 meters distance. The division 
commander intended to keep the 4th Guard Regiment in Ste. Marie in 
readiness at his disposition to throw it in where support seemed 
necessary or where an especially favorable attacking object showed 
itself. The Guard Fusilier Regiment and the Guard Jager Battalion 
were to remain in Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes to receive the remaining 
troops of the division in case of an unfavorable outcome of the battle. 3 
* * * 

THE DEFENDERS OF THE ST. PRIVAT POSITION 

With the French troops north of the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road 
the retrograde movements connected with the advance of the 75th and 
91st Line Regiments against the Saxons between Ste. Marie and the 
woods of Auboue had been fully completed before 5.30 p.m. The only 
two battalions which had remained in front, opposite the ravine of 
Homecourt, the 2d and 10th Line Regiments of the 1st Division, and 
the 1st and 91st Line Regiments, 3d Division, 6th Corps, suffered from 
the fire of the Saxon batteries which had come to within 1000 and 1500 
meters through a change of position to the Ste. Marie — Homecourt 
road. Seven hundred and fifty meters behind them was a second line 
with large gaps in it; west of Roncourt, with weak skirmishers de- 
ployed, was the 1st Battalion. 75th Line Regiment; 1000 meters farther 
south, 500 meters west of the west front of St. Privat, were the 2d and 
3d Battalions, 91st Line Regiment, fully deployed; on a line with them, 
300 meters farther south, the 3d Battalion, 93d Line Regiment on both 
sides of the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road. The skirmishers of the last 
three named battalions had been advanced westward as far as the 
edge of the terrace in front of St. Privat. The battalions in the second 
line all pertained to the 3d Division, 6th Corps. In the succeeding 
third line and in the reserves, troops of the 1st, 2d and 3d Division 
were mixed. 3 

'Recollections of General von Kessel and of the (then) adjutant of the 1st Guard 
Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant von Mitzlaff. 

'Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

'Of the 2d Division, 6th Corps, only the 9th Line Regiment was present. 



302 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

On the northwest edge of Roncourt stood the 1st Battalion, 9th 
Line Regiment; halfway between Roncourt and St. Privat the 2d and 
3d Battalion, 75th Line Regiment. The 3d Battalion, 10th Line Regi- 
ment was divided into two half battalions and was behind the group 
formed by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 91st Regiment, in the second line. 
A short distance to the south the 1st Battalion, 10th Line Regiment 
connected between it and the garrison of St. Privat. The field walls 
in front of the west side of the village were occupied by riflemen of 
the first battalions, 93d and 94th Line Regiments 1 ; the houses, visible 
from far off, on the southwest corner by the 9th Jager Battalion. In 
the village proper was the 3d Battalion, 9th Line Regiment at the 
northern exit and the entire 12th Line Regiment distributed in the 
buildings between the north exit and Jerusalem. As reserve, behind 
St. Privat, at the northeast corner of the village, were the 4th Line 
Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 100th Line Regiment whose other two 
battalions were east of Jerusalem. Of other troops there were still 
present the 2d Battalion, 9th, two and one-half battalions, 94th Line 
Regiment, three regiments of the Cavalry Division du Barail 2 and four 
batteries. The Horse Battery which had accompanied the attack of 
the 75th and 91st Line Regiments had returned to the quarries at 
Amanweiler shortly after 5 p.m. These troops were hidden from 
sight and from the hostile fire in the bottom east of the Roncourt— St. 
Privat ridge. The batteries had for some time completely ceased 
firing. 

The grouping of the French fighting forces north of the road in 
several lines behind each other had become much confused under the 
effects of the battles around Ste. Marie and the approach of the Saxons, 
and organizations were badly mixed. The thin advanced lines were 
given the task of delaying the German attack, and this, with the dis- 
tribution of forces in the third line and the strong massing of troops in 
and at St. Privat, clearly indicated that this village and not Roncourt 
formed the right wing of the position which was to be held under any 
and all circumstances. Neither Roncourt nor the ridge between the 
two places was sufficiently occupied to make a strong stand against 
pressure coming from the north and northwest. 

THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE STARTS FOR ST. PRIVAT 

When General von Kessel received orders to attack St. Privat, 
first from General von Dannenberg and then from General von Pape, 
he was much surprised that his brigade should make the attack in the 
undesirable direction around the east of Ste. Marie, but abstained from 
making any remark to the division commander and believed that he 
could best solve his task by carrying it out literally. After his discus- 

1 Of the first Battalion, 93d Line Regiment were four companies inserted here; 
two companies were farther south on the St. Privat— Ste. Marie road advanced toward 
St. Ail. Of the 1st Battalion, 91th, three companies were here; three had taken 
part at Ste. Marie. 

2 In the meantime reinforced by the 3d Chasseur Regiment from the Cavalry 
Division of the 3d Corps. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 303 

sion with General von Dannenberg he had called all mounted officers 
together and pointed out to them the high houses of St. Privat as 
attack objective which should be kept to under all circumstances. He 
now divulged to the regimental commanders the orders given by the 
division commander and added thereto that the attack was to be made 
by two one -eighth turns, one this side, the other the other side of the 
road, thus gaining the front toward the attack objective; skirmishers 
to be sent ahead after the completion of the first turn. » 

At 5.45 the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade left its position where it had 
been echeloned in three lines facing Ste. Marie, and started in the 
direction of the objective, after the brigade adjutant Lieutenant von 
Mitzlaff had ridden to the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade — which was 
known to be on the move south of the road — to report to it that the 
1st Guard Infantry Brigade would interfere. 2 The Fusilier Battalion 
of the 4th Guard Regiment on the right wing was the base battalion of 
the first line. Shortly after the start General von Kessel gave the 
command for the fh'st one- eighth turn to the right, and the mass com- 
menced to turn against St. Privat. In this turn distances and intervals 
were nearly completely lost, as the left wing had to pass close by Ste. 
Marie. In the meantime General von Kessel got a view of the 4th 
Guard Infantry Brigade and saw that it was pressing closer and closer 
to the road. Calculating that if he kept to his present march direction 
his brigade would get behind the left wing of the other he endeavored 
to gain more room toward the left. 

After the completion of the first turn the advanced wing com- 
panies of the two Fusilier battalions in the first line had deployed 
skirmishers on the run as per orders. As the brigade itself remained 
on the move the skirmishers were not sufficiently advanced and the 
brigade still presented an undeployed and unbroken mass the rear 
lines of which pressed together to the right as they passed Ste. Marie. 
General von Pape sent his general staff officer, Captain von Holleben 
with orders to allow the skirmishers to gain more room to the front 
and to deploy the brigade; the same orders came from Prince August 
of Wiirttemberg who had ridden as far as the east exit of Ste. Marie. 
General von Kessel endeavored to have the brigade mark time, to give 
the skirmishers the desired interval ahead; three times he sent corres- 
ponding orders to the base company of the first line 3 — but without re- 
sult. The brigade was not deployed; hostile bullets commenced to 
rain and everybody pressed forward. In the meantime the rear lines 
had left Ste. Marie behind, and General von Kessel considered that the 
moment had arrived to draw the brigade farther to the left. He gave 
the command: "Half left; march" first as the left wing of the brigade 
had commenced to cross the road in its original march direction 

'Recollections of General von Kessel and of the (then) 1st Lieutenant von 
Mitzlaff. 

'Lieutenant von Mitzlaff encountered the adjutant of the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade, Lieutenant von Twardowski, who gave him the first report of the heavy 
losses suffered by the Brigade. 

3 12th Company, 3d Guard Regiment. 



304 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

pointed halfways between Roncourt and St. Privat. The turn to half 
left forced the still massed brigade to cross the deep road ditches 
obliquely. The half left soon changed into a left turn and, while the 
Regiment Franz in its front sought cover on the road, the brigade 
moved past the east of Ste. Marie in a northeasterly, almost northerly 
direction and thus offered its right flank to the defenders of St. Privat. 

Though hot hostile fire greeted the brigade from the beginning of 
its advance, that fire now became still hotter. West of St. Privat the 
leading hostile line proclaimed its presence by a white smoke line 
which suddenly arose from the ground. Heavy artillery fire joined 
this infantry fire from near the north of St. Privat and shells also came 
from close south of the village. Under the effect of this fire, which 
caused numerous and rapidly increasing losses, the movement of the 
brigade gainedlso much in momentum that the columns of the right wing 
had to cross the road at the run to keep up in front. The brigade had 
therefore arrived at a considerable distance beyond the road when the 
attempt was made to change the front, which was turning gradually 
more and more toward Roncourt, toward its proper attack objective. 
At the southern of the two meadow basins running north of the road 
against the west front of St. Privat the brigade came to a short halt to 
restore order and make the turn, as well as to make the needed de- 
ployment. But the very opposite was accomplished. The enormous 
hostile fire crushed the battalions together, especially those of the 
second line which struggled to reach the northern basin with its 
promise of at least some protection. 

The losses increased so much that there could no longer be any 
question of a single leadership, especially as the leaders commenced to 
fall. It was only possible to make the leading line of the two Fusilier 
battalions assume a gradual turning toward St. Privat; the lines in 
rear, after a few attempts at a turn to the right, took up again the 
movement to the left as if to try by this shifting sideways to avoid the 
annihilating fire coming from St. Privat. 1 Thus the mass of the 
brigade, suffering enormous losses and attempting continually but in 
vain to deploy, moved farther to the north and northeast until the 
northern meadow basin opposite the northwest corner of St. Privat 
had been reached. Only from here on did the front of the first line 
take full direction on the village and the road leading to Roncourt. 

General von Kessel had been able to effect the turn of the Fusilier 
Battalions; the rear echelons he left in their left oblique in the hope 
that thereby they would find some protection in the terrain. He him- 
self, riding in the center of the brigade between the second battalions, 
considered it of the utmost importance to drive the leading lines and 
echelons, deprived of their officers, uninteruptedly forward, and en- 
deavored to get as close to the enemy as possible to make use of 
the rifles. The two regimental commanders, Colonel von Roeder of 

1 "It was a movement like that of a single man who, breasting a heavy rain and 
wind, involuntarily stops and tries to get ahead by a movement to the side." — Eecol- 
lections of (then) Captain von Holleben, general staff officer of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 305 

the 1st and Colonel von Linsingen of the 3d Foot Guard Regiment, 
rode with their Fusilier battalions and supported the brigade com- 
mander. 

After the last left oblique and turn the brigade had assumed about 
the following formation: the partly deployed Fusilier battalions of 
both regiments were with their right wing about 300 to 400 meters 
from the road, about 500 meters from the hostile skirmish line which 
had been advanced to the edge of the terrace west of St. Privat. The 
battalions in the second line had obliqued to the left, so that on the 
right wing the 2d Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment marched behind the 
gap between the two Fusilier battalions of the first line. The third 
line had similarly obliqued to the left. The Fusiliers faced east, the 
lines behind in part east, in part northeast. While the skirmishers 
fired, the brigade moved forward by rushes. Skirmishers and columns 
frequently had to lie down to gain breath, but quickly arose again at 
the word of command. The enormous loss sustained undoubtedly had 
a disadvantageous effect on the men. Each time the hostile fire in- 
creased the lines threw themselves down, or the men became panicky 
and huddled together in lines behind each other as if the rear line 
wanted to seek cover behind the one in front. But in general a single 
command sufficed to reestablish order. The men advanced with 
body bent down and face turned away, as if seeking protection in a 
hail storm; their expressions were often much disfigured. Where 
officers still were present their example had such effect that there was 
no visible timidity, but where there were no officers it was plainly 
perceptible that in difficult situations of deployment officers are ab- 
solutely required to inspire valor and confidence in the men. 1 

All trumpeters sounded their trumpets, all drummers beat their 
drums; General von Kessel called without interruption: "Forward! 
Forward !" Thus the brigade gradually came so close to the enemy 
that it was enabled to use its fire at a favorable range and then also 
began a grouping of the dwindled and hitherto orderless forces into 
different battle formations which of course were adopted less because 
of orders of leaders than because of the momentary inspiration of the 
men themselves. 

THE SAXON ARTILLERY SUPPORTS THE ADVANCE OP THE 1ST 
GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE 

When the four batteries of the Saxon 24th Infantry Division took 
position at 5 p.m. in the space between the corps artillery in the north 
and the village of Ste. Marie in the south, a part of that artillery was 
already firing on the hostile batteries which had appeared anew on the 
ridge between Roncourt and St. Privat. Toward that target the 4th 
Light and 4th Heavy Batteries also turned going into position with 
their right wing near Ste. Marie with the intention of firing on the 
hostile batteries the fire from which appeared to be greatly hindering 

'From Recollections of General von Kessel and other eye witnesses. 



306 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

the advance of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. The 3d Light Battery, 
going into position on their left, received orders from the battalion 
commander to support the attack of the Guard on St. Privat and to 
prepare that on Roncourt. It directed its fire on hostile infantry in 
motion in the vicinity of Roncourt and threatening to flank the attack 
of the Guard. The last arriving 3d Heavy Battery, taking position 
between the 3d Light and the right wing of the corps artillery, arrived 
at a time when a part of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade had already 
turned against Roncourt and it then threw shells on the hostile infan- 
try in front of that village. It fired only eight rounds, however, as, 
in consequence of a misunderstanding of orders, the entire battalion 
of artillery followed up the 47th Infantry Brigade which had been 
called by Crown Prince Albert from Ste. Marie to the woods of Aubou6. 
Thus the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade did not have a continued support 
from the Saxon artillery. 

THE 2D GUARD REGIMENT IS INSERTED 

The staff of Headquarters, Guard Corps observed the advance of 
the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade from the eastern edge of Ste. Marie. 
The violence of the fire which met the brigade took Prince August 
of "Wurttemberg by surprise as he had supposed that only weaker 
forces were in the village of St. Privat. And as yet nothing could be 
seen of the anxiously expected interference of the Saxons. Captain 
von Lignitz, arriving from Headquarters, IXth Army Corps with the 
request of General von Manstein to hasten the offensive of the Guard 
Corps, was asked if the IXth Army Corps was in a position to give up 
again the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade attached to it. Captain von Lignitz 
answered this question in the negative. 1 Prince August of Wiirttem- 
berg therefore had no reserve with which to influence the battle of the 
Guard Corps thus commenced under unfavorable conditions. 

General von Pape had followed the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade on 
the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road. He was surprised not so much at the 
intensity of the hostile fire— which he had foreseen— as at the manner 
and method in which the brigade advanced in a dense mass without 
paying any attention to the hostile fire effect. What appeared to him 
to be the most serious thing was the swerving of the brigade from the 
ordered attack direction on the southwest corner of St. Privat. In- 
stead of striving for that point the brigade, by a sharp left oblique, 
turned more and more toward Roncourt and thus continually widened 
the interval separating it from the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade which 
was with its left wing on the road opposite the south part of St. Privat. 
There was in consequence a part of the hostile line not covered by 
German troops and there could be no question of combined action be- 
tween the 1st and 2d Guard Infantry Divisions. General von Pape 
felt it necessary to throw fresh troops into the gap and for this desig- 
nated the 2d Guard Regiment which had been originally directed to 

T Von Lignitz; Aus drei Kriegen. Part II, p. 41. As a matter of fact, Headquar- 
ters Guard Corps had already sent orders to the brigade to attack. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 307 

follow in echelons to the left of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. This 
order agreed with the wishes of the regimental commander, Colonel 
von Kanitz, who was riding with him and had perceived the gap and 
suggested utilizing his regiment to fill it. 1 In consenting General von 
Pape directed the colonel to insert the regiment as rapidly as possible 
alongside of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade and to conduct the attack 
along the road. Thereupon the colonel proceeded to his regiment 
which, started on the move by the regimental adjutant, was now 
advancing south of Ste. Marie. 

This caused the reserve of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade to take 
position in the first line and a new reserve had to be formed for the 
first line from the troops still held in Ste. Marie. With this object 
General von Pape rode back along the road to that village. En route 
he tried unsuccessfully to induce several bodies of leaderless troops of 
the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade, which were fleeing wildly back on the 
road, to return into the battle; he was unable to influence them, the 
men acting as though blind and insane. 2 

THE ATTACK OF THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE DIVIDES 
ITSELF ON RONCOURT AND ST. PRIVAT 

The Fusilier Battalion, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, on the right 
wing of the first line of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, had, when 
about 200 meters north of the road and while still running and obli- 
quing to the left, commenced to execute the second one-eighth right 
turn toward St. Privat. As it had the shortest road distance to cover 
it was the first to come into touch with the enemy, whose fire had 
already caused serious gaps. The gradually executed movement of 
the turn, which because of the obliquing to the left led more and 
more away from the road, changed under the effect of the hostile fire 
and after the correct front had been to some extent established into an 
advance by rushes against the northwest corner of the village. The 
advanced wing companies, the 9th and 12th, which thus far had sent 
ahead only one platoon of skirmishers each, now completely deployed 
as skirmishers. The other half battalions followed in close order. 
In their front the Fusiliers saw the smoke-revealed position of the 
enemy whose fire could not yet be replied to; on their right front 
parts of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade were engaged in battle. 
When the forward movement of the skirmishers came to a stand under 
enormous losses the closed half-battalion followed up by order of 
Colonel von Linsingen and carried the skirmishers forward to within 
500 meters of the most advanced hostile skirmish line. The battalion, 
now fully deployed, gathered around its colors, lay down, and com- 
menced to reply to the hostile fire. In two additional rushes it 
came to within 250 meters of the enemy and could use its rifles effec- 
tively. By this time the battalion numbered only 3 officers and 250 
men. On its right the country was entirely open for a stretch of some 

'Communication from (then) Colonel Count von Kanitz. 
'Posthumous letters of General von Pape. 



308 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

400 meters to the road; on its left a gap had opened into which entered 
the 2d Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment. 

This latter battalion had followed the Fusilier Battalion at some 
distance which had been steadily diminished by the different turns and 
obliques. Its half-battalions, in column of half -platoons, were at first 
alongside each other, later, after the crowding together of the second 
line in the northern meadow strip, behind each other. At this place 
the battalion suffered the heaviest losses. From here the two leading 
companies, the 7th and 5th, after having completely deployed as skir- 
mishers, reached, by repeated rushes, the open space on the left of the 
Fusilier Battalion and, under command of the single unwounded officer, 
Lieutenant von Kracht, took up the fire against hostile skirmishers in 
position west of the churchyard of St. Privat. The other two com- 
panies, the 8th and 5th, saw themselves in a very short time deprived 
of all their officers and dispersed completely. Only separate groups 
of skirmishers later on joined the line of the leading companies. 

On the left of the 2d Battalion, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, 
the Fusilier Battalion, 1st Foot Guard Regiment was engaged. 
It had been given the same formation as the Fusilier Battalion 
of the sister regiment which had originally been on its immediate 
right: the wing companies, the 12th and 9th, had been advanced and 
each had deployed one platoon; the other companies followed as half- 
battalion in column of companies. Soon after the first one-eighth 
turn south of the road the skirmishers commenced to oblique to the 
left to avoid crowding to the right, thus causing the large gap which 
later on separated both Fusilier battalions of the brigade. When the 
9th Company, north of the road, saw the Fusilier Battalion of the 3d 
Guard Regiment some distance on its right execute the second one- 
eighth turn against St. Privat it brought its skirmish line into 
the same front, reinforced it by an additional platoon, and com- 
menced to advance by rushes in the direction of the southern part of 
the St. Privat— Roncourt road. On direct orders from the brigade 
commander, whose "Forward, Forward!" was continually heard be- 
hind the company, the left platoon deployed as skirmishers. Farther 
left the 12th Company, which still had one platoon in close order, 
gradually gained the new front. It received fire from Roncourt both 
directly from the front and from the half left, and thus was induced 
itself to take up the fire when still 600 meters from the enemy. At 
this distance there could be no possible effect and in addition a part of 
the paper cartridges were soaking wet; but the fire gave the men 
some employment, and drew their attention away from the enor- 
mous destruction in their ranks. In the turn a gap had likewise oc- 
curred between the 9th and 12th Companies, increasing during the 
subsequent rushes as the 12th Company was shoved to the left by the 
half left enfilading fire. The closed up half- battalion had in the 
meantime advanced to behind the 9th Company, reinforced it with two 
platoons, and carried the attack to within 300 meters of the hostile line, 
its skirmishers joining the right and left flank of the 9th Company. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 309 

About this time the French commenced to evacuate the advanced 
position on the edge of the terrace of St. Privat. Farther north, on the 
other side of the large basin, other parts also fell back, so that the fire, 
which up to then had been almost unbearable, commenced to decrease. 
The flanking fire had caused great losses to the 12th Company and 
had compelled it to insert its third platoon, but other forces now 
arrived, supporting it and relieving the battalions fighting farther 
south from the danger which threatened from Roncourt. 

The more the brigade had obliqued to the left north of the road, 
the more annoying had the enfilading fire from Roncourt become to 
the rear lines. It was consequently but natural that a part of the 
battalions in rear should seek and find employment in that direction, 
especially as they had drawn more to the north than had the battalions 
of the first line turning against St. Privat. By request of the brigade 
commander, the regimental commander of the 1st Guard Regiment now 
ordered the 2d and 1st Battalions, which had crowded together with 
parts of the sister regiment within the northern meadow strip and 
there suffered material losses, to proceed in the direction of Roncourt 
— undoubtedly with the underlying thought of thus enveloping St. 
Privat. This order, which caused the 1st Guard Regiment to be 
divided into two parts— between which later on the 4th Guard Regi- 
ment inserted itself — was not fully executed, single companies of the 
1st as well as of the 2d Battalion being thrown into the attack direction 
of the Fusilier Battalion. 

The 2d Battalion had followed the Fusilier Battalion across the 
road in two half-battalions alongside of each other, on the right the 
5th and 6th, on the left the 7th and 8th Companies. The 5th and 6th Com- 
panies were the first to disengage from the crowding in the northern 
meadow strip and, by direction of General von Kessel, deployed in 
part against Roncourt, from where fire came. The two and a half 
deployed platoons, advancing by rushes, crossed the large basin and, 
under leadership of Lieutenant von Brause, took up the fight with the 
French skirmishers who occupied the strip of country north of the 
large basin in front of Roncourt facing partly northwest and partly 
southwest. On the right they were supported by the other platoons 
of the two companies which, partly deployed, partly closed up, had 
halted at the south edge of the large basin, Lieutenant von Arnim in 
command. The resistance of the French north of the large basin 
decreased very soon. Lieutenant von Arnim therefore took position 
with his group left of the 12th Company, which then was on his right 
and had made front against the Roncourt— St. Privat road, and 
ordered fire opened against the French north of St. Privat. When 
the 12th on his right advanced by rushes he kept his group back and 
attempted to assemble it in accordance with directions from General 
von Kessel who desired to have in the general deployment at least one 
detachment in close order. 

Of the other half-battalion, the 7th Company at first followed the 
group under Lieutenant von Arnim; later, enormous losses made it 



310 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

shift farther to the right and closer to the Fusilier Battalion. The 8th 
Company was led farther left behind the group under Lieutenant von 
Brause, crossed the large basin entirely deployed as skirmishers, and, 
about 150 to 200 meters left of the Brause group, joined the front of 
that group against Roncourt. It kept up a very hot and costly fire fight 
against the hostile skirmishers in front of Roncourt and after some 
time received support from the third line of the brigade. 

The two first battalions in the third line during the turns and 
obliques of the brigade around Ste. Marie had to take up the run to 
keep their proper place and to lessen the losses caused by the hostile 
artillery fire to which they were especially subjected. During the left 
oblique north of the road the 1st Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment 
gradually arrived behind the 1st Battalion of the sister regiment. This 
battalion had become to some extent disorganized, having, when 
crossing the road, allowed its platoons to run across the embankment 
one after the other at considerable distance in order to avoid greater 
losses. Hurrying after the 2d Battalion marching in its front, it caught 
up with it in the northern meadow strip and received orders from the 
regimental commander " to take the extreme left wing of the battle 
front with the view of enveloping St. Privat." 1 The different units of 
the tangled up mass disengaged themselves severally from it like so 
many rays from a star. The right half -battalion, consisting of the 1st 
and 2d Companies, was personally sent by General von Kessel to follow 
up to and serve as a support the Fusilier Battalion just then charging 
on the northwest corner of St. Privat. To execute this task the bat- 
talion commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Oppell, had at his disposal 
only the 4th and 3d Companies which advanced in the direction of 
Roncourt in two half platoon columns followed by the 1st Guard 
Pioneer Company. In their front was the 8th Company of the regi- 
ment, moving in the same direction. When that company turned to 
the right against the enemy, on the other side of the great basin, the 
the leading two half platoons of the 4th and 3d Companies entered the 
thus cleared space and advanced by rushes, the still closed up parts 
following and overlapping them on the left. North of the great basin 
the Brause group of the 2d Battalion — the 8th, the 3d, and the 4th 
Companies of the 1st Guard Regiment — formed a line with a detached 
left wing which advanced, between the great basin and the crossroad 
connecting the Ste. Marie — Montois and the St. Privat -Roncourt 
roads, against the latter road and against Roncourt. 

The 1st Battalion, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, had fallen into some 
disorder when crossing the road, then obliqued sharply to the left and 
thus joined the confused masses of both regiments behind the northern 
meadow strip. As it appeared impossible to gain room in an easterly 
direction against St. Privat the battalion, after order had been restored 
and half -battalions again formed, followed those parts of the brigade 
which were moving on Roncourt, and, as extreme echelon, took its 

l Royal Archives. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 311 

place behind the left wing of the brigade just crossing the large basin 
and followed to the northern edge of the basin where a halt was made. 

Of the Guard Regiment battalions which had been started toward 
Roncourt the 1st and 2d Companies had followed the Fusilier Battalion 
by orders of the brigade commander and the 7th Company had fol- 
lowed on its own initiative. The first mentioned two companies were 
first inserted in the line in close order, then deployed as skirmishers 
into the gap made in the Fusilier Battalion between the 9th and 12th 
Companies. When the enfilading fire coming from Roncourt decreased 
they fought their way, intermixed with parts of the 12th Company 
and under enormous losses, against the northwest corner of St. Privat 
until alongside the 9th Company on the right. The 7th Company, 
when turning from the northern meadow strip eastward, came under a 
hot sweeping fire and lost more than half its numbers. Formed in a 
loose line, running, throwing itself down and firing without having 
a special target to fire on, it gradually took direction on the gap be- 
tween the two Fusilier battalions just where the 2d Battalion, 3d Guard 
Regiment, had just then inserted itself, and, thrusting itself behind the 
firing line with the remnants of this battalion's 5th and 8th Companies, 
became entirely dissolved. The only officer still unscathed was 
wounded just as he was attempting to reestablish some sort of order. 
The larger part of the 7th Company later on joined the 2d Battalion, 
3d Guard Regiment; the rest found a refuge with the other companies. 

During these events that group of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade 
which was deployed against the northwest corner of St. Privat had 
forced the enemy out of his advanced position at the edge of the 
terrace of St. Privat. 

THE FRENCH EVACUATE THE ADVANCED POSITIONS 
WEST OF ST. PRIVAT 

At the moment when the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, crossing 
the road, took a northeasterly direction, the two battalions of the 
French which had been advanced against the ravine of Homecourt fell 
back on the second line, as, in addition to having suffered much under 
the fire of the Saxon artillery, they feared being cut off from their 
main position by a new enemy. The gaps in the second line were 
closed by these battalions as well as by reinforcements coming from 
the third line, thus forming a connected infantry front extending from 
the Roncourt — Montois la Montagne road to beyond the St. Privat — 
Ste. Marie road. The extreme right wing was formed by the first 
battalions of the 9th and 75th Line Regiments, which surrounded 
Roncourt on a half circle in the northwest; only one company had 
remained at the north edge of the village proper. Toward the left, on 
the Roncourt — St. Privat road and a little in rear, connection was 
made with the 2d Battalion, 10th Line Regiment, which had arrived 
there from the third line, retreating step by step. Farther south the 
2d and 3d Battalions of the 75th and a half battalion of the 10th Line 



312 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

Regiment of the third line occupied the strip of country from the 
crossroad between the Roncourt — St. Privat and Montois la Montagne — 
Ste. Marie roads as far as the large basin; the front was toward the 
woods of Auboug from where an attack by the Saxons was expected. 
At a right angle to the front, at the north of and in this large basin, 
was the 1st Battalion, 91st Line Regiment which had retreated out of 
the first line there and which swept not only the large basin but also 
the entire field to the road with enfilading fire. South of the large 
basin, to the left of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 91st Line Regiment, one 
half of the 3d and 1st Battalions, 10th Line Regiment, had taken posi- 
tion, coming from the third line. 

The 3d Battalion, 93d Line Regiment, which stood on both sides 
of the road, had found reinforcement on its right wing through two 
companies of the 1st Battalion, which had retreated in front of the 
Regiment Franz from the country south of the road. 

This infantry front was south of the large basin about 500 to 600 
meters in front of St. Privat and of the road leading to Roncourt; north 
of the large basin it bent back at an obtuse angle on Roncourt. The 
fire of the battalions at and south of the large basin at first swept the 
ranks of the advancing 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. But there was 
no single leadership in the battle, nowhere any fixed intention of hold- 
ing the position at all costs. There had been no such intention in 
advancing the troops out of the third line, but rather the wish to facili- 
tate the withdrawal of the battalions retreating from the first line in 
face of the new enemy approaching from Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 

The heavy fire which the French battalions of the second line 
poured on the dense mass of the attacker, which fire was increased by 
the troops farther in rear, so far as they had a chance to fire over the 
head of the line in front, soon ate up the short supply of ammunition 
and thus caused a premature cessation of resistance. The fact that the 
hostile mass kept advancing in spite of the enormous losses, that it 
parted, that it sent ahead skirmishers and uninteruptedly advanced, 
even though only with fragments, against the French position and 
gained terrain did much to cause this early cessation of resistance. 
The fire of the enemy increased their effect; when the opponent had 
approached the French skirmishers to within 200 to 250 meters all 
thoughts of resistance were abandoned. The number of men rising 
from the position and retreating became larger and larger; nobody 
awaited the advent of the attacker in the position. The first to re- 
treat were those parts of the 93d Line Regiment deployed on both 
sides of the road, thereby opening to the Regiment Franz a way south 
of the main highway for its further advance. The 91st Line Regiment, 
whose 1st Battalion had especially annoyed the Prussians with its en- 
filading fire from the north edge of the large basin, was next to give 
way. It is quite comprehensible that this very battalion, which had 
just retreated across the open under the fire of the Saxon artillery, 
was least able to resist the general movement to the rear. Finally the 
parts of the 10th Line Regiment deployed south of the large basin also 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 313 

retreated and thus, on this part of the battlefield, the road was clear 
for the Prussians. 

North of the large basin the gradual advance of the Saxons from 
the woods of Aubou6 and through Montois la Montagne had forced the 
76th Line Regiment deployed there to retreat, together with the parts 
of the 9th and 10th Line Regiments which had joined it. To this cause 
for the retreat should be added the effect of the Saxon artillery, the 
uncovering of the left flank directed against the southwest when the 
troops south of the large basin left, and the advance of parts of the 
1st Guard Infantry Brigade across the large basin. The retreat of the 
infantry also decided the course of the last four batteries of the 6th 
Corps which had again opened fire behind the ridge between Ron- 
court and St. Privat when the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade offered them 
a specially welcome target. As soon as the infantry cleared the road 
to them they gradually joined the receiving position of the artillery of 
the 6th Corps at the quarries of Amanweiler. Their losses were un- 
important, but ammunition was scarce. 

The retreat of the troops from the advanced lines, north as well 
as south of the road — which retreat was made by the men themselves 
without orders from higher authority, roused, in conjunction with the 
danger of envelopment threatening from Montois la Montagne, the 
conviction in the mind of the commander of the 6th Corps, Marshal 
Canrobert, that retreat on Metz could not be prevented and that the 
only thing left to do now was to secure the route of retreat through 
Marengo and Saulny by holding the village of St. Privat. At 
6.30 p.m. he sent information to the 4th Corps nearby in the south that 
he would soon be compelled to evacuate St. Privat and fall back by 
way of Saulny. At the same time he sent a request for help to the 
Guard Corps. 1 The commander of the 1st Division, General Tixier, 
received orders to reinforce the garrison of the village with the 4th 
and 100th Line Regiments now in reserve east of St. Privat and to form 
a defensive flank east of the village toward Roncourt. The mass of the 
retreating infantry of all the divisions of the 6th Corps pressed into 
St. Privat, into the bottom east of the village, and along the road lead- 
ing to Marengo, the smaller number of them with the intention of sup- 
porting the garrison of the village in the coming attack, the majority 
endeavoring merely to avoid further danger. A stream of fugitives 
and wounded, mixed with vehicles of all descriptions, pressed along 
the road through Saulny to Metz. The dissolution of units and of dis- 
cipline had reached a remarkable degree. 

At length north of St. Privat there were only two battalions of the 
9th Line Regiment and the three regiments of the cavalry division du 
Barail. Of the first mentioned the 1st Battalion retreated from Ron- 
court to the forest of Jaumont; the 2d Battalion, which had stood be- 
hind the ridge south of Roncourt, advanced a short distance and faced 
toward the northwest. Shortly after 6.50 p.m. the Cavalry Division 

'This request did not reach the Guard Corps. 



314 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

du Barail received orders from Marshal Canrobert to "attempt" a 
charge in order to gain time for the 6th Corps against the advancing 
Germans and to facilitate its retreat, especially the falling back of the 
right wing to the route of retreat. General du Barail transmitted 
these orders to the Brigade Bruchard. He intended himself to lead 
behind that charge the still remaining 2d Regiment Chasseurs d' Afrique ; 
but it did not get very far and later on retreated along the west edge 
of the forest of Jaumont southeast of Roncourt. The two regiments 
of the Brigade Bruchard starting from the bottom east of the ridge 
between Roncourt and St. Privat reached the ridge about halfway be- 
tween the villages and halted there while two squadrons of the leading 
3d Chasseur Regiment deployed as skirmishers and rode at a gallop 
along the large basin against the German skirmish lines. This hap- 
pened at the time when the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade had already 
entered the position evacuated by the French and had come to a mo- 
mentary halt. 

THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE ENTERS THE ABANDONED 

FRENCH POSITION AND MOMENTARILY HALTS. THE 

CHARGE OF THE FRENCH CAVALRY IS DEFEATED 

When the Fusiliers of the 3d Guard Regiment, on the right wing 
of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, had rushed to within 250 meters of 
the advanced French infantry position, they could clearly see the 
trenches arranged with knapsacks and ammunition boxes and behind 
them the caps and heads of the French. The Fusiliers kept up an 
effective fire for about ten minutes when they received support on 
their left wing from the remnant of the 2d Battalion. This in itself 
immaterial reinforcement of the German needle gun fire caused dis- 
quietness in the French line and numerous French skirmishers could 
be seen leaving it. The officers decided on the final charge. The re- 
mainder of the force was gathered together. With loud hurras the 
Fusiliers charged. On the left the Grenadiers of the 2d Battalion 
joined the charge after a short rapid fire. In utter rout the remnant 
of the French still in the position fled to the village. A first important 
success had been attained, but the sharp hostile fire now coming from 
the village soon stopped the victorious onrush of this German line. 
It had to hug the ground 600 to 700 meters from the village— that is 
outside of needle gun range — and was able only to exchange shots with 
a few advanced skirmisners behind the field walls in the foreground. 

Reinforcements came from the rear, companies of the 2d Bat- 
talion of the 3d and of the 7th Company of the 1st Guard Regiment; 
but they were insufficient to carry the depleted skirmish line forward. 

Farther north the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment 
received renewed impetus from the charge from the lines of the 1st 
and 2d Companies of the same regiment, which came up with drums 
beating, and this impetus was strengthened by the perception that the 
enemy's line was gradually thinning. The hostile position was 
reached; some sort of protection was offered there by the knapsacks 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 315 

and the hardtack and cartridge boxes filled with earth ; but the fire from 
the northern part of the village as well as from the field walls in the 
foreground came undiminished ; here also a further advance was not to 
be thought of for the present. 

Thus the remnants of three and a half battalions, intermixed with 
parts of other companies, had fought their way south of the large basin 
to within 600 or 700 meters of the St. Privat— Roncourt road and the 
churchyard which formed the northwest corner of the village. There 
were no reserves save that, behind the left wing, parts of the 6th and 
6th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment, under Lieutenant von Arnim, 
formed a sort of rear echelon at the south edge of the large basin. 
After the advance of the Fusilier Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment had 
masked their fire on St. Privat they fired on targets the other side of 
the large basin. There the remainder of the 5th and 6th Companies, 
under Lieutenant von Brause, had pursued the enemy, who had 
early retreated, to the northern edge of the large basin until they 
were forced to halt 600 meters from the St. Privat— Roncourt road. 
On this road, which in part runs through cuts, the enemy still made a 
stand and also in the country southwest of Roncourt, after having 
evacuated the terrain between the large basin and the connecting 
road north of it, falling back toward the east. The 8th Company, 1st 
Guard Regiment, had just taken its place alongside of the group Brause 
in the line now facing east when the regimental commander, Colonel 
von Boeder, galloped to the front of the line and with the words 
"Hurry! Forward, Grenadiers!" carried the line onward in a new 
rush. This charge |brought the line 200 meters closer to the enemy, 
but here it received such a hot fire from St. Privat that the Grenadiers 
had to confine themselves to holding the ground they had obtained. 
The enemy, driven from the'St. Privat— Roncourt road, disappeared be- 
hind the ridge between the two villages. Thereupon the 3d and 4th 
Companies, 1st Guard Regiment, by orders of the regimental com- 
mander, placed themselves with short distance between on a line with 
the left wing of the 2d Battalion. 

At this moment— it was about 6.45 p.m.— the charge of the two 
Chasseur regiments of the Cavalry Division du Barail took place. On 
the ridge between St. Privat and Roncourt the French cavalry, visible 
from afar, appeared; one platoon rode in front and took direction on 
the separated parts of the 2d Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment, at the 
large basin. That cavalry's appearance had a strong effect; a great 
restlessness showed along the entire fighting line of the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Brigade, and even beyond it to the Regiment Franz south of the 
road. The disrupted and depleted regiments — at full strength and 
assembled only some two hours before — were overcome by a sense 
of their weakness. There was no cavalry present for a counter charge. 
The divisional cavalry of the 2d Guard Infantry Division, the 2d Guard 
Uhlan Regiment, had started, it is true, from the ravine of AubouS, 1 

'After the charge had been defeated by the infantry, the regiment remained in 
a position of readiness northeast of Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 



316 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

going around the west of Ste. Marie aux Chgnes; but naturally it 
would arrive too late if the French cavalry rode energetically. This it 
did not do. But before the German infantry could perceive that it was 
only a question of defeating merely a detachment of cavalry formed of 
two squadrons, the disquietness had already produced its effects. In 
the Regiment Franz thick groups formed themselves according to drill 
ground practice, unfortunately offering excellent targets to the French 
infantry but of no avail against the distant French cavalry. More 
firmness was shown by the skirmishers of the 2d Guard Regiment 
which just then entered the gap between the Regiment Franz and the 
1st Guard Infantry Brigade. In the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade the 
commanding general, General von Kessel, considered the situation 
very dangerous; the conduct of the troops here in the several organi- 
zations was very diverse. On the right wing of the brigade one of the 
last officers of the Fusilier Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment led the 150 
remaining men back some few hundred meters, as the continuous 
losses were unbearable and there was no hope of holding off the 
cavalry, should it ride on in mass. Though the men fell back at a 
walk, it was very difficult to get them to make front again at the spot 
where the leader intended, until the division commander, General von 
Pape, who had again ridden up from Ste. Marie, brought the men into 
order with a few words. Subsequently he saw to it that the remainder 
of the Fusilier Battalion, which in the meantime had lost an additional 
30 men, was assembled on the road behind the 2d Guard Regiment. 
They did not take part in the assault on St. Privat. Farther north a 
retrograde movement also took place with the 2d Battalion, 3d Guard 
Regiment, the men being without leaders. Here the forceful inter- 
ference of General von Pape and his orderly officer, Lieutenant von 
Esbeck, called von Platen, of the Guard Hussar Regiment, was re- 
quired to cause the men to again make front. 1 For the rest the 
skirmishers remained lying south of the large basin, as General von 
Kessel, hastening from group to group, endeavored to caution the 
men to he still. A hot fire was poured on the hostile cavalry. In the 
2d Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment, which was immediately threatened 
by the charge, the cry was taken up in Lieutenant von Brauses's group 
north of the large basin : "Cavalry is coming; form squares." The 
men rose and formed into dense groups but, after a few sharp words 
from their officer, soon lay down again deployed as skirmishers and 
ceased firing. "Every one will wait my command to fire; will then 
fire carefully, aiming at the horses' breasts," he directed calmly. On 
his right and left an enormous rapid fire had already commenced. He 
allowed the leading line of the charging cavalry to come within 250 
meters, then gave the command for a volley, followed by rapid fire. 
The troopers became confused, faced about, and disappeared, as did 
also the echelons in their rear, behind the hill between Roncourt and 
St. Privat. 

1 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 317 

Thus the weakly undertaken charge of the Cavalry Brigade 
Bruchard came to a quick and inglorious conclusion though the losses 
were small. 1 Nevertheless General Bruchard claims the distinction of 
having brought the German line to a standstill, confounding the effect 
of his appearance with the effect of the fire of the French infantry. 
As a matter of fact the charge was hopeless, not so much against the 
fragments of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade as against the 4th Guard 
Regiment, following up as reserve, against the Saxon artillery north 
of Ste. Marie aux Chenes and the Saxon columns appearing north of 
Roncourt. The two Chasseur regiments were led back to the terrain 
east of St. Privat. 

THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE ABOUT THE END OP 
THE SEVENTH AFTERNOON HOUR 

After the defeat of the hostile cavalry charge the group under 
Lieutenant von Brause and the 8th Company on its immediate left re- 
mained on the hill with the three trees; behind them, at the north edge 
of the large basin, was the 1st Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment, while 
farther north the 3d and 4th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment, had to 
overcome a serious opposition in their advance on Roncourt. 

In front of the southwest corner of Roncourt, behind the stone 
field walls and other obstructions in the terrain, were hidden hostile 
skirmish groups which had not yet generally joined the retreat of the 
French infantry. The 3d and 4th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment, 
were compelled by the fire of this opponent to deploy, except two 
platoons which followed in echelon to the left, and advanced by rushes 
against the enemy, suffering considerable loss in doing so; the left 
wing in part enveloped this enemy. The French did not await the 
final rush but fled in part to Roncourt and in part to behind the ridge. 
Only one officer and two men remained to continue the fire, and 
allowed themselves to be shot at close range. The skirmishers of the 
two companies halted at the field walls and behind them, the two 
closed up platoons and the 1st Guard Pioneer Company at the con- 
necting road north of the large basin. This was about the end of the 
seventh afternoon hour. 

About this time the front extension of the leading deployed parts 
of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade— four battalions after the Fusilier 
Battalion of the 3d Guard Regiment had fallen out— was about 1100 
meters; as the right wing and the center were much depleted, the left 
wing far dispersed after an interrupted advance of more than three 
kilometers, the battle line showed only thin skirmish lines or weak 
skirmish groups. North of the large basin there was still some depth 
formation, south of it only a group held in rear, that under Lieutenant 
von Arnim. Reinforcements were coming up : the 2d Guard Regiment 
which had about gotten on a fine with the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade 
when the cavalry charge was defeated; and the 4th Guard Regiment 

'The leading regiment, the 3d Chasseurs, lost 4 officers, 28 men; the 2d Chasseurs 
3 men. 



318 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

which at that time had ascended the east bank of the ravine at Home- 
court to advance along the large basin on St. Privat, 

THE 2D GUARD REGIMENT INSERTS ITSELF ON THE RIGHT OF 
THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE 

The 2d Guard Regiment had stood behind the west front of Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes in two lines : in the first line, the 1st and the Fusilier 
Battalion; in the second, the 2d Battalion behind the 1st Battalion. At 
6.50 p.m., that is, five minutes later than the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade, it started with orders to follow the latter echeloned to the 
left rear. 1 The battalions faced to the right about and, after having 
passed the southwest corner of the village, reassumed their original 
front by facing to the left. The subsequent march in the direction of 
St. Privat along the south edge of Ste. Marie was executed in three 
lines, as the Fusilier Battalion, overlapping on the right, took position 
behind the 2d Battalion. In the meantime the regiment had received 
new orders : to enter the battle on the right of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade. When the regiment appeared south of Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
the opponent directed his fire on this new target and several shells 
struck between the battalions. 3 The fire, especially that of the in- 
fantry, increased when the Ste. Marie— St. Ail road was crossed; at 
the same time the situation of the Guard infantry, hitherto advanced, 
was perceived. In front was the entire 4th Guard Infantry Brigade 
pressing with its left wing toward the road; farther to the left the 1st 
Guard Infantry Brigade, drawing sharply to the left, was seen reaching 
out on an arc against St. Privat. 

Colonel Count von Kanitz had directed that in the advance the 2d 
Battalion should place itself on the right of the 1st, the Fusilier Bat- 
talion to follow, echeloned to the right. The battalions were to deploy 
companies in good time and take connection and direction with the 1st 
Guard Infantry Brigade. The leading 1st Battalion formed one fine 
south of the road; one platoon of each company deployed as skir- 
mishers. About 400 meters east of Ste. Marie the road was crossed at 
the run, making a left oblique, the 4th Company in the lead, the other 
companies following with different intervals. On the other side of the 
road the left oblique was continued at quick time until the left wing of 
the 4th Company had uncovered the right wing of the 1st Guard Infan- 
try Brigade. Thereupon the front was turned toward the enemy and 
the general direction taken on the northwest corner of St. Privat. All 
these movements were made under heavy losses. From time to time 
all halted to get their breath, the men then kneeling down, officers 
standing. The battalion had already lost most of its officers before it 
entered the battle line proper. The tactical formation had been lost; 

"The commander of the 2d Guard Infantry Brigade, General Ton Medem, ac- 
companied the regiment. 

3 At this time on the right of the 2d Guard Regiment appeared the 2d Guard 
Uhlan Regiment which had orders to follow the advancing infantry of the 2d Guard 
Infantry Division. The shell fire compelled the regiment to fall back on the ravine of 
Auboue. It subsequently started again, to turn against the French cavalry. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 319 

the skirmishers became mixed with the supporting troops; stragglers 
from the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade and of the Regiment Franz 
pressed into their lines. The battalion became a skirmish line of un- 
equal density ; the forward movement at length stopped nearly com- 
pletely. Then parts of the 2d Battalion came up from the rear and 
carried the skirmishers ahead with them. 

This latter battalion which had followed the 1st Battalion, overlap- 
ping it on the right, had early formed two half-battalions. The left, 
consisting of the 7th and 6th Companies under Captain von Collas, 
followed the 1st Battalion with about 80 meters distance across the 
road and took direction on the church spire of St. Privat. Its way led 
across numerous dead and wounded of the Franz Regiment. The half 
battalion had broken off into half platoon column and remained in close 
order until its commander, turning the front from the left oblique into 
the direction of St. Privat. gave the command, about 400 meters north 
of the road:— "As skirmishers! To the attack! Rifles right! Drummers 
beat!" Just then he fell mortally wounded, the horse of the other com- 
pany commander fell, and the half battalion saw no leader in its front. 
The command had not been heard by all; it was not at once executed; 
the drummers commenced beating only when called on by the troops. 
Slowly, still obliquing to the left, gradually deploying into thick skir- 
mish groups in which the hostile fire caused heavy losses, the half 
battalion came on the line of the 1st Battalion, taking its place on the 
right. It now went on with that battalion until, 700 meters west of 
St. Privat, the right wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, the 2d 
Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment, was reached. 1 Although the hostile 
cavalry had then appeared on the heights north of St. Privat, this 
battalion rose up to join the forward movement. But very soon every- 
thing came to a halt again, partly on account of the fire effect from 
St. Privat, and partly because the rifles were turned against the 
cavalry. The position which the French had evacuated opposite the 
churchyard of St. Privat had been reached, and the knapsacks, cartridge 
and hardtack boxes filled with earth found there gave some sort of 
protection. Finally the six dwindled companies of the 2d Guard 
Regiment could use their rifles; an enormous rapid fire was opened 
along the entire line directed in part enfiladingly on the hostile 
troopers. 

The two other companies of the 2d Battalion, the 8th and 5th, had 
deployed south of the road. About 50 meters east of the half-battalion 
under Captain von Collas the 5th Company crossed the road embank- 
ment, immediately deployed as skirmishers and, mostly at the run, 
took direction on the right wing of the half -battalion Collas. Under a 
hot fire, which disabled nearly all officers and more than half the men, 
the company gradually gained the open space between the right wing 
of the half -battalion Collas and the road and threw itself down for the 
fire fight a little in front of that half- battalion. 

^he Fusilier Battalion was just then drawn back. 



320 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

The 5th Company arrived on the road a little later than did the 
8th Company and attempted, as its way northward was blocked by the 
8th Company, to proceed along the road itself. Under a perfect rain 
of pieces of shells striking its ranks the company came to a stand about 
250 meters behind the 8th Company and sought protection in the ditches 
and behind the piles of stones along the road. Its losses were com- 
paratively small. Here it came into connection with the remnants of 
the Regiment Franz clinging to the road. A panic started by the 
arrival of fleeing men was quickly strangled in its arising by Lieutenant 
von Zitzewitz. 

There still was a gap of some 150 to 200 meters between the road 
and the 8th Company. This gap was filled by the Fusilier Battalion 
which had followed the leading battalions 200 meters to the right rear 
south of the road and which had deployed in one line after crossing 
the Ste. Marie— St. Ail road in column of companies. When the front 
had been cleared by the left oblique of the leading battalions, the 11th, 
10th and 12th Companies crossed the road, the 9th Company remaining 
on the south of it; all companies marched into line and proceeded to 
near the right wing of the 2d Battalion, where orders to halt reached 
them from the regimental commander. The losses were especially 
heavy in the 11th and 10th Companies, which prolonged the line of the 
2d Battalion on the right; they were less with the 12th and 9th Com- 
panies. The 12th Company halted nearest the road without fully filling 
the still existing gap between the troops north of the road and the 
road itself. In the open space on its right the 5th Company, which had 
been held in rear, then entered, while the 9th Company, remaining on 
and at the road, advanced a short distance beyond the position of the 
5th Company and reinforced the front of the 2d Grenadier Regiment 
Kaiser Franz facing against St. Privat. 

The entrance of the Fusilier Battalion into the fighting line cost 
less sacrifice on the whole than that of the 1st and 2d Battalions. 
When it appeared north of the road the advanced position of the 
front of St. Privat had already been partly evacuated, hill 328 imme- 
diately southwest of the village was in the hands of the 4th Guard 
Infantry Brigade, and the French artillery was in retreat. 

The closing of the gap between the Guard brigades meant a 
material reinforcement of the German fighting power opposite St. 
Privat. As the defenders were compelled to direct their fire now in 
part on the new attacker the relief was felt materially by the remnants 
of the troops fighting under the most difficult situation in front of the 
village. 

THE 4TH FOOT REGIMENT OF THE GUARD IS SENT TO FOLLOW UP 
THE LEFT WING OF THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE 

As the commander of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, General 
von Kessel, realized from the effect of the hostile massed fire that an 
uninterrupted advance of his brigade was bound to lead to annihilation, 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 321 

he sent orders to both of his regiments to halt. These orders were 
superfluous and, in any case, reached only the 2d and the Fusilier 
Battalion of the 1st Guard Regiment. General exhaustion and the 
hostile fire had compelled the troops to lie down as soon as the aban- 
doned hostile position was reached. At the same time as the orders 
were sent General von Kessel sent his last remaining aid, Second 
Lieutenant Count von Pfeil 1 , and shortly thereafter also the adjutant 
of the 1st Guard Regiment, 1st Lieutenant von Falckenhausen, to corps 
headquarters and to the division commander with a request for support 
and with the report that he stood in front of St. Privat and had ordered 
his brigade to halt, for the reason that, after the losses suffered, he was 
too weak to undertake the assault without support 2 . Second Lieuten- 
ant Count von Pfeil encountered the commanding general and his staff 
on the west side of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, reported to him, and when 
asked about the losses suffered stated that probably one half of the 
brigade was killed or wounded. Prince August of Wiirttemberg ap- 
proved the measures taken by General von Kessel. The aid was dis- 
missed with the assurance that the 4th Foot Regiment of the Guard 
would advance on the left of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade". There- 
upon corps headquarters rode into the village to take the necessary 
measures. 

The division commander, General von Pape, had already arrived 
in that village to make disposition of the 4th Guard Regiment 4 . At 
the eastern exit of Ste. Marie aux Chenes he met the regimental com 
mander, Colonel von Neumann, who had just then received orders 
from his brigade commander, General von Medem, "to follow up as 
second line the 2d Guard Regiment advancing to the attack south of 
the road on St. Privat." 5 In compliance with these orders the 4th 
Foot Regiment of the Guard had fallen in and was about to leave the 
village. But now— it was 6.30 in the afternoon— it received orders 
from General von Pape to advance to the support of the left wing of 
the Brigade Kessel. At that moment the commanding general arrived 
and ordered Colonel von Neumann to lead his regiment through the 
northern exit of Ste. Marie aux Ch§nes so as to avoid losses. The 
colonel immediately rode back into the village to carry out these 
orders; but General von Pape, fearing that the advance of the 4th 
Foot Regiment of the Guard would be materially delayed because of 
the interference of the commanding general, directed the 1st Battalion 
in the lead to use the eastern exit, specially enjoining the battalion 
commander to reinforce the left wing of the columns attacking 
St. Privat 6 . In the meantime General von Kessel's aid, Second Lieu- 

' The brigade adjutant, all other aids and the orderlies of brigade headquarters 
were disabled. 

'Recollections of General von Kessel and statement of the (then) brigade 
adjutant, Lieutenant von Mitzlaff . 

'Statement of (then) Lieutenant Count von Pfeil. 

*Page 306, ante. 

•War Archives. 

•War Archives. 



322 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

tenant Count von Pfeil, had reported to General von Pape and de- 
livered the brigade commander's request for support. He was told 
that the 1st Battalion of the 4th Foot Regiment of the Guard was al- 
ready enroute and that the other battalions would follow very soon. 
Then General von Pape proceeded to the Guard Fusilier Regiment at 
the eastern exit of Ste. Marie aux Chenes and informed the regimental 
commander, Major Feldmann, that the Guard Jager Battalion would 
defend the village in case of a reverse and that the Guard Fusilier Regi- 
ment should hold itself in readiness to interfere in the battle 1 . He 
then returned to the fighting line reaching it at the moment when the 
hostile cavalry made ready to charge 2 . 

When Colonel von Neumann rode out of the northern exit of 
Ste. Marie aux Chines after having made the necessary dispositions, he 
encountered the adjutant of the 1st Foot Regiment of the Guard, First 
Lieutenant von Falckenhausen, who oriented him as to the situation 
and urged him to advance on St. Privat to support that portion of the 
1st Guard Infantry Brigade which had advanced against that village 3 . 
In the meantine the 1st Battalion had worked its way through the 
gardens in the eastern portion of the village and taken the direction 
to the north. At the same time the Fusilier Battalion, facing left about 
by sections, crossed that part of the village nearest Aubou6, where it 
had stood, formed half-battalions, and marched along the road to 
Montois la Montagne. It was followed by the 2d Battalion from the 
center of the village and for that purpose the leading — in rear of the 
1st Battalion — 5th and 6th Companies faced about on the village street 
and together with the 7th and 8th Companies left the northeast front 
of the village. After the 1st Battalion had left the edge of the village 
it had to take up the short step by orders of Colonel von Neumann so 
that the Fusilier Battalion could take its place on the left, while the 
2d Battalion took its place in second line. The battalions advanced 
northward within the Homecourt ravine until they reached the west- 
ern end of the large basin. The battalions had express orders to fully 
utilize this basin for cover in the further advance. First, a turn had to 
be made towards St. Privat. In this turn the 1st Battalion deployed 
on the 1st Company which came on the right wing; the other 
companies turned consecutively in serial number so that the 4th Com- 
pany got exactly into the depression in the large basin, while the 1st 
was about 600 meters from Ste. Marie aux Chenes. The 2d Battalion, 
also turning to the right, followed the 4th Company at a distance of 350 
meters, formed into two half-battalions. The Fusilier Battalion kept 
along the ravine somewhat farther northward so as to keep its place 
on the left of the 1st Battalion after execution of the turn; however, 

'Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

2 Page 316, ante. 

statements of the (then) Lieutenant von Falckenhausen. Subsequently he met 
General von Pape on the road behind the right wing of the 2d Foot Regiment of the 
Guard and received from him, on his request for support of the Brigade Kessel, the 
answer: — "The Saxons are coming up now." 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 323 

when the turn was made, with the four companies alongside of each 
other, it found itself in the third line to the left rear of the 2d Battalion. 
The interval became still larger because the Fusilier Battalion, en- 
deavoring to secure the left flank of the regiment against still un- 
known conditions in the north, adhered to its easterly direction instead 
of turning directly against St. Privat. 

When the regiment ascended the east slope of the Homecourt 
ravine the hostile artillery fire had about died out and the infantry 
line, which had advanced north and south of the large basin was al- 
ready giving way. Only a few shells greeted the regiment on its 
appearance on the battlefield. At the start the hostile infantry had 
but slight effect as it was directed mainly against the 1st Guard Infan- 
try Brigade. In spite of this the regiment, endeavoring to show but 
small targets to the enemy, early deployed single platoons, even entire 
companies as skirmishers and because of this as well as its apt utiliza- 
tion of the terrain its losses were materially smaller than those of the 
troops which had preceded it. In this it was favored of course by the 
fact that its advance was directed obliquely against the northwest 
corner of St. Privat, thus encountering no broad hostile fire front. 
At the start the regiment could see nothing definite either of the 
enemy or of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, for the dust clouds and 
powder smoke enveloped the entire surroundings. Only silhouettes 
could be distinguished within the regiment itself. Only after a further 
advance were some dark lines of skirmishers seen lying in front of the 
center of St. Privat. Some wounded men of the 1st Foot Regiment of 
the Guard coming back from the north of the large basin indicated 
that the Brigade Kessel extended to there. Occasionally, when the 
screen of powder smoke momentarily opened, some single men or 
small bodies of men became visible immediately in front of the village 
and on the St. Privat — Roncourt road. South of the road leading to 
Ste. Marie aux Chines larger masses were seen going back— these were 
crowds of wounded streaming back to Ste. Marie aux Chenes. 

The 1st Battalion took for its march objective the church steeple 
of St. Privat as soon as it appeared through the dense clouds of smoke 
enveloping the battlefield, in the hope of thus most quickly gaining 
connection with the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade. With drill ground 
precision — skirmishers in front, followed by the supports in half -pla- 
toons — the regiment, paying no heed to the fact that on its right its 
colonel sank seriously wounded from his horse, advanced up to and 
even beyond the line of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, taking but a 
very few breathing spells. Within the large basin the 4th Company 
came to a stand on the left front of the group under First Lieutenant 
von Arnim of the 2d Battalion, 1st Foot Regiment of the Guard 1 ; the 
other three companies, absorbing the Fusilier Battalion of that regi- 
ment, halted to the right front of the group Arnim and threw them- 
selves on the ground. The fire was then directed against the north- 

1 Page 316 , ante. 



324 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

west corner of St. Privat; but as the nearest hostile targets were still 
more than 500 meters distant the advance by rushes was continued. 

The 2d Battalion, following behind the 4th Company, drew the 
left half-battalion, consisting of the 8th and 7th Companies, up to the 
other half -battalion in the depression of the large basin as soon as the 
hostile fire made itself effectively felt; the right half-battalion thus 
received a pressure to the right and gradually arrived at the southern 
edge. From here the battalion commander had his first view of the 
battlefield. North of St. Privat hostile artillery appeared to be still in 
action; infantry was seen lying in several lines one behind the other 
in skirmish trenches on the slopes north and west of the village 
corner. Hostile fire came from there as apparently also from Ron- 
court. The left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was perceived 
in battle against Roncourt and against the hill between there and St. 
Privat. The right half-battalion commenced to advance by rushes, 
the left conforming to this movement in the large basin. The way led 
across many dead and wounded, among whom were French as well. 
The impression was gained that the battalion was advancing over a 
field already victoriously crossed by the troops in front, that the bat- 
talion was then very close to the leading German line, only dimly 
seen through the powder-smoke and dust, and that an immediate con- 
tact would be had with the enemy. The battalion had just arisen for 
what was thought to be the final rush when the regimental adjutant, 
Lieutenant von Daum, galloped up to the left wing and brought the 
nearest troops to a halt with the call: " Halt, halt! Don't advance. 
Wait for the Saxons!" 1 The battalion threw itself down again and 
when the dust had to some extent dispersed it was seen that the two 
half-battalions actually had reached the most advanced fighting line, 
but that this line was still far from the northwest corner of St. Privat. 
Across the field the broken line of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade 
could now be seen lying flat on the ground and enveloping the village 
in a shallow arc. The 2d Battalion had halted in and south of the 
large basin behind the group under Lieutenant von Arnim of the 2d 
Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment. This group lay in the gap between 
the 4th and the three other companies of the 1st Battalion, 4th Guard 
Regiment. 

North of the large basin the Fusilier Battalion had kept the 
easterly direction and, formed in one line, strove to reach the St. 
Privat— Roncourt road about half way between the two villages. As 
infantry fire came from there as well as from Roncourt, the companies 
deployed skirmishers and commenced to advance by rushes; of the 
center companies, the 10th and 11th, two platoons of each remained in 
close order in the second line, to serve as flank protection in case of 
need against Roncourt. The Fusilier Battalion arrived at the most 
advanced fighting line north of the large basin considerably later than 
the two grenadier battalions. 

'Immediately after Lieutenant von Daum fell exhausted from his horse, appar- 
ently unwounded. The orders to halt came from the Guard Corps headquarters. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 S25 

SITUATION OF THE 1ST GUARD INFANTRY DIVISION AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE SEVENTH AFTERNOON HOUR 

At the close of the seventh afternoon hour the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division took up a position which reached from the vicinity southwest 
of Roncourt as far as the road and allowed the troops to pour an 
effective fire on at least the closest French lines. The advance of the 
2d and 4th Guard Regiments had brought the remnants of the 1st 
Guard Infantry Brigade so many fresh forces that it appeared now pos- 
sible to execute the final attack. General von Kessel, who was on the 
right wing of the 1st Guard Regiment, felt that a decisive attack 
from the center of the position against the northwest corner of St. 
Privat gave the best promise of success and that a charge farther south 
against the strongly occupied west side of the village would be far less 
hopeful. Although no continuous artillery fire had yet been directed 
against the village the defenders seemed somewhat shaken. Some 
single detachments fell back from their positions, but were again 
driven forward. In the village, columns were moving. Undoubtedly 
the intrepid advance of the Guard had made the enemy uncertain and 
irresolute. General von Kessel could so far see nothing of the ex- 
pected interference of the Saxons. 1 

The division commander, Genex*al von Pape, viewed the situation 
less hopefully. When he returned after having led the 4th Guard 
Regiment on the road to the right wing of the 2d Guard Regiment, 
the extended fighting line of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade appeared 
to him so much broken after the enormous losses that an offensive 
could not be expected from it. Combined with this the repeated 
pictures of fleeing, leaderless soldiers and the heavy loss in officers 
increased his unfavorable view. One of the last higher com- 
manders, Colonel von Roeder of the 1st Guard Regiment, hastened up 
to him with the information that the attack was not progressing 
properly but that he still hoped to reach the northwest corner of St. 
Privat very soon with his 1st Battalion. General von Pape called his 
attention to the approaching 4th Guard Regiment and requested him not 
to be overhasty. The colonel returned to the left wing of his regiment 
and was later on seriously wounded. General von Pape's reference to 
the 4th Guard Regiment was not made in the hope that this regiment 
would bring the decision. On the other hand, it seemed to him im- 
possible that the 1st Guard Infantry Division would leave unexecuted 
the orders it had received to take St. Privat. He therefore decided to 
draw up the Guard Fusilier Regiment from Ste. Marie and to lead it 
personally to the assault against the southwest corner of St. Privat 
while the 4th Guard Regiment assaulted the northwest corner. 
When he gave his general staff officer, Captain von Holleben, the 
necessary directions, the latter called his attention to the fact that 
three regiments were wholly, a fourth partly inserted and that the 
fifth, led against the same hostile front, might not bring the desired 

Recollections of General von Kessel. 



326 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

success. He earnestly counseled against sacrificing an additional regi- 
ment; other means ought to be employed. 

General von Pape had no doubts at all as to what was meant by 
other means. He himself had long since deplored the absence of 
artillery preparation on St. Privat. He now sent his orderly officer, 
Lieutenant von Esbeck, called von Platen, to the left wing to see if 
some Saxon batteries might not be induced to fire on the village. This 
ofiicer was also to ascertain how close the Saxons were and what they 
were doing. The division adjutant, Major Count von Ysenburg, was 
directed to ride to the Guard artillery south of the road and to request 
it to bring a few batteries close enough to St. Privat to fire effectively 
on the village and set it afire within ten minutes. The general staff 
officer was sent by the division commander to Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
to start the Guard Fusilier Regiment without fail and to direct the 
Guard Jager Battalion to defend Ste. Marie to the very last and not to 
evacuate that village under any circumstances without direct orders 
from the division commander. With his last remaining orderly officer, 
who had lost his hox'se, General von Pape remained halted at the road, 
awaiting the effect of his orders. 1 

Headquarters of the Guard Corps, after the departure of the 4th 
Foot Guard Regiment, had remained at the eastern exit of Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes. Here the unfavorable aspect of the battlefield was 
strongest. As far as the eye reached the field was covered with killed 
and wounded. An endless stream of men seeking the dressing stations 
came along the road. From all directions men covered with blood 
arrived, groaning, hardly able to carry themselves along, and striving 
to get out of the hostile fire zone. The report which General von 
Kessel sent back concerning the progress of the battle was but slightly 
reassuring. The longer Prince August of Wiirttemberg viewed the 
battlefield with all its horrors, the more he gained the conviction that 
even the 4th Foot Guard Regiment would be unable to bring this 
horrible battle to a victorious conclusion. Fresher, stronger forces 
were necessary to overcome the enemy, and these could be brought 
only by the Saxons whose interference had been expected for the past 
two hours. How great were the disillusions which the past few hours 
had brought the Prince ! The enemy, believed by him to be weak and 
to be easily overcome, was strong and unapproachable in his defensive 
power; in place of a rapid success along drawn out battle with enormous 
losses had ensued, and the non-arrival of the Saxons, whose help he 
at the start had not believed he would need to gain the victory, was 
painfully felt by him now. As commander of the army corps the 
Prince stood far in rear of the most advanced fighting line and the 
pictures of bravery and self-sacrifice shown by the 1st Guard Infantry 
Division in the battle could not raise his spirits. He saw only the 
scenes of human misery behind the front and, under these depressing 
influences, he sent orders forward that everything should halt until the 

•Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 327 

Saxons effectively interfered. These orders were useless as regards 
the larger mass of the infantry fighting in front, since it had long ago 
halted as General von Kessel had reported, and were effective only for 
the 2d Battalion, 4th Guard Regiment. They came too late in any 
case, because now, as a matter of fact, the Saxons appeared at Ron- 
court. 

Among the leaders of the Guard Corps only General von Kessel 
estimated the situation correctly. He was in the midst of his men in 
the most advanced fighting line and, so to speak, best felt the pulse of 
the men. These men who with defiant bravery had lived through the 
worst battle crisis, stubbornly holding the captured position, were still 
imbued with the desire to get forward and it needed but little en- 
couragement to carry them on. 

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY PROCEEDS TO 
THE IXTH ARMY CORPS 

Prince Frederick Charles watched the advance of the Guard In- 
fantry from the hill west of Habonville. He saw the 4th Guard In- 
fantry Brigade, apparently in dense columns and colors flying, start 
from St. Ail, advancing with a gradual deployment of strong skirmish 
lines against the ridge held by the enemy southwest of St. Privat. 
Viewed from Habonville the growth of the hedge road there joined the 
west edge of the forests on the left bank of the Mosel farther east, so 
that it appeared as if these two woods were one. He perceived the 
Guard infantry come to a halt at this apparent forest edge, rise up again 
and disappear in it until finally hidden from view. From this he con- 
cluded that the infantry was already beyond St. Privat and that at least 
the southern part of the village had been taken possession of. North 
of the road the right wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Division was seen 
advancing on the rising terrain in front of the village. Further obser- 
vations were prevented by the dense powder smoke which hid the pic- 
ture, but the impression gained was very satisfactory. 1 The assump- 
tion that St. Privat had been taken by the Guard was strengthened by 
the advance of the guard artillery. It was seen that a gradually ensu- 
ing turn to the right took place from the position southeast of St. 
Ail to the front against the ridge southwest of St. Privat which turn 
took the left wing of tbe artillery so far that it also appeared to be on 
the other side of the village. 2 The artillery fire of the enemy at St. 
Privat which had been so voluminous when the advance of the Guards 
started, ceased again. As far as could be seen the decision on the left 
wing appeared to have been favorable and that without the interfe- 
rence of the Xllth Army Corps. Not till later was there seen in the vici- 
nity of Roncourt an artillery line, which could belong only to the Saxon 
corps, and which proved the interference of that corps. 

'Von der Goltz, Die Operationen der lid Armee, p. 150. (p. 76 ante.) 
'Statement of the (then) Lieutenant von der Goltz of the general staff of Second 
Army Headquarters. 



328 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

If now St. Privat was in the hands of the Guard Corps, then the 
road of retreat northwest was blocked to the hostile forces which had 
been chained down on Metz by the German attack. But the thoughts 
of Prince Frederick Charles now turned again to the Mosel valley, with 
its railroad and telegraph running north. It is true that he had sent 
orders as early as 3.45 p.m. to the XHth Army Corps to occupy the val- 
ley of the Mosel and destroy railroad and telegraph in order to deprive 
the enemy, who in his opinion were trying to avade the Germans, of 
the last possibility of escape. It was clear that for this purpose the 
Crown Prince of Saxony could use only cavalry, as his infantry had to 
solve other tasks, the difficulties of which it had been impossible to 
foretell. Now, however, the decision appeared to have been gained, so 
that the entire Saxon infantry would not be required in the battle and 
would therefore be available to block the road completely to the ene- 
my. An advance of the infantry into the valley of the Mosel toward 
Woippy could become a serious menace to the retreat of the hos- 
tile forces, which were now battling at Amanweiler and would probably 
have to take the road from St. Privat through Woippy to Metz for their 
retreat. It had not escaped the Prince's observation that these hostile 
forces had attempted an attack north of the railroad and had other- 
wise taken the offensive whenever an opportunity offered. While all 
this was being considered, an orderly officer arrived at 6.30 p.m. with 
the report that the Hd Army Corps had stood in readiness atRezonville 
with the 3d Infantry division since 4 p.m., with the 4th since 6 p.m. 
Return directions were sent to General von Fransecky that he would 
receive orders direct from the King. The following orders were then 
written out for the Crown Prince of Saxony: 

"In spite of isolated infantry counter attacks of the enemy the 
battle appears to have been won. It is of the utmost importance, not- 
withstanding the great fatigue of the infantry, to advance still today on 
Woippy with at least one infantry brigade of the XHth Corps to make 
sure of interrupting the railroad and telegraph there." 1 

Before the orders were signed the Prince saw himself compelled to 
ride at a full gallop to the Bois de la Cusse. Up to then the 3d Infantry 
Brigade had stood south of Habonville. At 5.15 p.m. the Guard Rifle 
Battalion in front had advanced eastward and disappeared in the Bois 
de la Cusse, while the other parts of the brigade had taken a more 
southeasterly direction. Now groups of dispersed men burst from the 
western edge of the forest; a retreat appeared to be in full swing. The 
Prince halted the men, assembled them and sent them ahead again. 
They made only about a weak battalion composed of the different units 
of troops. 2 The Prince now turned his whole attention to the battle of 
the IXth Army Corps in which success favored first one and then the 
other side. The previously written orders were sent to the Crown 
Prince of Saxony at 6.40 p.m. Then General von Manstein arrived and 
reported the situation of the battle of the IXth Army Corps. 

'Royal Saxon Archives. — von der Goltz, Die Operationen der lid Arm.ee, p. 151. 
(See page 77 ante.) 

statement of the (then) Lieutenenant von der Goltz of the general staff of Sec- 
ond Army Headquarters. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 329 

VII. The Second Army Up to the Close of the Battle 

THE 3D GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE ADVANCES FOR THE 
ATTACK ON AMANWEILER 

With great impatience General von Manstein at the north edge of 
the Bois de la Cusse waited for the advance of the Guard Infantry on 
which his own action was dependent. He had already sent one gen- 
eral staff officer to Headquarters of the Guard Corps to urge a hasten- 
ing of the attack when he observed the advance of the 4th Guard In- 
fantry Brigade from St. Ail toward St. Privat. He immediately de- 
cided to start his attack and to send the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade, 
which stood at Habonville at his disposition, toward Amanweiler. 
This attack was to be joined by all other troops, and only the re- 
assembled detachments of the 18th Infantry Division and seven com- 
panies of the 4th Hessian Infantry Regiment were to remain behind as 
a general reserve. 

The 3d Guard Infantry Brigade had already stood about one hour 
in its position of readiness southeast of Habonville when, towards 5 
p.m., General von Wittich, commanding the 49th Infantry Brigade, 
rode up to the Guard Rifle Battalion standing in the first line with the 
information that the Guard would advance at 5 p.m. to give the de- 
cision. 1 As a matter of fact, soon thereafter, the deployment of the 
1st Battalion 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment Kaiser Alexander No. I 
from Habonville was perceived, as also the advance from St. Ail of the 
4th Guard Infantry Brigade. Orders arrived from Headquarters 
Guard Corps, which paid no attention to the fact that the 3d Guard 
Infantry Brigade was under orders of the IXth Corps, and read that 
"the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade will have to support the advance of 
the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade on St. Privat by advancing on the right 
wing." 2 

Colonel Knappe von Knappstadt, commanding the 3d Guard In- 
fantry Brigade, thereupon issued orders to the Guard Rifle Battalion 
"to occupy the piece of woods situated east of Habonville and from 
there interfere in the general attack of the division." 8 At this mo- 
ment General von Manstein arrived at the battalion and directed the 
battalion commander "to advance on the right wing of the Hessian 
division." 4 In the meantime the Guard Rifle Battalion had, at about 
5.15 p.m., commenced to cross the Bois de la Cusse in an easterly di- 
rection. It was allowed to continue in this movement, but the other 
troops of the brigade received a more southerly direction, to comply 
with General von Mannstein's orders. Colonel von Knappe directed 
the two battalions of the Regiment Alexander 5 in the first line "to 

'War Archives. It is not clear ou what basis this information of General von 
Wittich rested. 

"War Archives. 

3 War Archives. The 2d Guard Infantry Division is meant. 

'War Archives. 

6 2d Battalion right, Fusilier Battalion left. The 1st Battalion participated from 
Habonville in the attack of the 4th Infantry Brigade. 



330 GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

advance to the attack with its left wing at the south edge of the 
woods." 1 The 3d Guard Grenadier Regiment Konigin Elizabeth in the 
second line moved with its two and a half battalions and with the 2d 
and 3d Field Pioneer Companies of the Guard Corps to close behind 
the piece of forest at knoll 316. 

Within this piece of woods the Guard riflemen learned that the 
3d Hessian Infantry Regiment had already occupied the eastern part of 
the forest. Working its way laboriously and in single file through the 
dense underbrush, the battalion now took a more southerly direction. 
The 1st and 2d Companies halted at the southeast corner of the forest 
at knoll 316, assembled, and established order, waiting for the other two 
companies to come up. So far nothing had been seen of the enemy, 
but the effect of his fire on the Bois de la Cusse was being felt, so 
that Major von Fabeck decided not to satisfy himself with mere pos- 
session of the forest, but to leave it and proceed on ahead. After this 
intention had been reported to the brigade commander, the 1st and 2d 
Companies at about 5.45 p.m. deployed strong skirmishers and, the 2d 
Company right, the 1st Company left, advanced in the general direc- 
tion of Amanweiler in such manner that the left wing of the 1st Com- 
pany moved along both sides of the ditch which runs from the south edge 
of Bois de la Cusse and ends at Amanweiler. The movement was made 
at the double time, the 3d and 4th Companies following at first one be- 
hind the other, then alongside of each other. The broad hostile front, 
hugging the ground at Amanweiler, received the battalion advancing 
thus alone with fire from the front and from the half right and half left, 
causing serious losses in both lines. The leading companies went about 
120 meters from the east edge of the Bois de la Cusse and threw them- 
selves down for the fire fight about 500 to 600 yards in front of the 
hostile line. Though previous to that nothing had been seen of the 
enemy, now he offered targets easily visible from a small rise in the 
ground. The 3d and 4th Companies farther in rear remained in motion, 
utilizing every protecting feature of the terrain. In this first position 
the battalion received an unexpected support. The commander of the 
Fusilier Battalion, 84th Infantry Regiment, Major Trenk who after the 
costly battles had reassembled three of his companies, had led them 
ahead along the south edge of the Bois de la Cusse behind the 3d Hessian 
Infantry Regiment 3 . When he saw that the Guard Rifle Battalion had to 
halt under heavy losses, he with his battalion left the southeast corner 
of the forest. The 10th Company was in the lead, entirely deployed as 
skirmishers; the 11th and 12th Companies followed behind the wings 
of the 10th Company. To the left of the Guard Riflemen, the Fusiliers 
threw themselves down and kept up the fire fight until the other parts 
of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade had arrived farther to the right. Af- 
ter this Major Trenck again took his battalion, which had lost many 

■War Archives. 

2 The 9th Company had become separated from the battalion when the Bois de 
la Cusse was first entered. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 331 

men, back into the forest where, by direct orders of General von Man- 
stein, it remained until the end of the battle. 

In the meantime the two battalions of the Regiment Alexander had 
crossed the woods from the center to the southwest corner at knoll 
316. Here the leading Fusilier Battalion turned left against Aman- 
weiler, placed its 12th and 9th Companies in the first line and deployed 
them as skirmishers under the fire of a still invisible enemy. While 
the other two companies were still held back within the forest the lead- 
ing companies advanced by rushes of 50 meters each uninterruptedly 
to the front in spite of the heavy losses they suffered. When the com- 
panies arrived about on a line with the Guard Rifle Battalion — on the 
latter's right — a longer halt was made; then both companies joined 
this advanced line, which at that time endeavored to get ahead. After 
a few minutes the companies in rear, the 10th and 11th, came up, pro- 
longed the fighting line on the right and carried the line forward. 
Only a single platoon of the 11th Company remained in close order. 

The subsequent advance of the Guard Rifle Battalion proceeded 
very slowly; the hostile fire was too powerful. The enfilading fire from 
the railroad cuts on hill 322 had an especially devastating effect. There- 
fore the two companies of the rear line, the 3d and 4th, endeavored to 
prolong the first line on the left, but had little success. The left 
oblique necessary to do this was made under heavy losses, especially 
when the ditch edged with bushes behind the front of the battalion was 
crossed, and when shell fire also made itself felt. As a matter of fact 
only a few men gained the left wing; most of the men went straight 
to the front on both sides of the ditch and thus entered the skirmish 
line which had by then gained a new position, together with the Fusi- 
liers of the Regiment Alexander, about 400 meters from the enemy. 
The left wing of the Guard Rifle Battalion was now in front of the 
southeast corner of the Bois de la Cusse and extended far enough 
northward not to interfere with the fire of the Hessian companies lying 
in the forest. 

The 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander, following the Fusilier Bat- 
talion, had received orders "to advance on the right of the Fusiliers and 
at the same time take over the protection of the artillery line of the 
IXth Corps, hitherto performed by the much weakened 1st Hessian 
Jager Battalion." 1 This order brought the 2d Battalion into a different 
front from that of the Guard Rifle and Fusilier Battalions; the latter 
moved northeastward on Amanweiler, the 2d Battalion moved from 
hill 316 more to the southeast toward the left wing of the artillery 
north of Champenois. To the left front of that artillery the thinned- 
out companies of the 1st Hessian Jager Battalion still performed the 
artillery protection though their ammunition was exceedingly short. 
At the double time, under a heavy hostile fire, skirmishers in front, 
the 5th and 8th Companies in the front line hastened to the batteries 
and threw themselves down directly north of the basin in which the 

'History of the Kaiser Alexander Guard Grenadier Regiment No. 1. 



332 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

footpath from Verneville to Amanweiler ends. The other two compa- 
nies remained farther west under cover. In this position the battalion 
was still in rear of the 1st Hessian Jager Battalion but was in readiness 
to advance at any moment into the first line. The increasing losses 
soon caused the two leading companies to deploy as skirmishers, keep- 
ing only one platoon in close order. At about 6.30 p.m., at the same 
time that the attack of the Guard Riflemen and Fusiliers came to a 
stand 400 meters from the enemy, the battalion commander, Major von 
Schmeling, received a request from the Hessian Jagers for relief as 
they were entirely out of ammunition. By his orders the two rear 
companies took position on the left of the companies in front, utilizing 
for this movement the depression of the field road, and deployed as 
skirmishers (except one platoon) as soon as the hostile fire made itself 
felt. As soon as the leading line was reached the entire battalion ad- 
vanced at a run, crossed the left wing of the artillery position of the 
IXth Army Corps, indicated by debris and dead bodies, and after sev- 
eral rushes gained the position of the Hessians. A part of the latter 
came to meet the battalion; but for the rest the relief was carried out 
in such manner that the Jagers evacuated their position only after the 
skirmishers of the Regiment Alexander had arrived. After a short 
halt in the position of the Hessians the entire 2d Battalion advanced 
again. The right wing, the 5th and 8th Companies, took direction on 
Montigny la Grange and, except one platoon of the 8th Company which 
kept to the left, reached to within 500 meters northeast of Champenois, 
from where the entire basin from Champenois in the direction of the 
enemy as far as the tent camp at Montigny la Grange could be plainly 
seen. The left wing sought connection with the Fusilier Battalion, 
Regiment Alexander, farther in front and advanced straight on hill 330 
occupied by the enemy, in order to gain a foothold in a new position 
about 300 meters south of the Fusiliers. From this position, how- 
ever, they could fire on the enemy on the hill only standing. The 2d 
Battalion, Regiment Alexander was thus divided into two parts sepa- 
rated only by a space of some 300 meters. The last movements had 
cost extraordinary losses, especially in officers. 

While in this manner the first fighting line of the 3d Guard In- 
fantry Brigade formed and established itself about 400 meters in front 
of the hostile position, the first line of the Regiment Elizabeth, consist- 
ing of the 2d and 3d Companies and the Fusilier Battalion, had left the 
southwest corner of the piece of woods north of knoll 316. Soon after 
6 p.m. it received orders from the commander of the Regiment Alex- 
ander, Colonel von Zeuner, who had taken command when the brigade 
commander was wounded, to fill up the gap between the two battal- 
ions of the Regiment Alexander. As point of direction the church- 
steeple of Amanweiler was designated. While the 2d Battalion and 
the two Guard Pioneer Companies remained temporarily in the forest, 
the leading line, the Fusilier Battalion on the right, started without 
being able to see the church steeple. A new point of direction desig- 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 333 

nated by Colonel von Zaluskowski, a high poplar south of Amanweiler, 
could not be kept to on account of the dense powder smoke. Asa re- 
sult the Fusilier Battalion took about the same direction which the 2d 
Battalion, Regiment Alexander in front had taken, on Montigny la 
Grange, while the half 1st Battalion endeavored to get ahead along the 
south edge of the Bois de la Cusse toward the village of Amanweiler. 

FRENCH COUNTER ATTACKS ARE DEFEATED. THE REGIMENT 
ELIZABETH INTERFERES 

Of the 4th French Corps at 5 p.m. seventeen battalions occupied 
the space in front of Amanweiler and Montigny la Grange between the 
Metz — Etain railroad and hill 340, 500 meters northwest of Folie, in a 
position which in general ran along the road from Folie across hill 330 
to Habonville. Six battalions of the Division Lorencez were in rear as 
reserve. 1 Of the artillery, two batteries were in the vicinity of Mon- 
tigny la Grange, but they were no longer able to enter a serious battle 
on account of shortage of ammunition. 

The fighting force of the 4th Corps being thus considerably dimin- 
ished the information that the 2d Division of the Imperial Guard had 
arrived at St. Vincent the other side of the Montveau valley was re- 
ceived with all the greater joy. But the hope of receiving from this 
division a support which could complete the victory against an enemy 
who at that time had almost completely ceased firing, was to prove 
vain. The momentary pause in the battle did not prevent a further 
weakening of the French battle front in consequence of a shortage of 
ammunition. Shortly after 5 p.m. the 13th Line Regiment fell back 
from southwest of Amanweiler and joined the 43d Regiment of the same 
brigade which had already left the battle front for the same reason. 2 
The resulting gap was temporarily closed by an extended development 
of the neighboring battalions. Thus the fighting front west and south- 
west of Amanweiler thinned more and more, while the battalions ac- 
cumulated west of Montigny la Grange. Just as the attack of the 3d 
Guard Infantry Brigade commenced, the 3d Battalion, 65th Line Reg- 
iment entered the line of the 98th Line regiment from the reserve, the 
2d and 3d Battalions of the 33d Line Regiment soon following it. 

The appearance of the Guard Rifle and Fusilier Battalions of the 
Regiment Alexander at the Bois de la Cusse and south of it called out 
a destructive rapid fire from the French infantry west of Amanweiler. 
The 5th Jager Battalion especially, having just received new ammuni- 
tion, was able to throw a hot fire on the Germans. The tremendous 
effect of the fire among the German lines could be clearly seen ; but in 
spite of it the two leading battalions worked their way side by side up 
to within 400 meters of the French position. Farther to the south the 
2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander could be seen drawing on itself the 

'The three battalions, 43d Line Regiment, which had expended their ammunition, 
are not counted in. 

"The losses of the 13th Line Regiment were considerable: Killed, 5 officers, 33 
men; wounded, 13 officers, 230 men; missing, 110. 



334 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

fire of the French infantry west of Montigny la Grange and coming to 
a halt in two widely separated groups west and southwest of knoll 330 
which was occupied by the 3d Battalion of the 54th Line Regiment. 
Other German infantry was seen approaching farther in the rear. 
These observations, and the fact that another advance of infantry was 
seen still farther north, from the Bois de la Cusse, led to the reinforce- 
ment of the fighting line west of Amanweiler by an additional battal- 
ion of the reserve, the 1st of the 33d Line Regiment. But before this 
battalion had entered the first line, two offensive counter attacks were 
made by the French line at 6.45 p.m. 

The 2d Jager Battalion, in position at the crossroads 327, 600 
meters west of Amanweiler, received from the Prussian Guard batteries 
north of the railroad an enfilading fire which in conjunction with the 
fire of the hostile infantry made its position in front very uncomfort- 
able. The battalion commenced to give way, but was again led for- 
ward by its commander and with fixed bayonets advanced against 
the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alexander, 400 meters distant. At the 
same time south of it the 2d Battalion, 64th Line Regiment advanced 
from the reserve and, making its way through the line of battalions 
which was holding the poplar-edged road west of Montigny la Grange, 
turned against the right wing group of the 2d Battalion, Regiment 
Alexander. 1 

When the French attack was perceived, the leaders of the Regi- 
ment Alexander stopped the firing along the lines in order to save the 
ammunition, which was getting short, for the close range fight. As soon 
as the dense skirmish lines, followed by columns, had approached to 
within about 250 meters of the German lines an annihilating rapid fire 
was poured on them. The attackers stopped; a part of them attempted 
to continue the charge; finally everything fled under heavy loss. 

At this moment the leading six companies of the Regiment Eliza- 
beth arrived. The Fusilier Battalion, with advanced shirmishers, had 
originally started in two lines, which were followed up by the other 
platoons in lines; subsequently all four companies had been put in one 
line and, after the basin had been crossed and the ridge north of Cham- 
penois had been ascended along the footpath between Verneville and 
Amanweiler, they turned a little to the left to again gain connection 
with the two companies of the 1st Battalion which were farther to the 
north. Suffering heavy losses the battalion, which had taken direction 
on hill 330, arrived with its 11th and 12th Companies in the gap between 
the Fusilier and the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander; with its 10th 
Company it entered the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander, while the 
9th Company prolonged the right wing of the entire position across the 
Champenois— Amanweiler road toward the south. 

The 2d and 3d Companies, Regiment Elizabeth, arrived a little 
earlier in the first line as they had taken the shorter road along the 
south edge of the Bois de la Cusse. They reached the right wing of 

'It cannot be stated with certainty which French battalion made this attack. 



THE 18TH OP AUGUST, 1870 335 

the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alexander, and though seriously de- 
pleted, formed a welcome reinforcement of the left battle group of the 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade. Here the losses had been noticeably high. 
Of the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alexander, most of the officers, 
and of the Guard Rifle Battalion all of the officers were disabled, an 
ensign commanding this battalion; of the men of both battalions nearly 
one half lay on the battlefield; and what the two companies of the 
Regiment Elizabeth brought into the fighting line after having crossed 
the space in rear by rushes were only fragments. 

Yet the reinforcements of the Regiment Elizabeth arrived in time 
to help defeat the renewed attempts at attack made by the French. 
Hostile cavalry also, a few squadrons strong, advanced from the vici- 
nity of Montigny la Grange against the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alex- 
ander, but turned back when about 400 meters from the Prussian line, 
having been met by volleys. • Not all movements on the French front 
were, however, attempts to attack, even though they seemed such to 
the Germans. Just as the companies of the Regiment Elizabeth ar- 
rived on the fighting line the 1st and 2d Battalions, 15th Line Regiment 
turned back south of the crossroads, 600 meters west of Amanweiler, 
being led into this retreat by the men of the 2d Jager Battalion who 
at that moment fled back after the miscarriage of their attack. Shortly 
afterwards the battalions were successfully led back to their former po- 
sition, being encouraged by the good example of the 1st Battalion, 33d 
Line Regiment then entering the firing line from the second line. 
These movements naturally started a hot fire from the German side. 

With the defeat of the French counter attacks the leading line of 
the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade had conquered its greatest difficulties. 
It is true that the opponent still kept up a sharp but not so well aimed 
fire, and the losses consequently decreased materially while on the 
other hand the German battalions found on reaching a suitable range 
that their careful training in firing stood them in good stead. Of 
course there could be no thought now of continuing the attack; only 
thin skirmish lines without supporting troops covered the extended 
position which the brigade had attained by fighting. 2 Shortage of 
ammunition here and there also prevented it and later a significant 
order from Colonel von Zenner to halt and defend the captured 
terrain was brought by the brigade adjutant. Colonel von Zenner 
had received information from Major von Bronsart, chief of staff of 
the IXth Army Corps, that one brigade of the Hid Army Corps would 
arrive as support and that the enveloping movement of the IXth Army 
Corps against the hostile right wing would not necessitate a further 
advance of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade. 3 

Thus the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade conducted a stationary fight 

'The French General Staff Account denies this offensive attack by French cav- 
alry. It is confirmed by the battle report of the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander, 
dated August 19, 1870. 

'One platoon of the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander, had reached Champenois 
and there joined the 1st Battalion, 2d Hessian Infantry Regiment. 
3 War Archives. 



336 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

from 7 p.m. on. Its last reserve, the 2d Battalion, Regiment Elizabeth 
and two Guard Pioneer Companies, were at this time drawn up closer 
to the front from the southwest corner of the Bois de la Cusse. 

On the French side now nineteen battalions of the 4th Corps had 
deployed in the first line south of the railroad, weaker in front of the 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade, stronger west of Montigny la Grange, 
where only weaker German forces stood opposite in Champenois and 
Envie. Only a single battalion of the Division Lorencez, the 2d of the 
54th Line Regiment, was still in reserve at Amanweiler. The last two 
batteries had disappeared from the vicinity of Montigny la Grange. 



THE ARTILLERY OP THE HID AND IXTH ARMY CORPS SUPPORTS 

THE ATTACK OP THE 3D GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE 

AND THE TROOPS AT CHA.NTRENNE WHERE 

THE BATTLE REMAINS UNDECIDED 

The attack of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade had been effectively 
prepared and supported by the artillery of the Hid and IXth Corps on 
the ridge north of Champenois, though the fire on the hostile infantry 
had been slow. These seven batteries could of course assist only the 
right wing of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade, as they could not see 
Amanweiler and the country west of it. They had a great share in 
defeating the hostile counter attack against the 2d Battalion, Regiment 
Alexander. It was soon after believed in the artillery line that there 
were noticeable evidences that the enemy's lines were being shaken. 
Similar impressions were held by the Hessian Horse and by the 5th 
Light Guard Batteries which were south of Champenois. 1 The enemy 
appeared to be already retreating through Montigny la Grange, 2 and 
the fire was therefore directed mainly towards that point. 

The left wing of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade received some 
support from the oblique fire directed when opportunity offered by 
the Guard artillery on the other side of the railroad; but there could 
be no regular cooperation by the artillery at this point. Because of 
the general conformation of the terrain, the Hessian batteries in 
position north of the Bois de la Cusse were unable to fire effectively 
on the enemy at Amanweiler; their fire remained directed against 
targets at and north of the railroad. 

The 2d Battalion, Foot Artillery, Hid Army Corps, after its un- 
fortunate attempt to advance from its position southeast of Verneville, 
had merely directed its fire in part on the far off targets at Montigny 
la Grange and in part on the woods of la Charmoise, occupied by in- 
fantry. In spite of the short range the success attained at the latter 
place was inconsiderable. Occasionally, indeed, it appeared as if the 
enemy within the forest had been silenced, but his fire broke out 

'The Hessian battery fired only with two pieces. 
'War Archives. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 337 

again each time the opposing German infantry at Chantrenne offered 
a good target. 



THE 3D GUARD INFANTRY BRIGADE ENTERS THE HOSTILE 
POSITION AT AMANWEILER 

The general offensive ordered by Prince Frederick Charles and 
executed by General von Manstein was made that evening only by the 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade and two neighboring companies of the 18th 
Infantry Division. Expecting the arrival of the Hid Army Corps placed 
at his disposal for support by the Prince, General von Manstein had sent 
orders to join the general advance to the still closed up parts of the 
3d Infantry Brigade 1 and to Colonel von Winckler, commanding the 
84th Infantry Regiment, who had assembled under his command the 
parts of the 18th Infantry Division gathered together in the Bois de la 
Cusse. At this time the situation of the battalions of the 3d Guard 
Infantry Brigade deployed in the first line was, after the successful de- 
feat of the French counter attack, though not actually endangered, 
scarcely favorable owing to shortage of ammunition. Among the Guard 
Rifles in front of the southeast corner of the Bois de la Cusse, and the 
battalions of the 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment Kaiser Alexander 
farther south, some companies had no cartridges left; others had only 
about four or five rounds per man. The ammunition of the dead had 
long since been used up; the ammunition brought back by wounded 
returning from the dressing station was insufficient. The six com- 
panies of the Regiment Elizabeth were more fortunate; they had not 
arrived in the firing line until later. On the left wing, where were the 
Guard Rifles, the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alexander, the 2d and 
3d Companies, Regiment Elizabeth, the condition of the troops after 
the previous horrible losses was scarcely satisfactory. On the right 
wing the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander and the Fusilier Battalion, 
Regiment Elizabeth, had not suffered so much as they had been ably 
supported by the artillery. An attempt was made from here to gain 
space toward the front, and single detachments commenced to envelop 
from the southwest knoll 330 occupied by the enemy. From other 
parts of the line skirmish groups had also worked their way up to 
within 200 meters of the opponent. It was a great help to the left 
wing of the brigade that after the last change of position of the Hes- 
sian batteries these, in conjunction with the Guard batteries farther 
north, could direct their fire on the enemy south of the railroad. It was 
not easy for the few skirmishers in the line of the 3d Guard Infantry 
Brigade to get a good aim on the enemy who was completely 
enveloped by powder smoke and, in addition, was under good 
cover. Only the flash of his rifles indicated the target for the needle 
guns. As the Prussian skirmishers lay not along one line but 
echeloned, in the increasing darkness some of the men in front were 

■2d Battalion, Regiment Elizabeth and two Guard Pioneer companies. 



338 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

hit by the bullets of the men in rear. Several times the rear lines had 
to be called on to cease firing. 

When Colonel von Winckler received General von Manstein's 
orders to join the general advance, he designated for this the 2d and 
3d Companies, 36th Fusilier Regiment, or rather what what was left of 
them, and the 2d and 4th Companies of the 84th Infantry Regiment, 
which so far had suffered least from the hostile fire. In the advance 
through the forest the two Fusilier companies went to the left and no 
longer participated in the advance. The Musketeer companies left 
the Bois de la Cusse one behind the other through the southern exit of 
the glade which divides the eastern part of the forest into two parts, 
and, after having been joined by a number of Guardsmen who had 
been left behind, gradually deployed in skirmish line, and prolonged 
the left wing of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade in front of the Bois de 
la Cusse. By direction of its commander the 2d Battalion, Regiment 
Elizabeth had anticipated General von Manstein's orders for the 
advance by moving from the southwest corner of the woods along the 
railroad somewhat farther to the front. Lieutenant Colonel von 
Bernhardi now caused the 7th and 6th Companies to advance in the 
first line south of the Bois de la Cusse, while the 5th and 8th Companies, 
as last closed reserve, were to follow at some distance. The leading 
companies were met by noncommissioned officers of the Regiment 
Alexander who were seeking ammunition and who reported its 
shortage with every sign of great agitation. The 6th Company 
entered the gap between the battalions of the Regiment Alex- 
ander, which had been but incompletely filled by the leading com- 
panies of the Regiment Elizabeth, and furnished the men there 
with some ammunition. Farther north the 7th Company arrived very 
soon after. At this point the German line had approached to within 
200 meters of the enemy and the final assault appeared imminent as 
the closed half-battalion of the Regiment Elizabeth was coming up to 
reinforce the skirmish line and carry it forward. But the first breach 
was not to be made at this point. 

On the right wing the 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander, and the 
neighboring Fusilier Companies, Regiment Elizabeth, became the 
target of a sudden hostile attack. On the ridge north of Champenois 
the figures of the Grenadiers silhouetted themselves clearly against the 
glow of the sinking sun; this undoubtedly induced the French to open 
an unexpected rapid fire and then, to the sound of trumpets and drums, 
to charge with equally unexpected fury. Because of the shortage of 
ammunition the situation was very critical; there was a dearth of 
officers; nevertheless calm commands rang out: "Load! Fire first at 
100 paces!" These directions were strictly followed and the intrepidly 
charging enemy was received at short range with a well aimed point 
blank fire, causing his line first to halt, then flee hastily back. Some 
of the companies of the Regiment Alexander having no ammu? 
nition with which to pour a pursuing fire on the enemy, the 6th and 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 339 

7th Companies, joined by a part of the 8th Company, followed the 
enemy with the bayonet, while the other part of the 8th and the 5th 
Company remained prone and kept up the fire. At places the enemy 
was overtaken and the bayonet brought into play. 

This charge together with the approach of the still intact part of 
the 2d Battalion was the signal for the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment 
Elizabeth to take up the assault, and with loud hurrahs the Fusiliers 
hurled themselves against the hostile position. Knoll 330 formed the 
attack objective for the right wing of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade. 
There the assault became blocked; some groups halted to exchange 
shots with the still firing enemy; others crossed the enemy's former 
position south of the knoll for a short distance, then came to a halt to 
get their breath and to assemble. Although the enemy was 
retreating on Amanweiler the country west of the village was still oc- 
cupied by numerous hostile detachments preparing for renewed 
resistance and the weak German companies did not dare to advance 
farther. A retreat even was made in part to reestablish order. Past 
these retreating groups the Fusilier companies, Regiment Elizabeth, 
which had started a little later, charged and captured hill 330. Falling 
darkness caused disorder and friction; friend could not be distinguished 
from foe and it happened again and again that one German detach- 
ment fired into another. 1 Hurrahs and loud shouts quickly remedied 
this. But the success was indisputable and the enemy evacuated his 
position. 

The shouts and the assault spread from the right wing along the 
line to the left, where the arrival in close order of the last half-bat- 
talion of the Regiment Elizabeth had been impatiently awaited as the 
signal to the assault. 

This half-battalion was still about 50 meters distant from the first 
line when the command "Forward!" put everything in motion. North 
of knoll 330 the 6th and 7th Companies, Regiment Elizabeth charged 
and entered the hostile position. They were joined on the left by the 
2d and 3d Companies— under one first sergeant— the Fusilier Battalion, 
Regiment Alexander, the Guard Rifle Battalion— under an ensign — 
and the two Companies of the 84th Infantry Regiment. The hostile 
resistance no longer amounted to anything; immediately north of 
knoll 330 the charge of the right wing, having passed that point, had 
an especially good effect. Here parts of the line halted in the aban- 
doned position, while others — in particular the 7th Company, Regiment 
Elizabeth — pursued the enemy in the direction of Amanweiler where 
several bayonet fights occurred. Farther north the enemy did not 
evacuate his positions as easily. Melees ensued at several points and 
the fire fight also was renewed, bringing however few losses to the 
Germans as the French fired very poorly at close range. In several 
instances parts of the enemy, after leaving the first position, again 
faced about— once opposite the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alexan- 

>War Archives. 



340 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

der— as a matter of fact not in order to continue the resistance, but to 
surrender. But the sudden reopening of fire prevented this and a 
hand to hand encounter ensued which ended in the wild flight of the 
French toward Amanweiler and their disappearance in the darkness. 

Thus at the fall of dusk — it was now toward 8 p.m. — it was 
granted the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade to enter the hostile position for 
the possession of which it had fought for more than two hours. The 
enemy had retreated; single detachments following him toward 
Amanweiler encountered resistance; but a general pursuit could not 
be attempted because of the exhaustion of the troops and the increasing 
darkness. The fire died down gradually, only occasionally reopening. 
The guns of the artillery northwest of Champenois, which had sup- 
ported the assault as much as lay within their power as long as friend 
could be distinguished from foe, were long since silent; but they still 
were in their positions to be in readiness for any eventuality. 

In the ninth evening hour Colonel von Zaluskowski issued orders 
to assemble the Regiment Elizabeth and the companies of the 2d Bat- 
talion which still were in close order. Only gradually could the 
straightening out of the disorganized and mixed units proceed. Inter- 
ruptions by dispersed and lost hostile detachments were frequent. 1 
The 2d Battalion, Regiment Alexander assembled on the right on hill 
330 without serious difficulties and was led back in two echelons to the 
Bois de la Cusse. On the left the Fusilier Battalion, Regiment Alex- 
ander, and the Guard Rifle Battalion while assembling suddenly re- 
ceived an enfilading fire which came from the railroad and not only de- 
manded a series of sacrifices, but in the tumult gave the French prison- 
ers a chance to escape. The lost French detachment which caused this 
interruption narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the 3d Hessian 
Infantry Regiment which still held the east edge of the Bois de la 
Cusse and was waiting for this chance ; but the French detachment 
escaped in time. 



THE FRENCH CORPS EVACUATES THE POSITIONS WEST OF AMAN- 
WEILER AND MONTIGNY LA GRANGE 

At the first assault of the 3d Guard Infantry Brigade the numer- 
ous reserves were plentifully inserted in the line of the 4th French 
Corps between the Metz — Etain railroad and Folie; other supports 
evidently were counted on and the arrival at St. Vincent of the 2d Di- 
vision of the Imperial Guard under General Picard apparently justified 
this expectation. General de Ladmirault sent to the other side of 
the Montveau valley an adjutant who, at about 6.15 p.m., brought to the 
commander of the Imperial Guard, General Bourbaki, a request to 
lead the Division Picard to the battlefield of the 4th Corps and thus 

•A hostile detachment suddenly coming up even demanded the surrender of one 
platoon of the 7th Company, which was protecting the assembly of the regiment. A 
rapid fire was the answer. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 341 

secure the victory with fresh troops. General Bourbaki showed little 
inclination for this for he had already observed the retreat of the men 
of the 6th Corps ; but he assented to it and, with the Guard Zouave Regi- 
ment, the 1st Guard Grenadier Regiment and two batteries, crossed the 
strip of woods between the forest of Saulny and the Montveau valley in 
the direction of Amanweiler. But on the other side of this strip of woods 
the pressure of fleeing masses in the vicinity of St. Privat and the con- 
fusion of troops and vehicles in the rear of the 4th Corps became so 
apparent that he believed that everything was retreating. In order 
not to involve the Division Picard in the general confusion and to regain 
the plateau of St. Vincent, which appeared to him extremely suited 
for defense, he caused the command to face about. This retrograde 
movement caused among the fleeing and wounded in that vicinity a 
panic which spread also to a part of the trains of the 4th Corps. In 
wild flight the confused mass of men, horses and vehicles ran back on 
the road to Lorry. The panic was brought bo an end by two batteries 
of the artillery reserve of the 3d Corps which had then been for some 
three hours at St. Vincent and which blocked the road decisively to 
the oncoming mass, taking position squarely across the road from 
Amanweiler to Lorry. Even the Guard troops had for a short time 
lost their confidence. At 7 p.m. the Division Picard was again on the 
plateau of St. Vincent and the support on which the 4th Corps had 
counted did not materialize. 

Knowledge of this reached the commander of the 4th Corps, Gen- 
eral de Ladmirault, simultaneously with other more serious informa- 
tion. He learned that the neighboring 6th Corps was in full retreat 
and also received a report from his right wing, Division Cissey, north 
of the railroad, asking for orders in view of an envelopment threatening 
from the north. General Ladmirault did not deceive himself in regard 
to the fact that it now was time for the 4th Corps to prepare for itself a 
receiving position for the retreat; he sent a corresponding request to 
General Bourbaki and ordered General Cissey to take his 1st Division 
back to the west edge of the forest of Saulny. General Lorencez was 
directed to hold the heights west of Amanweiler — Montigny la Grange 
as long as possible. General Leboeuf, commanding the 3d Corps, was 
requested to send a few battalions of his reserves at Folie to Aman- 
weiler. Then General Ladmirault rode to the quarries at Amanweiler, 
where he encountered the larger part of his batteries and troops of the 
Division Cissey. 

The retreat of that division, north of the railroad, had commenced 
about 7 p.m. The artillery, being short of ammunition and subjected 
without protection to the fire of the Hessian batteries, was the first to 
take up the retreat, falling back on the quarries of Amanweiler. The 
infantry of the division at and on knoll 322 did not feel itself so much 
endangered by the approaching Hessian infantry in its front as by the 
Prussian Guard which stood in front of its right wing on ridge 321. 
To prevent an envelopment the last infantry regiment of the rear 



342 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

echelon, the 1st Line Regiment, had been advanced in a northwesterly- 
direction against hill 321. Though the entire infantry suffered under 
the shell fire of the Hessian and Prussian Guard batteries this regiment 
was placed in a far more precarious situation, as it offered its flank to 
the hostile fire. The movement had no success. 

Of the infantry the 57th and the 73d Line Regiments were the first 
to fall back in the direction of the quarries of Amanweiler and they 
were followed by the remaining troops. Knoll 322, as well as the 
railroad cut east of the railroad guard's house, remained occupied by 
the skirmishers so that the Hessian fighting line opposite actually had 
in its front until dark an opponent who used his arms. In the main 
body of the division, which fell back under German shell fire, such a 
complete dissolution of formations took place in the dark that General 
Cissey could gather together of it at the quarries only fragments with 
which he marched off to Metz between 8 and 9 p.m. 

With the retreat of the Division Cissey the space immediately 
south of the railroad was evacuated by French troops. The right 
wing of the fighting line in front of Amanweiler and Montigny la 
Grange, composed of a mixture of troops of the Divisions Grenier and 
Lorencez, consequently felt its flank threatened, the more so as several 
German companies had assembled at the railroad guard's house and 
had within the last few minutes been reinforced. Though these com- 
panies showed no inclination to attack and were able to fire on the 
French fighting line only by small advanced detachments, and as the 
Prussian Guard troops hugging the ground in front also made no move, 
the 5th and 2d Jager Battalions of the right wing fell back close to 
Amanweiler on the east. The 1st Battalion, 54th Line Regiment, 
which had been between the two Jager battalions, also faced about but 
resumed its original front after having gone a short distance, so 
that the French right wing was not completely bare. It was mainly 
the enfilading fire of the Guard and Hessian troops north of the rail- 
road which caused these retrograde movements. 

For the rest not much change for the time being occurred in the 
French position. It was nearing 8 p.m. when a sudden advance of the 
1st Battalion, 65th Line Regiment, from the center of the French front 
against the opposite right wing of the German fighting front induced, not 
a counter attack, but a general offensive of the German troops de- 
ployed between the Bois de la Ousse and Amanweiler. This general 
attack caused a general retreat of the French troops, except the bat- 
talions west of Montigny la Grange — a giving way which of course 
could in no way be designated as a retreat or flight and which merely 
permitted the Germans to occupy the abandoned position. Very close 
behind the original fighting line a new line was formed offering re- 
sistance to the on-pressing German troops. Seven French battalions 
again made front between the original position and Amanweiler while 
the remainder marched off in the direction of that village. The fire 
fight continued; contacts occurred, leading to melees. In consequence 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 343 

of the hostile fire, the darkness, and the absence of all orders for the 
execution of the retreat, there was much confusion in the French 
ranks where the losses during the long battle had been heavy. 

While the French already were in retreat west of Amanweiler 
five reinforcing battalions, sent by General Leboeuf, approached from 
the south. Of them the 1st and 3d Battalions, 71st Line Regiment 
only reached the edge of the forest facing north of the Montveau 
valley east of Folie and remained halted there; the 41st Line Regiment 
marched beyond Folie and Montigny la Grange and, formed in two 
lines, advanced northwest, drums beating and bugles sounding. It 
was now completely dark; only the burning villages and farm build- 
ings lighted up the country. The regiment nowhere encountered 
German troops and it arrived in the new French fighting line south- 
west of Amanweiler, where it found connection with two battalions, 
15th Line Regiment. The later it grew, the greater the number of 
French troops which fled back, and the battle gradually ceased. 
Single battalions retreated out of the massed battalions west of 
Montigny la Grange. At 9 p.m. there were still thirteen battalions 
assembled in or in rear of the position. Two hours later the entire 
Division Lorencez, except two battalions, was assembled on the other 
side of the Montveau valley at St. Vincent; the 1st and 3d Battalions, 
33d Line Regiment, had moved with the 41st Line Regiment of the 3d 
Corps to Montigny la Grange where, secured by outposts, they passed 
a part of the night. Of the Division Grenier, two battalions, 64th Line 
Regiment, and the 98th Line Regiment had remained west of Montigny 
la Grange and went into their old bivouacs there, placing pickets out. 

As a matter of fact, the right wing and the center of the position 
of the 4th Corps were fully evacuated during the night; Amanweiler 
was free except for the numerous wounded lying in the burning vil- 
lage. On the left wing ten battalions bivouacked around Montigny la 
Grange. The right wing division of the 3d Corps, Montaudon, occupied 
during the night the woods of la Charmoise with two companies, while 
the six battalions which had defended those woods bivouacked behind 
them. At the clearing between them and the northeast projection of 
the Genivaux forest were three battalions. 

Farther in rear strong parts of the 4th Corps, especially the artil- 
lery and the Division Picard of the Imperial Guard, which had again 
been brought forward a little, awaited at the quarries of Amanweiler 
and on the road between the village and the quarries the complete 
departure of the 6th Corps from St. Privat. Then the retreat proper 
was taken up on the roads through Woippy and Lorry toward Metz. 
Only the 7th Hussar Regiment still remained for a time at the forest of 
Saulny. The troops which had remained west of the Montois valley 
left their positions very early on the 19th without being interfered 
with by the Germans. A single German squadron met the battalions 
of the 64th and 98th Line Regiments when they retreated from 
Montigny la Grange through Amanweiler to St. Vincent. 



344 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMY UP TO THE CLOSE 
OP THE BATTLE 

When Prince Frederick Charles shortly after 7 p.m. gave General 
von Alvensleben permission to advance for an attack with the Hid 
Army Corps south of the Bois de la Cusse, he intended to start also the 
Xth Army Corps behind the Guard Corps, and have it participate in 
the general offensive. Orders were sent at 7.15 p.m. to General von 
Voigts-Rhetz " to advance offensively as seemed best to him, prefera- 
bly with one division between the Guard and the XHth Army Corps, 
holding back one division behind the left wing of the IXth Army 
Corps." 1 The Prince did not realize that the Xth Army Corps had 
already become engaged in the battle around St. Privat. Finally 
orders were sent also to the lid Army Corps, which shortly before had 
been directed to report to the King for orders, to Rezonville " to inter- 
fere as seemed best and as quickly as possible and to report its decision 
to the King." 8 The Prince, who was ignorant of actual conditions 
with the Hd Army Corps, added to the orders, verbally to Major von 
Niesewand, first adjutant of army headquarters, who was to carry 
them that the battle was won and that the Hd Army Corps was at 
liberty to gather some of the laurels. 3 The entire Second Army now 
had been inserted for a last decisive attack and the Prince considered 
it advisable to inform himself again as to the situation of the battle on 
the left wing, especially also to ascertain where and how the XHth 
Army Corps was engaged. He rode over to Habonville and viewed 
the battlefield north of the Bois de la Cusse. Little was to be seen of 
St. Privat; dense powder smoke hid the village and neighboring 
heights. But he plainly perceived the long line of the Guard artillery 
fully turned against St. Privat and the southern ridge; and the flashes of 
the pieces north of the Ste. Marie — St. Privat road justified the con- 
clusion that there the artillery of other corps, probably the Xth and 
XHth, had entered the battle, surrounding St. Privat from the north. 
As Second Army Headquarters believed that village to have been 
long since in German hands, it was thought that this fire could be 
directed only against French troops holding their positions north of 
Amanweiler and the defeat of which would be only a question of time 
in the further progress of the envelopment. Satisfied with these im- 
pressions Prince Frederick Charles returned to his position at the Bois 
de la Cusse. From there the information officer of Royal Headquarters, 
Lieutenant Colonel von Brandenstein, reported at 7.35 p.m. to General 
von Moltke the Prince's last measures adding that the battle was 
progressing at all points. 

Headquarters Second Army soon was disabused in its beliefs, 
however. Ten minutes later a report arrived from General von Al- 
vensleben to the effect that his Hid Army Corps was being attacked 

"War Archives. 
2 War Archives. 

statement of the then Major von Niesewand. The orders did not reach the lid 
Army Corps, as it had started for St. Hubert. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 345 

in the right flank, that he was compelled to keep his forces together 
and that he could send no troops for the support of the IXth Army 
Corps. With this the planned general attack of the Second Army became 
a questionable move as far as the IXth Army Corps was concerned, 
and the general situation doubtful. The fears thus created were how- 
ever soon dispersed as it was ascertained that the fire again opening 
up on the right flank was not directed against parts of the Second 
Army. But the increasing darkness made it appear inadvisable to 
again insert the Hid Army Corps for the attack. Therefore General 
von Alvensleben was ordered at 8 p.m. to occupy with one infantry 
regiment each of the villages Doncourt and Caulre and to go with the 
main body in bivouac, placing outposts, just where it then was. 1 At 
8.15 p.m. a report arrived from Crown Prince Albert of Saxony in 
reply to the orders issued him at 6.40 p.m. to send one infantry brigade 
to Woippy to block the road to the north to the enemy. The Crown 
Prince wrote: 

"August 18, 7.10 p.m. The cavalry has already received orders to 
interrupt the railroad at Hagondange and Richemont. In addition 
cavalry with pioneers on wagons have been sent for the same purpose 
through Briey. 

"As St. Pri vat is not yet taken and as the road is therefore not 
yet open, one brigade will be sent through Roncourt and Marange to 
Maizifcres." 2 

This report brought out the astonishing fact that St. Privat, be- 
lieved to have been in the hands of the Guard Corps since 6.30 p.m., 
had not yet been taken at 7.10 p.m when this report was sent. The 
entire favorable picture of the battle was now dimmed. To the ques- 
tions sent out asking what had been done answers soon arrived . Verbal 
reports of 8 p.m. reported the fall of St. Privat, but also brought the 
news of the enormous losses, especially those of the Guard Corps. 
The victory appeared indeed to be certain, but the details which now 
became known made the situation, opposed to an energetic and stub- 
born enemy, appear not entirely without danger, especially con- 
sidering the heavy losses. In the meantime the firing in the Second 
Army ceased almost entirely; darkness had completely set in; St. 
Privat, Amanweiler and Montigny la Grange were burning. At 8.30 
p.m in the presence of General von Manstein the following orders for 
the night were issued by the light of burning grain sheaves: 8 

* * * 

At 8.45 Prince Frederick Charles rode from the Bois de la Cusse 
through Jouaville to Doncourt. He carried along a feeling of an un- 
usually hard won victory and also the apprehension that the French 
might still be fortunate enough to escape north in the valley of 
the Mosel. The strategic situation of the enemy had of course 
become exceedingly unfavorable in that he had been driven back 

'War Archives. 

s War Archives; also Von der Goltz, Die Operationen derlld Armee, p. 161. (Page 
77, ante.) 

3 For order see p. 81, ante. 



346 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

to Metz; but he had all the more cause to utilize the only remain- 
ing chance for escape. The Prince was still firmly convinced that the 
enemy's main intention on August 18th had been, not the resistance on 
the heights west of Metz, but escape into the interior of France. The 
apprehension that the enemy would escape northward was dispelled 
only within the next few days. 1 

THE XIITH ARMY CORPS COMPLETES ITS DEPLOYMENT 

From the hill west of Ste. Marie aux Chines Crown Prince Albert 
of Saxony watched the completion of the deployment and enveloping 
movements of his troops. To his great surprise he saw, between 5 
and 6 p.m., the Guard infantry advancing from St. Ail and Ste. Marie 
against St. Privat and the heights south of it. 8 

He thus believed that the Guard Corps had thought it advisable 
not to await the completion of the envelopment of the Saxons which 
had been started through Montois la Montagne, though that intention 
was known to the Guard Corps. During the advance of the Guard 
the Crown Prince took care that the subsequent attack of the envelop- 
ing column, the 48th Infantry Brigade, on Roncourt, which ought to 
have appeared on the heights of Montois la Montagne at about 6 p.m., 
should be supported by the other troops of the army corps. At 5.30 
p.m. the 47th Infantry Brigade, assembled at the northwest corner of 
Ste. Marie aux Chines, received orders to advance to the south edge 
of the woods of Auboui, which woods were then occupied by the 45th 
Infantry Brigade ; the 46th Infantry Brigade was to march there from 
Moineville. 

The corps artillery, deployed between Ste. Marie aux Chines and 
the woods of Auboui, was directed to advance farther in the direction 
of Roncourt to prepare the attack on that village. 

The ordered movements of the 46th and 47th Infantry Brigades 
had been completed by 6.15 p.m.; the46th, halting at the west edge of 
the woods, was to remain in reserve. By some mistake the artillery 
of the 24th Division, in position immediately north of Ste. Marie aux 
Chines, joined the march of the 47th Infantry Brigade from Ste. Marie 
aux Chines to the woods, ceasing the fire they had opened to support 
the Guard and limbering up by batteries to the rear. When it arrived 
behind the corps artillery the latter was just starting to go toward 
Roncourt. Not to interrupt the fire entirely, the change of position 
was to be made by battalions ; but, because the artillery units were 
already mixed up, and because of the extraordinary weariness of the 
horses, the change was made by batteries, which took much time. 
The first advancing batteries 3 sought out a new position first im- 
mediately east of the ravine of Homecourt, then advanced farther to 
the space south of the east part of the woods of Auboui. Into this 

1 Statements of the (then) Lieutenant von der Goltz, general staff of Second 
Army Headquarters. 

3 Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

3 Among them the 6th Heavy, which up to then had been furthest in rear. 



THE 18th OP AUGUST, 1870 347 

new position the last batteries of the corps artillery came only when 
Roncourt was in German hands. The undirected 2d Foot Artillery 
Battalion of the 24th Infantry Division also received orders from the 
Crown Prince to go into position to support the infantry attack on 
Roncourt, and take position to the left of the corps artillery. But 
there was room there only for two batteries, so that the other two had 
to halt in rear in march column. 

By 6.45 p. m seven batteries 1 had arrived in the first line and di- 
rected their fire on Roncourt, which had also been heavily fired on 
from the first chosen intermediate position. The main opponent up to 
that time, the hostile artillery between Roncourt and St. Privat, which 
had fired on the advancing Guard infantry, had by that time again 
disappeared; the batteries had also fired on hostile infantry at Ron- 
court and on hostile cavalry which had shown itself for a short time in 
the vicinity of Roncourt. Roncourt now became the main target and 
the infantry designated to attack the village had commenced very 
soon after 6 p.m. to advance upon it. About this time the 48th In- 
fantry Brigade appeared on the hill of Montois la Montagne and this 
caused the 45th Infantry Brigade, in pursuance of orders from Prince 
George, to start its attack from the woods of Aubou6. 

The enveloping column had made a hot and tiresome march in 
the Orne valley ; especially disagreeable was the heavy dust on the 
Auboue — Joeuf chalk road which the column, by passing Aubou§ on the 
east, reached about 400 meters northeast of the village. The enormous 
clouds of dust from there to the Ste. Marie— Homecourt road, where the 
highroad rises up to the east end of the valley, had been visible from 
far off. The infantry of the 48th Brigade was in the lead; the bat- 
teries of the 23d Infantry Division and the mass of the Saxon cavalry fol- 
lowing. 2 While still in the valley of the Orne reports arrived that the 
enemy was still occupying Montois la Montagne. 3 The leader of the 
enveloping column, Colonel von Schultz, when the northwestern vici- 
nity of Montois la Montagne was reached therefore ordered: 

"The 8th Infantry Regiment (107) ascends the side of the valley in 
front, the 3d Battalion deployed in column of companies as first line, 
the 1st and 2d Battalions in the second line, and advances straight on 
Montois la Montagne; the 7th Infantry Regiment (106) goes around 
the projecting part of the declivity on the left and attempts to attack 
the village on the hostile left flank. The Jager Battalion follows the 
8th Regiment as reserve." 4 

Thereupon the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry Regiment received 
orders from the regimental commander, "to advance demonstratively 
against the west front of Montois la Montagne and to hold the enemy's 
attention until the envelopment ordered by the brigade commander for 

'Serial arrival: 2d Horse, 5th Light, 6th Heavy, 7th Heavy, 5th Heavy, 4th 
Heavy, 4th Light. Farther in rear, 3d Heavy, 3d Light, 8th Heavy, 6th Light. 

= Of the batteries of the 23d Infantry Division only three were with the 48th In- 
fantry Brigade; the 1st Heavy Battery was with the 46th Infantry Brigade. 

3 Royal Saxon War Archives. This report is said to have been brought by a Prus- 
sian Guard Hussar officer; according to other sources the same report was also brought 
by Saxon cavalry detachments. 

4 Royal Saxon War Archives. 



348 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

attack of the north front of the village is completed." 1 The actual at- 
tack of the 3d Battalion on the west was to be made simultaneously 
with the attack of the 106th Regiment on the north. 

The battalion commander caused skirmishers to be deployed and 
start for Montois la Montagne, to be followed by two companies on the 
road from Homecourt to Montois la Montagne, while the other two 
companies accompanied the attack on the right and left with 120 meters 
interval. On the left of the 3d Battalion followed the 2d, on the right 
the 1st Battalion; these were followed in turn by the 13th Jager Battal- 
ion. The ascent up the declivity toward Montois la Montagne led 
through an open space in the forest 200 meters broad, was made diffi- 
cult by quarries, loose rocks and brush, and took much time and ex- 
penditure of strength. Farther east the battalions of the 106th Reg- 
iment climbed up the steep side of the valley, the 3d Battalion leading. 
When this battalion received fire from the strip of woods along the 
eastern edge of the Orne — probably from stragglers or from a patrol— 
the 12th Company obliqued to the left and, after having traversed the 
forest, took the direction to the left. Working its way along the edge 
of the forest and gradually formed in two lines, it gained the road to 
Malancourt. The 1st Battalion followed in similar formation. 

The 9th Company of the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry Regiment, 
remained behind when climbing the difficult side, so that only three 
companies could deploy for the planned attack against the west side of 
Montois la Montagne. A few shots were fired from the village; but 
very soon it was seen that the village was not occupied except by a 
patrol of the 100th Line Regiment. 2 The battalion traversed the vil- 
lage and remained halted at the south edge to await the arrival of the 
106th Infantry Regiment, but sent one company on ahead into the 
woods between Montois la Montagne and Roncourt. These woods 
were also found to be free of the enemy. In the meantime the other 
two battalions of the 107th Infantry Regiment and those of the 106th 
Infantry Regiment had gone around Montois la Montagne on the west 
and north and taken direction on Roncourt. 

Now the artillery and cavalry were brought up from the valley of 
the Orne. The 1st Light Battery first went into position at Montois la 
Montagne to fire a few rounds on Roncourt, and then joined the ad- 
vance of the 107th Infantry Regiment. The 2d Light Battery was sent 
to follow up the 106th Infantry Regiment, but soon joined the 1st Light 
Battery. Its place behind the 106th Regiment was taken by the 2d 
Heavy Battery. The 1st and 2d Cavalry Regiments followed the 107th 
Infantry Regiment, while the two regiments present of the 12th Cav- 
alry Division took a more easterly direction. 3 They marched behind 
the 106th Infantry Regiment into position at the woods between Mon- 
tois la Montagne and Malancourt. The attached 1st Horse Battery 

•Royal Saxon War Archives. 

2 Two men of this patrol were killed, one captured. 

3 The Guard and the 3d Cavalry Regiment, of which each one had sent one squad- 
ron into the valley of the Mosel to interrupt railroad and telegraph. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 349 

went into position at the southwest corner of the small wood, to fire on 
infantry visible in the direction of the forest edges south of Malancourt. 

The general staff officer of the 23d Infantry Division, Captain von 
Treitschke, had been busy in bringing up the batteries and afterwards 
had stationed himself east of Montois la Montagne. He perceived hos- 
tile infantry detachments retreating from the eastern vicinity of Ron- 
court toward the forest of Jaumont 1 and thought he could also see the 
enemy at Malancourt. 8 In consequence of these observations the com- 
mander of the 106th Infantry Regiment, Colonel von Abendroth, 
ordered the 3d Battalion to turn with three companies against Malan- 
court, while he himself with the 12th Company and the 1st Battalion 
held to the march direction toward the northeast corner of Roncourt. 
With these five companies, followed by the 13th Jager Battalion, Col- 
onel von Abendroth arrived opposite the small wood between Montois 
la Montagne and Roncourt where the 107th Infantry Regiment had also 
arrived. The latter had with its 3d Battalion occupied the south edge 
of the wood, the other two were echeloned somewhat to the right rear. 
Behind the infantry the three batteries which had followed them now 
went into position. The 2d Heavy Battery on the left wing fired on 
the hostile infantry at the forest of Jaumont; the 1st and 2d Light 
turned their fire against Roncourt which thus was attacked from two 
sides, from the north and from the woods of Auboue. By this time it 
was 6.45 p.m. 

Soon after 6 p.m. Crown Prince Albert hadproceded to the woods 
of Auboue to be closer to the decision. Prince George there watched 
the deployment of the 45th Infantry Brigade which had the same attack 
objective as the enveloping column. 

When the right wing of the 48th Infantry Brigade arrived beyond 
Montois la Montagne, the 1st Battalion, 101st Grenadier Regiment 
started in an easterly direction on Roncourt from the north edge of 
the eastern projection of the woods of Auboue. As soon as it came op- 
posite the Body Grenadier Regiment No. 100 this regiment also started, 
in two lines; in the first line were the 3d and 1st Battalions, in the sec- 
ond, the 2d Battalion in two half-battalions alongside each other. 
Behind the right wing of the Body Grenadier Regiment and awaiting 
orders for the advance were the 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Grenadier 
Regiment which already had been brought up from the western edge of 
the woods passing along the southern edge. Halted as reserve at the 
east corner of the woods was the 108th Rifle Regiment only single 
parts of which had earlier than this moved toward Roncourt and were 
in the first line. During the subsequent advance the left wing of the 
45th encountered the right wing of the 46th Infantry Brigade west of 
the woods between Montois la Montagne and Roncourt. Roncourt 
thus was surrounded by the Saxon Infantry on a shallow arc facing the 
southeast. The entire line was in movement forward when suddenly 

1 1st Battalion, 9th Line Regiment. 

3 It is stated that fire came from Malancourt; French uniforms were seen there. 



350 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

a Red Hussar on a white horse was seen from afar gallopping from the 
south toward the right wing of the 48th Infantry Brigade. 

This was the orderly officer of General von Pape, Lieutenant von 
Esbeck, called von Platen, of the Guard Hussar Regiment. Ordered 
to have Saxon batteries fire on St. Privat and to find out where the 
XHth Army Corps was, he had ridden at the most rapid gait from the 
Ste. Marie— St. Privat road along the separated parts of the 1st Guard 
Infantry Brigade to the large basin, had crossed that, and taken the 
direction of the woods of Auboue. He ascertained that north of the 
large basin the left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was still 
very far from its apparent attack objective, Roncourt, and appeared 
to require urgently the support of other troops. After he had ridden 
past the front of the 1st Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment north of the 
large basin and had given that battalion information of the situation at 
St. Privat, be saw the advancing Saxon infantry west of the small 
wood between Montois la Montagne and Roncourt and rode to meet it. 

He first met the commanders of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 107th 
Infantry Regiment who referred him to the regimental commander, 
Lieutenant Colonel von Schweinitz. He reported to the latter that 
the Guard urgently required support in the flank, and, after a short 
discussion, the lieutenant colonel decided to abandon the direction on 
Roncourt, which appeared not to be occupied, and to have the 1st and 
2d Battalions advance on St. Privat, passing Roncourt on the west. 
Report of the new march direction was sent to brigade headquarters. 1 
Lieutenant von Esbeck rode back and, at the southeast corner of the 
woods of Auboue, encountered the 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Grenadier 
Regiment, with whom was the brigade commander, Major General von 
Craushaar. He asked that general also to support the Guard and the 
general agreed to send the two battalions at once in the direction of 
St. Privat and also sent orders to this effect to the 100th Body Regi- 
ment. These orders were executed only by the left wing of the latter 
regiment, the 3d Battalion and the companies of the 2d Battalion in its 
rear, as the adjutant who was to carry these orders to the right wing 
lost his horse. Through the efforts of Lieutenant von Esbeck, a total 
of five and one half battalions left the Saxon line to turn toward 
St. Privat, while the remaining troops continued in the direction of 
Roncourt. Frictions and crossings naturally occurred during the 
subsequent advance. 

Lieutenant von Esbeck had no orders to divert the Saxon ad- 
advance on St. Privat. He acted independently under the impression 
that the left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade north of the large 
basin did not make any progress toward Roncourt; also it was not his 
intention to draw the Saxons onto St. Privat but only to hasten their 
advance on Roncourt, which he believed to be still occupied. It was 
again an independent decision of the Saxon leaders when they took 
the direction on St. Privat, where they perceived the main focus of 

1 The report did not reach its destination, as the officer carrying it was killed. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 351 

the battle to be and they of course left Roncourt on one side, be- 
cause it apparently had already been evacuated by the enemy. 
Lieutenant von Esbeck could ride back to his division commander 
with the knowledge that now the battle north of the road would come 
to a victorious end. South of the large basin he encountered General von 
Kessel and called to him: "The victory is ours! The Saxons are 
coming." The general grasped him by the hand. The same message 
he called out to the skirmishers of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade 
when passing them. They replied to it with cheers. * 

THE 6TH CORPS IS IN READINESS TO DEFEAT THE GERMAN 
ATTACK ON ST. PRIVAT 

The orders of Marshal Oanrobert for the security of the now 
unavoidable retreat of the 6th Corps on Metz had been executed by 7 
p.m. Fourteen and a half battalions crowded into St. Privat to defend 
that place. The units were so mixed up that there could be no attempt 
to assign specific organizations to the defense of the several points. 3 

Facing northwest stood the 2d Battalion of the 9th Line Regiment 
north of St. Privat and fired on the approaching Saxons and also on the 
Prussian Guards coming from the west. The 1st Battalion, same regi- 
ment, which was retreating from Roncourt to the edge of the forest of 
Jaumont, had taken up the fire fight. The defensive flank, arranged 
by Marshal Canrobert east of St. Privat, was formed by two battalions, 
100th Line Regiment, a little north of the road leading from the village 
to Chateau Jaumont. Farther east, on the same line, the 2d Regiment 
Chasseurs d'Afrique stood at the forest; it had participated with one 
squadron in the gradually increasing fire fight against the envelopment 
of Roncourt. Behind the defensive flank east of the village was the 
94th Line Regiment, less three companies; the three absent companies 
defended the western edge of the village; the Dragoon Brigade 
Bruchard also was behind that defensive flank. Still farther in rear, 
in the angle between the edge of the forest and the road from Jerusa- 
lem to Marengo, there stood in large squares the 75th and 91st Line 
Regiments, which were a little later joined by the 93d and the 2d 
Battalion, 10th Line Regiments. At the road itself were the re- 
mainder of the 4th Division, 6th Corps: the 25th, 26th, 28th and 70th 
Line Regiments who were charged with defending the country south 
of St. Privat. 3 The batteries of the 6th Corps were at the quarries of 
Amanweiler. 

Though the stream of wounded and unwounded men continued to 
flow on the road through Marengo toward Metz and the disappearance 
of numerous single soldiers into the depth of the forest of Jaumont 
did not cease, there was no real panic in the ranks of the 6th Corps. 

'Statement of the (then) Lieutenant von Esbeck, called von Platen. 

2 In the village were the 4th, 12th and 93d Line Regiments; one battalion from 
each of the 9th and 100th Line Regiments; two battalions of the 10th Line Regiment; 
one half battalion of the 94th Line Regiment; the 9th Jager Battalion; and a small de- 
tachment from the 25th Line Regiment. 

'Farthest off was the 70th Line Regiment. 



352 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

The broad slope, descending toward the forest of Jaumont east of the 
village offered the troops which had fallen back from the first line 
some protection against the German infantry fire and gave the leaders 
an opportunity to reestablish order. Of course the power of re- 
sistance of the parts which awaited the German attack in extended 
deployment in rear of the village ought not to be considered as very 
high. On the other hand in the village itself the firm determination 
not to let this last bulwark fall into the enemy's hands without 
making the utmost resistance prevailed generally, even though that 
determination was subsequently carried out by only a part of the 
defenders. 

THE GERMAN LEFT WING IS CONTAINED AT RONCOURT 

On the extreme left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade the 
3d and 4th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment, had just taken the field 
stone walls southwest of Roncourt and, in conjunction with the 8th 
Company farther south, taken up the fire against hostile skirmishers 
who were retreating across the ridge between Roncourt and St. Privat 
when Colonel von Roeder came up and ordered Lieutenant Colonel 
von Oppell commanding there to go farther ahead on Roncourt to- 
gether with the 1st Guard Pioneer Company just coming up from the 
rear. This happened at a time when the Saxon batteries were keep- 
ing up a very hot fire on that village. As soon as the Grenadiers and 
Pioneers had ascended the declivity they saw the hostile detachments, 
which up to then had remained in and around Roncourt, retreating at 
a run in the direction of the edge of the forest of Jaumont. The group 
under Lieutenant Colonel von Oppell turned therefore at once against 
St. Privat in such manner that only the left wing touched the south- 
west corner of the village. When that wing attempted to descend the 
declivity running from Roncourt southward it received a hot cross fire 
from the south and east, 1 apparently also fire from Roncourt itself, so 
that the officers caused the men to face about to first search that vil- 
lage. The right wing somewhat assembled again toward the field 
stone walls at the roadfork southwest of Roncourt and took up the 
fire fight against hostile skirmishers between Roncourt and St. Privat. 
Lieutenant Colonel von Oppell saw troops approaching from the west 
and rode back to bring them up for participation in the battle. These 
were parts of the 3d Guard Regiment and of the Saxon Body Grena- 
dier Regiment No. 100. 

The 1st Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment, in two half-battalions and 
forming the extreme left wing echelon of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade, had halted for a little while at the northern edge of the large 
basin while the skirmish lines of the left wing moved toward Roncourt. 
Informed as to the situation at St. Privat by Lieutenant von Esbeck 
the battalion renewed its advance on Roncourt to enter the first line, 
when all of a sudden three companies of the Saxon 100th Body Grena- 

'From parts of the 9th and 100th Line Regiments. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 353 

dier Regiment took their place at the double time between the two 
half-battalions. These three companies were the right wing of its 
regiment and had kept the direction on Roncourt while the left wing 
went toward St. Privat. They were the 4th, 6th and 5th Companies. 
In the left rear of the 1st Battalion, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, the 1st, 
2d, and 3d Companies of the Body Grenadier Regiment appeared, and, 
still farther to the left at some distance, the 1st Battalion, 101st Grena- 
dier Regiment was marching on Roncourt. Through that gap other 
Saxon troops which had been started for St. Privat, i.e. the 3d Bat- 
talion and the 8th and 7th Companies, Body Grenadier Regiment and 
the 2d and 1st Battalions, 107th Infantry Regiment, pressed in an almost 
southerly direction past the front of the 1st Battalion, 3d Foot Guard 
Regiment. This caused the right wing companies of the 1st Battalion, 
3d Foot Guard Regiment, the the 1st and 4th under Captain von Seel, 
to also turn against St. Privat, without succeeding in gaining full 
direction toward that village. Getting farther and farther away from 
the other half-battalion, they got between the 8th Company and parts 
of the 3d and 4th Companies, 1st Foot Guard Regiment, which, inter- 
mixed with Guard Pioneers, fought at the roadfork southwest of 
Roncourt. Into the vicinity of the half -battalion Seel the 4th Com- 
pany of the Saxon Body Grenadier Regiment also came, while the 
5th and 6th Companies following up were directed by Lieutenant 
Colonel von Oppell toward the group fighting at the field stone walls. 
Farther north the 2d and 3d Companies, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, 
under Captain von Altrock, followed by the 1st, 2d, and 3d Companies 
of the 100th Body Grenadier Regiment advanced on Roncourt and, 
close to the village met the 1st Battalion, 101st Grenadier Regiment, 
which had found Roncourt unoccupied and then had taken direction 
toward St. Privat. The just named three companies of the Body 
Grenadier Regiment intended to follow it, but strong fire from the 
southern vicinity of Roncourt caused them to throw themselves down 
north of the field stone walls on the road southwest of Roncourt, pro- 
longing the line of the Guard Grenadiers and Pioneers lying there. 

By this mixing of parts of two regiments and one pioneer com- 
pany at the fork of the roads there was formed a larger fighting group 
the right wing of which reached west of the Roncourt — St. Privat 
road as far as the hill with the three trees, while the left wing was 
crowded together at the field stone walls at the fork in the road. x 
Hostile skirmishers 3 fired from the rear between the two villages; 
strong columns were seen retreating southeast; a heavy fire fight was 
going on. 

The commander of the 1st Battalion, 3d Guard Regiment, Major 

'At the fork in the road were, in a dense mass, under command of Lieutenant 
Colonel von Oppell, men of eight different companies: the 3d and 4th, 1st Guard 
Regiment; the 1st Guard Pioneer Company; the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th Companies, 
Body Grenadier Regiment No. 100. The left wing reached only a short piece north be- 
yond the fork in the road, the right wing had alongside of it for a short time the 1st 
and 4th Companies, 3d Guard Regiment, and 4th Company, Body Grenadier Regiment 
No. 100. 

3 Of the 9th Line Regiment. 



354 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

von Seegenberg, in the meantime led the half-battalion Altrock 
farther toward Roncourt, as it appeared to him important for the 
further course of the battle to occupy this place now temporarily out- 
side of the battle zone proper, His adjutant, Second Lieutenant 
Beneckendorf von Hindenburg, rode ahead to the village for recon- 
naissance and, though the village was still under a weak shell fire of 
the Saxon batteries, found there a platoon of the 101st Guard Grena- 
dier Regiment and two officers of the 3d and 4th Companies, 1st Guard 
Regiment, who with their men were close to the western exit of the 
village. When entering the village the half -battalion Von Altrock re- 
ceived a hot enfilading fire from the south, which caused Major von 
Seegenberg to order the 3d Company to occupy the south edge while 
the 2d Company with the groups of the 1st Guard Regiment took posi- 
tion in the village which was filled with French wounded, and cleared 
it of the last stragglers of the 9th and 75th Line Regiments. When the 
3d Company spread itself out on the south edge, it saw the 1st Bat- 
talion, 101st Grenadier Regiment, falling back on the village from the 
south and arrived in good time to offer it a receiving position. 

This latter battalion, attempting to press past the west of Ron- 
court toward St. Privat, had encountered the same cross fire which 
parts of the 3d and 4th Companies, 1st Guard Regiment had previously 
felt. This cross fire was supplemented by shells from two directions: 
from the woods at Auboue and from the southeastern vicinity of St. 
Privat, to which point the French batteries had retired. The officers 
succeeded in deploying the battalion as skirmishers, though the men 
were much exhausted by the long run, and in taking up the fire 
against the hostile infantry south and southeast of Roncourt; but only 
for a short time. The artillery fire, especially, induced the battalion 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Leonhardi, to take his companies 
back to the village, where they occupied the southeast front and con- 
tinued until dark the fire fight against the hostile infantry in the forest 
of Jaumont. 

In the meantime time Prince George of Saxony had followed up 
the parts of the 45th Infantry Brigade, which remained on the march 
to Roncourt, with the 108th Rifle Regiment and had taken up a posi- 
tion in reserve close to the west side of the village. Almost simultan- 
eously the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry Regiment arrived in the north- 
ern partof the village from the right wing of the 48th Infantry Brigade. 
Major von Seegenberg now saw that possession of the village was se- 
cured by Saxon troops and ordered the half-battalion von Altrock to . 
assemble in the village in order to follow up the other half- battalion 
to St. Privat. But this assembly took considerable time as there was 
an indescribable confusion in the village. Tortured by thirst the Prus- 
sian soldiers, paying no attention to the bursting French and Saxon 
shells, crowded around the wells and pumps and around the numerous 
water carriers of all Saxon organizations which had come up. Only 
toward 8 p.m. did the half -battalion Von Altrock, which had been 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 356 

joined by parts of the 1st Guard Regiment which had reached Ron- 
court, arrive in the vicinity of the roadfork southwest of Roncourt 
and join the companies fighting there under command of Lieu- 
tenant Colonel von Oppell. These troops were not fortunate enough 
to participate in the assault on St. Privat as at the same time a hot 
fight had taken place southeast of Roncourt which had appeared to 
seriously threaten the German left wing and had chained down the 
German forces fighting in and around Roncourt. When the 2d and 
3d Companies, 3d Guard Regiment left Roncourt in a westerly direc- 
tion the troops farther off thought that the French had again entered 
the village. 1 

THE FIGHT AT RONCOURT 

Those battalions of the 48th Infantry Brigade which had remained 
on the march to Roncourt 2 had received just as little fire from there as 
had the 45th Infantry Brigade when they approached the village. In 
the northeastern vicinity of Roncourt hostile cavalry had appeared, 
causing the nearest companies of the 106th and 107th Infantry Regi- 
ments to form temporarily dense groups. A few rounds from the 
Saxon artillery at Montois la Montague chased away the French 
troopers. 3 The companies of the 107th Infantry Regiment arriving 
first— the 9th, 10th and 11th — first slaked their thirst at the village 
pumps and wells and attempted then to leave the village on the south. 
Though they were successful in driving back a detachment of the 100th 
Line Regiment 4 hugging the ground near the southeast corner of the 
village, a further advance came to naught in consequence of the hostile 
cross fire— the same thing having happened to all preceding detach- 
ments. Like the 12th Company following, the three companies had to 
throw themselves down at the village exit toward Pierrevillers and 
content themselves with occupying the southeastern village edge. 

Of the 106th Infantry Regiment advancing farther east, the 9th, 
10th and 11th Companies had in the meantime arrived at the appar- 
ently unoccupied Malancourt. Only three men were found there and 
according to their statements the village had been occupied by a de- 
tachment of the 100th Line Regiment. The three companies drank 
water and rested until new orders to advance reached themat7. 30 p.m. 5 

The 1st Battalion, same regiment, which was joined on the left 
by the 12th Company, under leadership of Colonel von Abendroth, 
had advanced from the northeast projecting corner of the small woods 
between Montois la Montagne and Roncourt, in the direction of the 
forest edge southeast of Roncourt, which had been perceived to be the 
objective of the hostile retrograde movements from the village. The 

'Shortly before the assault on St. Privat, the commander of the 1st Guard Regi- 
ment, Colonel von Roeder, fell near the group under Lieutenant Colonel von Oppell. 
a All, except the 1st and 2d, 107th Infantry Regiment. 
'Royal Saxon War Archives. 

♦Advanced from the defensive flank formed east of St. Privat. 
6 Royal Saxon War Archives. 



356 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

infantry was followed by the temporarily organized brigade of the 12th 
Cavalry Division with its horse battery, to be ready in ease of a chance 
for pursuit, as the general impression had gained ground that the 
French were in full retreat eastward from Roncourt and St. Privat. 
The brigade, however, only got as far as the hill north of Roncourt, 
receiving there such a hot fire from the edge of the forest that it had 
to be taken back to the covered low ground south of the just mentioned 
small woods, while its horse battery took a new position farther north, 
not far from that of the 2d Heavy Battery, to fire on the enemy at the 
edge of the woods. During these events orders from the brigade 
commander reached Colonel von Abendroth, who had arrived with his 
five companies in front of Roncourt, directing everything to turn 
against St. Privat. Though a serious enfilading fire came from the 
quarries at Jaumont and the neighboring forest edges, the colonel 
attempted to move around the northeast corner of Roncourt and gain 
the new direction. 

This movement was found impossible of execution and the com- 
panies were forced to make front against the enemy in the east and 
southeast, suffering material losses in a short time. The enemy ap- 
peared to have superior forces and under this supposition Colonel von 
Abendroth declined to follow the suggestion of Captain von Treitschke, 
of the general staff of the 23d Infantry Division, to chase off the enemy 
by a quick attack in the interest of the corps artillery turning against 
Roncourt, and instead called up reinforcements. When the companies 
of the 106th Infantry Regiment appeared east of Roncourt, the 3d 
Battalion, 107th Infantry Regiment was just making a renewed attempt 
to advance from the southeast corner of the village on the stone struc- 
ture 600 meters southeast of Roncourt. For this purpose it could 
utilize only three companies, as the 9th Company had not yet been 
completely assembled since the last attempt. The advance by rushes 
of the battalion was joined on the left wing by the right wing of the 
106th Infantry Regiment, causing a mixing of both regiments. The 
1st Battalion, 101st Regiment, which still was in the southeastern part 
of the village, and the troops assembled at the roadfork southwest of 
Roncourt, poured a hot fire on the enemy who still held the terrain 
between Roncourt and St. Privat. Success did not fail to materialize 
and the parts of the hostile infantry which had fought at the just men- 
tioned stone structure facing toward Roncourt gave way more and 
more to the pressure coming from the north 1 and fell back on St. 
Privat. All troops farther east fell back partly toward the east edge 
of the forest of Jaumont and partly to the south. 2 The fire from the 
east edge of the Jaumont forest increased so much that the 3d Battalion, 
107th Infantry Regiment also took station on the right of the com- 
panies of the 106th Regiment. The quarries of Jaumont and the forest 
edge southwest of them were occupied by a long line of hostile skir- 

'2d Battalion, 9th Line Regiment. 

'Parts of the 1st Battalion, 9th Line Regiment, of the 100th Line Regiment, and 
of the 2d Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 357 

mishers, who partly utilized for cover the embankment of the road 
running immediately along the forest. The 9th Company, 107th In- 
fantry Regiment, until then back in Roncourt, now came up. The 
parts of both regiments in the first line then rose up and charged 
against the forest edge and quarries. The road embankment was 
captured and the forest entered. An effective pursuit of the enemy 
who retreated into the forest was not made on account of increasing 
darkness and the dense underbrush, and especially because the enemy 
in the quarries still kept up his resistance for some time. Only parts 
of the 9th, 10th, and 11th Companies, 107th Infantry Regiment, traversed 
the forest and reached the vicinity of Bronvaux, which was found oc- 
cupied by the enemy. 

In the meantime reinforcements had come up, but too late for 
participation. Captain von Treitschke brought up the 13th Jager Bat- 
talion. The three companies of the 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry Regi- 
ment which had rested in Malancourt appeared at the quarries there 
to join the 1st Battalion. The commander of the 12th Cavalry Division, 
General Count zu Lippe, had sent them orders to advance against the 
southern edges of the forest when his regiments came under fire on 
the hill north of Roncourt. 

Of the infantry brigades of the Xllth Army Corps in rear, the 
46th had been brought up, by orders of the division commander, 
Prince George of Saxony, from the west edge of the woods of Auboufi 
in the direction of Roncourt. Arrived at that village, it received 
orders from the Prince to send one battalion to support the 48th In- 
fantry Brigade, the rest to take direction on St. Privat. Neither this 
detached battalion— 3d, 103d Infantry Regiment — nor the rest of the 
brigade came into contact with the enemy. The former passed Ron- 
court on the north and halted behind the fighting line at the forest of 
Jaumont; the latter arrived at the north front of St. Privat at a time 
when the village had been captured and it also turned its front against 
the forest of Jaumont. 

The batteries in rear followed up the advance of the infantry. 
The 1st Horse and 2d Heavy Batteries advanced from near the small 
woods north of Roncourt as far as the road from Roncourt to Pierre- 
villers and took an active part in the battle at the edge of the Jaumont 
forest. The 1st Heavy Battery, which had been attached to the 46th 
Infantry Brigade, entered the battle position of the Saxon artillery in 
front of St. Privat shortly before 8 p.m. but could fire only eight shells 
on the village as the fire was discontinued when the assault com- 
menced. 

The 47th Infantry Brigade, which stood as last reserve at the 
south edge of the woods at Auboue, was brought up in the evening to 
Roncourt. These movements lasted until toward 9 p.m. About the 
same time the last shots were fired at the edge of the Jaumont forest. 
Though the fire fight had originally been exceedingly hot the partici- 
pating French battalions suffered comparatively little loss as they by 



358 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

no means allowed the Saxon infantry to get within effective range. 
On the other hand the losses among the Saxon infantry were very 
material, especially in the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry regiment, and 
in the 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry Regiment. 

THE SITUATION IN ST. PRIVAT LA MONTAGNE SHORTLY 
BEFORE THE ASSAULT 

After the 2d Battalion, 9th Line Regiment had retired from the 
southern vicinity of Roncourt on St. Privat, the north front of the vil- 
lage was open for attack. Though farther east the space between the 
village and the forest of Jaumont were still held by parts of the 100th 
Line Regiment and, in connection with them, the edge of the forest 
and the quarries of Jaumont, there was, because of the weakness of 
these troops and their being partly chained down by German forces at 
Roncourt, no possibility of flanking the attack against St. Privat from 
the north by an attack from the east. St. Privat now could be at- 
tacked from three sides : from the west, south and north. In the vil- 
lage itself, which for some time before the assault had been under the 
fire of Prussian and Saxon batteries and was burning in places, the 
number of defenders had materially decreased. From the north front 
two battalions of the 10th and three of the 93d Line Regiments had 
marched off to the rear; those of the 10th Line Regiment started the 
retreat through Marengo with the 2d Battalion already east of the 
village. The shortage of ammunition had a great deal to do with 
this. At the commencement of the assault there were still in St. 
Privat ten and one half battalions, 1 in addition to numerous individ- 
uals dispersed but eager for battle. In a building at the southwest 
corner, prepared for defense, were the 9th Jager Battalion and parts 
of the 25th Line Regiment which also occupied a trench connecting 
that building with the projecting field stone walls on the west front. 
Northward three companies of the 94th Line Regiment and the rifle- 
men of the 12th Line Regiment connected. The northern wing of the 
west front was formed by a skirmish trench leading from the field 
stone walls of the west front to those of the north front. Behind this 
first line were, in the buildings on the west front, other parts of the 
12th Line Regiment, which occupied the windows, attics, and hastily 
prepared loopholes. On the north front stood the 3d and 2d Battalions, 
9th Line Regiment, and farther east, behind field stone walls on the 
road to Jaumont, was the 3d Battalion, 100th Line Regiment, which 
connected with the forces still holding out at the forest of Jaumont. 
Men of the 4th Line Regiment were distributed for reinforcing the 
firing line along the west as well as north front. The exit of the vil- 
lage toward Roncourt was especially strongly held; west and east of 
it were two pieces of ground admirably suited for defense, a church- 
yard surrounded by high stone walls, and a vegetable garden inside of 

'Inclusive of the 2d Battalion, 9th Line Regiment, which had come back from 
the vicinity of Roncourt. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 359 

which a massive two story building was under construction. The 
churchyard on the northwest corner within a large quadrangle en- 
closed by stone walls and skirmish trenches formed a sort of redoubt. 

While the west and north fronts of the village were admirably 
suited for a stubborn defense the extended and open south front, hav- 
ing but scattered buildings, offered far less difficulties to the attackers 
and here as a matter of fact the first German troops entered. 

The garrison of the village was so shaken by the effect of the 
German artillery fire and the destruction of the late protective cover, 
that only a part of it awaited the decision proper within the village. 
When the Germans pressed into the village the number of defenders 
was very scarce at some points, a large proportion of the troops hav- 
ing evacuated the village during the assault and gone eastward. 

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT ON ST. PRIVAT LA MONTAGNE 

The events at Roncourt, the occupation of that village and the 
formation of the fighting group under Lieutenant Colonel von Oppell 
at the roadfork southwest of the village relieved those parts of the 2d 
Battalion, 1st Guard Regiment, the 8th Company, and the group 
Brause, 1 fighting on the hill north of the large basin, from any danger 
from the north. When the last defenders of the ridge between Ron- 
court and St. Privat 2 gradually fell back on the latter place both fight- 
ing groups, behind which the 4th Foot Guard Regiment appeared on 
both sides of the large basin, increased their fire and directed it on 
hostile detachments appearing at the north edge of St. Privat. The 
impression obtained that the French, who had renewed the fight all 
along the line to cover the retreat, were preparing for a counter attack 
at that point. Such a counter attack did not happen, but the fire fight 
between the Germans on the hill with the three trees and the French 
at the northern edge became hotter and hotter and very costly to the 
Germans, who in the meantime had turned their entire front against St. 
Privat. The 4th Company, Saxon 100th Body Grenadier Regiment, and 
the 1st and 4th Companies, 3d Foot Guard Regiment, took part in this 
fight. These companies, engaged in the movement on St. Privat, had 
inserted themselves between the 8th Company, 1st Guard Regiment, 
and the fighting group under Von Oppell. While the Saxon company 
threw itself down alongside the 8th Company the two companies of 
the Guard regiment advanced to the bend in the Roncourt — St. Privat 
road, using for this advance the favorable moment when the hostile 
skirmishers south of Roncourt were kept busy by the advance of the 
1st Battalion, 101st Grenadier Regiment to beyond Roncourt. From 
that bend in the road skirmishers were sent ahead along the road to 
St. Privat against the field stone walls at the north side of the village, 
as soon as the ridge between Roncourt and St. Privat was evacuated 
by the enemy. 

'Lieutenant Brause's group consisted of parts of the 5th and 6th Companies. 
J 2d Battalion, 9th Line Regiment. 



360 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

The 4th Guard Regiment had remained continuously on the march 
from Ste. Marie to the battle position of the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade, 
which march only the 2d Battalion interrupted for a short time by 
orders from corps headquarters. 1 The 1st Battalion, which reached 
with its 4th Company the center of the large basin, with the other 
three the first line farther south, advanced by rushes against the north- 
west side of the village, having gradually deployed all its platoons under 
the effect of the hostile fire. The remnants of the Fusilier Battalion, 
1st Guard Regiment, under the last unwounded officer, joined this ad- 
vance, as did also what was left of the 1st and 2d Companies, which with 
the Fusilier Battalion had been engaged in the battle south of the large 
basin. The group under Lieutenant von Arnim, consisting of parts of 
the 5th and 6th Companies, was kept back at the south edge of the 
large basin as last closed echelon. 

The Fusilier Battalion, 4th Foot Guard Regiment, striving north of 
the large basin to reach the first line on the hill with the three trees, 
had observed that the hostile forces in position there turned their front 
more and more toward St. Privat. In consequence it also turned that 
way and inserted its 9th and 12th Companies between the 4th of 
its own regiment in the large basin and the skirmishers of the 1st and 
4th Companies, 3d Guard Regiment which were advancing along the 
road from Roncourt to St. Privat. In this movement the 12th Com- 
pany absorbed the group under Lieutenant von Brause. The 11th and 
10th Companies for the present halted behind the 8th Company, 1st 
Guard Regiment, on the hill with the three trees. 

The commander of the 4th Guard Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel 
vont Wolffradt 2 saw the rapidly augmenting losses caused by the hostile 
fire among the deployed companies of the 1st Battalion and sent orders 
to the 2d Battalion to reinforce the 1st. The battalion lying behind the 
group von Arnim rose up and the 8th, 7th, and 6th Companies ran for- 
ward along the south edge of the large basin and arrived in a gap be- 
tween the 3d and 4th Companies when these were still 250 meters from 
the first field stone walls defended by the French. The 5th Company 
under Captain von Esebeck followed the right wing of the 1st Battalion 
in the direction of the northwest corner of the village. 

The hot enfilading fire directed on the northwest corner of the vil- 
lage had already caused the opponent to evacuate the first field stone 
walls and other cover and draw back on the village edge proper. 
Through the interference of the 2d Battalion the attack on the left wing 
was carried nearly to the just abandoned position but came to a halt 
there under the fire from the edge of the village. Here the left wing 
toward the east reached only as far as the Roncourt— St. Privat road. 

1 These orders did not reach all parts of the 2d Battalion. The view obtained in 
the 4th Guard Regiment that they were to await the effect of the artillery against St. 
Privat and then advance conjointly with the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade to the attack. 
The artillery effect commenced during the forward movement of the regiment. — War 
Archives. 

* He was already severely wounded, but did not relinquish command. He died 
of his wound a few days after the battle. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 361 

Strong enfilading fire came from the northeastern vicinity of the vil- 
lage so that at present no success was had in an attempt to turn against 
the eastern sector of the north front of the village. 

This was the last moment before the assault. On a large arc open 
toward the north, the Guard infantry surrounded the village, its wings 
closer than the center to the attack objective. Almost everything in- 
serted against St. Privat was deployed in the first line or — as in the 
4th Guard Regiment —close behind as supporting troops. The right 
wing, on hill 328 and on the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road, was formed by 
troops of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade, whose other troops were 
fighting farther south against the French 4th Corps; toward the north 
the 2d and the rest of the 3d Guard Regiment were in connection; the 
northwest corner was attacked by the 1st and 4th Guard Regiment, 
badly mixed. Farther in rear some groups only were in the vicinity 
of the large basin: those under Lieutenaut von Arnim in the large 
basin; the 8th Company 1st Guard Regiment, on the hill with the three 
trees; with it the 10th and 11th Companies, 4th Guard Regiment; and 
on the Roncourt— St. Privat road the 1st and 4th Companies, 3d Guard 
Regiment which had reached a favorable firing position there. Any 
troops farther north were held down by the fight at Roncourt. Pro- 
gress had been made against the southwest corner in the same way as 
against the northwest corner; the Regiment Franz along the Ste. Marie 
— St. Privat road had drawn closer to the enemy occupying the edge. 
Lieutenant von Esbeck, called von Platen, had here also spread the 
information on the right wing and at the south of the road that the 
Saxons were approaching. As a matter of fact their columns, in two 
groups, now became visible behind the lines of the left wing. The east 
group, consisting of the 3d Battalion, 100th Body Grenadier Regiment, 
the 2d and 1st Battalions, 107th Infantry Regiment, and the 7th and 8th 
Companies of the first named regiment, advanced in column of battal- 
ions behind each other west of the Roncourt— St. Privat road toward the 
left wing of the 4th Guard Regiment; farther right, at some distance, 
the 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Grenadier Regiment, in eight columns of 
companies alongside each other, under General von Craushaar, hastened 
toward the right wing of the 4th Guard Regiment. Still more forces 
were coming up. On both sides of the Ste. Marie— St. Privat road the 
Guard Fusilier Regiment was advancing. The 20th Infantry Division 
was marching from St. Ail toward the road. 

From the hill southeast of St. Ail General von Voights-Rhetz had 
overlooked the battle of the Guard Corps and had arrived at the inde- 
pendent decision to lead his forces through St. Ail to the Guard Corps. 
The artillery had started the advance toward 6.30 p.m. at the trot, to 
enter the positions of the Guard artillery. Shortly after the 20th In- 
fantry Division had started in the direction of the Ste. Marie— St. Pri- 
vat road, while the 19th Infantry Division and the 6th Cavalry Division 
had followed up to St. Ail, taking a position in readiness there. 

The approach of strong reserves from all sides indicated an immi- 
nent decision. But nothing pointed to this more clearly than the sue- 



362 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

cessful effect of the artillery; the flames arising from the village of St. 
Privat gave the signal for the attack and the spur for the final assault. 

In the course of the afternoon St. Privat had repeatedly been fired 
on by the artillery. Even before the attack of the Guard the Guard 
artillery fired shells into the village from time to time. Shortly after 
6 p.m. the 3d and 4th Heavy Guard Batteries, in position at the foot of 
the ridge southwest of St. Privat, turned their fire occasionally on the 
south front of the village. Other batteries also fired against that point. 
Though the crowded masses in the village might find this fire very an- 
noying, no effect could be perceived from the outside. There was an 
absence of unity in the artillery leading and action. Toward 7 p.m. 
the adjutant of General von Pape, Major Count zu Ysenburg, arrived 
at the corps artillery of the Guard Corps in position at the projecting 
hill southwest of St. Privat and brought orders from his commanding 
general, couched in very direct terms, that the fire was to be directed on 
the village. 

The batteries of the 2d Guard Infantry Division, in position on the 
Ste. Marie — St. Privat road, simultaneously received orders from their 
division commander, General von Budritzki, to set St. Privat afire. 
In consequence nine batteries of the left wing of the Guard artillery 
now directed their fire on the village, while the right wing south of the 
ridge 328 — 321 continued its battle with the 4th French Corps. 1 Two 
horse batteries of the Xth Army Corps entered the firing line of the 
left wing, using the gap between the 1st Horse and 4th Light Guard 
Batteries; the foot artillery battalions followed later, as the field, en- 
tirely covered with troops, left no space for further artillery deploy- 
ments. At 7.15 p.m. sixty -six Prussian guns fired on the south and west 
edge as well as on the interior of St. Privat. The results of this en- 
veloping fire were soon perceptible. The hostile infantry fire soon 
decreased; here and there thick smoke was seen, caused by the shells. 
The eleven Prussian batteries were soon joined by fourteen Saxon bat- 
teries which turned from their previous positions south of the east 
projecting corner of the woods of Aubou6 and south of Montois la 
Montagne against St. Privat. 

When Crown Prince Albert, who followed the course of events 
from Roncourt, observed that his infantry in part proceeded toward 
St. Privat, after Roncourt was in the hands of the Germans, he directed 
his artillery to turn against St. Privat. This renewed change of posi- 
tion was made under great difficulties. The batteries south of the 
woods of Auboue had not yet fully deployed in their position when it 
became necessary to again limber up. The movement stopped, being 
hampered by infantry. From the north some few batteries came up 
and crowded into the newly gained firing position. By the time that 
was fully brought into order all the batteries were in position. St. Pri- 
vat was in the hands of the Germans. The new Saxon artillery line 

1 The following batteries fired from the left wing on the road on St. Privat:— 6th 
Heavy, 5th Heavy, 6th Light, 4th Light, 1st Horse, 3d Horse, 2d Horse, 3d Heavy, 4th 
Heavy; on the French 4th Corps: — 3d Light, 2d Heavy, 1st Heavy, 1st Light, 2d Light. 



THE 18 TH OF AUGUST, 1870 36S 

touched the southwest corner of Roncourt with its left wing; with its 
right it was a few hundred meters north of the St. Privat — Ste. Marie 
road. The line included all Saxon batteries, except the 1st Horse and 
the 2d Light which interfered in the vicinity east of Roncourt in the 
fight at the forest of Jaumont. 1 

The Prussian and Saxon Batteries fired on the village at ranges 
of from 800 to 1600 meters. 

Finally the foot artillery battalions of the Xth Army Corps 
entered the gaps in the German artillery front which now extended 
north of the Bois de la Cusse over the entire space to Roncourt. The 
3d Battalion took position south of the road between the 3d Light and 
4th Heavy Guard Batteries and directed its fire on the numerous French 
batteries, the flashes of whose guns could be seen at the quarries of 
Amanweiler. The 2d Battalion took position north of the road in the 
space which the Saxon artillery had left free, masking those batteries 
in part, and participated in the bombardment of St. Privat, after hav- 
ing fired already a few rounds from a position farther in rear at Ste. 
Marie. 2 Only shortly before 8 p.m. did the 1st Battalion, Foot Artil- 
lery, of the 19th Infantry Division which had been kept with it at St. 
Ail in readiness, arrive and attempt to gain a place in line. It was 
enabled to fire a few shots against the French artillery at the quarries 
of Amanweiler and on hostile infantry east of Amanweiler. 

THE ASSAULT ON ST. PRIVAT LA MONTAGNE 

The shells struck St. Privat from the north, west and south; 
masses of defenders fled back on the road through Jerusalem; bright 
flames shot up from the southwest corner and from several buildings 
in the north part of the village. 

It was now 7.30 p.m.; darkness commenced to fall. At this time 
there started in parts of the 4th Guard Infantry Brigade lying in 
groups on hill 328, 150 to 300 meters from the edge, movements which 
enveloped the southwest corner of St. Privat. It is not known 
whether it was due to Lieutenant von Esbeck informing them that the 
Saxons were approaching, or whether the destruction of the thus far 
stubbornly defended nearest buildings by the artillery was instru- 
mental, or whether both of these factors together, but the desire 
again sprung up to get ahead. Suddenly the Grenadiers and Fusiliers 
of the Regiments Konigin and Franz rose up; first one, then more, 
then all who still had life and power in thetn; drums beat and bugles 
sounded, and with loud hurrahs the south front of the village was 
entered. The enemy offered but little resistance; a few Frenchmen, 

'The Saxon batteries counted from the left wing, stood in following sequence: 
1st Light, 4th Heavy, 8th Heavy, 7th Heavy, 2d Light, 5th Heavy, 5th Light, 6th Light, 
2d Horse, 6th Heavy, 1st Heavy, 4th Light, 3d Light, 3d Heavy. The 1st Heavy had 
come up from Moineville. 

"These shots had been directed on the Guard Horse Batteries, which had ad- 
vanced during the assault to the hill south of St. Privat and were believed to be 
hostile batteries. The general staff officer of the 1st Guard Infantry Division, Captain 
von Holleben, who just then brought the Guard Fusilier Regiment from Ste. Marie to 
the front, showed that error to the artillery.— Posthumous Papers of General von Pape. 



364 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

continuing the fight to the last moment, were bayonetted down. On 
the right wing the 7th and 8th Companies, Regiment Konigin, entered 
the part of the village called Jerusalem; farther west the Fusilier Bat- 
talion of the same regiment and the 9th and 12th Companies, Regiment 
Franz, entered the buildings between Jerusalem and the southwest 
corner. 

The timely occupation of the road leading through St. Privat 
became of importance to cut off the retreat to those parts of the 
enemy that, frightened by the assault progressing farther to the left, 
were endeavoring to leave the village. The remnants of the Regiment 
Franz on and south of the road — little more than the strength of two 
companies — did not lose a moment's time in charging against the 
village when they saw the forward movement on their right. They 
captured the southwest corner and with some other detachments at 
once ran as far as the east side and occupied the exit toward Marengo. 

Almost simultaneously with the parts of the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade, the regiments of the 1st Guard Infantry Division started for 
the final rush. The impulse to this came partly from the right, partly 
from within; the higher leaders also, Generals von Pape and von 
Kessel, and the few remaining officers participated in the glory of this. 

At 7.30 p.m. General von Pape was on the road between Ste. 
Marie and St. Privat. He saw the favorable effect of the artillery on 
the village and saw the Guard Fusilier Regiment coming from Ste. 
Marie and the columns of the Saxons from Roncourt and the woods of 
Aubou6. When these had about reached the line of the left wing, he 
decided that the assault might now be well undertaken, even without 
inserting the Guard Fusilier Regiment. He ordered that regiment — 
which was deployed in column of companies and advanced, with the 
1st Battalion south of, with the others north of the road from Ste. 
Marie— to take up a receiving position for the division 1 about half- 
way between the villages, and himself went to the firing line north of 
the road about where, opposite the northwest corner of St. Privat, the 
left wing of the 2d Guard Regiment lay between remnants of the 3d 
and 1st Guard Regiments behind the right wing of the 4th Guard Regi- 
ment — about 600 meters from the village. While the 4th Guard Regi- 
ment made its assault movement by rushes, the general shouted to the 
nearest skirmish groups and had a trumpeter sound the charge. 3 
From the piles of dead in the long and stubbornly defended position 
the few remaining men arose. The remnants of the 1st Guard In- 
fantry Brigade and the 2d Guard Regiment, one carrying forward the 
next, hastened up to the foremost field stone walls on the west edge 
of the village. Thus the assault was in progress along the entire 
attacking front; for on the extreme left wing opposite the north front 
the approach of the eastern Saxon group 3 had carried forward the 
attack movement which had stopped. 

•War Archives. 

- Posthumous papers of General von Pape. 

a 3d Battalion, 100th Body Grenadier Regiment, 1st and 2d BattalionB, 107th In- 
fantry Regiment, 7th and 8th Companies, 100th Body Grenadier Regiment. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 365 

Not far from the place where General von Pape gave the signal 
for the assault was General von Kessel with the debris of his brigade, 
which were mixed with the 1st Battalion, 2d Guard Regiment. 1 He 
gathered together the nearest groups of skirmishers and led them 
against the west side of the village, leaving the northwest corner to 
the 4th Guard Regiment. While the men scaled the walls, which in 
some places were very high, and drove back the last resistance, the 
general rode with his orderly officer, Lieutenant Count von Pfeil, 
through a breach north of the road into the village. Farther south, 
three companies of the 2d Battalion, 2d Guard Regiment and the Fusilier 
Battalion on and alongside of the road, mixed with men of the 5th 
Company and the Regiment Franz, charged into the village. The 10th 
Company cleared the enemy from the houses at the road entrance, the 
others pressed through to the east side gate and took many prisoners 
as the retreat to Marengo had been blocked by the 4th Guard Infantry 
Brigade. Stubborn resistance was encountered only near the church, 
where the road branches off to the southwest; here hand to hand 
fights ensued, in which later on parts of the 4th Guard Regiment and 
Saxons interfered. On the whole the west part and the south part of 
the village were taken without much difficulty. The assaulters were 
enabled to cover the long distance to the edge of the village within 
one rush and without suffering material loss. 

All those who had pressed through the village at the first rush to 
the east side used their rifles to fire on the dense fleeing masses 
of the French pressing back on and alongside of the road to Marengo. 

Immensely more difficult was the assault against the northwest 
corner and the north front of the village where the 4th Guard Regi- 
ment, mixed with parts of the 1st Guard Regiment 8 and the Saxons 
fought. When the 2d Battalion, 4th Guard Regiment was inserted in 
the line of the 1st Battalion by Lieutenant Colonel von Wolffradt, the 
5th Company, separating from the rest, gained the extreme right wing 
of the regiment. This was the moment when the attack movement 
came to a standstill. As the fire fight appeared to him useless, the 
company commander, Captain von Esebeck, who was the first again to 
take up the charge, led his men against a stone wall near the north- 
west corner of the village and which was pierced by a gate. With the 
help of men from other companies, also men from the 1st, 2d and 3d 
Guard Regiments, the hostile resistance in the gardens on the west 
front along the road leading to Roncourt was overcome and the 
nearest houses occupied. Numerous prisoners were taken. 

Though the charge was successful here, although under heavy 
losses, the assault made a few moments later by the eastern Saxon 
group against the north front came to naught under the enormous fire 
of the defender of the village exit leading toward Roncourt and the 

'Mainly of the 7th Company of the 1st and the 2d Battalion, 3d Guard Grenadier 
Regiment. 

'Mainly of the 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Companies (group Brause) and the Fusilier 
Battalion. 



366 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

enfilading fire coming from the vicinity northeast of St. Privat. The 
3d Battalion, 100th Body Grenadier Regiment, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 
107th Infantry Regiment, behind them the 7th and 8th Companies, 
100th Body Grenadier Regiment, which the 4th Company had followed 
from the hill with the three trees, had crossed the large basin not far 
west of the road from Roncourt to St. Privat and, closing together in 
dense masses in the confined space, 1 had arrived behind the left wing 
of the 4th Guard Regiment, which had just halted in front of the fore- 
most field stone wall. Unable to deploy— only the 2d Battalion, 107th 
Infantry Regiment had been able to form two lines— with but few 
skirmishers in front, the Saxons crossed the fine of the Guards and 
charged against the northern exit of the village. It appeared as if the 
French had been waiting for this favorable moment to increase their 
fire to the utmost intensity. The bullets cut wide swaths in the dense 
columns. The commander of the 107th Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant 
von Schweidnitz, and all battalion commanders, were disabled. The 
attempts of the battalions to now deploy and send skirmishers ahead 
miscarried as did the endeavors to continue the advance. Deprived 
of a large part of their officers and fighting power the battalions re- 
treated to and back of the line of the 4th Guard Regiment, where they 
had to be assembled and order again established. 8 

This success of the French fire appeared to revive in a high de- 
gree the courage of the defenders of the north front. East of the road 
to Roncourt masses of skirmishers left the edge of the village ; farther 
west a few more brave ones let themselves down over the surrounding 
wall of the village. But no counter attack was made; that was pre- 
vented in its incipiency by the fire of the Germans and by the again 
resumed forward movement of the 4th Foot Guard Regiment. While 
the 8th Company, 1st Foot Guard Regiment fired from the hill with the 
three trees, and the 1st and 4th Companies of the 3d Foot Guard Regi- 
ment from their location on the Roncourt — St. Privat road, on every- 
thing which showed itself in front of the walls, on the left 
wing the 12th, 9th, 4th, 8th, 7th and 6th Companies, mixed with men 
of the former group Brause of the 1st Guard Regiment, pressed closer 
to the northern entrance of the village. In this charge the 12th Com- 
pany, giving way to a pressure coming from the west, crossed with 
two platoons the Roncourt— St. Privat road. Behind the left wing the 
10th and 11th Companies, 4th Foot Guard Regiment, followed up from 
the hill with the three trees, their skirmishers already being on the 
line of the other two Fusilier companies. 

The reassembled Saxon troops joined this forward movement, 
partly entering the line of the left wing of the 4th Foot Guard Regi- 
ment and mixing with it, partly prolonging the line to the east. 

'From the right: 3d Battalion, Body Grenadier Regiment, the 1st and 2d Bat- 
talion, 107th Infantry Regiment; the other companies were still behind. 

"The skirmishers of the 1st and 4th Companies, 3d Foot Gnard Regiment also 
became involved in the retrograde movement on the Roncourt — St. Privat road. The 
decided attitude of the parts of these companies still in rear brought the fleeing men 
again to a stand. 



THE 18TH OP AUGUST, 1870 367 

Farthest west the 3d Battalion, 100th Body Grenadier Regiment ad- 
vanced with three companies, its 12th Company, having become 
separated in the movement to the rear, now following in reserve; on 
the left the 7th, 8th and 4th Companies, same regiment, connected; 
on the road from Roncourt to St. Privat the 1st and 2d Battalions, 107th 
Infantry Regiment again entered the fight. In front of the extreme 
left wing were three low parallel field stone walls, the third one form- 
ing the village edge proper. They indicated the natural limits of the 
last rushes before the assault and offered some protection against the 
fire from the village. 

In the meantime behind the right wing of the 4th Guard Regi- 
ment the west group of the Saxons had appeared. This was composed 
of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 101st Grenadier Regiment, in company 
columns alongside each other, under General von Craushaar. 1 The 
general had ridden ahead and gone to the 3d Battalion, 100th Body 
Grenadier Regiment which he saw charging against the north front of 
the village. He arrived there when this and the other two battalions 
of the 107th Infantry Regiment were retreating after their charge in 
mass. After he had worked to reestablish order and with sword in 
hand shown the troops again the road to take, he rode back to the 
right wing. On the way, mortally wounded, he fell from his horse. 
Of the two battalions he had brought up, the 3d, 101st Grenadier Regi- 
ment, reached the fighting line first and, exhausted from the run, 
threw itself down. A little later the 2d Battalion arrived on its right 
and gave an impulse for the continuation of the charge. Farther to 
the right the attack against the west front was in full swing. The at- 
tack objective of the two Saxon battalions was now the northwest 
corner. Mixed with them the 1st, 2d and 3d Companies, 4th Guard 
Regiment, advanced. 

The closer the assaulters approached their objective the more the 
troops crowded together and into one another. Finally the troops at- 
tacking the northwest corner and the north front became an indistin- 
guishable mixture of Prussians and Saxons and the confusion was so 
pronounced that men appeared at points away from their organizations 
where they were hardly expected to be according to the original march 
direction. At many points an indescribable crowding took place 
which the officers vainly sought to prevent; the skirmish lines changed 
into dense masses behind one another; and in addition powder smoke 
and dusk prevented any supervision. The attack against the north- 
west corner and the north front offered an entirely different picture 
from that on the west and south front. On the one south thin skir- 
mish groups with large intervals, dispersed and without cohesion; on 
the north dense masses, far too many troops in a confined space. No 
wonder that the stubborn defender of the northern part of the village, 
in spite of his poor marksmanship at short range, was able to cause 
the attacker serious losses, and that, because of the general confusion it 

'From right to left: 6th, 7th, 5th, 8th;— 12th, llth,9th, 10th Companies. 



368 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

could not be helped that German detachments fired on other Germans. 
Repeatedly the command "Order arms!" had to be given to silence 
the fire of the rear lines. 

On the right wing of the 4th Guard Regiment, the 1st, 2d and 3d 
Companies, together with the two battalions of the 101st Grenadier 
Regiment, forced their way into the quadrangle on the northwest 
corner formed by the field stone walls and trenches. The heavy hos- 
tile fire from the redoubt-like churchyard and the houses at the exit 
to Roncourt precluded a further advance. Farther east parts of the 
left wing gained the center one of the field stone walls in front of the 
northern entrance. After a slight fire preparation success was had 
here — though at the cost of much time and the sacrifice of many lives 
— in gaining the third field stone wall, the village wall proper, and in 
forcing back the defenders. At first it was a thin line, formed from 
men of the 4th Guard Regiment and the two Saxon Grenadier Regi- 
ments, which gained a foothold in the village ; gradually that line was 
filled up, in spite of heavy losses, to a dense group of skirmishers. 

The edge of the village was now reached; but not yet the northern 
entrance proper which was formed, a little farther south on the 
western side, by the highwalled churchyard, on the east side by a 
garden with a newly erected building. Against that entrance re- 
peated attacks were made by the dense mass of the Prussian and 
Saxon infantry but failed under heavy loss. A number of men suc- 
ceeded in holding their foothold in the dead angle of the wall of the 
churchyard. A Saxon shell pierced one of the walls and the opening 
was enlarged by hand. Then the attackers pointed their rifles through 
it and killed the defenders— about 25 in number. In spite of this 
success it was still impossible to enter the village as long as the neigh- 
boring new building was in the enemy's hands. One part of the 4th 
Foot Guard Regiment under Captains von Kunowski and von Krosigk 
— about 300 men— therefore moved south to a point where the 5th 
Company under Captain von Esebeck had entered the village, and 
attempted to take possession of the nearest houses on the road lead- 
ing toward Roncourt. Saxon soldiers of the 11th and 12th Companies, 
101st Grenadier Regiment, under Captain von Rouvroy and of the 3d 
Battalion, Body Grenadier Regiment now pressed around the walls of 
the churchyard, seeking protection under these walls not only against 
the hostile fire from the neighboring new building, but also against the 
fire of their own artillery, the effect of which had become the more 
annoying the closer the village was approached. Three shells had so 
far struck in rapid succession in the ranks of the Saxons. The fire 
intended for the enemy became a serious obstacle to progress. Close 
to the village edge stood masses of the attacker. Some detachments 
had to be taken back to a less exposed place. All attempts to make 
the batteries stop firing failed. 

Before the assault on Ste. Marie Colonel von Erckert had caused the 
artillery to be notified that he intended to assault. This was not done 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 369 

prior to the assault on St. Privat because of an absence of concerted 
action, and the artillery groups directing their fire on the village re- 
mained ignorant that the final assault was taking place. They fired on 
St. Privat, knowing the range, but any effect, other than the setting of 
of buildings afire, could not be perceived because of the dense powder 
smoke and the falling dusk, and the movements of their own infantry 
could not be seen. The Saxon artillery and the 2d Battalion, Foot 
Artillery, Xth Army Corps, especially, caused havoc among the 
attackers with their shells while the remaining Prussian batteries 
again changed position to the front and found new targets. Thanks 
to General von Kessel the annoying artillery fire was finally brought 
to an end. His attention had been called to the fire by officers of 
the 4th Guard Regiment within the village and he sent off several 
mounted officers to the artillery. 1 

While the assault on the northwest corner made but slow progress 
the southern part of the village was almost completely in German 
hands. On the west side of the road leading from the north to the 
southwest all houses had been taken, the southwest corner, Jerusalem, 
and the east edge were occupied by German troops. Stubborn resis- 
tance was encountered only in the school building, close to the new 
building at the north entrance, and in some few houses on the east 
side of the churchyard. Farther toward the east edge some buildings 
were still occupied, but their defenders kept quiet. The school build- 
ing was taken by the grenadiers of the 4th Foot Guard Regiment, 
who had entered from the west under Captain von Kunowski; the 
opponent in the church square was overpowered by the numerous 
detachments converging to that point. Thereafter support could be 
brought to the comrades coming from the north. The houses close 
to the new building were occupied by sharpshooters and a hot fire 
directed on the defenders, whose fighting power gradually gave out. 
From the rear a detachment of the 4th Foot Guard Regiment stormed 
against the new building while at the same time the attack was again 
taken up from the north. Saxons and Prussians scaled the walls of 
this last French bulwark, and not a single one of the desperately fight- 
ing defenders remained alive. 

As soon as the north entrance became clear a disorderly stream 
of Prussian and Saxon soldiers broke through the village and increased 
the already existing confusion to the utmost. One part found an en- 
trance east of the new building and pressed toward the northeastern 
exit, mingling there with numerous men who had overcome the last re- 
sistance in the church square. Here were taken many prisoners whose 
retreat had been cut off. The entire east front of the village was 
filled with sharpshooters who from behind the walls and hedges kept 
up an effective rapid fire on the retreating Frenchmen hastening to- 
ward the forest of Jaumont. Another part traversed the village south • 
ward. Here and there in a few buildings some resistance was still 

'Recollections of General von Kessel. 



370 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

offered by the enemy. The battle and the firing continued into the 
night, while the burning buildings, especially the church and the farm 
called Jerusalem, lighted up the village with their flames. To increase 
the horrors of the situation the French artillery from the quarries at 
Amanweiler opened a hot fire on the village as soon as they ascer- 
tained that it was in the hands of the Germans. The flash of the guns 
was plainly seen, then the white clouds of the bursting shrapnel 
against the dim heavens, and the flare of the bursting shells. 1 But 
little thought was given to what happened far off, especially as the 
artillery fire effect was immaterial. Where the battle had died down 
prisoners were collected, the fire extinguished, and the signals sounded 
for assembly. General von Pape had ridden behind the assaulting 
troops on the road into the village and convinced himself of the fact 
of capture. His main endeavor now was to care for a regulation oc- 
cupation of the east front and to assemble the completely dispersed 
troops. Both things proved nearly impossible ; the assembled groups 
again became dissolved in the pressure on the village roads and did 
not remain in the hands of the leaders. The occupation of the east 
front appeared very important for the reason that, when entering the 
village, the general had seen a hostile brigade in close order in front 
of the forest of Jaumont in a position in readiness, while for the rest 
the field east of St. Privat had entirely been covered with fleeing 
French soldiers. 

THE GUARD FUSILIER REGIMENT FOLLOWS UP TO ST. PRIVAT 

The Guard Fusilier Regiment from its receiving position 600 meters 
west of St. Privat had been an inactive observer of the general ad- 
vance on the village. General von Pape thought of it when he per- 
ceived the total dissolution of the other four regiments of his division 
in St. Privat and sent orders to it to start. The regimental commander, 
Major Feldmann, took all three battalions to the south side of the road 
and approached the hill immediately south of the village. En route 
he perceived the heavy cannon fire of the French artillery at the quar- 
ries of Amanweiler directed against the captured village, and decided 
to capture those batteries. With this intention he had already led the 
1st Battalion as far as Jerusalem when he received orders from General 
von Pape to take up a position as closed up reserve at the southwest 
corner of the village. Only two skirmish platoons remained south of 
Jerusalem. The general then made a renewed attempt to gather men 
enough together in the village and this time had better success. These 
troops, belonging to different regiments, he then led to the east exit of 
the village. But here were already numerous men of the Guard, pur- 
suing the fleeing enemy with fire and the feared counter attack did 
not materialize. Subsequent efforts of General von Pape and of Gen- 
eral von Kessel, whom he met in the southern part of the village, 
were mainly directed towards again establishing order in the mixed 

'Recollections of General von Kessel. The French fired generally with badly 
acting shrapnel. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 371 

organizations. As this was impossible of execution within the village, 
assembly points were designated on the road to Ste. Marie. Not much 
was achieved in this at the start, for other forces were still coming from 
the rear toward St. Privat, filling up the space around the village and 
the village itself, and left no room for the attempts at establishing 
order. 

THE ARTILLERY GOES INTO POSITION NORTH AND SOUTH OF 
ST. PRIVAT 

It was the Guard artillery which first hastened up behind the 
storming Guard Infantry. When Lieutenant von Esbeck arrived on 
hill 328 shortly before the assault and informed the skirmish groups 
there of the approach of the Saxons, a noncommissioned officer of the 
Regiment Konigin called his attention to the fact that his men were 
suffering from the fire of the artillery in position in rear. At this time 
the fire of the Guard artillery had already been directed on St. Privat. 
About to ride toward the artillery, the officer suddenly saw the masses 
of the fleeing French on and along the road to Marengo and immed- 
iately perceived that the artillery would have the most favorable effect 
against that target from hill 328. He gallopped to the artillery line in 
the rear and induced the 1st and 3d Horse Batteries of the Guard to 
proced to hill 328. He then hastened to the Guard Hussar Regiment, 
halted south of Ste. Marie, to start it in pursuit of the enemy. The 
two batteries arrived on the hill just when the infantry there charged 
into the village and were able to fire for some time on the fleeing 
troops. Led by their example, other batteries followed and, while the 
last resistance was overcome in St. Privat, a new, long artillery line 
was formed, its left wing touching St. Privat, its right wing reaching 
as far as the Hessian batteries in their last position west of knoll 322. 
In this front the Guard batteries were mixed with those of the Xth 
Army Corps and the two batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division which 
had been brought to the battlefield. North of the road seven Saxon 
batteries and the four batteries of the 2d Foot Artillery Battalion of 
the Xth Army Corps took station in the space between St. Privat and 
the forest of Jaumont, to sweep the country east of the village with 
their fire. St. Privat set a limit to the space, and only a part of the 
batteries found room. South of the road two Guard batteries had to 
remain back and one battery entered the new line with only two 
pieces. North of the road nine Saxon batteries were kept back in 
their former position. 1 The remaining batteries formed a powerful 
front reaching from the Bois de la Cusse to the forest of Jaumont, be- 
ing interrupted by the village of St. Privat. The batteries were 
brought to the front only gradually and, because of the limited space, 
continued to move with many crossings and much friction until it was 
completely dark. A few batteries were misdirected to entirely un- 

■The following batteries had to remain in rear: 3d Heavy and 4th Light, Guard 
Batteries; 4 preees of the 6th Heavy, Guard Battery; 3d Heavy, 3d Light, 4th Light, 
1st Heavy, 6th Light, 5th Light, 2d Light, 4th Heavy, 1st Light, Xllth Army Corps. 



372 THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF 

suitable points; for instance, the 1st Horse Battery, Xth Army Corps 
from the vicinity east of St. Ail to the vicinity north of St. Privat. 
Battalions became split up and there could be no question of unity in 
leadership. The batteries between St. Privatand the forest of Jaumont 
at the start directed their fire on the fleeing French detachments which 
had defended that strip during the assault on St. Privat and, after 
these had disappeared, the fire was directed on the French batteries at 
the quarries of Amanweiler. On account of the increasing darkness 
aim could be taken only on the flashes of the French guns. The range 
was underestimated and the shells bursting in the space east of St. 
Privat endangered the German pursuing infantry. The 1st Horse 
Battery of the 10th Army Corps which had gone astray, fired from 
north of St. Privat on targets appearing at the edge of Jaumont for- 
est. 

South of the road the larger number of the batteries arrived in 
the new position too late to do any material damage to the hostile 
infantry retreating toward Marengo. The fire and the main attention 
was directed principally on the large hostile military position at the 
quarries of Amanweiler which the opponent had gradually extended 
as far as the eastern vicinity of that village. Opposite the left wing 
especially, the hostile batteries were so placed in the quarries taking 
advantage of the different terraces there that they could fire from sev- 
eral positions behind each other. To hold down their fire, which was 
directed in part on St. Privat and in part on the German artillery 
south of the village, twelve batteries of the left wing turned their 
pieces in that direction. On the right wing partly the hostile artillery 
and partly the hostile infantry was fired on, the latter being seen 
marching off east of Amanweiler under protection of the division in 
position between Amanweiler and the quarries. Many good targets 
offered themselves in that direction. A part of the hostile infantry 
still held its place on knoll 322 and north of there. Its fire reached the 
new artillery position, and two batteries, the 5th and 6th Light, Xth 
Army Corps, came so close to the lost hostile infantry detachment when 
going into position in the center of the line that they were forced to 
make front and defend themselves with shells. The four batteries of 
the 1st Guard Foot Artillery Battalion not engaged in this change of 
position and which had stood from the start on the southern slope of 
ridge 321, fired, together with the Hessian batteries, on the enemy 
south of the railroad and on the village of Amanweiler, which was 
soon set in flames. 

Thus the artillery fire did not play a very material role in the 
pursuit of the enemy retreating through Marengo. The infantry fire 
from St. Privat naturally had no far reaching effect. There was no 
thought of a pursuit by the troops in the village because of their con- 
fused state and the threatening attitude kept up by a part of the hostile 
infantry at the forest of Jaumont. While the fight still raged in St. 
Privat there approached fresh infantry, the 20th Infantry Division, 
which seemed fit to take up the pursuit of the French in an energetic 



A German Professional Final Judg- 
ment Concerning the Battle 
of St. Privat 1 



^TpHE fifth volume of Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte and 
■*- Taktik, published by the Great General Staff, which 
appeared a few days ago gives a very comprehensive picture 
of the great decisive battle of the 18th of August, 1870. 
This study, taken in large part from the Royal Saxon ar- 
chives and from memories and recollections of numerous 
participants, pays also due attention to the late publications 
of the French General Staff and, with the utilization of the 
increased knowledge of events, gained by the Germans as 
well as the French, there has come a larger freedom of 
judgment as to persons and things. For this reason this 
publication does not hide itself behind the account of the 
battle published by the General Staff in 1875, though, as 
stated expressly in the foreword, a careful final examination 
of all material utilized has proven that the earlier account 
of the General Staff has been correct in almost all material 
points. A review of this new work will be published in a 
subsequent edition of this paper. To-day we will give a few 
extracts from the concluding comments of the study. 

Of all the battles fought under his leadership as Chief 
of the General Staff of the Prussian Army, General von 
Moltke designated that of Koniggratz as the best planned in 
the wars of both 1866 and 1870-71. It is easily understood 
that he considered this magnificent victory especially highly, 
it being his first. With the same justification he could have 
cited the battle of Sedan, the success of which was so 
thoroughly prepared by the previous operations that there 
was no necessity for Royal Headquarters to issue any orders 

iEditorial from Leipziger Zeitung (No. 298, Supplement No. 1), 
December 24, 1906. 

373 



374 LEIPZIGEE ZEITUNG 

to the corps headquarters during the battle in order to pre- 
serve unity of action. The least successful battle was that 
of St. Privat— Gravelotte, because the design of Royal Head- 
quarters prevailed only in part, or not all. If we look for 
the reasons for this, we find first, that what General von 
Moltke desired— the annihilation of the enemy on the 
heights of Metz through a double envelopment— could hardly 
be accomplished. Not however because it would have been 
impossible to envelop the enemy doubly. But it was not a 
question of a contracted front, as he supposed, but of such 
an extended one that it was hardly possible that all of the 
enemy's forces could be surrounded and forced to lay down 
their arms outside of Metz or driven off in a direction un- 
favorable to them. It was far more probable that a very 
material part would have had an opportunity to get away 
into Metz. That would not have been a complete annihilation 
but only a serious defeat, probably connected with a far 
reaching dispersing of the hostile forces. Even this was not 
attained because the envelopment was accomplished only 
against the French right wing which received by its pres- 
sure the direction of its retreat on Metz, while the other 
wing, which probably could have been forced away from 
Metz, was not enveloped. In this manner the French army, 
actually beaten at only one place, retreated undivided into 
Metz and, though that fortress later on changed into a trap 
which the army could not get free from, its situation at the 
start was not entirely hopeless, provided the desire for 
breaking through was adhered to tenaciously. The objective 
which General von Moltke endeavored to reach through the 
battle was thus not entirely attainable, and in so far as his 
intentions were possible of execution they were crossed not 
merely by the fact that the envelopment became effective only 
on the left wing but also by the premature attack of the center 
and right wing. On the whole, Royal Headquarters played the 
role of a spectator who had no opportunity to interfere in the 
course of events, though there was no absence of attempts to 
regain the reins of leadership. How are these remarkable 
facts to be explained ? Two causes were the most prominent 
in interfering unfavorably : absence of far reaching recon- 



A PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 375 

naissance and the failure of communication between Royal 
Headquarters and the different army headquarters, especially 
that of the Second Army. Insufficiency of reconnaissance 
brought it about that General von Moltke based his battle 
orders on a conception of the situation which was near the 
truth but not entirely in consonance with it. But the effects 
of the failure of reconnaissance reached farther. They 
delayed the movements of the Second Army, allowed the 
IXth Army Corps to encounter the enemy prematurely and 
gave the First Army, which also interfered prematurely, a 
wrong conception of conditions with the opposing enemy, 
who was believed to be retreating on Metz. That communi- 
cations between Royal Headquarters and Headquarters First 
Army failed at the most important moment, in that the 
verbal orders for the simultaneous attack on Gravelotte and 
from the forest of Vaux did not reach General Steinmetz 
in the intended wording, was in the main an unfortunate 
happening and had far reaching consequences. To this 
circumstance may be attributed the frontal attack of the 
VHIth Corps and, in connection with an additional mis- 
understood direction from Royal Headquarters, the fact that 
the infantry of the Vllth Corps was held back for hours. It 
is true that in the afternoon hours Royal Headquarters was 
in direct communication with Headquarters First Army ; but 
it was too late to bring about in the situation a change which 
would have been in consonance with the intentions of Royal 
Headquarters. That headquarters completely lost sight of 
the Second Army. Some reports were received, it is true, 
but these did not help rectify the original error of the belief 
that the French right wing extended only as far as Montigny 
la Grange. Not till evening was the real situation with the 
Second Army known and uncertainty reigned until the next 
morning concerning the outcome of the battle there, though 
there was no reason to doubt that success had been attained. 
The absence of communications did not concern merely the 
relations of Royal Headquarters to the different army head- 
quarters. There was also absence of connection between 
these latter. In the Second Army the Guard and the Xllth 
Corps were in very loose communication with Prince Fred- 



378 LEIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

erick Charles in the afternoon. In the First Army the troops 
inserted in front were at times out of the higher leaders' 
hands. As far as reconnaissance is concerned we are com- 
pelled to say that great sins of omission were committed. 
This is acknowledged by all, especially as far as relates to 
August 17th. Nevertheless, this neglect needs an explana- 
tion, and this is found in the fact that the reconnaissance 
activities of cavalry were as yet little or not at all understood. 
It was believed that the main duties of the cavalry consisted 
not in reconnaissance but in battle activity. This applies to 
the entire period between the Wars of Liberation and the 
year 1870. Prior to the battle of Koniggratz the uncertainty 
of the situation is not less than it was on August 17, 1870. 
But in that battle prominent separate achievements enabled 
the Germans to perceive in time the position of the Austrians. 
Such prominent achievements were not present on the 17th 
of August and came too late on the 18th of August to have 
any effect on the leadership. It was during the campaign, 
and as a result of the experiences of the August days, that 
the necessary conclusions concerning cavalry reconnaissance 
were drawn, of course not always nor everywhere. At the 
present time there is no doubt concerning the duties of cav- 
alry—to supply the highest leader continually and promptly 
with reports and not to await orders for doing so. 

In the concluding comments of the study the methods of 
transmitting orders in those days are contrasted with the 
more valuable ones of to-day. The 18th of August is desig- 
nated as a modern battle which had for the larger part to 
be fought with old fashioned means, and it is explained in 
detail that this applies also to infantry tactics and the needle 
gun. In this connection the concluding comments recite 
how the attack on the French position would have been 
made could present drill regulations and fire effect have 
been employed. If — it is said in one place in the account— 
we take conditions at St. Privat as they actually existed on 
August 18th, 1870, the attack, according to today's princi- 
ples, would not have been unusually difficult; though we 
must not believe that the battle against a defender with 
modern arms can be brought to a finish as rapidly as was 



A PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT 377 

done in those days. The position in readiness for the attack 
ought, of course, to be taken early in the morning in order 
to have the entire day for its execution. For today the fire 
fight opens at longer ranges than in those days, and pauses 
in the advance will frequently occur while the skirmish lines 
regain power for the further advance. It is the duty of all 
leaders to watch that the desire to press forward is not 
diminished, nor deadened by the use of the spade. A body 
of troops must finish its day's task and the leadership must 
create the time necessary therefor. We will pass over what 
the comments say concerning the role of field artillery in 
present day battle and also what is said about the losses on 
August 18th. The account concludes with the following, 
concerning the result of the day of battle: In comparison 
to the immense sacrifices on the German side the tactical 
success of the day is on the whole very small and the strate- 
gical success appeared but slowly. It is true that the Army 
of the Rhine was lamed for the time, but it was still in 
existence and for two months kept 200,000 Germans chained 
down; for the investment of Metz was not for the purpose 
of capturing that fortress but, as General von Moltke stated, 
of annihilating the Army of the Rhine. Had the French 
fought on August 18th with reversed front, without having 
had touch with the fortress, the success unquestionably would 
have been greater in the start and would undoubtedly have 
led far more quickly to the complete annihilation of the 
Army of the Rhine. The retreat of that army into the 
interior of France was hindered; it had to stop on the Mosel, 
and fresh German forces, the 3d Reserve Division, were 
already approaching from the frontier to bar the way. 
After the war much talk was heard of the power of attraction 
of that fortress and it was also said that the Army of the 
Rhine dug its own grave by retreating thereon. But we 
should not overlook the fact that a general different from 
Bazaine could have prepared quite other and far greater 
difficulties to the investment than was actually the case. If 
we imagine energetic and apt leaders in the places of 
Bazaine and MacMahon, the attempt at relief made by the 
Army of Chalons could have brought on a very dangerous 



378 LEIPZIGBR ZEITUNG 

crisis, though the final outcome, favorable to the Germans, 
need not remain in doubt. Success is eventually decisive in 
the criticism of military actions. The decisive thing in this 
case was that General von Moltke understood as early as the 
19th of August how to utilize the results of the 18th. The 
necessity of having to reckon in future with the Army of 
the Rhine was to him no obstruction to the immediate com- 
mencement of operations against the other main part of the 
French Imperial army, and the prospect of a favorable out- 
come was based on the fact that— in addition to the numeri- 
cal superiority of the Germans — the maneuvering ability of 
the Army of the Rhine was materially decreased, if not 
entirely ended, on account of its having retreated into the 
fortress. Taking this view, the battle of St. Privat— Grave- 
lotte is the most important and most eventful battle in the 
first half of the campaign, without precedent in audacity 
and correct sequence of operations, without precedent in the 
enormous struggle between two equally strong opponents 
and in the final result of the capture of an army which had 
but insignificantly lost its fighting power. Opposed to such 
a success the numerous frictions, reverses and wrong actions 
which the battle shows fall into the background. Just these 
frictions and reverses offer a number of instructive examples 
and it is necessary to let bright light shine on them to pre- 
vent our arriving at erroneous estimates and wrong con- 
clusions which might influence the picture of the battle. In 
this sense Moltke says: "As a rule everything appearing 
absolutely improper and contradictory disappears entirely as 
soon as we perceive the motive, the thousands of frictions 
and difficulties, which the execution encountered." 



The 18th of August 1870 1 

By 

R 

VOLUME 5 of the excellent and instructive Studien zur 
Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, which the Miltary-His- 
torical Section I of the Great General Staff has been 
publishing for the past few years, is entitled "The 18th of 
August 1870." In Number 298 of 1906 we printed a short 
extract of the final comments of this book from which our 
readers could see in what an instructive and interesting 
manner questions of military history and tactics are handled. 
But it now behooves us to discuss the total contents of this 
work more closely, because the battle of St. Privat la Mon- 
tagne— Gravelotte was for us Saxons of very great— almost 
world-historical— national importance; for it was the first 
decisive battle in the Franco-Prussian War in which also the 
Xllth (Royal Saxon) Army Corps battled side by side with 
its brothers from the north and the south and inscribed, 
under the leadership of both its Royal Princes, a new leaf 
of glory in its military history. 

This volume is of importance and interest not only to 
the participants in that war, not only to the officer, desirous 
of instruction, but also for all men who have the love of 
their fatherland at heart, for it offers entirely new estimates 
and important statements, and the estimates of the situation 
and the measures taken by the leading personalities furnish 
an entirely new picture. 

We will premise that the authors have also in this vol- 
ume given us an exceedingly clear captivating account along 
broad lines of this complicated battle and have understood 
how to hold the reader's interest by dividing the battle into 
definite battle units and battle sectors, and in giving a clear 
picture of the battle groups by supplementing the volume 
with numerous maps and sketches. 

^rom Wissemchaftliche Beilage No. 11 of the Leipziger Zei- 
tung, 16 March 1907. 

379 



380 LEIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

Reading this volume and comparing its contents with 
prior accounts of this battle involuntarily reminds us of a 
statement made by von Oncken in reference to the method 
of writing the history of the Wars of Liberation: "In the old 
accounts the endeavor to belittle the deeds of other partici- 
pants as much as possible so as to make our own merits 
shine more brightly is restrained by the exultant joy over 
the success of the dangerous undertaking; but the more time 
advanced, the more did this endeavor increase. Each mili- 
tary writer triumphantly claims for his own people the main 
share in the general success. ' ' In the descriptions of the 
battle in question it is not the exultant joy over the attain- 
ment of the great success by the united German races 
coming to the surface which arouses our antagonism; but the 
partisanship displayed. 

The subsequent more thorough searching of the 
archives dealing with this war, the utilization of various 
and numerous recollections and memorials by participants, 
of regimental histories, published letters, etc., has in many 
instances put a different aspect on the events; but it remains 
very doubtful whether or not these subjective accounts are 
of more indisputable and essential value than the official 
accounts submitted immediately after the conclusion of the 
war. Each memorialist is inclined to color the account as 
regards his own achievements. General von Schimpff in 
his preface to Das XII Korps im Kriege 1870-71 says: 
"Reports written subsequently, recollections, revised diaries 
should be used with caution, for it is merely human nature 
not to hide our light under a bushel measure, and after the 
lapse of years and when in possession of exact knowledge 
of all material factors, even with the most truth loving^ 
authors the original impressions become changed and conse-* 
quently also the recital of the events." 

It is of course correct that many military writers have 
recited and discussed the advance of the Prussian Guards on 
St. Privat la Montague in a manner which must have deeply 
offended those brave troops. Woide 1 writes: "This prema- 

] Die Ursachen der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870. An 
attempt at a critical recital of the Franco -Prussian War up to the 
battle of Sedan; by Lieutenant General von Woide, Russian General 
Staff. Translated by Klingender from the Russian; Mittler & Son, 
Berlin, 1906;— vol. 2, p. 93. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 381 

ture attack, though executed with the greatest bravery, cost 
the Prussians dearly; thanks to the inactive attitude of the 
French, this incipient blunder of the Guards did not result 
in a complete defeat which in all probability would have 
decided the fate of the battles of August 18th." In his 
Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen 1 Major Kunz has recited the 
battles around St. Privat la Montagne applicatorically and 
entirely to the great credit of the Guards, saying (on page 
113): "No troops on earth could have attacked with greater 
bravery than did the Prussian Guard infantry on August 18, 
1870." But von Schimpff, referring to Woide (vol. 
2, p. 86), has the imprudence to write: "A lucky star brought 
it about that by this transposing of the two corps the Guard 
was called to extremely bloody and glorious achievements, 
but that Crown Prince Albert had the opportunity to bring 
about the main decision in the battle by his intrepid inter- 
ference with the Xllth Corps on the extreme right wing of 
the French." 8 

This, however, left no rest to other critics. It appeared 
unbelievable that the Guard, the commissioned places of 
which were from time immemorial filled by the flower of the 
old Brandenburg— Prussian nobility, could not have the 
credit of bringing about the main success. Thus, as early as 
1901, in the 6th and 7th Supplement to the Militar Wochen- 
blatt, Colonel von Schack attempted to prove that Marshal 
Canrobert drew off his troops on the right wing, not because 
of the threatening envelopment by the Saxons, but because of 
the attack made by the Guards, and writes: "If the attack 
of the Guards caused the orders for the retreat, then the at- 
tack of the Guards brought about the victory and with this 
victory of Gravelotte-St. Privat opened the road to a 
Sedan, to an Imperial Crown!" 

Thereupon the General Staff sent out question sheets 
to all participants in the war. And everything which was 
expected to materialize from these questions has now 
happened: the authors have succeeded in portraying the 
battles of St. Privat and the final capture of that village in 
such manner as leaves no doubt but that the Prussian Guard 
alone brought about the decision on the 18th of August by 

*Part 10. 

s Das XII Korps im Kriege 1870-71. I, St. Privat la Montagne; 
by Col. von Schimpff. Dresden, 1901, Page 61. See p. 159 ante. 



382 LEIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

its premature attack on the village. All others— Saxons, 
Hessians, the Hid, IXth and Xth Corps— are given credit 
for having bravely participated, but not for having gained 
the decision. The account admits at least that the crossing 
of the Guard Corps and the Xllth Corps on the morning of 
August 18th was caused by political considerations and that 
the premature attack of the Guard Corps in the afternoon 
on St. Privat was due to the apprehension that the Saxons 
might, through their enveloping movement, bring about the 
decision in the battle. 

Turning now to the contents proper of the study, we 
have to determine first of all that Prince Frederick Charles, 
commanding the Second Army, kept entirely too long to the 
original view or preconceived belief that he had to seek and 
find the enemy northwest of Metz. The Second Army had 
entirely too much cavalry, yet the Prince failed to utilize that 
cavalry sufficiently for reconnaissance purposes; and this is 
the more remarkable because he had the reputation of being 
an efficient cavalry leader. Had he utilized his cavalry prop- 
erly, he could have ascertained that the enemy had not 
marched off to Verdun on August 17th. When the com- 
manding general of the Hid Army Corps, von Alvensleben, 
had attacked the opponent in his position at Mars la Tour on 
the 16th "the strategic situation was clear to him since Aug- 
ust 15th" and also that on August 16th he would be in con- 
tact, if not with the entire hostile army, then at least with a 
large part of it. Then the battle of August 16th proved 
that the entire hostile army was held and could advance no 
step, on this day, in the direction of the Maas. Why did the 
Prince not perceive the truth of this? On August 17th 
everything was quiet along this front, and German cavalry, « 
the 12th (Royal Saxon) Cavalry Division was already on the 
road to Etain, and the road to Verdun had been found clear 
of the enemy. 

It is admitted, on page 111, that reconnaissance, in the 
present day sense, was carried out by the 12th Cavalry Divi- 
sion; in contrast to the utilization of the other German cav- 
alry. It is also stated : ' ' During the next few hours the 12th 
Cavalry Division was the unit from which Prince Frederick 
Charles mainly expected reports." But, because of the pre- 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 383 

conceived opinion of the Prince that the enemy had retreated 
toward the Maas, this body of cavalry had been given a wrong 
direction. The Prince held to this erroneous opinion even up 
to 4.30 p.m., August 18th, though it is clearly stated in Gen- 
eral von Moltke's reply to General von Steinmetz, dated 4 
a.m., August 18th, that "a right turn is being executed by 
us." "The fact that no reports were sent by the 12th Cav- 
alry Division, because there was nothing to report, later on 
induced him to come to a different view of the situation.'' 
But still the Prince for a long time supposed ' ' that the field 
of activity of his army lay in the northwest and only very 
gradually he arrived at the conclusion that the attack 
objective was to be sought in the east, under the influence 
of the fact that there was an enemy actually in the east and 
that it could not be ascertained with any degree of certainty 
that he was in the west." This dullness in the Prince's 
thought current, in contrast to Moltke's, is said to have had 
the benefit that the disadvantages of his directions for 
the advance of the Second Army, especially that of the 
crossing between the Guard and the Xllth Corps during the 
battle proper, were not very prominent. 

When finally the view of conditions with the enemy had 
become clearer, the leaders of the corps in front indepen- 
dently arrived at their decisions, which on page 117 are 
described as ''deserving great credit," although the actions 
of the Crown Prince in advancing with the advance guard 
on both banks of the Orne and taking a security position 
at the Bois de Ponty are criticised. But that is a matter 
of opinion. 

The conduct of General Steinmetz is severely criticised 
and it is stated in general (page 121) i 1 "It is not a satis- 
factory picture to see the conduct of the Germans during the 
forenoon hours of August 18th. There are of course satis- 
factory dispositions seen in the conduct of the commander 
of the Second Army, such as an order for attack, well 
thought out by an efficient and tried leader, independence, 
and the ardent desire to close with the enemy; but, predomi- 
nating, are uncertainty and vaccilation, error and misunder- 
standing; and the time in which the concentration before 
the hostile front ought to have been completed is filled with 
movements in the dark, which are very far from an orderly 
advance of an army against an enemy. The Guard and the 

1 Comments on Chapter III. — Ed. 



384 LEIPZIGBR ZEITUNG 

Xllth Corps still are far away from the enemy. In spite of 
the slow progress of action the First Army and the IXth 
Army Corps are cut off from the leadership and the attempts 
to stop the premature opening of the battle miscarry." But 
this hard judgment is somewhat softened by the statement 
on page 123: "It is but natural that the measures taken by 
the Prussian leadership in the forenoon of August 18th have 
aroused the critics in a high degree. To judge correctly we 
must place ourselves into the then existing situation of the 
leaders. They looked against a screen which hid the enemy's 
intentions and a part of his forces, and arrived at their final 
decision at a time when the screen was pierced only here and 
there and not fully raised. No matter how much we may 
blame, the faculty of arriving at a decision and the will for 
action in spite of the difficult conditions was present." 

It is not our intention to discuss the entire course of the 
battle here, though there are a large number of interesting 
starting points for discussing the "pro and con;" we can 
discuss merely single events. Thus, on page 160 surprise is 
expressed that Ste. Marie aux Chenes was so weakly occupied 
by the French; but we must consider that this village was 
merely an advanced position in front of the main position of 
St. Privat, and was quite correctly utilized in this sense. In 
contrast to the German art of war, the French favor ad- 
vanced positions. They fully accomplished their end in 
view — to force the enemy to deploy early. Military litera- 
ture has pointed this out frequently. 

The commanding general of the Guard Corps, Prince 
August of Wurttemberg, had directed General von Pape, 
commanding the 1st Guard Infantry Division, "not to con- 
tinue the march farther to the north, but to form the division 
against Ste. Marie, and not to attack that place in earnest 
before the arrival of the expected Saxon Corps." With this 
end in view General von Pape then discussed with General 
Nehrhoff von Holdernberg, commanding the 24th Infantry 
Division, the combined attack on Ste. Marie aux Chenes, * 
after which the combined Guard batteries and the artillery 
of the 24th Division should turn against the hostile infantry 
north of the Ste. Marie aux Chenes— St. Privat la Montagne 
road. "The result was not long delayed; under the com- 
bined effect of the Saxon and Guard artillery the hostile 

x Pae:e 251, ants. 



THE 18 TH OF AUGUST, 1870 385 

infantry was forced to halt and, with the exception of some 
weaker detachments, finally fell back to the main position 
at St. Privat." 

How difficult it is to give an actually objective illustra- 
tion of a battle is shown by the many contradictions to be 
found in this work. Thus on page 168 the Guard Hussars 
claimed to have observed at 12.30 p.m. 1 that the hostile 
position extended northward to beyond St. Privat and that 
also Roncourt was occupied, while on page 185 it is stated 
that Marshal Canrobert prolonged his front only at 2.30 p.m. 2 
by three battalions of the 10th Line Regiment to halfways 
between St. Privat— Roncourt. 

The error as regards the 46th Infantry Brigade — which 
was turned towards Moineville instead of Coinville— is de- 
plorable; it could, however, have been offset by the brigade 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Montbe, had he kept 
closer to the main body, which as a matter of fact is the 
duty of every subordinate commander of rear echelons in 
the progress of an attack. He must never wait for orders, 
but must act independently. (See footnote, page 189. ) 3 

Pages 226 to 228 discuss the measures of the two Saxon 
Princes for the envelopment of the hostile right wing. On 
page 228 the Saxons are blamed for being indirectly guilty 
for the "premature attack of the Guards." The conduct of 
the Xllth Corps is even scored by citing Clausewitz as 
authority therefor: "The field of friction, of which Clause- 
witz says that it increases the difficulties of the apparently 
easy situation and differentiates between actual war and war 
on paper, is well illustrated by events in the Xllth Army 
Corps." 4 

A very interesting point is the note concerning the attack 
on Ste. Marie aux Chenes: "The political tact displayed by 
General von Pape in giving up the west side of the village 
for the attack of the Saxons will be willingly acknowledged. " 6 
Then the reproach is expressed that Crown Prince Albert 
extended his enveloping movement too far beyond Montois 

•Page 247 ante. 

■Page 261 ante. 

•Page 265 ante. 

*In Comments to Chapter IV.— Ed. 

•Ibid. 



386 LBIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

la Montagne without reporting this fact to army head- 
quarters, and at the same time Prince Frederick Charles is 
blamed for not having changed his location farther to the 
north during the battle, and thus having had an opportunity 
to bring the frontal attack and the envelopment into con- 
sonance. As a matter of fact, all plausible reasons are 
sought out in order to free the Guard Corps from the blame 
of a premature attack. 

Crown Prince Albert had caused Prince August of 
Wiirttemberg, commanding the Guard Corps, to be informed 
that he would start the march for the enveloping movement 
of Roncourt and St. Privat at 5 p.m. Prince August did not 
take into consideration how much time this march would 
take and only considered "that a decisive attack in front 
was necessary," and he also possessed the justifiable ambi- 
tion to give his corps full share in the expected victory, 
especially as on August 18th it encountered the enemy for 
the first time. Of course rapid action was necessary to 
allow the Guard Corps to interfere with success; "a combined 
deployment of the Guard infantry and a preparation of the 
attack by the artillery could not be waited for." 1 Prince 
August of Wiirttemberg decisively declined the offer of the 
commander of the corps artillery of the Xth Corps to pre- 
pare the attack with his batteries — he was firm in his de- 
cision for the immediate attack. "The expectation at 
army headquarters that the decisive action would commence 
very soon also increased to impatience." The Guard 
batteries of General Prince zu Hohenlohe were already in 
action south of St. Ail. Prince zu Hohenlohe has written in 
his memoirs and in the History of the Guard Artillery con- 
cerning these events. Toward 5.30 p.m. he saw how the 
hostile fire in front of St. Privat la Montagne increased in 
volume. "This freshly started fire was however not aimed 
at the corps artillery. The Prince asked the Colonel, 'What 
does this mean ? For God's sake ! Our infantry is attack- 
ing in front before the Saxons have completed their en- 
veloping.' " 2 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg was so completely taken 

*Page 275 ante. 
8 Page 285 ante. 



THE 18th OF AUGUST, 1870 387 

up with this desire for attack that he cut short all re- 
monstrances and objections of General von Pape with the 
words: "Hurry up now; everything takes so long with 
you. " * These discussions between the separate commanders, 
which are given to us from the copious literature of recol- 
lections, are of course very interesting but offer no pleasant 
spectacle. General von Kessel called General von Dannen- 
berg's attention to the fact that several intact hostile 
battalions were lying in front of St. Privat la Montagne 
which ought to be silenced first of all by artillery fire, but 
the latter replied with great assuredness: "We attack. If 
we do not take St. Privat the Saxons will get it ahead of us. 
The brigade will reap the harvest of today." In the com- 
ments on page 448 the premature attack is strongly censured: 
" Whatever was directed for carrying out the attack was 
wrong in almost every instance," and at another place it 
is stated, "Action was taken without seeing the conditions." 

The account of the advance of the Guard Infantry 
Brigade also offers no picture of adept leadership. A few 
batteries of the Saxon 24th Division had the intention of 
facilitating through their fire the advance of the 1st Guard 
Infantry Brigade. But it is stated on page 419 : 8 " Thus 
the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade did not have a continued 
support from the Saxon artillery:" Compare with this the 
Saxon opinions concerning the attack of the Guards, for 
example in the work " Konig Albert, Filnfzig Jahre Soldat," 
pages 213-214. 3 

In the work in question, it is then stated on page 427: 4 
The retreat of the troops from the advanced lines, in con- 
nection with the danger of envelopment threatening from 
Montois la Montagne caused the conviction in Marshal Can- 
robert's mind that the retreat to Metz was unavoidable and 
that the only thing left to do was to secure the line of retreat 
leading through Marengo and Saulny by holding the village 
of St. Privat. Therefore it was the threatening envelopment 

'Page 293 ante. 
2 Page 306 ante. 

3 Read Kunz's book, page 82, how he estimates the activity of the 
Saxon artillery. 

4 Page 313 ante. 



388 LEIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

by the Xllth Corps which was a very decisive factor in the 
decision, and not only the attack of the Guards which had 
just then come to a standstill, as Colonel von Schack main- 
tains. 1 Compare herewith also the report of the battles of 
the Guard on pages 442 et seq., 2 where the enormous losses 
of the disrupted and dispersed 1st Guard Brigade and the 
retreating, leaderless soldiers are discussed. General von 
Pape did not consider the situation as very hopeful. He 
sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant von Esbeck, called von 
Platen, to the left wing to find out if Saxon batteries could 
not fire on the village and to ascertain how close the Saxons 
then were and what they were doing. Many of the Saxon 
participants will doubtless remember the young, dashing, 
fresh Hussar officer galloping up to the Saxon battalions to 
request their help for the Guards. 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg also anxiously awaited 
reinforcements. ' ' The longer the Prince viewed the battle- 
field with all its horrors, the more he gained the conviction 
that even the 4th Foot Guard Regiment would be unable to 
bring this horrible battle to a victorious conclusion. Fresher, 
stronger forces were needed to overcome the enemy, and 
these could be brought only by the Saxons, whose interfer- 
ence had then been waited for for two hours." "In place 
of rapid success a long drawn out battle with enormous losses 
had ensued, and the non-appearance of the Saxons, whose 
help he did not consider necessary in the start to gain the 
victory, he now felt painfully." 3 

These expressions of the situation of the battle in the 
afternoon hours appear to justify the independent action on 
the part of the orderly officer of General von Pape, Lieu- 
tenant von Esbeck, and the longing for the interference by 
the Saxons appears to have made itself felt everywheres. 
However, this energetic young officer is indirectly blamed 
subsequently, in the statement on page 509 : 4 ' ' Lieutenant von 
Esbeck, called von Platen, had no orders to divert the Saxon 
advance on St. Privat. He acted independently under the 
impression that the left wing of the 1st Guard Infantry 
Brigade north of the large basin did not make any progress 

'Supplement to Militar Wochenblatt, 1901; Part 6 and 7. 
•Page 318 et seq., ante. 
"Page 326, ante. 
4 Page 301, ante. 



THE 18 TH OF AUGUST, 1870 389 

toward Roncourt; also it was not his intention to draw the 
Saxons onto St. Privat, but only to hasten their advance on 
Roncourt, which he believed to be still occupied. It was 
again an independent decision of the Saxon leaders when 
they took the direction of St. Privat la Montagne, where 
they perceived the main focus of the battle to be; and they 
of course left Roncourt on one side because it apparently 
had already been evacuated by the enemy. Lieutenant von 
Esbeck could ride back to his division commander with the 
knowledge that now the battle north of the road would come 
to a victorious end. South of the large basin he encountered 
General von Kessel and called to him: ' The victory is ours; 
the Saxons are coming! ' The general grasped him by the 
hand. The same message he called out to skirmishers of the 
1st Guard Infantry when passing them. They replied to it 
with cheers." 

How at that time, in 1870, everybody was imbued with 
the view that it was the Guard that must bring about the 
decision is clearly shown in the orders issued by General von 
Wittich shortly before 5 p.m. to the Guard Rifle Battalion: 
"The Guard will advance about 5 p.m., in order to bring 
about the decision." 

The subsequent development of things before the final 
charge is very graphically recounted and the last moments 
before the storm of the village very dramatically on page 
521. ' The statement on page 524 that the Saxon batteries 
could not act effectively against St. Privat, is in contradic- 
tion with all Saxon reports and also with Kunz (page 92) . 
Nearly all military authors agree that the specific details of 
the battles immediately in front of and in St. Privat 
cannot be given with exactitude; in this work, however, the 
attempt is made to do this as far as the Guard regiments are 
concerned, and success in this has been obtained with great 
literary adeptness. 

Though the account of the conduct of the battle pro- 
duces much edification and exaltation, that impression is 
materially reduced in the subsequent comments. We will 
emphasize a good sentence in these comments: "It is one 
of the peculiarities of war that but seldom is everything 
fully accomplished which the leadership tries to attain by 
the battle. We should therefore not find fault with great 

'Page 361, et acg., ante. 



390 LEIPZIGER ZEITUNG 

decisions because the success was not up to expectations. 
It is to the glory of the German leadership on August 18th 
that the firm will of proud spirits to conquer was present, 
which, as Clausewitz says, like the obelisk toward which the 
main streets of a town lead overtops everything as the cen- 
tral point of the art of war." It is very sad that this 
magnanimity of cautioning against criticism was not prac- 
ticed in this work. The appearance as a leader in the field 
of Prince Frederick Charles fades before the bulk of re- 
proaches and it would have been very desirable had the 
General Staff not gone so far in the inexorable impulse for 
love of truth. 

With full justice the "insertion by driblets of the forces 
against the hostile front" is criticized; but it should be 
pointed out that higher authority has stated that the 
measures taken and the formations on the German left 
wing, especially with the Xllth Corps, had been excellent in 
regard to their well-planned, well-aimed and united action. 
How does the fault-finding agree with the subsequent com- 
ment on page 571: "And, in spite of all, this result in the 
confluence of all forces in one front before the final de- 
cision!" Compare Woide, Volume 2, page 85. 

We also would prefer a little less criticism in regard to 
blaming the disposition of forces in the enveloping of Ron- 
court, for the wrong disposition of forces arose only when the 
Saxons hastened up for support on the request of Lieutenant 
von Esbeck. The troops were formed at the start according to 
regulations. But this hastening up for support by a few 
Saxon regiments is described by the history writers in 
Berlin as an abomination, and on that account mention is 
made only on page 563 of one report of Lieutenant von 
Esbeck according to which there was no intention of draw- 
ing the troops toward St. Privat la Montagne and the rapid 
action of the independent Saxon leaders is laid as a blame at 
their door. We well remember, and we could name many 
witnesses, that the young Guard Hussar officer galloped up 
in haste and great excitement and begged them, for God's 
sake, to bring support to the Guards, who were bleeding 
to death in front of St. Privat. 

The envelopment of Roncourt is then criticised as not 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 391 

having been made sufficiently far reaching, as it should 
have been extended to the quarries of Jaumont. This is in 
direct contradiction to previous statements where the far 
reaching extension through Montois la Montagne was criti- 
cised. And while other writers 1 describe this envelopment 
movement of the Xllth Corps as the most decisive one, it 
states here, on page 565: 2 "But from all this the conclusion 
should not be drawn that the envelopment by the Xllth 
Army Corps was entirely without result. * * * * * jf 
we keep to the facts, we find that the movement of the 
Saxons, though not resulting in a complete envelopment, 
shortened the resistance of the French and materially con- 
duced to the fact that the 18th of August ended with a 
decisive effect against the French right wing." Crown 
Prince Albert receives praise: "In war it is a difficult art to 
await the regulation movement of troops for a definite object, 
when strong influences of the battlefield appear to demand 
an earlier utilization, be that to help other troops, or be it to 
hasten the delayed decision. Proper attributes of the com- 
mander in the field are shown by the ability to set a deaf 
ear against such impressions and never to lose sight of the 
final objective. ' ' And at another place it is stated : ' 'There- 
fore the Crown Prince acted as he had to act under condi- 
tions as seen by him." On the other hand on page 578 he is 
refused acknowledgment of having that "strong, pityless 
will" 3 necessary to immediately take up the pursuit of the 
fleeing enemy and gather still greater fruits of the victory. 
The concluding sentence of this chapter reads: "Royal 
Headquarters interfered with the First Army, where the 
battle had remained undecided, in order to separate the 
corps and take them back for the larger part to behind the 
Mance defile, because there was expectation of a continua- 
tion of the battle on the next morning, and possibly even an 
attack. In the Second Army however the troops had the 
proud right to pass the night on the ground which they had 
captured from the enemy in hot battle." In the concluding 
comments, which have been published before in these 
columns, the attack on St. Privat la Montagne is very in- 
structively discussed with reference to present day battle 
maxims. 

1 Woide, vol. 2, page 86. 
8 Comments— Ed. 

3 Moltke, Geachichte des deutach-franzdaisohen Krieges, 1870-71; 
page 324. 



392 LEIPZIQER ZEITUNQ 

Though the contents of this work are captivating and 
instructive, though the many teachings of tactics and 
battle leadership are of great use to the future officers of the 
army, we have to acknowledge that this book has not made 
an edifying impression on us, for it contains too many contra- 
dictions. 



The 18th of August 1870 1 

BY 

Colonel von Kretschmar 

WOULD like to add a few remarks and corrections to 
-■- those published in Supplement No. 11 of the Leipziger 
Zeitung of March 16, 1907, relating to Vol. 5 of Studien 
zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik published by the Great 
General Staff. 

These studies of events of the 18th of August contain 
several erroneous remarks concerning the artillery of the 
Xllth Army Corps which I must combat. My corrections 
are especially aimed at some statements, contained in the 
text and in the sketches, as to the time of the appearance 
of the batteries and battalions in the different positions. 
These statements deviate considerably from those given in 
the General Staff Account of the War of 1870-71, in the 
works of General von Schimpff concerning the Xllth Army 
Corps, and in the History of the Royal Saxon Field Artillery, 
compiled by me. The time periods given in these works 
were ascertained at that time from the battle reports of the 
different organizations; which, with different and better 
sources, are at the disposal of the compilers of this present 
fifth volume and these various works are referred to in 
several places as sources of information. 

In regard to some material time periods I am myself 
able to state the absolutely correct time. As adjutant at 
that time to the commander of the artillery of the Xllth 
Army Corps I noted down these time periods by the watch 
at time and place or very shortly thereafter and in addition 
I put down, on the evening of August 18th, in my personally 
kept diary, exact notes of the battle; noted the position of 
the batteries on the map, or on specially drawn sketches. 
Furthermore I personally carried a part of the orders in 
question to the battalions and to the corps artillery and am 

^rom Wissenschaftliche Beilage No. 29 to the Leipziger Zeitung 
July 20, 1907. 

393 



394 VON KRETSCHMAR 

today still able, in connection with accessory circumstances, 
to state correctly and definitely the exact time periods. 

Finally, to put aside all doubt as to the correctness of 
my statements and as to the correctness of watches carried, 
I will remark that each day, when orders were distributed 
at Headquarters Second Army, to the adjutants of the differ- 
ent army corps, the time was given out and so transmitted 
to the troops when corps headquarters issued their orders. 
(I personally went for orders to Pont a Mousson on August 
16th and thus my watch was probably absolutely correct.) 

The statements given in the fifth volume from later and 
posthumous sources are often unreliable, as has been proved 
in several instances. 

It is remarkable that the first statements of time periods 
in this work agree absolutely with my statements and the 
reports of the troops engaged; the differences commence to 
appear where the support of the attack made by the Guards 
on St. Privat la Montagne is taken up. 

For instance, page 131, first line: "Their (advance 
guard battalion, IXth Corps) first shots were fired between 
11.45 and 12 a.m.' ' I noted down in Jarny according to my 
watch "12 noon"; History of the Field Artillery, page 120, 1 
stated "toward 12 noon"; von Schimpff says, page 77, 
"shortly before noon." 

The time stated on page 172 also "shortly after 2.30 the 
6th Heavy Battery which had arrived first opened fire" 2 
corresponds exactly with the battle report of the corps 
artillery, which gives this time period as "2.30 p.m." 

The time for the advance of the corps artillery from the 
first position west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes into the second 
position west of the Ste. Marie aux Chenes— Auboue road is 
given by the statement on page 183 by "Only after Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes had been taken did the corps artillery re- 
ceive orders from corps headquarters to advance by echelons 
from the right wing" 3 , and by the report of General von Pape 
to his corps headquarters (page 177) ' 'Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
taken at 3.45 p.m." The reports of battle of the corps 
artillery and batteries of the 24th Division agree with this, 
they giving the time of the advance into that position as 
between 3.30 and 4 p.m. 

8 Page 250 ante. 
3 Page 260 ante. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 395 

From here on the time periods given in this work very 
often differ materially from those heretofore considered 
correct. The statements on page 188 1 in regard to the com- 
manding general of the Xllth Army Corps must cause a 
wrong impression. After concluding the comments on the 
capture of Ste. Marie, it reads: "The commanding general 
of the Xllth Army Corps, Crown Prince Albert, had ridden 
from Batilly to the ravine of Auboue west of Ste. Marie," 
etc., and in the next sentence: "he informed Prince George 
of what he had seen and ordered him," etc; and later on: 
"These orders were transmitted by Prince George about 4 
p.m." This makes it appear that Crown Prince Albert was 
at the ravine of Auboue "about 4 p.m." or a little earlier, 
while as a matter of fact he and his staff, with which I was, 
had arrived on the hill west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes before 

3 p.m. 

From this hill we watched the three batteries of the 
24th Division going into position and all of us saw the first 
shot fired by the 4th Heavy Battery and we remember that 
the projectile struck the highest part of the side of a tall, 
white building (not the garden wall as is stated on page 171 3 , 
4th line from bottom). In addition I rode from that hill to 
the three batteries and had just reached the 3d Heavy 
Battery when the battery commander, Captain Keysselitz, 
and a cannoneer were wounded. Lieutenant Exner was 
already in command of the battery. 

Therefore on sketch 14 the mark designating the com- 
manding general of the Xllth Army Corps should have been 
placed on the right wing of the corps artillery between the 
6th Heavy Battery and the projecting corner of the forest 
south of it. That is the place where we actually stood 
"before the attack on Ste. Marie." At this point (at the 
start on the right, later on, on the left wing of the corps 
artillery) the Crown Prince remained until after 6 p.m. (von 
Schimpff, page 124 3 ) and from there proceeded to the left 
wing of the corps, thereafter to Roncourt. This is proven 
also by the statement of this work on page 507 4 : ' 'Shortly 

> Page 264 ante. 
8 Page 250 ante. 
3 Page 197 ante. 
4 Page 349 ante. 



396 VON KRETSCHMAR 

after 6 p.m. Crown Prince Albert proceeded to the woods 
of Auboue."' 

A further discrepancy is found in giving the time of the 
advance of the batteries of the corps artillery and those of 
the 24th Division from the position on the Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes— Auboue road to the road leading from Ste. Marie 
to Hautmecourt. 

The Crown Prince considered this advance necessary to 
prepare the subsequent attack on the enemy's main position 
and "ordered General Kohler to take the entire available 
artillery forward to beyond the Ste. Marie aux Chenes— 
Auboue road." These orders were issued about 4.30 p.m. 
and there is no disagreement as to this time contained in any 
of the battle reports. The time also corresponds to the 
further events after the capture of Ste. Marie: 3.30 p.m. 
After that place had been taken the corps artillery had no 
target to fire on in the location it then held and for that 
reason the 3d Battalion of the corps artillery had already 
advanced north of Ste. Marie as far as the road to Auboue, 
the 4th Battalion remaining back for the time being. From 
here General Kohler led the entire corps artillery into a 
position alongside of the road to Hautmecourt, into which 
later the batteries of the 24th Division came, so that toward 
5 p.m. 12 batteries were in position there. Sketch 17 shows 
this position of the batteries, but in the legend on the sketch 
it says: "The artillery of the Xllth Army Corps north of 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes went into this position only after 5.30 
p.m." This is not correct, for at that time, 5.30 p.m., the 
forward movement of the batteries was already taking 
place, which movement brought them from the Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes— Hautmecourt road into a position southeast of 
the thickets of Auboue facing toward Roncourt. The orders 
for this forward movement were given to me personally in 
presence of General Kohler by the Crown Prince at 5.15 
p.m. and I can vouch for the truth of the following. From 
the hill west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes I rode to the Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes— Hautmecourt road (about 2500 meters) 
and there gave the orders to the commander of the corps 
artillery, Colonel Funcke, that is between 5.14 and 5.30 p.m. 
While making that movement the fire was stopped and the 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 397 

advance made by batteries through the bottom in front 
toward Roncourt. The batteries arriving first took a posi- 
tion on hill 258 west of the Ste. Marie — Montois la Montagne 
road; Colonel Funcke, with whom I rode, led the batteries 
arriving later farther to the front, to hill 269 ('distance 1300 
meters, took 15 minutes at a walk) and here all the batteries 
gradually went into position. That was between 5.45 and 
6 p.m. I remember these facts quite well for the following 
reason : I rode for a time with the 7th Heavy Battery and 
greeted a comrade whom I passed close by. These time 
periods were ascertained in 1871 in answer to a question 
asked of the 12th Artillery Brigade by Captain von Hoden- 
berg, detailed to the Great General Staff. To answer that 
question a conference was held by all battery and battalion 
commanders who participated in the battle of August 18, 
1870. 

I wrote the answer to Captain von Hodenberg's question, 
basing it on the battle reports and the times given therein 
(date of my answer December 14, 1871) and that answer is 
now deposited in the Royal Saxon Archives, which the com- 
pilers of this work had access to. 

The battle report of the 12th Artillery Brigade reads: 
"By repeatedly pushing the left wing ahead the batteries 
of the corps artillery advanced to fire on the village of Ron- 
court. Orders for this they received at 5.30 p.m." 

The battle report of the corps artillery reads: "The 
corps artillery received orders at 5.15 p.m. to effectively 
prepare, in conjunction with the divisional artillery, the 
attack on Roncourt, and this was executed in two positions.' ' 

In confirmation of the correctness of the time stated the 
following should also be considered: After several— how 
many I cannot say — batteries had opened fire on Roncourt in 
the second position on the Ste. Marie aux Chenes— Montois 
la Montagne road, I rode back— this time through the 
northern part of Ste. Marie aux Chenes— and found the 
Crown Prince and his staff still at the same place, hill west 
of Ste. Marie, where I had left them (Sketch 15). This posi- 
tion he "left soon after 6 p.m." (page 507); therefore I must 
have been there before that time. This proves that the 
advance of the corps artillery to the Ste. Marie — Montois 



398 VON KRETSOHMAE 

road must have taken place between 5.15 and 5.30 p.m. and 
the previous position north of Ste. Marie (Sketch 17) been 
occupied to about 5 p.m. In the book of Lieutenant Colonel 
Rouquerol "Uartillerie dans la bataille du 18 aout," on page 
293, the time of the second advance of the Saxon battery 
toward Roncourt, i. e. into the position east of the Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes— Montois la Montagne road, is given as 
"toward 6 p.m." 

The account on pp. 523 * and 524 of the advance of the 
Saxon batteries against St. Privat la Montagne as far as 
opposite Roncourt requires correction in several places. The 
account of this advance creates the impression that the 
greatest disorder obtained. The remark on page 524 2 ' 'By the 
time this (i. e. the newly taken position) was in good order and 
all batteries in position, St. Privat was already in the hands 
of the Germans", must not be understood to mean that the 
Saxon batteries found no time to prepare the attack on 
St. Privat, for that would be contrary to actual events. 

The orders of the Crown Prince— mentioned on page 
524 — for the closer advance toward St. Privat were received 
by the corps artillery from Lieutenant von der Planitz at 
6.30 p.m. Thus the battle report of the corps artillery 
states, adding, "fire was opened (in the new position) at 
6.45 p.m." The batteries of the 23d and 24th Divisions 
arrived at the same time in that position; the 2d Light 
Battery reports "6.45 p.m;" the 1st Heavy "from 6.45 (it 
remained there) until 7.30 p.m;" the 4th Light "about 6.30 
p.m;" the 4th Heavy was in this position until "7.15 p.m." 
These reports can undoubtedly be considered correct; reports 
reading otherwise can be only capricious or artful combina- 
tions. 

In any case about 7 p.m. 16 batteries were in this posi- 
tion and directed their fire on St. Privat. I can very min- 
utely remember this time and the position of the batteries, 
because that time is connected with a special event. I had 
ridden with General Kohler from Roncourt, where the 
Crown Prince and his staff remained, along the line of 
batteries which, according to my recollection, were in good 

!Page 361-63 ante, 
2 Page 362 ante. 



THE 18TH OF AUGUST, 1870 399 

order, firing on St. Privat to their right wing, and was ob- 
serving through the glasses the excellent effect of the pro- 
jectiles knocking down the buildings on the north side of 
the village, when Colonel Schormer, commanding the am- 
munition columns greeted the general. Half jokingly the 
latter blamed the colonel for "taking a pleasure ride among 
his batteries, ' ' when the colonel who was between us two 
was seriously wounded by a shot through the abdomen. 
On this account the entire situation is vivid in my recollec- 
tions. 

The above mentioned extract from page 524 of this work 
is in direct contradiction to the statements of Colonel Rou- 
querol, who says (page 286): 

"As to the preparation for the attack of St. Privat, 
that was only made in reality after the occupation of Ron- 
court by the Xllth Corps, when the Saxon artillery had 
completed a semicircle of mouths of fire which effected an 
actual reduction in the power of resistance of the 6th Corps. 
Furthermore, as we see, the final attack of the Guard on 
St. Privat could not have been delivered without the assis- 
tance of the Xth Corps and without the general strain due 
to the flank attacks conducted by the Xllth Corps. Without 
that circumstance the infantry of the Guard, unassisted, 
would have been totally unable to deliver that supreme 
effort and would have remained beaten to earth at least 400 
meters from the French lines." 

This extract judges the operations of the Saxon artillery 
more justly and is far more in consonance with actual events 
than the remarks on page 524 of this work. 

In connection with the position of the Saxon artillery at 
Roncourt an advance was made finally by seven batteries to 
opposite St. Privat. The commander of the corps artillery, 
Colonel Funcke, had already taken steps for this advance 
when the batteries had to cease firing on St. Privat on ac- 
count of the gradual advance of the storming infantry. 
First the heavy batteries of the corps artillery advanced by 
echelon; the 7th Heavy Battery, according to its battle 
report, opened fire on the enemy retreating in the direction of 
Jaumont at 7.30 p.m. The fire of the batteries ceased with 
darkness. 

In conclusion I desire to make a few remarks as to the 



400 VON KRETSOHMAR 

statements contained on page 3, 3d paragraph, concerning 
the French artillery. 1 Compare with this also Rouquerol. 

The French shell were supplied with a time fuse which 
could be timed only for two ranges, 1200 and 2800 meters. 
Therefore it was directed in the French regulations to fire 
only at mid range, 1500—1800 meters. It is self evident 
that sighting shots were impossible with these shell and 
were never resorted to. To this fact may be ascribed the 
small effect of the French artillery. In an order issued by 
French artillery headquarters dated August 23, 1870, it is 
directed that for each piece 3 shell with percussion fuses 
are to be kept in readiness in the caisson — a very interesting 
fact, not known until now. 

The foot note on page 533 : 2 "The French as a rule fired 
with badly working shrapnel" is not correct and that 
statement undoubtedly is attributable to the erroneous views 
springing out of present day conditions, that all projectiles 
exploding in the air have to be shrapnels. The French shell 
burst in the air also. 

Besides this, the supply of the French batteries as far 
as ammunition is concerned consisted mainly of shell. 
Concerning this Colonel Rouquerol says on page 24: "As to 
the shrapnel they formed but a small part of the supply" 
and "the loads were computed on a weight of 37 shrapnel per 
4 pounder caisson, 17 shrapnel per 12 pounder caisson." 

Shrapnel is not mentioned at all as a matter of fact. 

von Kretchmar, 

Colonel, reserve list. 

1 "The French employed both shell and shrapnel the chief weak- 
ness of which was defective fuses. The shell fuses could only be used 
at ranges of from 1400 to 1600 meters and of from 2650 to 2950 meters. 
At other ranges the shell could be used only as solid shot. The shrapnel 
fuses (of the cylinder type) could only be set in the heavy guns at 500, 
800, 1100, and 1400 meters and in the light at 500, 800, 1000 and 1200 
meters." — Introduction to Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, 
Vol. V, p. 3. 

8 Page 370 ante. 



FROM 

Life Recollections of 
Gustav von Schubert 1 



{Part 7— Chapter XXII) 



The Battle of St. Privat 

ON August 15, which, being Napoleon's Day, was at that 
time of special importance in France, we fully expected 
a contact with the enemy, our expectations being strength- 
ened by the fact that the division, as part of the corps, was 
concentrated at 5 a.m. at the small town of Delme to serve 
as a strategical reserve in readiness. It was rumored that 
a sortie of the French army from Metz was expected. The 
impatiently looked for orders for the advance did not arrive, 
however, and consequently we stood under arms until the 
afternoon, good weather fortunately obtaining. As the men 
were not permitted to cook, there were many drunken men 
who had tried to still the gnawing at their stomachs with liquor. 
Only toward 4.45 did we start the march, debouching in a 
southwesterly direction. On this fine summer evening 
we traversed the nice, hilly country situated on both sides 
of the Seille, and this shortened our march; but when It 
commenced to get dark relaxation and weariness made 
themselves felt. Only at 11 p.m. did the leading elements 
of the division reach Nomeny where headquarters took 
quarters, while the troops, the last of which did not arrive 

lieutenant General (then Lieutenant Colonel) Gustav von 
Schubert was, in 1870, Chief of Staff of the 23d Division and of the Xllth 
Arm j' Corps. His Life Recollections were compiled by him in Dresden, 
1891-92, from the diaries which he had kept without break since his 
boyhood. A few notes and additions were subsequently made from 
time to time. After the General's death these memoirs were published 
by Dr. Hans von Schubert, Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1909. 

401 



402 VON SCHUBERT 

until 2 a.m,, went into bivouac. Being very tired the men 
threw themselves down to sleep without first cooking. I 
secured a place to sleep for a few hours in a private house; 
but little thought of sleep could be entertained because of 
the delayed issue of orders. * The day had been exceedingly 
tiresome, bringing many stragglers and footsore in its wake. 
Very early on the morning of August 16 rumors of an 
imminent battle gained ground. The army corps received 
orders to reach by 9 o'clock the bridge across the Mosel at 
Pont a Mousson where Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia 
intended to have it march past him. The division therefore 
had to begin cooking very early after a short night's rest, 
and had to start at 6 a. m. to arrive there at the correct 
time, as it was to form the leading element of the corps. 
The footsore were all formed into one company and left at 
Pont a Mousson as garrison. We saw them again only at 
Paris, for whatever falls out from an organization during 
operations— that is, the so-called march casualties, is as good 
as lost to that organization. In spite of weariness and dis- 
couragement our men tried to put their uniforms and arms 
into as good shape as possible, to create a good impression on 
Prince Frederick Charles whom up to then they had not 
seen and who had the reputation of being a strict and sharp 
soldier. Our hopes, however, were vain, for he did not 
appear at the designated time. It was said he had ridden 
to meet the enemy. In his stead our honored Crown Prince 
had us march past him, after we had waited some hours at 
the foot of the ancient town ruins of Mousson enthroned 
high up on the picturesque cliffs of the Mosel valley. A war 
bridge had been thrown across the Mosel above the town; a 
curious feeling took possession of me as I now crossed the 

1 "It is a peculiar thing with larger headquarters in the field; the 
smallest thing can assume the utmost importance, each word must be 
weighed and every circumstance considered. At headquarters no one 
is ever idle, for if at any time there is nothing actually to be done the 
brain still continues to work; in mind we review our troops, consider 
the terrain, estimate the known situation; the map is again resorted 
to, new combinations figured out. And in addition we know that the 
life and welfare of so many may be endangered, even that the entire 
success of an operation can be jeopardized by a single erroneous 
measure taken. We have most freedom when on the move; for then 
higher headquarters direct everything in general." (Life of General 
von Goeben; published by Zernin, 1895, Vol. I, page 233.) 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 403 

second important stream which had hitherto separated us 
from the enemy. In the pleasant valley of the Mosel there 
reigned an oppressive heat which made itself uncomfortably 
felt when we again resumed the march at 1 p.m. to advance 
a few miles more toward the west. The defile- like road led 
uphill all the way and was entirely devoid of shade, so that 
numerous men, especially from the 2d Grenadier Regiment, 
fell down from exhaustion. The country on the left bank of 
the Mosel proved to be a gently rolling plateau, for the most 
part under cultivation, covered with large and small pieces of 
woods and traversed by rows of tall poplars. As the wind 
was from a contrary direction we had no idea of and did not 
hear the noise of a battle of world importance taking place 
a few miles north of us. 

Toward 3 or 4 o'clock division headquarters reached its 
night quarters, Regnieville en Haye, and lodged there with the 
Catholic priest, a fat, sly, peevish man, whose room I shared, 
the Prince occupying the guest room as usual. He tried his 
best to pump me but of course learned nothing. A bed had 
been prepared for me on the floor, and I had just lain down, 
at about 10.30 p.m., to wait for the time to transmit the 
orders, which had not yet arrived from corps headquarters, 
for the march on the 17th, when I heard the arrival of a 
rider in front of the house and immediately after Captain 
von Klenck of the Guard Cavalry Regiment fell into the 
room, dirty, heated, and excited. He brought an order from 
Prince Frederick Charles directing our corps to advance 
immediately toward the road leading from Metz to Verdun. 
This brave officer and his squadron had formed the right flank 
guard for our cavalry division advancing toward the Maas, 
had then, following up the sound of cannon, arrived in the 
vicinity of Tronville and witnessed in the evening hours the 
battle raging there— the battle of Mars la Tour. Here Prince 
Frederick Charles had charged him with seeking out the 
Saxon corps and calling its infantry and artillery to the 
battlefield the next morning. At the time of his departure 
the battle according to his impression was not going well. 
He had then ridden off by himself and, thanks to his sense 
of locality, his decision and his excellent charger, a few 



404 VON SCHUBERT 

hours later reached our headquarters which were from 12 
to 16 miles distant from the battlefield— a remarkable 
achievement, especially as the night was inky black. The 
division was immediately alarmed and Colonel von Montbe 
at once started out with one regiment of his brigade (46th) 
which camped in our village, as an advance guard toward 
Thiaucourt. The Crown Prince in Pont a Mousson and the 
neighboring Guard Corps, whose headquarters we had 
casually learned when crossing the Mosel, were informed. 
Thereafter we rode to the place of assembly of the division, 
west of Regnieville. 

As an almost incredible darkness reigned it took a long 
time before the division was assembled from its distant 
villages and bivouacs, and the march could be commenced 
only at 3 a.m., August 17th; being made at the start on 
Thiaucourt, four miles distant. We had not removed our 
clothes and 'rode off without breakfast, full of anticipation 
of what the day would bring us and especially glad that we 
had our troops together. At sunrise we arrived at Thiau- 
court, a "pretty little town in a deep valley, and marched 
into position on the hills on the other side of the town, 
where our Crown Prince and corps headquarters soon joined 
us. Numerous wagons loaded with wounded met us coming 
from the direction of Metz. We were told by the wounded 
that yesterday's battle had been very bloody and had been 
undecided. Cannon fire, which would have indicated a 
resuming of the battle, could not be heard, however, and 
therefore we halted here for one hour. The Crown Prince 
regaled us with a cup of coffee. In order to hasten the 
march he directed the removal of knapsacks, an opportunity 
which most of the men utilized to put on clean underclothes. 
Many a poor fellow put on his death shirt. But the spirit of 
the men was good and all were ready to do battle. 

From Thiaucourt we took, with the Crown Prince, a 
more northerly direction and, with security measures, ad- 
vanced through Xammes and Hageville toward Mars la Tour. 
We still were met by transports of wounded, but the eagerly 
expected reports of our patrols said nothing of the enemy. 
Finally I myself rode with the advance guard and in the 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 405 

first afternoon hours encountered near Mars la Tour on the 
Metz— Verdun road Prussian cavalry (the 12th Thuringian 
Hussar Regiment of the Cavalry Division Rheinbaben) whose 
outposts we immediately relieved. That cavalry was still 
under the impressions of the preceding day and its battles, 
and evidently very glad to be relieved. They knew nothing 
whatever of the enemy in their front— which was remarka- 
ble—save that it had retreated northward at break of day. 
Captain von Treitschke therefore proceeded with a squadron 
of the 1st Cavalry Regiment to reconnoiter toward Jarny. 
The division went into a single bivouac behind the village of 
Mars la Tour, while the Prince and his staff took quarters 
in a castle-like building within the village. I lodged in a 
small house in the garden. The traces of yesterday's battle 
showed everywhere, all houses were full of wounded. In 
the vestibule of the church we saw a few dead Prussian 
officers with gaping wounds, and, as we learned from patrols 
that there were still numerous wounded lying unattended on 
the battlefield north of the village, our sanitary detachment 
was sent out to find them and bring them into the village. 
Toward evening wagon loads of these unfortunates arrived, 
but with the best will it was impossible to shelter them under 
a roof. With the assistance of the Catholic chaplain, Dr. 
Wahl, who spoke French fluently, I examined all houses, and 
only after strenuous efforts and after dark, did we succeed in 
arranging a provisional camp for the wounded behind a stone 
wall where they received medical attention. Amongst those 
thus brought in was the body of Colonel Count Finkenstein 
of the Prussian Guard Dragoons, whose head had been cleft 
in two. Later on our Treitschke returned from his re- 
connaissance, which, accompanied only by his orderly, he 
had extended as far as Jarny. He had encountered the 
enemy nowheres but brought back a French prisoner whom 
he had taken as a straggler and whose chassepot rifle inter- 
ested us much as it was the first we had seen. The good 
fellow also brought a wagon load of government cigars, 
which did not, however, taste good at all to us; they were 
distributed among the troops, whose advance guard (3d 
Infantry Regiment No. 102) was advanced to beyond the 



406 VON SCHUBERT 

Metzroad. Unfortunately Prince George in the evening 
was seized with a violent neuralgic headache and I went to 
bed troubled in my mind on that account, for there was no 
doubt but what we would have to fight our first battle with 
the enemy the next day. But our spirits were high with 
hope. 

At 5 a.m., August 18, our headquarters was called to 
the bivouac of our army corps, whose two divisions camped 
close together, and here verbally received orders from Prince 
Frederick Charles for the movements for the day, orders 
which our Crown Prince enlarged on and explained with his 
usual tranquility and clearness. It was still not definitely 
known where the enemy would be found. According to 
some reports he was in front of Metz, others stated that he 
intended to march in a large circle past us from Metz to 
Paris. Therefore General von Moltke had directed the 
execution of an advance with a broad front, directly north- 
ward; this march to be made with three army corps— the 
IXth, Guard and Xllth Corps— in the first line; the Hid and 
Xth Corps in the second line. The enemy was to be attacked 
wherever found. Thus a decisive battle could be counted on 
with certainty. We rejoiced at this, although we wondered 
why we Saxons were drawn from the center to the extreme 
left wing, which necessitated crossing with the Guard Corps 
on our left. We felt that we were to be cheated of our 
chance to participate in the impending battle and that the 
Guards were given the preference. However, at such 
moments there is but little time for guess-work, and it be- 
hooves each to obey everything with his best efforts. 

The army corps massed itself in battle formation south 
of Mars la Tour in two parallel columns and, crossing the 
village, started with its advance guard at 6.45 a.m. This 
advance guard consisted of the Rifle Regiment, the 1st 
Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Light Battery Westmann, 
which latter I had commanded (it being then the 3d) from 
1861 to 1865 as captain. It received direction on Jarny. 
Captain von Treitschke was attached to General von Crau- 
shaar who commanded the advance guard. It was a glorious 
summer morning, followed by a clear day and not too hot. 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 407 

After we had passed Mars la Tour and the mass of the Guard 
Corps, which had waited for our passing, we halted; the 
rifles were loaded and the colors unfurled amidst cheers. 
For the first time we saw the entire army corps, with the 
exception of the cavalry division, assembled in full strength, 
and when the bands commenced playing their inspiring 
marches confidence and the lust of battle filled every one's 
heart. The military spirit of our advance was increased 
when we passed the battlefield where the bloody cavalry 
charges had taken place on August 16. The corpses of riders 
and horses were still lying unburied and had to be stepped 
over by our battalions, which must have shaken the nerves of 
many of our young soldiers who had never seen such a sight. 
We saw the brave riders lying as death had overtaken them, 
most of them with their saber in their right hand, many 
with gaping wounds on the head and upper part of the body. 
Prince George, who fortunately was entirely well again, 
rode with his staff in front of the 46th Brigade and, toward 
9 a.m., reached the vicinity of Jarny where a longer halt 
was made to await reports from the advance guard, whose 
cavalry reconnoitered in the north toward Valleroy and 
occupied Conflans. The 24th Division kept on our right and 
halted at Ferme Chateau Moncel. Here several hours passed 
in waiting, while our staff, expecting further orders from 
the Crown Prince who had also ridden to Jarny, remained 
sitting in the ditch alongside the road. According to the old 
soldier rule that we have to eat and sleep whenever we have 
a chance so to do, we partook of breakfast, and after it I 
slept a short hour, my head on the lap of our honored chief 
surgeon of the division, Pohland; for during the past few 
nights sleep had been out of the question. 

Finally the march could be resumed. The advance 
guard had reported that the enemy stood about an hour's 
march in front of us at Moineville and on our right in Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes. Thereupon the Crown Prince ordered 
the divisions to march against these two points, one division on 
each. The 23d Division received the former direction. Our 
orders read: to advance with the 45th Brigade northward 
toward Tichemont and to occupy the forest of Ponty, while 



408 VON SCHUBERT 

the 24th Division turns to the half right and marches on Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes. The 46th Brigade was to be the reserve. 
At exactly 12 noon our division started the march in the 
direction ordered and at 12.30 p.m. we had hardly crossed 
the railroad to Verdun which was then still under con- 
struction when we were surprised by hearing the thunder of 
cannon on our right and thus gained the conviction that the 
enemy had been found in an entirely unexpected direction. 
Following our orders, the 45th Brigade occupied the forest 
of Ponty which was in our front and which proved to be very 
dense with very few roads. This occupation was executed 
with probably unnecessary thoroughness and conscientious- 
ness, as it was soon seen that the forest was unoccupied. 
The Prince halted with his staff between Tichemont and 
Fleury on the southwestern side of the forest. The thunder 
of cannon on our right was steadily increasing in volume as 
between 1.30 and 1.45 p.m. there arrived in quick succession 
two reports which finally cleared up for us the condition 
with the enemy. Our advance guard had merely reported 
that the first report that Moineville was occupied by the 
enemy was erroneous. These new reports showed that we 
were on the very best road to get nowheres. First, Captain 
von Hodenberg 1 reported that the enemy was at St. Privat, 
and, a few minutes later an orderly officer of the Guard 
Corps galopped up with the more definite report that the 
thunder of cannon on our right was caused by a battle raging 
the other side of the forest of Verneville and that a French 
camp, estimated at one division, was in our right front at 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes and that the 1st Guard Division had 
started the march at 12 noon from Doncourt toward Anoux 
la Grange. He stated at the same time that French troops, 
which had been under canvas at St. Privat and Roncourt, 
were now marching toward Verneville and that only weak, 
hostile infantry detachments had shown themselves between 
Batilly and Ste. Marie. He thereupon rode away to look up 
our Crown Prince, but said before he went that it was the 
intention that the left wing, which we formed, should not 

1 Later on for a number of years Adjutant General of His Majesty 
King Albert, finally commander of the 2d Division No. 24. Died as 
General of Infantry, active list, in 1903. 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 409 

press forward too much, and that the decision lay on the 
right wing! 

Prince George considered these reports so important 
that he on his part sent Captain von Hodenberg with them 
to the Crown Prince. 1 The latter thereupon issued the fol- 
lowing orders at 2 p.m. at the east corner of the forest of 
Ponty: 

"The 1st Division (23d), which will now again have the 
disposition of the 2d Brigade (46th) in position behind the 
west corner of the forest of Ponty, will take direction through 
Coinville and the small wood east of Auboue and advance on 
the position at Roncourt." 

In the meantime Prince George, knowing that the 24th 
Division had marched off at 12 noon toward Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes, had arrived at the independent decision, as soon as 
the Prussian orderly officer had left, of abandoning occupa- 
tion of the forest of Ponty and of marching through Batilly 
toward Ste. Marie aux Chenes, in order to operate, if pos- 
sible, against the hostile right flank. As happened so fre- 
quently in this war, he thereby anticipated the very same 
orders of the commanding general, as did the Crown Prince 
in the same manner with Prince Frederick Charles, his 
superior commander. Thus the independent measures taken 
by the higher commanders, based on simultaneously correct 
estimates of the situation, reacted upon one another as the 
cogs of a machine, and, if success was not attained as 
smoothly as in peace maneuvers, the causes of this are at- 
tributable only to the friction of the war machine and the 
individualities of the subordinate commanders. 

To carry out his decisions the Prince for the present had 
of course only six companies of the Body Guard Regiment 
and the division artillery at his disposal, while the other six 
companies and the 2d Grenadier Regiment had to be first 
brought from the forest of Ponty and then assembled 

1 Note by the editor Hans von Schubert. — The report has been copied 
from the Saxon War Archives in the Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und 
Taktik published by the Great General Staff, vol. V, p. 168 (1907). Did 
not the orders of the Crown Prince based thereon leave only after 2 p.m.? 
This in view of the fact that report thereof to army headquarters was 
made only at 2.30 p.m., and that the orders arrived at Headquarters of 
the 23d Division only at 2.45 p.m. and that headquarters was but a 
short distance away. (P. 247 et seq., ante.) 



410 VON SCHUBERT 

again. The Rifle Regiment was with the advance guard. 
As has been stated before, the entire 46th Brigade under 
Colonel von Montbe had been retained at the disposition of 
corps headquarters in the vicinity of Jarny. After all neces- 
sary orders had been issued I rode at the head of the 6th 
Company of the Body Guard Regiment past Batilly on the 
west and, north of the village, ascended a ridge which gave 
a wide outlook and spread the entire battlefield before our 
eyes. Here Hussars of the Guards stood as extreme left 
observation post of their corps. 

In our front, about 2,000 meters off, on the other side of 
the basin, was situated the village of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, 
large, solidly built, enclosed with walls and hedges; on the 
other side of it, about 15 minutes march from there, rose a 
gradually ascending, open, glacis-like slope, crowned on its 
top by the imposing, fortress-like village of St. Privat. To 
its right and left the edge of the plateau continues evenly 
and entirely open, and there we perceived the French in 
strong position with a numerous artillery. As we saw it, 
the French line on the left extended to the village of Ron- 
court, a mile distant; on the right even farther, interrupted 
by some few farms, until it finally was hidden from our sight 
in the distance. On our left wing ran a rolling, partly 
wooded terrain down to the Orne valley from which we saw 
our Rifle Regiment marching against Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
to which point it had been directed by General von Craushaar 
on his own responsibility when he found no enemy on the 
Orne. We perceived a hot battle raging on the south side 
of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, evidently carried on by the Prus- 
sian Guards, while the Saxon columns approached that point 
from three directions: nearest the Guards parts of our 24th 
Division coming from St. Ail; then, from Batilly, our own 
45th Brigade, what we had of it together, accompanied by 
the divisional artillery; and from the Orne valley, the head 
of our advance guard, formed by the 3d Rifle Battalion. At 
this moment the Prince received orders, I do not know from 
whom, to support the attack of the Guards on the village by 
his artillery. Accordingly the 1st Light Battery Legnick 
received orders to advance on Ste. Marie, while the remaining 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 411 

divisional batteries went into position on the ridge north of 
Batilly, where we stood. At exactly 2.30 p.m. the battery 
Legnick, which had very decisively advanced to within 
1,500 paces of the village, fired the first round, with which 
our (the 23d Division's) interference in the bloody battle 
commenced. The 24th Division had commenced its action 
some time before this. 

Only about this time, 2.45 p.m., did the above mentioned 
orders of the Crown Prince reach Prince George, directing 
him to envelop the hostile right wing, which touched the 
village of Roncourt, with the 23d Division through Auboue 
and the woods on our left, and for this purpose again have 
the disposition of its 46th Brigade. The division could at 
once have started the movement, had it been together, es- 
pecially if the 46th Brigade had not been at that time about 
one hour behind us. And the 1st Brigade, No. 45, was not 
assembled for some time, and thus we had to contain our- 
selves in patience. As place of assembly for his dispersed 
forces the Prince designated the ravine at Coinville, one 
mile on our left, and for a time our staff were able, unmo- 
lested by hostile fire, to watch the battle around Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes, in which very soon our 3d Rifle Battalion also 
participated. Surrounded and attacked from three sides, 
the French had to evacuate this advanced post toward 3.30 
p.m. and from then on confine themselves to the defense of 
their main position 2,000 meters in rear. The Guards and 
the 47th Infantry Brigade (Major General von Leonhardi) 
of our 2d Infantry Division occupied Ste. Marie aux Chenes, 
and our corps artillery, under Colonel Funcke, went into 
position to the left (north) of the village, taking up with the 
hostile artillery between St. Privat and Roncourt a battle 
which gradually took the shape of a grand artillery duel. 

In the meantime Prince George and his staff had pro- 
ceeded to the assembly place at Coinville where our differ- 
ent bodies of troops arrived greatly trying our patience by 
their slowness. This assembly had not been unperceived by 
the enemy and one of his batteries threw shells on us which 
however had but small effect. Most of them passed high 
above us and their smoke followed them in the shape of 



412 VON SCHUBERT 

smoking white cloudlets through the air. As it appeared 
necessary to clear the road assigned to the division of the 
enemy whose troops emerged from Roncourt, the leading 
battalion of the Rifle Regiment received orders to take pos- 
session of the small piece of woods extending as far as Ron- 
court. Thus very soon a hot forest battle ensued, in which 
the regiment soon gained ground and thereby enabled the 
corps artillery to advance farther to the front. This also 
enabled us to move the assembly point of the division about 
a mile farther forward east of Ferme Grimoneau, where the 
enemy could not see us and where thus we had better pro- 
tection. 

The Prince and his staff remained on the hill not far 
from the left wing of our corps artillery which gradually 
turned more to the right and apparently gained the fire 
superiority. My friends, Hoch and Hammer, were carried 
past me, wounded, as well as Major Allmer of the Rifle 
Regiment. Though our headquarters were a good 2,000 
meters from St. Privat some stray chassepot bullets struck 
in our midst and the horse of Lieutenant Schmalz of the 1st 
Cavalry Regiment, the orderly officer of General von Craus- 
haar, was killed alongside of me by receiving a bullet in its 
shoulderblade. 

At about 4.30 p.m. Lieutenant Miiller von Berneck of 
corps headquarters arrived and reported to Prince George 
that the enveloping of the hostile right wing was to be made 
along larger lines and that for that purpose the still intact 
48th Infantry Brigade of the 24th Division would be placed 
under his orders. This was the more welcome as our 46th 
Brigade had not yet arrived and as we could not have exe- 
cuted the envelopment with assured success with our 45th 
Brigade alone. The 46th Brigade had been drawn deeper 
and deeper into the fight for the above mentioned woods, in 
which the French attempted to gain a firm foothold and in 
front of which they stood in force. Thus the decision of the 
Crown Prince, arrived at independently, was most fortunate; 
else the enveloping movement would have started half an 
hour later than it actually did. It was already 5 p.m. when 
the 48th Infantry Brigade under Colonel von Schulz finally 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 413 

arrived and was instructed and when the decisive movement 
could commence. Two roads for that movement were open 
to us. It could be executed as an envelopment of the 
hostile wing by our marching through the woods at 
Auboue direct against Roncourt— even though we thereby 
described a larger arc, or it could be made as a complete 
turning movement by our marching in the deep 
valley of the Orne under cover to opposite Joeuf, there 
ascending the side of the valley near the village of Montois 
la Montagne and then turning to the right against the flank 
and rear of the enemy. The latter road was the longest, 
but would have better decisive effect, and I succeeded in 
persuading the Prince to take it. For the turning movement 
the 48th Infantry Brigade was designated, the 1st Cavalry 
Regiment and the two heavy and two light batteries of the 
division attached to it. Captain von Treitschke, to whom I 
showed on the map which road he was to take, was placed 
in command of the column. Finally, it was agreed that the 
48th Brigade, as soon as it arrived at Montois, should let its 
batteries open fire and that upon this signal General von 
Craushaar should advance frontally on Roncourt with the 
45th Brigade. 1 

Now came three quarters of an hour of waiting in great 
tension, during which our corps artillery, which in a certain 
sense formed the supporting point of our envelopment, 
opened an annihilating fire against the village of Roncourt, 
throwing a veritable rain of projectiles on it. A dense cloud 
of smoke cut off the view when the artillery battle reached 
its climax. The hostile artillery between Roncourt and 
St. Privat retired and concentrated more around St. 
Privat. Finally, toward 5.45 p.m., the eagerly awaited 

x The orders issued by me for this movement are reprinted in the 
General Staff Account, vol. II, p. 768.— General von Hodenberg is in 
error in stating (in Wissenschaftliche Beilage to the Leipziger Zeitung 
No. 44, 1898) that the details of the envelopment through the valley of 
the Orne were ordered by the Crown Prince. — (Note by the Editor, 
Hans von Schubert: A communication in Prince George's own hand- 
writing states expressly that the orders for the extended envelopment 
through Montois did not originate with the commanding general, but 
were his own special orders. As Abendroth's regiment belonged to 
the enveloping column on the left, while Funke commanded the corps 
artillery on the right, these three, friends from their youth, were here 
together for decisive action.) 



414 VON SCHUBERT 

moment arrived when the dark masses of our enveloping 
column appeared in view coming from the valley at Montois. 
Shortly after the thunder of its artillery was heard, The 
columns of the 48th Infantry Brigade advanced in part on 
Roncourt and in part turned to the left against the woods 
bounding the valley of the Mosel towards the quarries of 
Jaumont. The time for our advance had now also arrived. 
Though we had been twelve hours on horseback we all felt 
as though electrified. In the best of order the two Grenadier 
regiments, deployed in battle formation, advanced alongside 
each other frontally against Roncourt, while the skirmishers 
on the left continued to clean out the forest. My Prince 
insisted on riding ahead of the 45th Brigade on the heights 
of Soutiens, and when I took the liberty of pointing out the 
danger he ran, he gave the princely reply: "In the first battle 
I belong at the head of my Division." His calmness and 
coolness were remarkable and set the men a shining example. 
The nearest companies broke out in cheers when they heard 
his reply 1 and I have to own that at this moment my heart 
was filled with the highest military enthusiasm. The hostile 
skirmish lines in our front retreated from our advancing 
lines without offering any material resistance into Roncourt 
and beyond it. From the insignia of a dead French soldier 
we learned that we had the French 6th Corps opposed to us, 
under the renowned Marshal Canrobert who was no mean 
opponent according to the reputation he then had. 

The distance to Roncourt, 4000 paces, was covered with- 
out our suffering great losses. Captain Erwin von Minck- 
witz, our division adjutant and a very brave soldier, under- 
took the feat of charging under fire to the very entrance of 
Roncourt where he ascertained that the enemy had left the 
village, very probably in consequence of the effective fire of 
our corps artillery. The village was immediately occupied 
by one company of the Rifle Regiment and two of the Gren- 
adier Regiment, while the remainder of the 45th Brigade 
turned against St. Privat. It was 6.30 p.m. when the whole 

1 Note by Hans von Schubert. — This moment has been handed 
down to posterity by the well known battle painter, Lieutenant Colonel 
von Gotz, which shows Captain von Zeschau, at the head of his com- 
pany, cheering the Prince. The author is seen on the painting imme- 
diately behind the Prince. 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 415 

horror of a large decisive battle spread out. Our staff halted 
in front of the entrance to Roncourt, which village was 
under a perfect hail of hostile projectiles from St. Privat, 
1000 paces distant. The terrain as far as St. Privat proved 
to be here also a naked, gradually ascending slope on which 
several field walls, in parallel lines and rising one above the 
other like terraces, formed just so many defensive lines 
strongly occupied by French infantry. A few batteries in 
position in front of St. Privat and the forest poured a very 
heavy fire on our advancing columns. One shell exploded in 
our immediate rear in a dense mass of men without, how- 
ever, doing any damage. I well remember the droll incident 
of the Prince's servant, Liebsch, who rode behind the Prince 
and suddenly called out loud to him. When we turned 
around, he held his left hand up and showed us that he held 
only the ends of four bridle reins, a shell having cut them 
clean through. 

To be entirely truthful I have to own up that from now 
on direction of the battle on the part of headquarters ceased. 
The 45th and 48th Brigades had become mixed and there 
were even troops of the Guards among them. Every indivi- 
dual, instinctively and filled with battle lust, pressed toward 
the battle objective, the village of St. Privat, which, enveloped 
in smoke like a volcano, partly itself in flames, was the 
center of a veritable furnace place. The furies of war had 
been unchained and the achievements of the individual now 
took the place of the previous higher leadership. We still 
had to live a heavy hour to 7.30 p.m. Our headquarters 
remained halfways between Roncourt and St. Privat and 
from there was a spectator of the final imposing drama 
when, at the moment of the decisive charge, 50,000 Germans 
pressed into the village in this horrible battle noise, thunder 
of cannon, sounding of trumpets and bugles, beating of 
drums and shouting at the top of their voices. The capture 
of that village was the decision of the battle there. The 
setting sun shone bloodred on this giant battle. Our 46th 
Brigade, which had come up in the meantime, stood deployed 
and in readiness to renew the attack, in case the Grenadiers 
were defeated; but that did not become necessary and the 



416 VON SCHUBERT 

knowledge that we had gained a great victory and had inter- 
fered materially in the battle took possession of our souls 
and filled us with glad pride. 

Here, at the fall of dusk, we met the Crown Prince and 
his staff and congratulated him. While the hand to hand 
fight with the retreating French still raged within the 
village the necessary steps were taken to harass the fleeing 
enemy as much as possible. The corps artillery again went 
into position at the exit of the village of St. Privat and 
engaged the hostile artillery which had taken a new position 
some few thousand paces distant at the quarries of Aman- 
villers. Complete darkness had set in when the last shots 
were fired and the bloody day's work was finished. 

There could be no thought of bringing order into the 
masses which filled the dark terrain. Every one remained 
lying where he had last fought and we also sought in 
the nearby Roncourt for a sleeping place which we finally 
found in a saloon after I had requested a number of Bruns- 
wickers, who had been pushed ahead of the Xth Corps and 
therefore had not participated greatly in the battle, to vacate 
the premises for us. 

Physical condition now made its desires felt. Fortun- 
ately we found a large can of native wine in the cellar and 
then we searched our pockets for scraps of food. These 
small rests made dinner and supper for us as for the Prince 
also. We found a bed for him at least; the rest of us lay down 
on straw in the saloon. I had placed a guard, taken from 
the nearest organization, in the hall of the house and thus 
we slept without apprehension. In the middle of the night 
Prince George von Schonburg, adjutant of our Crown Prince, 
arrived and I shared my sleeping place with him— as he had 
done with me the night before Koniggratz. 

Thus ended the great day which had been the first 
victorious day for the Saxon arms for a long, long time. 

The day after the battle shows the reverse of the medal. 
The ardor had disappeared and given place to cold calcula- 
tion. We counted our losses and found that our division had 
a loss of 717 killed and wounded, among them 32 officers. 
We deeply lamented the death of General von Craushaar, who 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 417 

had been killed by a bullet in the head in the charge on the 
village of St. Privat. Just two hours previous to that, when 
we started, he had offered me a cigar which I declined with 
thanks. His jovial disposition, eager for battle, and his ex- 
cellent leadership had pleased me greatly. The Prince had 
heard that he would be buried at 9 o'clock in Ste. Marie and 
therefore rode with me to that place, our road leading across 
the field over which the Guards had attacked. It was a 
sorrowful ride. The entire space between St. Privat and 
Ste. Marie was covered with the corpses of the brave, strong 
men who had known no falling back. It was especially 
painful to hear the calls of a number of dying and wounded 
lying there still unattended— and we could not help them. 
The sanitary soldiers had stuck each man's rifle bayonet in 
the ground alongside of the wounded, so as to find them 
easily, and such marks numbered into the hundreds as far 
as we could see. At the church in Ste. Marie we met 
Lieutenant Schmalz 1 General von Craushaar's adjutant, and 
a number of Saxon soldiers who had constructed a coffin 
out of rough boards. Deeply moved we buried the brave 
general. A handful of earth was the last sign of honor we 
could give him. 

All houses in Ste. Marie were filled to overflowing with 
wounded and we had great difficulty in locating the house in 
which Major Moritz Allmer of the Rifle Regiment lay. He 
had received a bullet through the left shoulder into the 
breast and appeared to be beyond hope. He well recognized 
his condition, for he gave me his last will and testament. 
The tear which crushed between his lids showed me how 
unwilling this brave man was to leave this life. 

The return ride over the battlefield was as sorrowful as 
the going. With the consent of the Prince I killed the 
wounded horse of a Guard officer with my revolver. It was 
a fine English mare, whose nose had been shot off by a shell 
and was standing with hanging head, slowly bleeding to 
death. It took five or six shots in the head to bring it to 
the ground. There was much to do in the line of writing on 
my return to Ron court so that I had not even time to look up 

1 Later on (until 1901) commandant of Dresden, now (1892) Lieu- 
tenant General, retired, and lives in Gonsdorf near Dresden. 



418 VON SCHUBERT 

my wounded friend Abendroth who was somewhere in the 
village. He had carried himself, as was to be expected, 
bravely and efficiently in the special battle which he con- 
ducted at the forest of Jaumont for the protection of our 
left flank. 

The opinion was held at Royal Headquarters that the 
beaten enemy might possibly attempt this afternoon to cut his 
way through in the valley of the Mosel going through Marange 
to Montmedy. Therefore our division, which had already 
sent the 46th Infantry Brigade into the valley of the Mosel 
early in the morning, had to take up, right after 12 noon, a 
position in readiness between Roncourt and the forest of 
Jaumont; but the enemy did not appear. At 6 p.m. we re- 
ceived orders to start to the valley of the Orne and go into 
close quarters there. Thus we again traversed the battle- 
field, from which the wounded had by that time been re- 
moved, in the direction of Ste. Marie, where the columns of 
the Guard Corps crossed ours and caused us a long delay. 
When crossing the road behind Ste. Marie I had the mis- 
fortune to see my brave horse Miicke who had carried 
himself excellently the day before in battle, get his hind 
hoof entangled in a telegraph wire lying on the ground, and 
almost entirely cut a tendon in the joint. With great diffi- 
culty I bandaged the wound with my dressing package and 
then, tying my horse to a provision wagon belonging to the 
battalion under Captain Hager, rode myself on the wagon in 
the midst of the columns as far as Hatrize in the Orne valley 
which we finally reached at midnight. Here the Prince had 
obtained good quarters of the village priest and I well re- 
member how good his camomille tea tasted that night. It 
seemed that the priest's cook knew no other kind of tea. 
Our field mail service, which the day before had found noth- 
ing to do, had now found time to open up business and so I 
had the joy of receiving letters from my wife dated August 
2 and 8. An order also was received from the Crown Prince 
heartily thanking the army corps for its achievements on 

August 18. 

August 20 we had a day of rest in Hatrize, well earned 

after the exertions of the past eight days. It was a welcome 

event to be able to sleep an entire night in a bed without 



LIFE RECOLLECTIONS 419 

being disturbed. I welcomed this rest; for my feet had be- 
come so sore that I could hardly walk. The priest's cook 
made me a present of a pair of stockings of incredible length 
and gave me an opportunity of having my underclothes 
washed — one of the greatest difficulties in war. I had much 
writing to do on this day; report of the battle, war diary, 
letters home, and many other things. 

A retrospect of the events of the last few days on which 
the Germans had been victorious August 14, 16 and 18, 
caused us to think that political negotiations would now be 
taken up and that the fighting would soon cease. 

What an error! And still it would have been the wisest 
thing the French could have done, as the future showed. 
But whom the Lord would chastise he first strikes blind. 



420 VON SCHUBERT 

Field Notes 

The following is a translation (from a photographic reproduction) 
of the notes contained on two and one-half pages of the note book of 
Lieutenant Colonel von Schubert invariably carried on his person dur- 
ing the campaign of 1870-71 and in which he jotted down, during all 
engagements, notes of the progress of the engagement, orders, etc. 
The notes, hastily jotted down with a pencil, on horseback, narrate in 
very brief form all moments of the battle of September 1: 



5.10 Arrival of alarm order. 
5.30 Departure of orderly officers. 
6 Arrival of orderly officers. 

8 Head in front of Douzy. 

8.45 Saw flash— 

The 46th Inf. Reg. (read Brigade) goes through the forest 
defile la Rullewith the 2 batt(eries.) 
9.45 Garten occupies the sector and right of the road. 
10 Critical moment — 

1 Batt, 4th Reg. (No. 103), 1st and 2d Co. 

Bugler 
Rifle regiment sent ahead. 
Garten left to on the road. 
10.45 Start of the Brigade Garten for the march to Moncelle. 
11.45 Orders, to fall back on Illy. 

12.30 Start of the march; (batteries under) v. Leonhardi and Leg- 
nick go into position under protection of the Rifle Regi- 
ment. 
1 Catastrophe at Daigny. 

1.15 Deploying. 
1.45 The 1st Brigade passed Kliix and divers battalions, 3d Batt. 

II (Grenadier Regiment No. 101); 1-100; £ 1-101. 
2.15 Renewed start via Haybes 1 Bn. 100. as cover; 3 Bns. 101. 

above Kliix 2 h(alf ) Bn. 101 Schimpff . 
4 2d going into position of artillery other side of defile. 

4.30 Last (offensive of enemy and therewith) conclusion (of bat- 
tle. Last shots) on single batteries fleeing out of Sedan 
and batteries gone into position. 



Crown Prince Albert and Prince George of 
Saxony on August 18th, 1870 1 

By 

Paul Haake 

PJURING 1898 and 1899 Freiherr von Hodenberg, General 
*S of Infantry, reserve list, in a series of articles in the 
Scientific Supplement of the Leipziger Zeitung, pictured and 
emphasized "The Initiative of King Albert in the Campaign 
of 1870-71," and (in Supplement No. 44, April 16, 1898) 
"The Leadership of the Xllth Corps at Gravelotte— St. 
Privat la Montagne, August 18, 1870." 

Searching and exact inquiry, based on the archives, 
will, I believe, confirm in all material points the correctness 
of the excellent account of this able officer (who participated 
in the Franco-German War as captain on the headquarters 
staff of Crown Prince Albert and who thus was an eyewit- 
ness of the latter's actions and decisions); and its agreement 
with the opinions of Colonel von Schimpff, as expressed in 
his captivating work "Konig Albert, 50 Jahre Soldat," 
(Dresden 1894) and "Das XII Korps im Kriege 1870-71, I, 
St. Privat la Montagne" (Dresden 1901). 

In the following pages I shall reproduce a few authentic 
documents which I was graciously permitted by the Director 
of the Royal Saxon Archives, Lieutenant-Colonel Hottenroth, 
to copy from the archives, and shall at the same time take 
issue with the latest published accounts of the advance of 
the Saxons on Ste. Marie aux Chenes, Roncourt and St. 
Privat. Unfortunately, "The 18th of August 1870," pub- 
lished by the Historical Section of the Great General Staff in 
Berlin in 1906 as volume 5 of Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte 
und Taktik (Studies in Military History and Tactics), leaves 
much to be desired as regards completeness and accuracy — 
as I learned from the documents in the Dresden War 

'Prom Neues Archiv fur .S'ac/istsc/ie Geschichte und Altai umakunde 
—Vol. XXXIII, Parts 1 and 2, 1912. 

421 



422 PAUL HAAKE 

Archives; and the criticisms of it, published by two Saxon 
officers in the Leipziger Zeitung 1 are very probably unknown 
to most historians. Otherwise Frederick Regensberg could 
not have said on page 89, vol. 2 of his work on the Franco- 
Prussian War "represented and based on the very latest 
sources of information" published in 1910: 

"This most excellent work of the General Staff treating of the 
18th of August, the material of which it took long years of labor to 
collate, brings the inquiries concerning the battle to a close and gives a 
captivating picture, true in the most minute details, of the battle, the 
account being clear, the language excellent, and each line indicating 
endeavor to state the full truth and to give proper credit to friend and 
foe equally." 

Though myself a Prussian reserve officer, I must as a 
conscientious historian, agree with the two Saxon critics that 
the part the Saxons played in the success of St. Privat and 
the independent power of decision of their leader are not 
sufficiently emphasized and recognized by the Great General 
Staff. To make good this defect, by means of the material 
furnished by the archives, is the purpose of the following 
pages. The commander of the Prussian 1st Guard Infantry 
Division, General von Pape, considered it a comrade's duty 
three weeks after the battle of Sedan to praise, in a detailed 
report to headquarters of the Guard Corps, the excellent 
achievements of the Saxon troops, who so energetically and 
successfully supported their Prussian comrades in arms on 
August 18, and September 1. 2 For us who have come later 

iScientific Supplements 11 and 29, March 16, and July 20, 1907, re- 
spectively: — "The 18th of August 1870" (one signed"— r" and the other 
by Colonel von Kretschmar). In 1870 the latter was a first lieutenant 
and adjutant to the commander of the artillery and — as I was person- 
ally able to ascertain— not only kept an exact daily record of events 
during the campaign, but also marked at the very time and place the 
positions of the Saxon batteries on a map which he carried with him 
and which he still has in his possession; and the statements contained 
in the above mentioned book by the Great General Staff differ materi- 
ally from these notes and marks. 

-'Gonesse, September 24, 1870, copy. (Royal Saxon War Archives, 
Box 505, b20, Campaign 1871, Document No. 5b, battle reports and 
statements of the battle of Sedan, September 1, 1870). In connection 
with this it may be remarked that it is much to be wished that all 
military historians should follow scientific methods in citing documents 
and proofs. Unfortunately most historians, particularly those of the 
historical section of the Great General Staff, merely state in which 
they found the paper or document, but not the exact place, and there- 
by make verification very difficult. 



SAXONPRINCES 423 

it is even more a duty to give every one due credit; it is our 
task to give historical truth full victory; not in order to 
revive disputes which were alive 40 years ago, but to settle 
them finally and definitely. 

As is well known, the Saxon Army Corps (Xllth), com- 
manded by Crown Prince Albert, belonged at the outbreak 
of the war to the Second Army, under Prince Frederick 
Charles of Prussia, which, in conjunction with the First 
Army under General von Steinmetz, pushed back Marshal 
Bazaine to and beyond Metz. Marching about the center of 
the Second Army the Xllth Corps crossed the Mosel August 
16th, at Pont a Mousson and, at 12 noon, like all other corps, 
received orders from Frederick Charles to continue the for- 
ward movement in a westerly direction and to reach the 
Meuse at Bannoncourt August 18th. 1 But the battle ensuing 
at Vionville — Mars la Tour on the 16th brought about a 
change in these dispositions. Captain von Klenck of the 
Saxon Guard cavalry regiment, who arrived on the battle- 
field at 6 p.m. in search of the 5th Cavalry Division, received 
from the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps, von 
Voigts-Rhetz, a note, which was later countersigned by 
Prince Frederick Charles, to the effect that it was desirable 
for all available forces to concentrate at daybreak the 17th 
at Tronville. 2 Five hours later Headquarters Second Army 
sent direct orders to the Xllth Corps to march during the 
night by way of Thiaucourt to Mars la Tour and, if possible, 
to take position in readiness at sunrise behind the Xth Corps 
in bivouac there. 3 According to the Great General Staff ac- 
count 4 the preliminaries for this movement ordered by 
Prince Frederick Charles were carefully prepared by both 
the Xllth and the Guard Corps "and mainly according to 
directions from Royal Headquarters. " Saxon headquarters 
ordered the start for the battlefield for 3 a.m. Therefore 
Crown Prince Albert issued orders as early as 9.30 p.m. to 

^on der Goltz, Feldzug 1S70-71. Die Operationen derll Armee, 
page 74 (Berlin 1873). 

2 Von der Goltz, page 106, Note. Von Klenck, Kriegstagebnch der 
1, Eskadron des Gardereiter Regiments 1870' 72. — (Page 105, ante ) 

■Von der Goltz, page 105. 

*Studienzur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, Vol. 5, pp. 18 & 19. 



424 PAULHAAKE 

the 12th Cavalry Division to start at 4 a.m. from Vigneulles 
through Harville toward the Metz — Etain road. The 23d 
Infantry Division received orders at 10.15 p.m. to start with 
its advance guard at 3 a.m. from Thiaucourt toward Mars la 
Tour. The 24th Infantry Division was to march at the same 
time from Pont a Mousson. The Corps artillery was to 
follow the 23d Division. Special praise for initiative is given 
only to the commander of the latter division, Prince George, 
younger brother of the Crown Prince. 

"In the 23d Division," says the Great General Staff, "independent 
action had been taken before these orders arrived. Upon the arrival 
of Captain von Klenck the division commander, Prince George of 
Saxony, had already ordered the advance guard of the division to 
start at once for Thiaucourt and the main body to be in readiness 
about midnight at Regnieville en Haye, when orders arrived from 
Crown Prince Albert and postponed the start of the main body until 
3 a.m. 1 But the information which Prince George sent to the neigh- 
boring Guard Corps as to his intended start 8 caused that corps to be 
in readiness at Eicheeourt and Plirey at 5 a.m. for a forward march 
northward. Thus the orders from Headquarters Second Army, ar- 
riving during the night, found the XHth and the Guard Corps well 
prepared." 

There can be no doubt that by these measures Prince 
George excellently anticipated the orders which were shortly 
afterwards to reach him; the procedure of Crown Prince 
Albert— to judge at least from the cited account— appears 
neither so suitable nor so independent; some may even read 
in the Great General Staff account a slight criticism of the 
Saxon corps commander's slowness in issuing his orders, 
when, as a matter of fact, in the carrying out of the wishes 
of Royal Headquarters he deserves hardly less credit than 
his younger brother. Let us hear what he himself says, 
in his diary of the Campaign of 1870-71 which, written in 

1 Lieutenant General Gustav von Schubert-- chief of staff of the 
23d Division in the first weeks of the campaign — states in his Lebenser- 
innerungen, edited by Hans von Schubert from posthumous papers, 
Stuttgart & Leipzig, 1909, pp. 191-2: "As it was incredibly dark, it 
took a long time to assemble the division from its scattered villages 
and bivouacs, and the march could not be started until toward 3 a.m. 
August 17th." Schubert makes no mention at all of the orders of the 
Crown Prince, which designated that hour as the time of starting. 
(Page 403-4 ante.) 

2 " in conjunction with the results of a reconnaissance made 

from Guard Corps Headquarters " Omitted here by Haake with 

no indication of omission. — Ed. 



SAXONPRINCES 425 

the Crown Prince's own hand, stands today as one of the 
most valuable documents of the Saxon War Archives. l Prince 
Albert notes on August 16 and 17 the following: 

"16th. March to Pont a Mousson. I had the entire 23d (Division) 
cross on the ponton bridge, the 24th on the permanent bridge. At 
noon rumors reached the city of the fight of the Hid Corps. I sent 
little Planitz 2 ahead to reconnoiter. While at tea with the King (Wil- 
liam) I learned that the affair was serious and decided to start for Metz, 
though I had orders to march to the Meuse on the 17th. At first I in- 
tended to start at 5 a.m.; Holleben 3 who arrived from the front, as well 
the reports from George 4 (through Klenck) that the situation at noon 
was serious, caused me to order the start to be made at 3 a.m. An 
order arriving at 1.30 a.m. from Fritz Karl 5 induced me to have the 
24th Div. alarmed at once. I rode off at 1.30. The march to Mars la 
Tour was very fatiguing. Fortunately there was no fight. I had the 
23d Div. bivouac at Mars la Tour, the 24th at Puxieux. I had sent 
out the cavalry division to the Metz — Etain road, where it was to harass 
the possible retreat of the enemy on Verdun. I remained in Puxieux, 
after having informed myself as to the situation at headquarters of the 
Xth Corps." 

Does not this sound as though Crown Prince Albert had 
taken his measures for the main part on his own responsi- 
bility; as though he had independently arrived at the idea of 
marching toward the Meuse not in a westerly, but northerly 
direction to bring assistance to the endangered Branden- 
burgers and Hanoverians; at least as though Moltke's orders 
to start at 3 a.m. in the direction of Thiaucourt— Mars la 
Tour had been in consonance with his own decision? Even 
if it be said that the initiative of the Crown Prince in this 

ir rhe events from the departure from Dresden up to and includ- 
ing August 17th evidently were written at one sitting; those of the 
18th, 19th and 20th August, in some lighter colored ink, the same; and 
so on up to the second half of September; but without doubt very soon 
after each event occurred; in front of Paris the Crown Prince lost 
interest in continuing the diary and added about 25 lines toward the 
end of January, 1871, the last sentence of which reads: "This was the 
commencement of the siege of Paris, which we believed would be 
short, but which has continued for 4J months." 

2 Captain Edler von der Planitz, then on the staff of the Crown 
Prince, later Minister of War. 

3 Major Freiherr von Holleben, called Normann, in 1870 detailed 
to the Prussian General Staff and in the first weeks of the campaign 
attached to Royal Headquarters. 

4 Prince George of Saxony, brother of the Crown Prince. 

5 Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, commander-in-chief of the 
Second Army. For his orders issued in Gorze at 11 p.m. see Von der 
Goltz, p. 104. 



426 PAUL HAAKE 

matter was but small, 1 one thing is certain: he gave his 
cavalry division even more far reaching orders than Royal 
Headquarters had thought necessary; namely, that his 
troopers were to reach not only the road leading through 
Mars la Tour and Fresnes to Verdun, but also that leading 
to Verdun through Jarney, Conflans, Puxe, St. Jean les 
Buzy and Etain, blocking that road so as to delay or inter- 
fere with a possible retreat of the enemy. Half an hour 
after midnight Crown Prince Albert personally directed 
Lieutenant von Trebra— whom the division commander, 
Count Lippe, had sent to Pont a Mousson with a report — to 
ride at breakneck speed and tell Count Lippe that the division 
was to make as much noise as practicable 8 during its advance. 
While German Royal Headquarters is justly blamed for not 
having caused sufficient cavalry reconnaissances to be made 
on August 17 and for losing touch with the enemy almost 
entirely, that criticism cannot be made of Crown Prince 
Albert; the commander of the 12th Corps and its troopers 
performed their duties on the 17th to the fullest extent and, 
even if they could not locate the enemy, made certain that 
the main part of Bazaine's army had not yet gotten away 
toward the west, at least not along the roads occupied by 
the Saxons. 3 

Count Lippe passed the night of August 17-18 with his 
division in the vicinity of St. Jean les Buzy and Parfondrupt. 
Of the two Saxon infantry divisions: the 23d camped at Mars 

1 He arrived at his decision undoubtedly during conversation with 
others who brought discouraging news from Vionville to Royal Head- 
quarters, and especially during his conversation with King William 
and Moltke, who subsequently verbally directed him at 9.30 o'clock to 
have the Xllth Corps start at 3 a.m. 

2 War Archives, box 539, No. 152. Supplements to battle reports 
1870-71. Dresden, 15, January, 1873, Count Lippe to Captain Freiherr 
von Hodenberg, Great General Staff, Berlin. 

3 At 7 p.m., August 17, Lieutenant von Hiniiber brought three 
captured Frenchmen, who were making their way toward Metz, to 
Puxieux; one was the secretary of finance Marquis de Marguerie, the 
second a merchant and the third an officer's servant of the 51st Regi- 
ment of the Line. These supposed spies he delivered two hours later 
in Buxieres at Headquarters Second Army, and on his return at 10 p.m. 
in Puxieux reported to Count Lippe that Prince Frederick Charles had 
expressed great gratification at the achievements of the Saxon troop- 
ers, stating: "I had to recount to his Royal Highness the march of 
our cavalry division and he looked upon it as a great achievement." — 
War Archives, Box 539, No. 152. 



SAXON PRINCES 427 

la Tour, the 24th to the south at Puxieux. Crown Prince 
Albert, as we learn, had his headquarters in the latter 
village. On the German side it was expected with certainty 
that contact with the enemy would be renewed the following 
day and opinions differed only as to the place where he 
would have to be sought. Moltke believed it more probable 
that he had retreated on Metz, but made arrangements for 
both contingencies, i.e., of having to fight fronting either 
north or east, and consequently ordered the Second Army to 
start at 5 a.m., August 18 by echelon from the left wing. 
Prince Frederick Charles was firmly convinced that Bazaine 
had withdrawn his main force to the north or northwest to 
march into the interior of France through Conflans or Briey, 
while a smaller part formed a sort of rear guard on the 
heights west of Metz; and this conviction he expressed in 
the directions he gave to the commanding generals of his 
five army corps on the morning of August 18. i 

"It is difficult to state," said he, "where the enemy may be found. 
He is supposed to have been marching off toward evening on both 
roads in our front towards Conflans. A bivouac of three divisions, 
observed yesterday at Gravelotte, also probably has marched off. If 
that is not the case, General Steinmetz will attack there. The advance 
will be made not in long, thin march columns, but by divisions massed, 
the two infantry brigades one behind the other, the corps artillery 
between the divisions of each army corps. For the present the ques- 
tion is merely one of a short march of less than four miles to occupy 
the northern road to Verdun. During the noon hour the troops will 
rest." 2 

As we know, the Saxons had thereupon to start their 
movement from Mars la Tour directly north toward Jarny, 
while the Prussian Guards, who were camped west of them, 

'Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia. Denkwiirdigkeiten aus 
seinem Leben (Memorable Events of his Life). Arranged and published, 
mainly from the posthumous papers of the Prince, by Wolfgang 
Foerster, Captain on the Great General Staff, vol. 2, p. 229, (Stutt- 
gart & Leipzig 1910). The orders of the Prince read somewhat 
differently in the new Great General Staff account, vol. 5, p. 60, (216, 
ante). Especially important there is in addition "the two infantry 
brigades one behind the other." The passage speaking of the supposed 
withdrawal of the enemy "on both roads in front of and towards 
Conflans" is evidently a typographical error and should read "in front 
of us toward Conflans." It is gratifying that Captain Foerster gives 
full credit (page 265) to "the widely known caution and initiative of the 
Crown Prince of Saxony," on August 18. 

2 P. 216, ante. 



428 PAUL HAAKE 

had to advance in a northeasterly direction upon Doncourt. 
These orders from Prince Frederick Charles somewhat 
depressed the leaders of the Xllth Army Corps. General 
Gustav von Schubert, who at that time was a lieutenant- 
colonel attached to the staff of Prince George, writes as 

follows: 1 

"We wondered why we were drawn from the center to the ex- 
treme left wing, which necessitated a crossing with the Guard Corps 
on our left. We felt that we were to be cheated out of our chance to 
participate in the impending battle and that the Guards were given 
the preference." "It appeared pretty certain that the march of the 
extreme left wing from Mars la Tour to Jarny would be a stroke in the 
air and that the army corps marching on the right would in all prob- 
ability encounter the enemy." 

To explain this remarkable disposition, which was dis- 
approved also by Moltke, General von Schubert states (fur- 
ther on) that merely personal views had probably influenced 
Prince Frederick Charles: 

"The valiant and ambitious Prince was not without prejudices, 
and one of them was that only the Guard Corps and possibly the lid 
and Hid Corps (Pomeranians and Brandenburgers) of the entire army 
deserved complete trust in regard to their efficiency. What could be 
expected of the little Saxons, when a heavy and decisive battle 
threatened?" 

The order of standing here given, supposed to be the 
order of value the Prince placed on the corps, is surely 
erroneous. The governor general of the Province of Pomer- 
ania, Freiherr Senfft von Pilsach wrote of his own volition 
to Prince Frederick Charles in the spring of 1864 that he 
was accused of showing partiality to Brandenburgers, Pom- 
eranians, etc., and of slighting other troops, especially the 
Guards and the Vllth Army Corps. 2 General von Goeben 
and the biographer of the Prince, Captain Foerster, confirm 
his special fondness for those troops which he had had under 
his command and known for years; 3 those, however, were. 

1 Lebenserinnerungen, p.p. 293, 294 (P. 406, ante) and 490, 491. 

2 Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia; vol. 1, p. 306, Note 1. 
3 Zernin, Das Leben des Generals von Goeben, (Life of General von 

Goeben) vol. I, pp. 280-281. When the Prince changed command from 
the Hd to the Illd Brandenburg Army Corps, he stated "The Pom- 
eranians are the best soldiers in the World." (vol. I, p. 240); later he 
said of the Hid Corps, "While the Brandenburgers may in general be 
considered as zouaves and have been trained by me for years both 
morally and physically in the fight of man against man, the 13th Divi- 



SAXON PRINCES 429 

not the Guards, but the Pomeranians and the Brandenbur- 
gers. It may possibly be true that Frederick Charles 
thought more of the elite corps of the Prussian army than he 
did of the Saxons, but the opinion of General von Schubert 
to the effect that he intended to deprive the Saxons of their 
share of the victory is evidently wrong. He, the Prince, 
firmly believed in a westward movement by Bazaine, and so 
must have believed that he could soonest reach him with his 
left wing and force him to fight. 1 On the other hand, the 
account given by Prince Krafft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen in 
the 4th volume of his work Aus Meinem Leben (From my 
Life), pp. 61, 62, appears to me to be correct in the main 
points and to allow a close guess at the real thought of 
Frederick Charles. It reads: 

"In the morning of August 18 Prince August of Wurttemberg 
entreated Prince Frederick Charles that his corps, the Guard, might 
be allowed to execute the envelopment and that the Xllth Corps might 
advance on Bruville, because the former corps was already on the 
left of the latter. In vain. Once more I (Hohenlohe) urgently impor- 
tuned General Stiehle, Prince Frederick Charles' chief of staff, to avoid 
such a crossing of two army corps, which would cost hours and which 
subsequently, when completed, would spread disorder and uncertainty 
among everything coming up in our rear, because the columns, trains, 



sion is exactly opposite in so far as that is possible in one and the same 
army. The Brandenburger, devoted to me unto death, fleet as a deer, 
seeking hand to hand conflict — the Westphalian, more cautious and 
better suited to fight in mass — what a contrast!" (vol. I, p. 282.) That 
the Prince "was no friend of the Guard" is again emphasized by Count 
Richard von Pfeil, Major General, reserve list, in his work Vor vierzig 
Jahren. Persohnliche Erlebnisse und Bilder aus grosser Zeit (Forty 
Years Ago. Personal Experience and Pictures of a Pregnant Time) ; 
Schweidnitz 1911; p. 25. 

^his appears to me to be proved also by the battle reports of the 
Potsdam Guard Hussars, which I was permitted to examine by the 
present regimental commander, Freiherr von Senden. Concerning 
August 18, it is noted in the war diary of the 4th Squadron: "Toward 
6.15 a.m. the squadron was ordered on reconnaissance. Captain von 
Holleben, chief of staff of the division, indicated on the French general 
staff map hill 277 south of Bruvill as the point to be reached. Captain 
von Holleben accompanied the squadron. The enemy was supposed to 
bein close proximity." That this applies equally to Frederick Charles 
is proved by a report sent by him about 6.15 to Royal Headquarters: 
"No enemy is marching in direction of St. Marcel nor as far as Don- 
court. Their late camp at St. Marcel is empty; there was marching 
on the road during the night," as also by the entry in his diary shortly 
before seven o'clock: "Enemy, who was north of us yesterday, appears 
to have withdrawn towards the north; St. Marcel and Bruville unoc- 
cupied." Prinz Friedrich Karl von Preussen, vol. II, p. 231. 



430 PAULHAAKE 

ammunition reserve, and field hospitals, who knew that the Saxons 
were on our left, would lose their way or, in the most favorable case, 
cross and delay each other. It was in vain. Stiehle said that the 
Prince had duly considered these matters but still insisted on having 
the Guard Corps fight in the center ; that the Prince was not acquainted 
with the Xllth Corps; that he knew what he could expect of the Guard 
Corps; that the best troops were invariably placed in the center." 

This actually was Frederick Charles' true opinion and 
governed his desire to have, between the Saxons and Hes- 
sians—who had fought on the side of Austria four years be- 
fore—Prussian troops who would thus spur on the neigh- 
bors on their right and left and carry them forward. 1 In 
addition he probably believed himself able more quickly to 
block to the French the road through Jarny to Conflans and 
Etain with the Saxons, marching on both sides of the road 
from Mars la Tour to Jarny than with the Guard which was 
marching in the Yron valley and presumably advancing 
very slowly ; and, finally, the presence of the Saxon cavalry 
division on the extreme left wing may have influenced Prince 
Frederick Charles' decision to take the Guard more to the 
center. However, this crossing remained an error in any 
case; for, as Hohenlohe remarks, sarcastically and to the 
point, of the praise given the Guard by Stiehle ''We do not 
beat the enemy with fine phrases, but with saving of time;" 
and Moltke, in his history of the Franco-German War, also 
disapproves of this disposition made by Prince Frederick 
Charles. 

After the Prince had concluded his discussion with the 
leaders of the Xllth, Xth, and Guard Corps and had ridden off 
to give the necessary directions also to the Brandenburgers, 
Hessians, and Schleswig-Holsteiners, Crown Prince Albert 
issued orders, at 5.20 a.m., to his Saxon army corps; and as 
these orders are incorrectly reprinted in the book of the Great 
General Staff dealing with the 18th of August, 1870, they 
are here reprinted verbatim. 2 

Sent from Mars la Tour, 18 August, 5.20 a.m. 

The 23d Inf. (Div.) will form north of Mars la tour an advance 
guard, of 3 Ba(ttalions), Cavalry R(egiment, 1 Batt(ery), which will im- 

x So also in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, vol. V, p. 107, 
Comments. 

"War Archives, Box 528, No. 75, Reports from 17-8-70 to 30-9-70 
inclusive; p. 45 (See page 217 ante.) 



SAXON PRINCES 431 

mediately fall in and march on Jarny. It will reconnoiter, on the left 
through Ville sur Yron, searching the woods of la Ville aux Pres and 
pushing as far as Friau ville. 

The Div. will form north of Mars la tour in a rendezvous position, 
the 45th Br(igade) light, and the 46th Br(igade) left of the highroad to 
Jarny and will follow in that formation, battalions at quarter platoon 
interval, half an hour's distance behind the advance guard. 

The Corps Art(illery) follows the 46th Br(igade) with battery 
fronts extended as far as possible. 

The 24th Inf. Div. proceeds (immediately to) Mars la tour, pro- 
ceeds immediately to Mars la tour, 1 forms north of that place like the 
23d Inf. and follows that division. 

The (illegible word, crossed out) Amm(unition) col(umns) follow 
one hour in rear of the 24th Div. through Mars la tour, with fronts as 
broad as possible. 

The trains of the division and of H(ead)q(uarters) assemble south 
of Mars la tour and park there. 

The trains of the Army C(orps) move immediately through Thiau- 
court to Mars la tour. 

I am with the 23d I(nfantry) D(ivision). 

T(he) c(ommanding) G(eneral) 
Albert 
(Crown Prince) o. S. 



Immediately after this the Crown Prince ordered his 
cavalry division in camp at Parfondrupt to ride eastward 
along the Etain— Conflans— Jarny road, but to leave one 
regiment four miles west of Puxe to observe the roads lead- 
ing to Etain. This latter order was written, not on the 
same sheet containing the orders to the main body of the 
Saxon corps as we are led to believe by the General Staff 
account, but on a separate sheet which Lieutenant von 
Hiniiber carried to Count Lippe; and, in addition, the orders 
for the 24th Infantry Division were not composed twenty- 
five minutes later than those for the 23d, but immediately 
after the latter as conclusion of one and the same corps 
orders. Can it be that the officer who copied them by di- 
rection of the Great General Staff was led to take this er- 
roneous view from the fact that the first half of the orders 
was written on one side, the second half on the other side of 

x The second "proceeds immediately to Marsla tour," is crossed 
out. 



432 PAUL HAAKE 

the message blank which Crown Prince Albert used? The 
orders given the advance guard to search, on the left flank, 
the woods of la Ville aux Pres and to push on as far as 
Friauville, are omitted entirely in the General Staff 
account. In place of them there appears in the General 
Staff's book on page 61: 

"The advance guard of the 23d Infantry Division received orders 
to advance by way of Jarny and Labry toward Hatrize, reconnoitering 
both flanks, and to take up a battle position there. It thus received a 
march objective more than five kilometers beyond the march objec- 
tive, Jarny, set by corps headquarters and this took it to the left bank 
of the Orne." 

Nothing of this is contained in the orders of Crown 
Prince Albert; and in the account of the part taken by the 
23d Infantry Division in the battle of St. Privat on August 
18, 1870, drafted by Lieutenant Colonel Schubert during the 
succeeding night 1 it is merely stated: 

"At5. 30a.m., August 18, the Division, in bivouac immediately south 
of Mars la Tour along the Metz— Paris road, received orders from 
corps headquarters to send out an advance guard along the road from 
Mars la Tour through Jarny towards Briey, but with the main body to 
proceed into a rendezvous position north of the mentioned village and 
to follow the advance guard at half an hour's interval." 

But if Crown Prince Albert somewhat later personally 
directed the cavalry point of the advance guard to the left 
bank of the Orne to Hatrize and beyond, this, in view of the 
reports received by him, can hardly be considered a mistake. 

According to Lieutenant Colonel Schubert's account the 
corps artillery was to immediately follow the 23d Division; 
the 24th Infantry Division the corps artillery. Prince George 
designated the Rifle Regiment No. 108, the 1st Cavalry Regi- 
ment, the 2d Light Battery, the 2d Pionier Company, and 
Sanitary Detachment No. 1 to form the advance guard under 
command of Major General von Craushaar. The advance 
guard started its march at 7 a.m., followed at 7.30 a.m. by 
the main body of the division formed into two parallel col- 
umns; the right column, under Colonel Garten, consisting of 
the 45th Infantry Brigade, two heavy batteries and one light 

1 War Archives, Box 506, IIC. Accounts (reports) from 16 July to 
31 December, 1870. 



SAXON PRINCES 433 

battery, the left column, under Colonel von Montbe, of the 
46th Infantry Brigade, one heavy battery, the 4th Pionier 
Company, and the 1st Field Hospital; behind the 45th 
Brigade marched the 47th; behind the 46th, the 48th Brigade. 
The main body of the 23d Division reached Jarny at 8.30 
a.m. and, by orders of the corps commander, halted for 
some time, while the advance guard scouted on the left of 
the Orne through Labry and Hatrize toward Valleroy and 
occupied Conflans on the left flank. To the right of the 
Orne valley patrols advanced on Doncourt and Jouaville. 
No enemy was encountered anywhere, but connection was 
established with the Guard Corps marching on the right of 
the Xllth Corps from Mars la Tour through Bruville to Don- 
court. 

While the Saxons were marching around and through 
Mars la Tour the Guard had approached that village from 
the west and had then stacked arms; quite naturally it was 
some time before the 24th Division, which had bivouacked 
at Puxieux, could come up and the entire Xllth Corps, as- 
sembled north of Mars la Tour, resume the march in battle 
formation and clear the road to the northeast for the Guard. 
Hohenlohe remarks on this; 

"Instead of in mass of brigades the Saxons passed us in march 
columns. Thus we lost three and a half valuable hours in waiting. 
At that time we were very indignant over this formation of the Sax- 
ons, but we soon convinced ourselves that they were not to blame. For, 
when we started our movement, we also could not march in masses of 
brigades, because the terrain in our front soon compelled us to assume 
the march column formation." 

In any case we will hardly go wrong in assuming that 
the Guard has no more cordial feeling for the Saxons on 
August 18, 1870 than did the Saxons for the Guard, and that 
neither corps was particularly anxious to sacrifice itself for 
the other. Prince George wrote to Colonel Schubert on 
December 22, 1871; "On the 18th of August the Guard did 
not pass behind the Saxon army corps, but through it, and 
directly behind the 23d Division." 1 But this statement does 
not conform to the actual facts. According to Hohenlohe, 
Prince August of Wiirttemberg had but one squadron of 

'Gustav von Schubert, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 512. 



434 PAUL HAAKE 

Hussars trot through the march column of the Saxons to 
reconnoiter the position and strength of the enemy in the 
direction assigned the Guard; and all accounts, known to 
me, agree that Prince August could not have his corps con- 
tinue the march until 9 o'clock 1 and that consequently prob- 
ably only that small body of cavalry interfered for a short 
time with the march of the Saxon 24th Division. 2 

The Saxons have frequently been blamed for having 
been too slow with their march that day; and especially, 
many critics hold, they should have reached Jarny earlier, 
and then, starting from there immediately in a northeasterly 
direction towards Ste. Marie aux Chenes and Roncourt, 
they could have attacked the French right wing one and a 
half to two hours earlier than was the case. In so far as 
concerns the march in the forenoon, I hold, with General 
von Hodenberg, that this criticism is not justified. Crown 
Prince Albert had issued his corps orders at 5.20 a.m. One 
hour later the 23d Division was already at the assigned 
rendezvous place north of Mars la Tour; the 24th Division, 
according to Hohenlohe's statement, could not arrive at that 
place from Puxieux, to which place the orders for starting 
had to be first taken, until about or after 6.45 a.m.; and it 
is therefore easily understood that the entire corps, now as- 
sembled in battle formation, could not start its advance 
guard until about 7 a.m. 3 The distance to Jarny could 

1 So also in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, V. 67. (p. 218 
ante. ) 

2 Freiherr von Hodenberg states the same in the Leipziger Zeitung 
in 1898 (P. 132 ante). And the war diaries of the Guard Hussars report 
that the regiment, with the exception of the 4th Squadron, sent ahead 
for reconnaissance, had to wait at Mars la Tour, according to the diary 
of the 5th Squadron "about 2 hours;" according to that of the 2d — 
which fixes the start for Doncourt at about 9.30 a.m. — one hour longer. 

3 Gustav von Schubert's statement in Lebenserinnerungen, page 
294 (P. 406, ante.) "The army corps massed itself in battle formation 
south of Mars la Tour in two parallel columns and, crossing the village, 
started with its advance guard at 6.45 a.m." is erroneous, as shown by 
his own account of the part played by the 23d Division in the battle of 
St. Privat. The battle report rendered by the 1st Battalion, 1st (Life) 
Grenadier Regiment No. 100 (War Archives, Box 505, No. 15) states of 
August 18, agreeing with the official report of the Crown Prince to 
King John (Box 506, b5): "The regiment started at 6 a.m. from its 
bivouac at Mars la Tour and joined the 2d Grenadier Regiment No. 
101 northeast of that village; the march to the front was taken up in 
a northerly direction at 7 a.m." And in the report of the 2d Grenadier 



SAXONPRINCES 435 

hardly have been covered in less time, in the prescribed 
formation. According to Schubert's report the 46th Brig- 
ade marching west of the road took only one hour and a 
half to cover a distance of a good four miles. The 45th, on 
its right, remained apparently somewhat in rear but had to 
cover a materially longer distance; the road and the stream 
bending out far to the east. The advance guard, marching 
in front of the 46th Brigade, had hardly passed Jarny, and 
the leading elements of the 45th Brigade had hardly reached 
Chateau Moncel, southeast of that place, when Captain von 
Treitschke (attached by Prince George to the advance guard), 
who had gone ahead with one squadron of the 1st Cavalry 
Regiment 1 on the road leading from Conflans through Labry 
west of Hatrize and Valleroy to Briey, reported at 8:20 a.m. 
from north of Labry that apparently one French battery 
stood in position west of Valleroy and that infantry columns 
could be seen between that village and the woods of Abbe- 
ville. Captain von Treitschke also thought he saw at the 
same time infantry columns east of Jarny, north of Don- 
court; all of which indicated that the enemy was in front 
and on the right flank. Major General von Craushaar im- 
mediately caused the advance guard to halt and occupy Jarny 
and Conflans. In rear of it the 46th Brigade prepared for 
battle. Of the two regiments forming the main body of the 
45th Brigade, the Guard Grenadiers took position at Chateau 
Moncel, while the 2d Grenadier Regiment No. 101 received 
orders to take up a flanking position along the watercourse 
from Chateau Moncel to Bruville. 3 Patrols sent ahead by 

Regiment No. 101 of August 18 it is stated: "The brigade started at 7.15 
a.m., the Life Regiment in the first, the 2d Grenadier Regiment in the 
second line through Bruville to Chateau Moncel." (War Archives, Box 
496,War Diary II. Grenadier Regiment No. 101.) The 2d Grenadier Regi- 
ment had started from the bivouac south of Mars la Tour at 6.15 a.m., 
consequently the 23d Infantry Division did not take — as Studien zur 
Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, V. 106, Comments, censuringly states — 
one hour and twenty minutes to form north of Mars la Tour; but only 
a little more than half that time. 

'Now the 1st Hussar Regiment "Konig Albert" No. 18. It was the 
1st Squadron, commanded by Captain von Welck, with First Lieuten- 
ant von Posern and Second Lieutenant Schmalz as his subordinates. 

2 When in Studien zur Kriegsgesshichte und Taktik, V. 117, Com- 
ments, it is stated "It could hardly be maintained that the army corps, 
in this narrow and confined position, was especially prepared to meet 
a possible attack from the north," it is forgotten that the Saxons at 
that moment appeared also to be threatened from the east. 



436 PAUL HAAKE 

this regiment soon reported that Bruville had been occupied 
on August 16 by 1,400 hostile infantry, who had left the 
place early August 17, and that numerous French cavalry 
had passed through the village the night of August 17-18; 
that the enemy in Doncourt had been alarmed by the Prus- 
sian Guard Hussars, just arrived there, and had left the 
village in all haste. At 8.45 a.m. a report arrived from 
Lieutenant von Posern to the effect that the right flank 
patrol had pushed forward as far as Tichemont and had also 
searched Jouaville, but had seen nothing of the enemy who 
appeared to have fallen back upon Metz. Finally, Captain 
von Treitschke supplemented his first report by a second 
one, stating that he had been mistaken and that the sup- 
posed fleeing infantry columns had turned out to be fleeing, 
villagers. 1 Thus the entire matter was a false alarm and the 
deployment of the leading two brigades for battle unneces- 
sary; but that took hardly more than an hour and no time at 
all was lost thereby, for the first objective given by Prince 
Frederick Charles— "for the present the question is merely 
one of a short march of less than four miles to occupy the 
northern road to Verdun"— had been reached, and there was 
still absolutely no definite information concerning the where- 
abouts of the enemy: on the contrary this could be gained 
only through far reaching reconnaissance. Therefore Crown 
Prince Albert was fully justified in reassembling the corps, 
and halting at Jarny and Chateau Moncel to rest. The ad- 
vance guard he ordered to have its cavalry reconnoiter to 
Briey, Auboue, and Ste. Marie aux Chenes and to learn if 
hostile columns had been there and in what direction they 
had marched, 2 and at the same time General von Craushaar 
was directed to send one platoon to the west towards St. 
Jean les Buzy to establish connection with the division under 
Count Lippe. 3 

According to information kindly given me by General of In- 
fantry von Treitschke in person. See copies of reports on file in War 
Archives (Box 528 No. 75) mentioned in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte 
und Taktik, V. 63-4. (P. 219 ante.) 

a This order was sent out from corps headquarters at 9.45 a.m. 
(War Archives, Box 528, No. 75.) 

3 War Archives, Box 492, No. 24, War Diary of the Royal Saxon 1st 
Cavalry Regiment during the Campaign 1870-71. This task was per- 
formed by one platoon of the 2d Squadron under First Lieutenant 
Meyer. 



SAXONPRINCES 437 

As is known, General von Moltke had already that morn- 
ing informed Prince Frederick Charles that, in case'the road 
leading through Doncourt and Jarny should be found un- 
occupied, he was not to send the Xllth and the Guard Corps 
too far to the west, and further notified him at about 8.30 
a.m. that, in his opinion, Bazaine stood with his entire force 
on the heights west of Metz and that the French position 
extended to about Amanweiler. However, concentration 
movements in the hostile camp, believed to be seen by the 
Prussian right wing, caused him to change his opinion be- 
tween 9 and 10 o'clock. He interpreted these movements as 
preparations for marching off in a northerly direction on 
Briey, and informed the commander-in-chief of the Second 
Army that the First Army under General Steinmetz pre- 
sumably would not require support by more than the Hid 
Corps. 1 This apparently meant that the Second Army was 
to do everything possible to overtake the departing enemy 
and force him to give battle. Prince Frederick Charles, 
who personally firmly believed up to 9 o'clock that Marshal 
Bazaine was marching north or northwestward, appears to 
have held a different view after the arrival of the reports 
from the Crown Prince of Saxony; at least, in spite of the in- 
formation sent him from Royal Headquarters at 10 o'clock, 
he issued orders to the IXth Corps, which formed the right 
wing of the Second Army, to advance in a northeasterly 
direction against the hostile right wing and to attack it for 
the present with artillery. The Guard Corps he directed 
to continue its march to the front through Doncourt 
to Verneville and if necessary to support the IXth Corps. 
The Crown Prince of Saxony, on the other hand, he directed 
to remain stationary with his Saxons at Jarny. Only if 
then interference proved unneccessary were the Saxons (as 
was stated in the orders for the Xth Corps, which was then 
to take their place) to continue the march to Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes. Only towards 10.30 a.m. did Moltke again revert 
to the conviction that the enemy intended to make a stand 
on the plateau between Le Point du Jour and Montigny la 
Grange, and he then ordered the commanding general of the 

'P. 226 ante. 



438 PAULHAAKE 

Second Army to attack from the direction of Amanweiler. 
Prince Frederick Charles thereupon, at 11.30 a.m., directed 
the Guard Corps on that village with orders "to advance 
from there envelopingly against the hostile right wing;" at 
the same time orders were sent to the IXth Corps to delay 
a serious engagement until the Guard should appear from 
Amanweiler, and at 11.45 o'clock to the Crown Prince of 
Saxony to march on Ste. Marie aux Chenes, to secure by 
cavalry toward Briey and through Conflans and to send, if 
possible, cavalry as far as the valley of the Mosel, to inter- 
rupt railroad and telegraph lines to Thionville. 1 

Thus finally the initial steps were taken for the wide 
turn to the right which was to lead to finding the enemy and 
to the gigantic battle of Gravelotte— St. Privat. It was no 
small credit to Prince Frederick Charles— who at the start 
had had an entirely erroneous conception — that he prepared 
the way for it by deciding in the tenth hour to start the IXth, 
and the Guard Corps in a northeasterly direction and did 
not allow himself to be again deluded by the information sent 
from Royal Headquarters. It also was no small credit 
to Crown Prince Albert that he did not slavishly follow his 
orders from army headquarters to remain at Jarny, but ad- 
vanced beyond that place on his own initiative as soon as he 
received positive information of the enemy. 8 

*Pp. 63 and 229 ante. 

2 Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, V. 89 (P. 230 ante) 
clothes its "praise" in the following words: "As the corps head- 
quarters (Prince August of Wurttemberg and Crown Prince Albert) 
received these reports earlier (than Prince Frederick Charles), they 
could forni a clear judgment earlier and, when the commanding gen- 
erasl of the Guard and the Xllth Corps decided on independent action 
based on their estimate of the situation, they fortunately anticipated 
by their action the 11.30 a.m. orders from Prince Frederick Charles." 
On page 117 (Comments) it says, after the confined position at Jarny 
and Chateau Moncel has been censured: "The more credit therefore 
must be given to the decision to abandon the (march) direction so far 
held to (to the north) and to seek the enemy in the northeast." But 
this praise is immediately qualified by the sentence: "Itis not re- 
markable that a small part of the suite of Crown Prince Albert still ad- 
hered to the belief held until now that the Xllth Corps would be the 
first to encounter the enemy. The peculiar distribution of the ad- 
vance guard on both banks of the Orne in the continuation of the 
march and the subsequently extended security position at the Bois de 
Ponty, which was later to prove very disadvantageous, show that he 
had prepared himself for surprises." Was it not perfectly natural to 
believe that the enemy, marching beyond the Orne to Briey, would 



SAXON PRINCES 439 

At 9.45 a.m. Captain von Welck, commanding the 1st 
Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, forming the point of the ad- 
vance guard, reported that he was in Hatrize and had sent out 
patrols far to the front; that Lieutenant Schmalz, who was 
in Valleroy, had just reported that strong hostile cavalry de- 
tachments showed themselves to the right of that village. Half 
an hour later Welck reported that his men had received fire 
from Moine ville ; 1 and toward 11 o'clock Lieutenant von Posern 
and one platoon encountered southwest of Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes French infantry and cavalry which hastily fled back to 
the village when he prepared to charge them. Crown Prince 
Albert, who knew from orders issued by Prince Frederick 
Charles at 10 o'clock and of which he had been informed, 
that the Guard and the IXth Corps were marching on Ver- 
neville, decided also to start the march again in spite of the 
orders holding him at Jarny. This was certainly not done 
because of knowledge of the location and intentions of the en- 
emy, but to prevent him either from marching off to the 
northwest, or from endangering the left flank of the Guard 
Corps. In any case it was done with the laudable desire of 
getting to the enemy as quickly as possible and perhaps also 
with the intention of enveloping, from the direction of Val- 
leroy, the right wing of the French, should the latter make 
a stand at Moineville, and then to block the enemy's road to 
Briey. Consequently, at about 11.30 a.m., the Crown Prince 
ordered General von Craushaar to advance with the advance 
guard as left flank guard on both sides of the Orne on Valle- 
roy and Moineville, and Prince George to occupy Tichemont 
and the Bois de Ponty with the 45th Brigade. The 46th 
Brigade was for the present to remain at Jarny at the dispo- 
sition of the commanding general, the 24th Division under 

attempt such surprises? and was the presence of large bodies of the 
enemy behind Moineville and Ste. Marie aux Chines so improbable, 
considering the reports received before and after 11 o'clock? 

*As Wolfgang Foerster writes in the biography of Prince Fred- 
erick Charles (vol. 2, p. 242, note), "It is not apparent on what re- 
ports the statement was based that the enemy was at Moineville" we 
will here insert verbatim the report from Captain von Welck to the 
commander of the advance guard, which is not reprinted in Studien 
zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik: "Our patrols were fired on from 
Moineville. Therefore I send one platoon to that place to reconnoiter, 
and if necessary to support Lieutenant Schmalz who is at Valleroy. 
10.45 a.m. v. Welck." 



440 PAULHAAKE 

Major General von Nehrhoff to march on Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes through Chateau Moncel, Jouaville and Batilly. The 
corps artillery received Giraumont en Jarnisy as immediate 
march objective and Count Lippe received orders to rejoin 
the army corps as quickly as possible and take position at the 
Bois de Ponty, but to leave one regiment in rear and direct 
it to march on Valleroy. 1 Probably not under three-quarters 
of an hour later did the Crown Prince receive the orders from 
Prince Frederick Charles to march with his entire force on 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes. In my opinion it is to his credit that 
he did not comply literally with these orders — which would 
have interrupted the directed and already commenced move- 
ments—but merely caused the 46th Brigade to advance also 
to behind the Bois de Ponty. It was still possible to suppose, 
from what he knew, that the enemy intended to draw off in a 
northwesterly direction through Ste. Marie aux Chenes, Au- 
boue, and Briey, and in that case the most sensible thing was 
to advance on a broad front, about parallel to that road. In 
case Bazaine did not try to escape, there was still time to 
have the Saxon corps execute a right turn and envelop the 
enemy either from the northwest or the north. 

Let us first follow the advance of the 24th Division, form- 
ing the right wing of the Xllth Corps. Its commander, Major 
General Nehrhoff von Holdernberg, made an exhaustive re- 
port of it a few days later to corps headquarters. We will 
let him speak for himself since his account is not yet known 
and the main point is to learn the course of the battle as a 
whole, as well as the part taken by the Saxons in the victory 
and the motives governing their leaders, especially those of 
the Crown Prince and Prince George. In his official report 2 
he says that after the 24th Division— so it is called in this 
official report— had rested one hour at Chateau Moncel, 

"the start was made, by orders of the Saxon Corps headquarters, 
through Chateau Moncel, Jouaville and Batilly in the direction of Ste. 
Marie aux Chgnes. The advance guard started at 12.15 and was under 

1 War Archives, Box 506, 24b. Report of Saxon Cavalry Division of 
its employment in the battle of St. Privat, August 18, 1870. 

2 War Archives, Box 539, Campaign 1870-71. Posthumous mili- 
tary papers of Lieutenant General von Schubert: from the battle re- 
ports of the 2d Infantry Division No. 24, concerning its participation in 
the battle of August 18, 1870 (copy). 



SAXON PRINCES 441 

command of Colonel von Leonhardi and consisted of the Regiment No. 
104, a squadron of the second Cavalry Regiment, and Captain von der 
Pforte's four-pounder battery; it was followed immediately by the 
main body in the following order of march: Regiment 105, the other 
three batteries, the 12th Jager Battalion, the 2d Cavalry Regiment, the 
48th Brigade ; the sanitary detachment and pioniers, which were at the 
tail of the column, received orders to move up immediately. As the 
march through Chateau Moncel could be made only in narrow column, 
and as after passing it deployment into battle formation had to be made, 
the 48th Brigade was unavoidably left about half an hour's march be- 
hind the 105th Regiment. The fire heard at very close range spurred 
everyone to increased haste and efforts. Near Jouaville the three bat- 
teries and three squadrons in the main body were sent on at a trot to 
overtake the advance guard. Just as the advance guard marched 
around Batilly on the east, the division commander received orders 
from corps headquarters dated 2 o'clock to go around Batilly on the 
west, to advance behind the small clump of woods there in the hollow 
and to attempt from there to press directly on Ste. Marie aux Chgnes, 
but to leave the 48th Brigade behind the woods of Batilly at the dispo- 
sition of his Royal Highness, the corps commander. As the 48th Brig- 
ade did not return under the orders of the division commander during 
the course of the day, the latter is unable to report on its participation 
in the battle. On the other side of Batilly the advance guard at once 
took the direction ordered and at 2.50 the 47th Brigade, with the 12th 
Jager Battalion "Crown Prince," formed in the meadow ground for the 
attack on Ste. Marie aux Chines. This attack was prepared and sub- 
sequently most forcefully and successfully supported by the two six- 
pounder foot batteries, Captains Qroh and Keysselitz, which were sent 
by the division commander to the hill north of St. Ail, where they im- 
mediately opened fire; the cavalry regiment and the two four-pounder 
batteries remained temporarily in the hollow. 1 After the division 
commander had come to an agreement as to the time of attack with 
the Prussian division commander, Major General von Pape, command- 
ing on his right, Colonel von Leonhardi received orders at 3 o'clock to 
attack Ste. Marie auxChenes. At 3.10 the brigade started to attack, 
the 12th Jager Battalion in line of company columns with a dense 
skirmish line as first line; it was followed by the first battalions of Reg- 
iments 104 and 105 extended in line of company columns as second line, 
followed by the second battalions in half-battalions and the 3d battal- 
ions in attack columns as reserve. The attack of the 47th Brigade 
naturally took direction against the west end of the village, while the 
southern and eastern edges were simultaneously attacked by the Guard 
infantry under Major General von Pape. The 47th Brigade, though 

1 Concerning the employment of the light batteries compare the 
somewhat different account in A. von Kretschmar's book Oeachichte 
der Koniglich Sdchsiaehen Feldartillerie-Regimenter von 1821—1878, 
Berlin 1879, p. 122 et seq. 



442 PAUL HAAKE 

suffering considerable losses under a heavy artillery fire, advanced 
bravely and in good order against the village, which was occupied 
only by a relatively small force of hostile infantry, and there gained a 
a strong foothold. After the attack commenced, the division comman- 
der called ahead first one, then both four-pounder batteries to the left 
flank of the 47th brigade and had them enter the action to keep down 
the hostile artillery fire which was extremely heavy; the 2d Cavalry 
Regiment acted as support for these two batteries, but was subse- 
quently, by orders from higher authority, employed otherwise on the 
left wing of the army corps. The division commander, having followed 
the assaulting battalions into the village of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, 
soon became convinced that a further advance against the dominating 
French position was for the present out of the question and therefore 
ordered Colonel von Elterlein, who had relieved the wounded Colonel 
von Leonhardi of the command of the 47th Brigade, to confine himself 
to the defense of the village. Ste. Marie aux Chines was very poorly 
adapted for defense; the houses, built closely together along the nar- 
row village street, had neither windows nor doors on the side facing 
the enemy, and the companies crowded together in the village (part of 
the Prussian 4th Guard Foot Regiment was alongside and between the 
Saxons) could utilize but a very few gaps between the houses to get 
to some stone walls facing the enemy and to secure from there and 
from the ditches on the left of the village the possibility of some sort 
of fire effect. The conduct of the men, standing in the streets and 
continually harassed by a hot artillery fire, was most excellent. Sev- 
eral times it appeared as if the enemy intended to charge; but the 
appearance and the fire of the Saxon corps artillery (4.40) prevented 
this intention. The 47th Brigade was assembled behind the village by 
orders of His Royal Highness, the corps commander, and on receipt of 
additional orders started for the woods situated between Auboue and 
Roncourt, followed by its four batteries. The brigade was to serve 
there as reserve for the 23d Division. By orders of His Royal High- 
ness, the corps commander, the batteries, arrived in the woods, joined 
the left wing of the corps artillery, while the 47th Brigade followed 
gradually as far as the neighborhood of Roncourt; there it encountered 
the 2d Cavalry Regiment and parts of the 48th Brigade and went into 
bivouac. The other parts of the 48th Brigade and the pioniers were in 
bivouac the other side of Roncourt. The sanitary detachment had 
commenced its work during the attack on Ste. Marie aux Chenes at 
the dressing station behind the village." 

Let us at once follow this report of the commander of 
the 24th Division with the report of the 23d Division, com- 
manded by Prince George; this report, as already stated, 
was written on the evening of the day of the battle by a 
general staff officer of the Prince, Lieutenant Colonel Schu- 



SAXON PRINCES 443 

bert, and reads as follows concerning the events of the 
second half of August 18: 

"At 11:30 a.m. the commanding general issued orders for the re- 
sumption of the march of the army corps, according to which the ad- 
vance guard was to march on both sides of the Orne as far as Moine- 
ville and Valleroy; of the 23d Infantry Division, the 45th Brigade was 
to occupy Tich6mont and the woods of Ponty (on the right bank of the 
Orne), the 46th, on the other hand, to remain in reserve north of 
Jarny. During the execution of this movement, which began at about 
11.46 o'clock, the division commander, who was with the 46th Brigade, 
received information at Giraumont that the commanding general 
reserved to himself the disposition of the 46th Infantry Brigade, and 
that the 24th Division, following the 23d Division, had been started on 
the right of the 45th Brigade through Chateau Moncel, Jouaville, and 
Batilly toward Ste. Marie aux ChSnes. The 46th Infantry Brigade was 
still on the march between Chateau Moncel and Tichemont when, 
about 12.15 o'clock, the first sounds of a fire fight were heard, coming 
from a northeasterly direction. Columns of the Prussian Guard Corps 
were seen in the vicinity of Jouaville keeping direction on Batilly. 
The 45th Brigade now traversed Tichemont and was proceeding to 
occupy the Bois de Ponty as directed when, about 1.45 o'clock, an 
orderly officer fx-om the Prussian Guard Corps arrived and reported to 
the division commander that the battle now in progress, the noise of 
which became louder and louder, was taking place within, and on one 
side of, the forest of Vern§ville; that in addition a French camp, of at 
least one division, was at Ste. Marie; that the Prussian 1st Guard 
Division had started at about 12 o'clock from Doncourt for Anoux la 
Grange; that other French troops were in tent camps at St. Privat 
and Roncourt and were marching toward the battle at Verneville; and 
that weak infantry detachments were between Batilly and Ste. Marie. 

''Under these conditions and in consideration of the steadily in- 
creasing artillery fire the undersigned division commander decided to 
abandon the occupation of the Bois de Ponty and to take the direction 
on Ste. Marie through Batilly and if possible operate against the hos- 
tile right flank. Unfortunately a rapid execution of this decision was 
prevented by the fact that the 45th Brigade had become very mucli 
extended in the occupation of the Bois de Ponty and had to be first 
assembled again. Therefore at the start only the six cumpanies of 
the Body Guard Grenadier Regiment and the 1st Light Battery (Cap- 
tain Lengnick), which were in front, could be started in the direction 
of the large white house in Ste. Marie, as at about 2.15 o'clock we per- 
ceived from Batilly that the fighting was already in progress around 
Ste. Marie. 

"It was exactly 2.30 o'clock when the first light battery went into 
position at the northern point of the woods immediately north of 
Batilly and opened fire on Ste. Marie aux Chgnes, protected on its left 



444 PAUL HAAKE 

by the above mentioned one and a half battalions and detachments of 
the Prussian Guard Hussar Regiments. On the other side of a ravine 
in front stood the Prussian Guard Rifle Battalion in a wood fight 
against Ste. Marie. The range proved too long for the four-pounders, 
therefore the battery crossed the ravine, advancing to within 1,200 or 
1,300 paces of Ste. Marie into the line of the above mentioned one and 
a half battalions and opened fire anew. At the same time the position 
just left by that battery was occupied by batteries of the Saxon corps 
artillery (2.45 o'clock.) Here also, between 2.30 and 2.45 o'clock, the 
division commander received the following orders from corps head- 
quarters, sent from there at about two o'clock: 'The 1st Division, 
which is hereby again given the disposition of the 2d Brigade now 
behind the west corner of the Bois de Ponty, will take direction 
through Coinville and the small woods east of Auboue and advance 
against the position at Roncourt. ' At the same time the advance 
guard under General von Craushaar appeared on the left flank from 
the Orne; the 3d Battalion of the Rifle Regiment, sent far to the front, 
had already turned against Ste. Marie, participating in the assault on 
that village with one company. The other two battalions, the 2d Light 
Battery Westmann and the 1st Cavalry Regiment also were on the 
march on Ste. Marie, crossing the Orne at Hatrize and proceeding 
through Beaumont and the small wood at Bondeseille. 

"The division commander now decided, before proceeding to any 
further operations, to assemble the division under cover in the bottom 
of the valley in front, which joins the Orne valley at Auboue, and to 
reestablish order, especially as the 2d and 3d Battalions of the Body 
Guard Grenadier Regiment were still far behind. This assembly took 
up considerable time, and was also not unobserved by the enemy, who 
threw shells into the valley. The capture of Ste. Marie aux Chenes at 
about 3.30 o'clock by the Prussian Guard, the Saxon 47th Brigade, and 
one company of the Rifle Regiment now permitted deviation from the 
orders directing that Coinville- a difficult and confined place — be the 
assembly point for the troops in rear, and to substitute for that 
assembly the hill east of Grimoneau north of the Verdun road, which 
could not be seen by the enemy. In the meantime, one squadron of 
the 1st Cavalry Regiment had been sent toward Hautmecoui't and 
Joeuf to reconnoiter on the left flank, and orders had been sent to the 
4(5th Infantry Brigade behind the west corner of the Bois de Ponty to 
draw up to Moineville." 

Let us stop for a moment and get a clear idea of the 
importance of what we have just read. Without doubt, we 
see here instances of extremely important independent de- 
cisions by the different leaders. The first who of his own 
initiative changed the march direction of his column was the 
commander of the advance guard, Major General von Crau- 
shaar; he was induced to this probably by the report of 



SAXON PRINCES 446 

Captain von Welck, which unfortunately is not printed in 
Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte and Taktik. 

"The Prussian Guard Corps entreats immediate advance on Ste. 
Marie aux Chenes. The advance guard of the Jagers has been notified, 
v. Welck." 1 

As Major von Craushaar knew that the Orne valley, as 
far as Auboue, and also Briey, were at that time free of the 
enemy, he believed that he was justified in complying with 
the entreaty of the Guard Corps and turned east early 
enough to enable him to support the assault on Ste. Marie 
with at least one company. The second higher leader who 
also ordered a right turn on his own responsibility was 
Prince George: when Captain von Hodenberg reported to 
him, by direction of corps headquarters, between 1.30 and 
1.45 o'clock, that St. Privat was occupied by the French, 
and immediately after the Prussian orderly officer (Lieu- 
tenant von Meyerinck of the Guard Hussars), mentioned in 
the report of Lieutenant Colonel Schubert appeared and 
gave more exact information of the strength and movements 
of the enemy and entreated an instant advance of the 
Saxons, 2 Prince George directed the 45th Brigade, still 

1 War Archives, Box 528, No. 75, page 2. 

2 According to Studien zur Krieggeschichte und Taktik, page 168, 
note 2 (page 247 ante), Lieutenant von Meyerinck had been sent to 
meet the Saxons on the request of General von Pape. According to 
the war diary of the 5th Squadron of the Guard Hussars he rode by 
orders of the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel von Hymmen. 
It is stated in the diary: "As soon as we had left the rendezvous (of 
the 1st Guard Division at Doncourt) the lieutenant colonel had the 
regiment form in column of platoons on account of the terrain, and we 
marched toward Ste. Marie across country along a fold in the terrain. 
Here the lieutenant colonel relinquished command for some time to 
Major von Meyerinck, himself riding ahead. The major drew the 
regiment off a little farther to the left, under cover of a small wood 
which allowed us to break forth either right or left. The major him- 
self took post on a rise to the left of the woods, from where he had an 
open view onto the battleground in front. After we had halted here for 
about fifteen minutes Baron von Kottwitz rejoined the squadron with 
the first platoon. At the same time the lieutenant colonel returned, 
took command again, and sent off the major to urge His Royal High- 
ness, the Crown Prince of Saxony, to bring up the Xllth Corps as 
rapidly as possible. The desire of Lieutenant Col- 
onel von Hymmen to have Major von Meyer- 
inck ride immediately to the Xllth Corps, 
as well as the major's ride, entreating the 
Saxons to advance immediately on our left 
flank, is of much greater importance for 
the 18th of August, than is generally sup- 



446 PAULHAAKE 

under his orders, to advance immediately upon Ste. Marie 
aux Chenes; in this he hoped, as Schubert states in his 
Memoirs, page 296, 

"to operate if possible against the hostile right flank; and, if 
things did not go as smoothly as in peace maneuvers, the causes should 
be looked for only in the friction of the war machine and the char- 
acteristics of the subordinate commanders." 

This praiseworthy initiative of the commanders of the 
23d Division and of the advance guard, which is mentioned, 
but without special praise, in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte 
und Taktik, pages 169 and 170, 1 is finally and worthily 
joined by the independent decision of Crown Prince Albert. 
He undoubtedly had made his decision before Captain von 
Hodenberg arrived with the report from Prince George, 
dated about 1.40 o'clock, of the turn which the latter had 
commenced and before Lieutenant von Meyerinck brought 
the entreaty for hastening the march; for the Crown Prince's 
new plan was written down as corps orders about 2 o'clock 
and came into the hands of Prince George only between 2.30 
and 2.45 o'clock. 3 Captain von Hodenberg, at that time 
belonging to the general staff of the Xllth Army Corps, 
describes in 1898, in the Leipziger Zeitung these important 
events and, strangely enough, mentioning his ride to Prince 
George: 

"When his corps continued the advance after 12 o'clock, Crown 
Prince Albert tranquilly 3 waited on the rise south of Batilly for the 

posed; for very likely this was the first 
request, or at least very definite request, 
for haste. Any one who participated in 

this bloody battle knows how important for 
this day was the timely appearance of the 
.Saxons. ' ' The nephew of Major von Meyerinck, at that time a 
lieutenant and now a major on the retired list, also named von Meyer- 
inck, has kindly informed me that not his uncle but he himself was 
sent by the regimental commander to the Saxons and that he showed 
them the way. 

i Pages 249 and 250 ante. 

2 According to Gustav von Schubert, Lebenserinnerungen, page. 
491. Therefore I prefer to assume that von Hodenberg rode to Prince 
George before von der Planitz reached the Crown Prince, and that 
von Hodenberg bases his vivid account of events only on the state- 
ments of other eyewitnesses. 

'See page 137 ante. The German of the von Hodenberg article 
says " quietly — though very eagerly, especially as the noise . . . . " 
With this exception, and the one mentioned below, the paragraph 
quoted is, as it appears in the article given earlier, almost literally 
translated. It will be noted that Dr. Haake, in quoting, makes certain 
changes in form and also omissions which he does not indicate. — Ed. 



SAXONPRINCES 447 

further development of events. A new situation was created only at 
about 1.30 o'clock by the return of Captain von der Planitz, who had 
been sent ahead. He had found Ste. Marie aux Chenes still free of the 
enemy at 12.30 o'clock, had also seen from there that St. Privat was 
held in strong force and that that place, situated on a height, offered a 
remarkable degree of resistance against an attack from the west, all of 
which he reported in great detail. The Crown Prince, examining the 
map, listened to Captain von der Planitz without saying a word and 
immediately said: 'In that case we will not attack in front, but will go 
around ' l and made a corresponding movement with his left arm. The 
sudden decision was then carefully considered in its execution, for 
which there was in this case plenty of time." 

Undoubtedly this resolve was the decisive factor in the 
success of the day. Of course it easily suggested itself. It 
hung in the air, so to speak, after Moltke had given the 
idea of the envelopment of the hostile right wing in his 
orders of about 10.30, and after Prince Frederick Charles 
had used the word "envelop" in the orders to the Guard 
Corps, 2 issued about one hour later, information of which 
order was transmitted to the Crown Prince of Saxony. But 
in any event, even when Captain von der Planitz, describing 
the reconnaissance ride, caused this thought to arise anew, 
it remained a credit to the Crown Prince— and was so com- 
mended by the Prussian General Staff —and a proof of his 
independent thinking and acting, that he immediately, 
without exchanging one word with his chief of staff, 3 adopted 
the plan of envelopment and executed it without first asking 
permission therefor from his superior. This decision of the 
Crown Prince secured victory to the Germans on the 18th 
of August. By operating to beyond the hostile right wing 
the Saxons succeeded in first rolling up the Corps Canrobert 
opposite them and later, by a combined advance with the 
Prussian Guard, in driving the French out of their strong 
position, which latter feat the Guard, unassisted, would 
hardly have been able to perform on that day by its frontal 
attack. 4 

J The German word herumgehen implies a turning movement 
rather than an envelopment as translated on page 137, ante.— Ed. 

8 Page 63, ante. 

3 As was personally told me by an eyewitness, His Excellency 
Lieutenant General Miiller von Berneck, reserve list. 

♦As stated in Studien zur Kriegsgeschicte und Taktik, V, 226 
(Comments), it is true that the measures for the envelopment of the 



448 PAUL HAAKE 

The leader of the Saxons was fully cognizant of this 
merit and has claimed for his corps and himself the glory of 
having turned the scales on the 18th of August; for this we 
have reliable proof. In the copy of Moltke's History of the 
Franco-Prussian War 1870-71, which is in the State Archives 
at Dresden, after the following sentence on page 60 "only 
toward 7 o'clock two Saxon infantry brigades arrived on the 
battlefield on the left of the Guard" we find, in the hand- 
writing of Lieutenant General von Ehrenstein, who died 
in October, 1899, and had owned this copy, the following 
pencil notation, which I transcribed with some difficulty. 
He had participated in the campaign as captain and personal 
adjutant to Prince George and his note, which I publish by 
permission of his relatives, reads: 

"It is amazing that the decisive interference of the Saxons is con- 
sidered so incidental. Our King (Albert) related to me himself that he 
had offered his support to the Guard Corps for the assault on St. Privat 
but that that offer had been declined. He soon perceived that the as- 
sault would fail, and therefore, on his own initiative, de- 
cided on the turning of the hostile right wing which proved decisive." 1 

It is true that this account does not exactly correspond 
with actual facts, for the Crown Prince arrived at the deci- 
sion to turn the French flank long before the attack on St. 
Privat could be thought of. But it is undoubtedly true that 
the decision was the result of his own initiative, and if 
Moltke knew this to be a fact he was guilty of a sin of omis- 
sion in not mentioning it at all in his book. The reason for 
that is probably to be found in a certain dissatisfaction with 



hostile right wing taken by the Crown Prince at about 2 o'clock were 
not quite sufficient; but that was the fault of the insufficient report of 
von Meyerinck. That Canrobert's corps, as the latter reported, was 
marching from Roncourt and St. Privat to Verneville — that is toward 
the rear— was absolutely wrong as was found out later. 

x For more comprehensiveness we will cite two other notations. . 
Of the 3d paragraph, page 58, General von Ehrenstein says: "General 
Fransecky told me personally that he was received by von Moltke with 
reproaches for arriving so late on the battlefield — which was due to 
the long march — and sent at once into the battle." Compare this with 
the personal recollections of J. von Verdy du Vernois, Im Grossen, 
Hauptquartier, 1870-71, p. 108. On page 426 he added to Moltke's sen- 
tence "The war of 1866 was considered by the cabinet as necessary, as 
a long intended and tranquilly prepared campaign," in pencil "and in 
spite of this Bismarck spread, in 1866, the lie believed by many that 
Saxony had commenced the war. This was told me in 1867 by the 
Prussian general staff officer Lieutenant Colonel von Reisewitz." 



SAXONPRINCES 449 

the advance of the Xllth Corps, which appeared to him to 
be too slow. He says on page 59, "the Saxons had already 
participated in the capture of Ste. Marie aux Chenes, but in 
order to attack the enemy in flank the Crown Prince deemed 
it necessary first to assemble his corps at the woods of Au- 
boue. For this one of the brigades (46th) had still to come 
from Jarny, and one (48th) be drawn back from Ste. Marie; 
so, as the corps was late in starting from Mars la Tour in the 
morning, its actual participation could not be expected for 
some hours yet." Is the slight criticism discernable in this 
sentence justified, and could not the Xllth Corps, as is held 
in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, Vol. V, pp. 227-8, 
Comments, perhaps have enveloped the hostile right wing 
somewhat sooner and thereby saved the guard from those 
enormous losses caused by its premature attack in front? 

In his Diary, as narrated by his devoted biographer, page 
255, Prince Frederick Charles expressly states "that he could 
not unqualifiedly agree" with the idea which others had at- 
tributed to him that the Saxons had been too slow; and Field 
Marshal General von der Goltz in his review of Foerster's 
book mentions: "the necessity for the Saxons making the 
long detour which they had chosen," 1 furthermore, Lieuten- 
ant General von Schubert and his son, the editor of the form- 
er's Memoirs, contradict Moltke's and the Great General 
Staff's reproaches in a special appendix to the Memoirs. 2 
General Schubert himself admits that when the 2 o'clock 
orders of the Crown Prince reached his brother three-quar- 
ters of an hour later on the hill south of the village of Batilly, 
the execution of those orders left much to be desired. The 
23d Division, which was to take the road through Coinville 
and the small woods east of Auboue against the position at 
Roncourt, could as Schubert states on page 297, 3 

1 Von der Goltz, Die Denkwiirdigkeiten des Prinzen Friedrich Karl 
von 1866-1885 in Deutsche Rundschau, March number 1911. He says 
the same in 1873 in Die Operationen der II. Armee on page 145: "To 
keep the envelopment as much concealed from the enemy as possible 
and with good prospects of decisive results, it had to be made under 
cover of the steep hill ridge west of Montois in the Orne valley passing 
close to Joeuf." (P. 71 ante) 

2 This applies to the premature attack of the Guard Corps on St. 
Privat at five o'clock in the afternoon. Gustav von Schubert, Leben- 
serinnerungen, pp. 491 to 495. 

» P. 411 ante. 



450 PAULHAAKE 

"at once have started the movement had it been together, especially if 
the 46th Brigade, which had again been placed under the orders of 
Prince George, had not been at that time about one hour behind us; 
the 45th Brigade also was not assembled for some time yet and thus we 
bad to contain ourselves in patience; our different bodies of troops ar- 
rived at Coinville greatly trying our patience with their slowness." 

This was undoubtedly true of the 46th Brigade, which 
was kept back at about 11.30 o'clock by the Crown Prince as 
a reserve and then sent to the Bois de Ponty. Its comman- 
der, Colonel von Montbe, marched with it, as directed by 
Prince George, first to the village of Moineville situated two 
kilometers west of Coinville. This order was given by the 
Prince after due consideration, and was perfectly justified. 1 
But Montbe unnecessarily kept up the battle formation dur- 
ing this march, made nevertheless rapid progress and, hav- 
ing arrived in Moineville toward 4.30 o'clock, remained there 
for some time "instead of closing up, as is the duty of every 
subordinate in rear during the progress of an attack." 8 He 
merely sent off his adjutant to Prince George to ask whether 
he was to proceed further 3 ; it was after five o'clock when 
Captain von der Planitz, dispatched by the Crown Prince, 
found the brigade at Moineville after vainly looking for it at 
Coinville, and not till an hour later did it cross by order of 
Captain Planitz the Ste. Marie— Auboue road— Justin time to 
participate gloriously, in at least the final attack, in the 
charge on St. Privat. Thus, Colonel von Montbe seems in 
my opinion to be justly blamed for insufficient independence, 
presence of mind and energy; but whether parts of the 45th 
Brigade also sorely tried the patience of their division com- 
mander I am unable to ascertain. It appears to me as if all 
regiments of that brigade reached Coinville and were in 
readiness to envelop the hostile right flank as early as the 
rolling country permitted, and the leaders, Prince George 

1 According to the statements of the editor of Schubert's Memoirs, 
Privy Church Councillor Professor Dr. Hans von Schubert, on pp. 493 
and 494, in contrast to the entirely erroneous statements in Studien zur 
Krieg8geschichte und Taktik, Vol. V, p. 170. (P. 249 ante.) 

s According to the judgment of the Saxon Colonel "— r" in the 
Scientific Supplement to the Leipziger Zeitung, 1907, No. 11, page 50. 
(P. 385 ante.) 

"George von Schimpff, "The Xllth Corps in the War of 1870-71. 
Part I- St. Privat la Montagne," p. 91-2, Note. (P. 174 ante.) 



SAXONPRINCES 451 

and Lieutenant Colonel Schubert, made an error possibly 
only in selecting as a concentration point a very unfavorable 
spot, namely the narrow plateau near Coinville, which ended 
in a sharp point and which, on account of being so much ele- 
vated could easily be observed and swept with fire by the 
enemy; but that point of concentration was very soon 
changed farther to the front, to the Ferme Grimoneau east 
of Auboue. 

Concerning the further measures taken by Prince George, 
Lieutenant Colonel Schubert states in his official report: 

"The division commander now took steps to occupy the woods to- 
wards Roncourt, to complete the concentration of the division under 
their cover. Consequently, about 4.15 o'clock, the most western clump 
of woods was occupied by the the 1st and 2d Battalions and a short time 
later the one farthest to the front and east by the 3d Battalion of the 
Rifle Regiment. For protection from the heavy shell fire directed by 
the hostile artillery on those woods and on the 1st and 2d Saxon Cav- 
alry regiments in their vicinity, the 2d Heavy Battery went into posi- 
tion alongside the woods and directed its fire on the hostile batteries in 
position alongside of St. Privat. The 3d Battalion of the Rifle Regi- 
ment, at the edge of the woods farthest in front, now received an un- 
interrupted fire from hedges, situated toward Roncourt and occupied 
by hostile skirmishers, causing material losses in the battalion. (Nev- 
ertheless the battalion advanced to the attack.) 1 

"It was about 4.30 o'clock when an aide from corps headquarters 3 
reached the division commander and placed the 48th Infantry Brigade 
at his disposal for the ordered flank operation against Roncourt. This 
was more welcome as the 46th Infantry Brigade had not yet come up, 
probably because the orderly sent to find that brigade had been un- 
uble to locate it on account of the similarity of names of Moineville and 
Coinville; and the division commander, because of possible failure, did 
not think it advisable to make such an important attack with only one 
brigade. 

"When the 48th Infantry Brigade arrived at about five o'clock, it 
was directed to take the completely covered route along the road until 
nearly at Jouef and from there to take the road to the ridge of Montois 
la Montagne and from there to Roncourt; the three available batteries 
of the division were also attached to this brigade, their former positions 
on the right wing of the division being now taken by the corps artil- 
lery." 

Can now any of these measures taken by Prince George 
and his chief of staff be rightly found fault with? It seems 

1 The sentence in parenthesis was ruled out by Lieutenant Colo- 
nel Schubert personally. 

2 First Lieutenant Mtiller von Berneck. 



452 P A U L H A A K E 

to me that the intention of first concentrating both brigades 
at Coinville or Grimoneau before making an envelopment as 
ordered cannot be designated an error; even an authority like 
Field Marshal von der Goltz appears indeed to share the view 
of General von Schubert "that by ourselves with the 45th 
Brigade alone we could not have executed the envelopment 
with assured succes." Moltke, however, criticises the con- 
centration of the entire Xllth Corps or at least that of three 
brigades at the woods of Auboue only as a delay of the deci- 
sive operations. Prince George ordered the occupation of 
these woods shortly after 3.30 o'clock on instructions from 
his brother who saw from a hill west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
the advance of French infantry from Roncourt on Auboue. 
How important and necessary haste was in this case is shown 
by the battle reports, on file in the Saxon War Archives, of 
the Rifle Regiment and those of its battalions and companies 1 ; 
all agree that not only were the hills between Roncourt and 
Montois la Montagne occupied by about two battalions, but 
also the wood groves to the west of them; and the French 
would undoubtedly have made the Saxon envelopment more 
difficult and would have delayed it more, if they had also oc- 
cupied, ahead of the Rifles coming up on the double time, the 
woods situated not so very far from Auboue and on the 
Orne. Thus there is now only left for consideration the final 
decision of Prince George to advance one brigade along the 
Orne valley as far as the prolongation of the line Roncourt 
—Montois la Montagne and then attack in superior force and 
from the north and west simultaneously the enemy holding 
the villages. Was this decision arrived at on the Prince's 
own initiative and was it in any way an error? 

According to Schubert's account, about 4.30 o'clock First 
Lieutenant Miiller von Berneck, sent by the Crown Prince, 
arrived at Grimoneau, delivering verbal orders to Prince 
George that the hostile right flank was to be enveloped 

1 Boxes 490 and 497. It is stated in the battle report of the 1st Bat- 
talion: "After the difficulties of the march along the narrow valley 
ravine had been overcome, the battalion was started, about 3: 30 o'clock, 
from the plateau east of Auboue in direction of the woods near Ron- 
court, His Royal Highness, the division commander, pointing out the 
importance of these woods for the decision of the day, ordered double 
time to be taken to gain possesion of it." 



SAXON PRINCES 453 

through Roncourt and that for that purpose the 48th Brig- 
ade, which was following the aide from Ste. Marie aux 
Chenes, was placed under his orders. The Crown Prince in- 
formed his brother at the same time that the envelopment 
was to be completed by five o'clock; that the guard would at 
that time attack St. Privat from the direction of Ste. Marie. 
On December 22, 1871, Prince George explained: 

"The 48th Brigade was not given me for the purpose of executing 
with it the envelopment through Montois la Montagne, but probably 
only for the reason that the 46th Brigade had not yet arrived. The 
subsequent envelopment through Montois was not ordered by the com- 
manding general, but was my own special measure." 

According to Schubert the leading elements of the 48th 
Brigade arrived only about 4.45 o'clock. It was five o'clock 
before the enveloping march could be started. There were 
two roads available for this decisive maneuver: 

"it could be executed either as an enveloping of the hostile wing 
by marching through the woods of Aubou6 direct against Roncourt, 
even though we thereby described a larger arc, or as a complete turn- 
ing movement by our marching in the deep cut valley of the Orne to 
opposite Joeuf , there ascending the side of the valley near the village 
of Montois la Montagne, and then turning to the right against the flank 
and rear of the enemy. The latter road was the longest, but would 
have a better decisive effect, and I succeeded in persuading the Prince 
to take it." (p. 299) 1 

The originator of the turning movement extending farth- 
er northeastward was thus Lieutenant Colonel Schubert; 
Prince George apparently did not accede without scruples, 
the main one being probably that he could, in that case, not 
attack at five o'clock as ordered, but hardly before half past 
five. 2 It is to be presumed that he finally acceded only be- 
cause his skirmishers were fired on also from Montois la 
Montagne and because he entertained the belief that this 
village was strongly held by the enemy, which would seem 
to me to justify his and Schubert's decision. Prince Albert 
undoubtedly held the same view. Having been since about 
three o'clock on the hill west of Ste. Marie, he learned from 

1 P. 413 ante. 

8 This fact he also had Lieutenant Miiler von Berneck report to his 
brother; but the lieutenant did not get back to corps headquarters until 
the Crown Prince had stated to an orderly officer of the Guard Corps 
who asked at what time the envelopment would become effective, that 



454 PAUL HAAKE 

the Prussian lieutenant, von Rundstedt, who was returning 
to his Hussar regiment, which also stood under cover at Ste. 
Marie, that hostile infantry was in Montois la Montagne. ] 
He himself and his suite saw that the hostile skirmish line ex- 
tended northward to beyond Roncourt, and shortly after four 
o'clock he believed he could make out the advance of French 
cavalry from there 2 ; the conclusion that the movement from 

the flank attack on Roncourt would start at five o'clock. Lieutenant 
Colonel von Zezschwitz, Albert's chief of staff, called after the Prussian 
adjutant: "Best say 5.45 o'clock." (von Schubert's Lebenserinnerungen, 
pp. 492-2.) Thus Grown Prince Albert was also to blame that the Prince 
August of Wiirtteruberg expected the appearance of the Saxons on 
the right flank of the enemy entirely to early and thus prematurely 
started the frontal attack by the Guard on St. Privat. 

1 It is stated in the war diary of the 4th Squadron of the Guard 
Hussars: "When the Saxon artillery went into position north of the 
woods between Batilly and Ste. Marie, this side of the ravine of Batilly, 
to prepare the attack on Ste. Marie, the 1st Platoon under Lieutenant 
von Rundstedt received orders to proceed as far as Aubou6 and recon- 
noiter on the left flank and in rear of the division toward Briey. Lieu- 
tenant Count Liittiehau joined that platoon. Auboue' was free of the 
enemy. A Saxon rifle regiment was advancing along the road from 
Auboue down the Orne (this was a little before half past three accord- 
ing to the war diary of that regiment). Lieutenant von Rundstedt and 
Count Liittiehau rode ahead of the platoon to Montois la Montagne, 
which they found occupied by hostile infantry. Subsequently, after 
they had assured themselves that there was no room for cavalry on 
this wing, they returned to the regiment, joining it in its position im- 
mediately behind Ste. Marie." 

General von Hodenberg states that cavalry patrols of the Guard 
Corps had reported to the Saxon corps headquarters that Montois la 
Montagne was occupied, but it is more than probable that Crown 
Prince Albert, who was not very far from the Guard Hussar regiment, 
learned of the results of Rundstedt's reconnaissance ride, perhaps even 
before Prince George. In the battle report of the 3d Battalion of the 
107th Regiment which participated in the envelopment (War Archives, 
Box 1575) it is stated that the regimental commander did inform the 
battalion during the march through the Orne valley that Montois prob- 
ably was occupied. The reverse of this, i.e. — that only some few infantry 
men were in Auboue, Joeuf , Montois and Malancourt and that Roncourt 
did not appear to be occupied, is said to have been reported about three 
o'clock by the adjutant of the Guard Hussars, First Lieutenant von 
Beyern, to General von Pape who immediately sent this adjutant to 
the Crown Prince. (Major Kunz, retired, in Kriegsgeschichtliche Beis- 
piele aus dem deutsch-franzosischen Kriege von 1870-71, part 10; The 
Battle of St. Privat la Montagne, p. 29). I have been unable to find any 
substantiation of this in the archives. 

2 The battle report of the 2d Cavalry Regiment (War Archives, 
Box 505, No. 16) states: "Toward 4.30 o'clock the regiment (the pres- 
ent 2d Hussar Regiment No. 19) received orders through a first lieuten- 
ant of the engineer corps that it as well as the other divisional cavalry 
(the 1st Cavalry Regiment, at present the 1st Hussar Regiment No. 18) 
should advance south or north of the woods between Ste. Marie and 
Joeuf, as hostile cavalry was supposed to be behind that wood." 



SAXON PRINCES 455 

Auboue against Roncourt ordered about 2 oclock would lead 
to a frontal attack, and that the 23d division would have to 
reach out further if it desired to bring about an actual en- 
velopment, was thus not far fetched. The orders of Prince 
Frederick Charles, sent from Habonville at about 2.45 o'clock 
to have the telegraph and Metz— Thionville railroad destroyed 
by Saxon cavalry and thus take from the hostile army its 
last and only communication with Paris, T probably reached 
the Crown Prince early enough to induce him to change his 
dispositions. Basing his decision on his own personal obser- 
vations, he was undoubtedly justified in taking the initial 
steps for an enveloping movement along the Orne, 2 though 

1 These orders were printed verbatim in volume 5 of Studien zur 
Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik on page 192 (P. 70 ante). But it is not men- 
tioned there that the last sentence "Everything goes well so far, thank 
God" is an addition in the handwriting of Captain von Hodenberg. 
Prince Frederick Charles appears several times to have urged the 
Crown Prince to advance more rapidly; Major von Werder brought 
such a request, as I was informed by Colonel von Kretschmar, and de- 
livered his message in such a blunt manner that the Crown Prince com- 
plained to Prince Frederick Charles the next day. The Saxon artillery 
advanced more quickly than stated in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und 
Taktik as has been explained in detail by Colonel von Kretschmar in 
the Leipziger Zeitung. 

2 According to the French General Staff account, Montois was not 
at all occupied and the situation of the Corps Canrobert at about five 
o'clock was as follows: 

"On the extreme right the 1st Battalion of the 75th Regiment still 
held the summit of the ridge which descends from Roncourt to the 
woods of Auboue, one company extended as skirmishers and one com- 
pany in reserve at the edge of the woods. General Bisson had Ron- 
court occupied by the 1st Battalion of the 9th Regiment; the 2d Bat- 
talion being in reserve south of the village." (Les operations cautour 
de Metz du 13 au 18 Aout; III., Texte. Paris 1905, p. 138.) "According 
to the documents available it does not appear that the French infantry 
extended as far as Montois (p. 441.") But the war diaries of the Rifle 
Regiment and of the Grenadier Regiment No. 101 are in accord in 
definitely maintaining that the enemy fired from Montois. It is prob- 
able that no complete organizations were within that village, but only 
stragglers or dispersed soldiers; for several men — not belonging to 
any regiments of the Corps Canrobert who had been looting in Ste. 
Marie were later on captured. (Kunz, The Battle of St. Privat, (p. 18) 
Captain von Klenck states in his report: ''A Saxon infantry regiment 
stood behind Auboufi, the officers of which were sure that the valley of 
the Orne was held in force by strong French detachments," and it is 
possible that such detachments were still there in the early afternoon 
hours, for numerous artificial obstructions increased the difficulties of 
the advance of von Klenck's squadron (Page 112 ante) on the road as 
far as Moyeuvre la Grande (von Schimpff , Das Xllth Corps, I, 117, 
note), but that squadron was not directly interfered with by the enemy 
and this latter fact also seems to indicate that the French right wing 
did not extend as far north as Montois during the later afternoon hours 
and in the evening. 



466 PAULHAAKE 

that appears to me not to have been the measure best cor- 
responding to actual conditions; for Montois la Montagne 
was evidently occupied only temporarily and by inferior 
forces so that the enemy was unequal to meet a direct attack 
on that village from Auboue. 

Thus considering all the facts in the case, it appears 
that Molke was justified in taking the view that the Saxons 
could have been sooner at the assigned place and could have 
thus sooner decided the battle in favor of the Germans. If 
the riflemen, who held the woods at Auboue from a little 
after four o'clock, had not been compelled to carry on a mere 
delaying action for about an hour and a half, and if the other 
two regiments belonging to the 45th Brigade had, as was en- 
tirely feasible, proceeded at about five o'clock from those 
woods in the direction of Montois la Montagne, and if the 
48th Brigade, which arrived with its leading elements at 
as early as 4.45 o'clock, had immediately ascended the slope 
for the direct support of the two regiments of the 45th 
Brigade, 1 then the attack of the Xllth Corps and the Guard 
Corps would have been made simultaneously and the Prus- 
sians would probably have been spared the enormous losses 
suffered; provided that their artillery in the meantime had 
kept up a sharp and effective fire on the defenders of St. 
Privat. Lieutenant Colonel Schubert's intended cutting off 
of the French battalions between Montois and Roncourt was 
not successful, since they fell back in good order to the vil- 
lage of Malancourt farther to the east. Because of their 
weak numbers they would undoubtedly have done the same 
thing had the Saxons advanced with the 45th and 48th 

x In the report of the 2d Grenadier Regiment No. 101 (War Arch- 
ives, Box 491, Appendices to the war diary of the 2d Grenadier Regi- 
ment No. 101) it is stated that the regiment took up a position in re- 
serve west of the woods situated between Auboue and Roncourt. 
''While in that position it received orders at 5.15 p.m. to advance with 
the Schulz Brigade, which had been given direction on Montois, in a 
simultaneous attack against Roncourt as soon as special orders for 
that should be received; but to, at once, send one battalion (1st) in the 
direction of Montois as well as the advance of the Schulz Brigade and 
then to join the general advance against Roncourt. * * * * When 
leaving the brigade this battalion took a covered position in the direc- 
tion of Montois within the woods southwest of that village and 
advanced its skirmishers to within about 800 paces thereof. The bat- 
tallion was fired on in this position from Montois." 






SAXONPRINCES 457 

Brigades directly on Montois from the west at about five 
o'clock. 1 

The commander of the 23d Division reported the follow- 
ing day to corps headquarters: 

"It was 5.45 when the enveloping column became visible on the 
heights of Montois la Montagne and when thus the expected moment 
had arrived for the concentric attack against Roncourt. While the 
48th Brigade, which had found Montois unoccupied, advanced from 
the north on Roncourt, the brigade under General von Craushaar 
advanced from the clump of woods against the west side of the village, 
drove off the hostile skirmish lines in front of it, and, as Roncourt had 
already been evacuated by the enemy, turned with its right wing 
against the northern flank of St. Privat, from whence a destructive 
infantry fire was thinning the ranks. 

"At about 6.30 o'clock Roncourt — found free of the enemy — was 
occupied by the 1st Battalion of the 2d Grenadier Regiment and de- 
tachments of the 2d Rifle Battalion, while on their right the 2d and 3d 
Battalions of the same regiment and parts of the 2d Battalion of the 
Life guard Grenadier Regiment engaged in a fire fight against St. 
Privat and came under a very effective fire. At the same time the 
light batteries which had accompanied the envelopment took position 
at 7.15 south of Roncourt, facing St. Privat, which village then became 
the focal point of the battle. All these detachments vigorously at- 
tacked the village, in conjunction with the Prussian 1st Guard In- 
fantry Division which had been unable to force the entrance on the 
side from Ste. Marie. 

"The division commander, at Roncourt, now ordered the 48th 
Infantry to advance between Roncourt and the edge of the woods 
north of it and attack St. Privat from the rear, but the edge of those 
woods was occupied by strong hostile infantry (the 100th Regiment) 
which made an advance there impossible and which drew the charges 
of the 48th Brigade onto itself and away from St. Privat. Further 
details of this affair will be found in the report of Captain von Treitschke. 

"This last supporting point.of the enemy was hotly attacked by 
the Saxon corps artillery and set afire, in a bombardment lasting from 
7.15 to 7.45 o'clock, compelling the enemy to evacuate the western en- 
trance to St. Privat. When the Saxon infantry, close to that entrance, 
observed this, it advanced to the assault and the 4th s and 11th Com- 
panies of the Life Guard Grenadier Regiment and the 11th Company 
of the 2d Grenadier Regiment were the first of the attackers to enter 
the village. From the direction of Roncourt the enveloping fire fight 
was simultaneously continued against the enemy still holding the east 

'According to the war diaries of the 7th and 8th Companies of the 
Rifle Regiments the woods situated south of Montois were evacuated 
by the French at about 5.15 o'clock. 

*In the oi'iginal the 4 is inserted with blue pencil over a 10. 



458 PAUL HAAKE 

side of the village by the Life Guard Grenadier Regiment and by the 
1st Battalion 2d Grenadier Regiment and in this phase of the battle 
General von Craushaar found a hero's death. 

"Towards 7.45 the 46th Infantry Brigade had come up from 
Moineville to behind the leading firing line. It received orders to 
carry out the last assault against the west end of the stubbornly de- 
fended village. When this assault seemed sufficiently prepared by the 
batteries of the corps artillery and of the 23d Infantry Division, the 
46th Brigade advanced to the assault. The enemy, not awaiting this 
final charge, retreated along the road to Metz, and thus the battle of 
St. Privat came to an end. The firing of the opposing batteries con- 
tinued until after dark and closed the bloody struggles of this day. 
The 7th Infantry Regiment No. 106, fighting on the extreme left wing 
of the 48th Infantry Brigade, had also succeeded in pressing forward 
along the edge of the forest as far as the road to Metz, thus completely 
closing this line of operation to the enemy. 

"The division bivouacked in the positions held at approaching 
darkness on the captured battlefield. The division commander can 
bear testimony to the fact that all troops of the division performed 
their full duty. Details can be seen in the special reports submitted 
by the troops. 

(signed) George. H. z. S." 

Crown Prince Albert, who remained on the hill west of 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes until after six o'clock and then pro- 
ceeded to the left wing and finally to Roncourt, also gave 
much praise to all troops participating in the battle. At the 
conclusion of his report, sent that same evening to King 
John, he says: 

"All commanders distinguished themselves by correct leadership 
and all troops by extraordinary bravery, and the army corps was thus 
enabled to bring about a vei*y decisive turn in the battle, as was gra- 
ciously acknowledged the very evening of the day of battle by head- 
quarters of the Second Army." 

The Saxons received the same acknowledgment also 
from General von Pape, the commanding General of the 1st 
Guard Infantry Division, who appears to have laid great 
stress on the gaining of the sympathies of these new com- 
rades in arms. Prior to the assault on Ste. Marie aux Chenes 
—although convinced that his troops could successfully ac- 
complish that assault unaided— he proposed to the Saxon 
Major General von Nehrhoff to open this first battle— ex- 
pected to be a successful one— in conjunction with the 



SAXONPRINCES 459 

Guard; 1 and in accordance with this proposition the 1st 
Guard Division charged the village from the southwest, the 
Saxon division from the northwest. Concerning the advance 
of the latter division Von Pape reported from Gonesse on 
the 24th of September to headquarters of the Guard Corps: 

"The fire of the artillery was then reinforced by Major Richter, 
commanding the 2d Battalion of the Saxon 12th Field Artillery Regi- 
ment, and, as soon as the Saxon troops under Colonel von Leonhardi, 
Von Elterleinand Von Tettau were on a line with the advance guard, 
the assault was commenced, the Jager Battalion Crown Prince of 
Saxony No. 12, under Major Count Holtzendorff , distinguishing itself 
by its impetuous ardor. I greatly regret my inability to give the 
names of several officers of the organizations mentioned whom I per- 
sonally perceived distinguishing themselves during and after the 
action, because they deserve the fullest recognition, especially the 
officers and men of the Jager Battalion." 

On the other hand, General von Pape mentions several 
officers and noncommissioned officers of two Saxon Grenadier 
regiments, who greatly distinguished themselves in the as- 
sault on St. Privat. 2 He added: 

"The 4th Foot Guard Regiment states in its battle report, dated 
August 19, and consequently while still under the fresh impressions of 
events 'It should be mentioned that the officers of the Saxon Life 
Regiment performed quite unusual services in this (assault;') I (von 
Pape) personally conversed with several of the (saxon) gentlemen, 
being compelled to give them the same measure of praise as to my 
own troops." 

In 1870, and today still as it seems, such examples were 
necessary to create and maintain a genuine and true com- 
radeship between Prussians and Saxons. The fact that the 
left wing of the Guard urgently needed the help of theXIIth 
Corps in the seventh afternoon hour of the 18th of August 
and that Von Pape's aid, Second Lieutenant von Esbeck, 
called Von Platen, almost imploringly begged the Saxons to 

x Pape subsequently expressly stated that he was guided in this by 
military and political reasons. See the verbatim statement reprinted 
in Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, vol. 6, p. 173, Note 1. (Page 
251, ante.) 

8 Of the Life Guard Grenadier Regiment No. 100, Captains von 
Doring and von Klutchtzner. First Lieutenants von Grunenwald and 
Krabitz ("the latter especially distinguished himself,") Second 
Lieutenant von Gregory and "an especially brave first sergeant, 
named Roll;" "of the Grenadier Regiment No. 101 Captain von Rouvroy 
and adjutant First Lieutenant von Schwanenwede and Second Lieu- 



460 PAUL HAAKE 

bring that help 1 is not admitted in 1906 by the Great General 
Staff, and, even during the day of the battle jealousy un- 
doubtedly influenced the decisions of the highest leaders of 
the Guard. Major General von Dannenberg, chief of staff 
of the Guard Corps, replied to General von Kessel, who 
counselled that the defenders of St. Privat be first of all 
shaken or silenced by artillery and that the arrival of the 
Xllth Corps be awaited: 

''We shall attack. If we do not take St. Privat the Saxons will 
get it ahead of us. The brigade (led by General von Kessel) will reap 
the harvest of today. 2 " 

Geneneral von Wittich sent word to the Guard Rifles 
shortly before five o'clock that the guard would advance 

tenant Schneider; and also First Lieutenant von Werlhoff and Second 
Lieutenant Hauth. Coming farther from the west, between the 4th 
and 2d Guard Regiments, detachments of this regiment under Captains 
Hager and von Engel, First Lieutenants von Metsch and Kallenbach 
and several junior officers, among them Lieutenants von Scheie, 
Siggel, Raber, von Pereira, Uhlemann, Ensign Schiitze, First Sergeants 
Florey, Richter, Lommatzsch and others, pressed forward wish great- 
est bravery." 

1 In the battle report of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment 
No. 197 (War Archives, Box 1,575, Battle reports of the 2d Infantry 
Brigade No. 48) it is stated : "After half the distance (to Roncourt) 
had been covered an orderly officer of the Prussian Guard Hussar 
Regiment arrived who urgently entreated support in the charge on 
the village of St. Privat la Montagne. The 2d Battalion, in conjunction 
with the 1st Battalion, therefore advanced on St. Privat." The same, 
and in almost the exact language, is stated in the battle report of the 
2d Grenadier Regiment No. 101 (War Archives, War diary of the 2d 
Grenadier Regiment No. 101.) 

s Studien zur Kriegsgesehichte und Taktik, vol. v, p. 410 (Page 300 
ante). Count Pfeil recounts this exchange of words in his previously 
mentioned book, on page 44: "I reported to General von Kessel what 
I had seen. But immediately thereafter General von Dannenberg the 
almighty chief of staff of the Guard Corps, came riding up. We 
adjutants knew that the two generals were not on the best of terms 
and that the latter did not look with any great favor on our (1st Guard) 
regiment. Some distance away from us, both generals argued in evi- 
dent excitement, during which argument General von Kessel several 
times pointed in the direction where the Saxons were." The charge 
on St. Privat was ordered and commenced. "We now found out what 
General Kessel had told the chief of staff in that heated discourse, 
namely that we ought to wait with the attack to give the Saxons time 
to come up.' (p. 50.) Thus it appears that Prince Albert and Dan- 
nenberg were equally to blame for the premature advance and Lieu- 
tenant Colonel von Cammerer is undoubtedly right in stating in his 
review of Foerster's book (Forschungenzur branderiburger und preus- 
sischer Oeschichte, XXIV, 320-1): "Through incorrect selection of his 
place of observation Prince Frederick Charles was brought to approve 
the premature attack made by the Guard Corps, though up to that 
moment he had reckoned more on the effect of the simultaneous en- 



SAXONPRINCES 461 

about five o'clock to force the decision: 1 but according to the 
official Prussian account 2 the commanding general of the 
Guard Corps, Prince August of Wiirttemberg, was induced 
to make the premature frontal attack mainly by the sudden 
silence of the French artillery and by movements of hostile 
detachments from Roncourt toward St. Privat, which led 
him to believe that the enemy was weakening himself in 
his main position, in order either to fall back upon Metz, or 
to throw himself upon Manstein's IXth Corps and break 
through there. Yet, according to the statements of Count 
von Pfeil, 3 Prince August of Wiirttemberg held the same 
views as General von Dannenberg and General von Wittich, 
namely, that other troops should not be allowed to dispute 
with the Prussian Guard the laurels of victory* and it hap- 
pened probably more by reason of this desire than by reason 
of the above mentioned consent of Prince Frederick Charles 



velopment by the Saxons. Had he himself seen personally at the 
proper time and place that the Saxons were not yet far enough ad- 
vanced to allow them to envelop the enemy, he surely would have 
withheld his approval of the attack by the Guard." The Prussian 
Minister of War, Bronsart von Schellendorff I., told Hans Delbruck 
that Prince August of Wiirttemberg had ordered the attack and re- 
gretted the error committed by him until his death. Delbruck also 
states in 1911 in the 146th part of the Prussian Jahrbiicher on page 530: 
"Prince Frederick Charles did not order the fatal attack, but merely 
gave his assent when asked by Prince August." 

1 Studien zur Kriegsgeschite und Taktik, V. 466 (P. 329 ante.) 

'Tbid, V, 376 et seq. (P. 273 ante). It is true that that work, on 
page 447 (Comments), also mentions "the awakening jealous desire to 
secure to the Guard Corps the fullest measure of participation in the 
expected victory." Von derGoltz says (in Deutche Rundschau 1911, p. 
337): "The day was declining and still the battle had to be decided 
before dark. There was no longer any opportunity for delay, consid- 
eration, waiting; neither could further reconnaissance be carried on. 
In the Guard Corps the decision had been made to storm St. Privat 
and Prince Frederick Charles approved that decision; all those near 
him felt like him and agreed with him." On the other hand, Prince 
August's decision was condemned by Major von Kunz (Kriegsgeschicht- 
liche Beispiele, X, p. 30 etseq.), by General von Pape and by others. 

3 In Vor Vierzig Jahren, p. 50. "Neither the corps commander, 
Prince August of Wiirttemberg, nor his chief of staff found it necessary 
to find out for themselves how far away the Saxons were; they be- 
lieved that St. Privat was but weakly occupied; they did not have the 
artillery prepare the attack; and now they demanded that the assault 
against this completely intact and strong position should commence 
at once so that the Saxons would not reap the harvest." 

4 Crown Prince Albert and his chief of staff had given assurance 
that the attack of the Saxons on Roncourt might take place between 
5 and 5.15 o'clock! 



462 PAUL HAAKE 

that the Prince remained as deaf to the well considered 
counsel of General Pape, who insisted on waiting, as did his 
chief of staff to General KessePs advice. As is known, Otto 
von Bismarck openly and gruffly stated to Moritz Bush in 
Versailles concerning these events: 1 

"At St. Privat the Guard unreasonably attacked out of sheer pro- 
fessional jealousy, and then, when it failed, it shifted the burden of 
blame onto the Saxon troops, who could not possibly have gotten up 
any quicker considering the long march, and who subsequently brought 
the Guard out of their dilemma with admirable bravery." 

In conversation with Robert von Keudell, the Chancellor 
stormed equally against the chief of staff of the Guard Corps, 
who, "without waiting for the Saxons, intended to finish 
the matter alone," and whose method of throwing the best 
and picked troops, the Guard Rifles and Jagers, against the 
trenches of St. Privat not in skirmish order, but in column, 
he condemned as criminal. 3 Moltke, it is true held that 
much might be cited in justification of the errors committed 
and would not entertain Bismarck's demand that the Prince 
of Wurttemberg should be dismissed; but, on the other hand, 
he was fully cognizant of the merits of the commander of 
the Xllth Corps, as is proved by his recommendation to have 
him appointed commander of the Meuse. Later he said as 
is well known: 

"Of all the generals in this great war the Crown Prince of Saxony 
understood me best. His leadership is signalized by two important 
qualities: absolute and intelligent obedience to supreme authority, 
and energy in execution. It was these two characteristic qualities 

1 Moritz Busch, Tagebuchblatter, I, 575. 

s Robert von Keudell, Fiirst und Fiirst in Bismarck, p. 452. King 
William appears to have been just as indignant. In the Diary of Field 
Marshal Count von Blumenthal, (Stuttgart & Berlin, 1902) he states on 
page 82: "Saturday, August 20, 1870. . . . The King was intensely 
strained by the fatigues of the campaign, and had become quite nerv- 
ous. "What affected him most were the terrible losses among the 
officers in the battle of the 18th. He complained bitterly that the 
officers of the higher grades appeared to have forgotten all that had 
been taught them so carefully in maneuvers, and had apparently all 
lost their heads: battles like that we could not stand for long." On 
August 21, 1870, Major Hans von Kretschman wrote to his wife: "The 
poor Guard! An insane leadership caused it to suffer losses which 
can never be made good; there are no depot battalions for the officers' 
corps." Kriegsbriefe aus den Jahren 1870-71, by Hans von Kretsch- 
man, later General of Infantry, edited by Lily von Braun, nee von 
Kretschman, page 70.) 



SAXONPRINCES 463 

that made the leadership of the Array of the Meuse by the Crown 
Prince so conspicuous." 

Though in 1906 the Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und 
Taktik deny the Crown Prince the possession of the "strong, 
pitiless will of a leader' ' because he did not, in spite of the 
fatigue of the troops, obey the orders of Prince Frederick 
Charles to advance still on the evening of August 18 with 
at least one brigade to Woippy and there interrupt railroad 
and telegraph, it is only necessary to state in justification 
what Von Hodenberg stated in 1898 in regard to the delay 
of the pursuit that: The Crown Prince did not execute the 
orders of Prince Frederick Charles until early in the morn- 
ing of the 19th because on account of the darkness and the 
forest, it could not be seen in what condition was the enemy, 
who still showed a strong artillery line. Crown Prince 
Albert and his Saxons performed what lay in their power to 
achieve the victory of St. Pri vat — with the possible excep- 
tion of Conel von Montbe, who did not bring his brigade 
against the enemy quickly enough, and of some other sub- 
ordinate leaders, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Schubert, 
who talked Prince George into making this envelopment too 
far reaching before knowing the strength of the enemy in 
Montois la Montagne. Every unprejudiced historian must 
consequently agree with the Prussian Captain Helmuth, who 
as early as 1873 condensed the result of his investigations in 
the following words: 1 

■Von Helmuth, Die Preussischen Garden am IS. August 1870. A 
lecture delivered before the Scientific Society of Berlin, February 22, 
1873, page 69 (P. 28 ante.) According to Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte 
und Taktik, V, 444, (P. 337 ante:) "at the close of the seventh hour only 
General von Kessel estimated the situation correctly. These men, 
who, with defiant bravery had lived through the worst battle crisis, 
stubbornly holding the captured position, were still imbued with the 
desire to get forward and it needed but little encouragement to carry 
them on." "General von Kessel felt that a decisive attack from the 
center of the position against the northwest corner of St. Privat gave 
the best promise of success .... Undoubtedly the intrepid ad- 
vance of the Guard had made the enemy uncertain and irresolute. 
General von Kessel could so far see nothing of the expected interfer- 
ence of the Saxons." (page 442) (page 325 ante.) On the other hand, 
Count Pfeil, who had been sent by General Kessel shortly before 6.30 
to the Prince of Wiirttemberg with the request for support, states in 
his recollections of the campaign: "My report (that the 4th Guard 
Regiment would soon advance on our left for support, for which, ac- 
cording to Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik, it received orders 
about 6.30) reassured him (Kessel) somewhat in regard to the situation. 



464 PAULHAAKE 

"As a matter of fact, the final decision in the heavy battle is to be 
credited to the interference of the Saxon Corps, not only to the pressure 
of its main masses but also to the heroic deeds of the battalions which 
directly entered the battle. The glory due to the Saxons must be ac- 
corded them without reservation. But just as joyfully will an unbiased 
judgment recognize that only in consequence of the self-sacrifice of 
the Guard the decision came with such suddenness and such far reach- 
ing consequences." 

Field Marshal von der Goltz also says: 1 

"At this late day we cannot say if delay by the Guard would 
have had the desired result; for the attack in front fostered and hast- 
ened the envelopment, which without that attack might have been 
beaten to St. Privat by darkness." 

That valorous charge of the Guard, forced, I might say, 
Marshal Canrobert to mass his corps and to do without suffi- 
cient extension and security of his right flank; the envelop- 
ment of the latter, the prerequisite for German victory, was 
in thought an independent conception of Crown Prince 
Albert and its execution entirely the work of his army corps; 
the capture of the key of the hostile position, St. Privat, is 
therefore, though there might be something left to desire in 
the entire co-operation, due equally to Saxons and Prussians. 

In conclusion let us examine how the Crown Prince 
viewed the entire work of the day immediately after the con- 
clusion of the battle. It is true that this report, contained 
in his diary of August 18, is but a summary, but still a very 
characteristic one with all its brevity. 

"At five o'clock in the morning," thus reads the report, "Freder- 
ick Charles assembled the corps commanders of the Guard and the 12th 
Corps with their chiefs of staff and issued his orders for the advance 
to us verbally. My corps was to form the leading, left, echelon; every 
unit in battle formation. We found no enemy as far as Jarny, leading 
me to the belief that he had withdrawn. At Jarny reports reached me 
that he stood in position at St. Privat. I started the 24th Division on 



It was also seen that the Saxons were finally approaching." (Vor 
Vierzig Jahren, page 55.) Mention has already been made (G. von 
Schubert's Lebenserrinerungen, p. 495) of the passage of the French 
General Staff Account: "When the 48th Saxon Brigade appeared in 
the direction of Montois at about 6.15, threatening from the north the 
weak force at Roncourt, already hard pressed by the 45th Brigade, the 
commander of the 6th Corps felt that retreat to the Bois de Saulny was 
inevitable." 

'In the Deutsche Rundschau, March 1911. — Ed 



SAXON PRINCES 466 

Marie au chenes, the 45th Brigade on Coinville, holding the 46th Brig- 
ade in reserve; the corps artillery went to the heights west of Marie 
au chenes, to which point I also went. Arrived there, I saw the battle- 
field in my front; gradually rising slopes east of Marie au chenes and 
St. Privat, the highest point being marked by Doncourt 1 on the forest 
this side of Metz, formed the hostile position. After a short bombard- 
ment Marie was captured by the 47th Brigade in conjunction with the 
1st Guard Division, and subsequently held against two very heavy 
counter attacks (executed by lines continuously firing). I left the vil- 
lage to the Guard and issued orders for the entire 23d Division to push 
forward from Coinville through Montois towards Roncourt, for which 
purpose I gave it the 4th Brigade as a reserve. The corps artillery went 
into position on the road north of Marie and advanced, as the 23d Di- 
vision pushed forward, on Doncourt (Roncourt. — H.), which it captured 
by its fire. I rode on ahead and arrived just when the artillery (now 90 
guns) went into position at Roncourt and fired on St. Privat, which had 
repulsed three attacks made by the Guard, causing them great loss. 
This artillery gave the Guard a breathing space. The 45th Brigade now 
pushed into the burning village with the Guard and held it. The 46th 
Brigade, with loud hurrahs, then approached the other side of the vil- 
lage and thereafter the battle ended in the darkness with a bombard- 
ment, doing small damage to us. 

"I remained in the half ruined Doncourt (Roncourt). Glad of the 
victory we remained awake until toward midnight and refreshed our- 
selves on the things we found in the houses. In war we become cal- 
lous; while we were happy the body of Colonel von Roder of the 1st 
Guard Regiment was lying immediately below our window. Poor 
Zeschwitz, 2 whom I had sent off to receive orders, fell in the darkness 
and broke his collar bone, also hurting his knee, so that he had to be 
carried back." 

Assuredly pride speaks in these lines; the supposition 
that the Prussian Guard would have bled to death in the vain 
charge on St. Privat had not the Saxon Xllth Corps hastened 
to its relief, is evidently shared by Crown Prince Albert. 
But with how very few words he describes the interference 
first of the Saxon artillery, then of the infantry! How mod- 
estly does he mention or rather hide his own personal merit 
and how the last sentences especially touch our sympathies. 
He does not say that the envelopment of the hostile right 
flank sprang from his own initiative, nor that he offered to 
Prince August of Wurttemberg his support in the assault on 
St. Privat, and had it declined; nor that he offered to the 

Should read Roncourt.— Haake. 

2 Lieutenant Colonel von Zezschwitz, chief of staff of Xllth Corps. 



466 PAULHAAKE 

lance corporal of the 1st Guard Regiment who requested the 
honor of being allowed to stand guard over the body of his 
dead colonel part of the very small amount of food which the 
victor found in the village— and, when he subsequently came 
to speak again of the 18th of August, he mentioned this in- 
cident, as Count Pfeil narrates, 1 only to laud as an excellent 
example of soldierly virtues that Prussian guardsman who 
declined to partake of food and drink by the side of the 
body of his dead commander. Such an example Prince Al- 
bert undoubtedly was himself; he was not only a leader of 
importance far exceeding the average leader, but also a true 
comrade with an unusually noble mind and heart. Through 
his fine tactfulness, through his unselfishness in thought and 
act, always aiming at the best for all, he gained in 1870-71 
for the German cause not less merit than he did through his 
strategic leadership. As I have seen from the files of the 
Saxon War Archive and from the campaign diary of one of 
my regimental comrades, subsequent to August 18 minor 
conflicts frequently arose between Prussian and Saxon com- 
rades in arms. 2 It would be an interesting task to set these 
forth from reliable sources, as well as the endeavors to over- 
come these conflicts; in which efforts Crown Prince Albert 
undoubtedly took a principle part, as in the battle of St. Pri- 
vat. Among the Prussians, his efforts at reconciliation were 
supported, in first line, by General von Pape, Moltke and 
Bismarck— it is to be hoped that the critics on both sides of 
the question may bear this in mind. Ascertainment of the 
historical truth, will, as it is hoped this essay will show, go 
exceedingly well hand in hand with this. 

1 Vor vierzig Jahren,~p. 65. 

2 Karl Strey, Erinnerungen an den Krieg 1870-71, published by 
me in the October number of the periodicalSoldaten/ret/nd, pr>. 200 and 
207. 



Saxons and Prussians on the Day of the 
Battle of St. Privat 1 

The charge of excessive slowness, made by Moltke in 
his history of the Franco-Prussian War, in reference to the 
Xllth Corps on August 18, 1870, may possibly be justified in 
so far as applies to the early morning hours; for, though 
Prince Frederick Charles issued his orders to the Second 
Army as early as five o'clock, and though Crown Prince 
Albert issued his orders to the Xllth Corps twenty minutes 
later, the advance guard of the Saxons did not start, in 
battle formation from Mars la Tour until seven o'clock, the 
main body of the 23d Division half an hour later, the 24th 
Division having to wait even longer. Speaking of this, the 
battle report of the 24th Division states: "The division 
started in obedience to orders at six o'clock in the morning 
to march into a battle position at Mars la Tour, which at 
that moment was taken up by the 23d Division, but which 
was to be evacuated by that division at once. This position, 
astride the road to Jarny north of Mars la Tour, was occu- 
pied as follows: the 46th Brigade and the artillery on the 
right side of the road, the 48th on the left side, the cavalry 
regiment being somewhat ahead on the right side of the 
road. The start from this position could not be made (in 
rear of the 23d Division and corps artillery) until about nine 
o'clock because the 47th Brigade was delayed by the narrow 
streets of Mars-la-Tour and arrived very late. One Guard 
division, which was to march behind the division to the right 
was thereby much to its annoyance, considerably delayed 
but without our being to blame. After ten o'clock the 
division encountered, in the narrow defile this side of Jarny, 
the corps artillery assembled in rear of the 23d Division, 
and took a position at Moncel Chateau in densely crowded 
columns on both sides of the road." 

1 Reprint from New Archives of Saxon History and Archaeology, 
vol. XXXIII, parts 3 & 4. Supplement to preceding article. 

467 



468 PAULHAAKE 

The war diaries of the separate companies, battalions 
and regiments of the 47th Brigades vary extraordinarily in 
their accounts of the start from the bivouac. In the 48th 
Brigade seven o'clock is given by almost all organizations as 
the hour of starting— that would have been probably the 
regulation distance, as the start was made in march columns 
and executed by orders in that formation until the place of 
rendezvous north of Mars-la-Tour was reached. 

I am unable to decide if any time could have been saved 
by taking up the battle formation at the very start; but it 
appears certain to me that on account of that very formation 
the advance from Mars-la-Tour to Jarny was delayed; and 
of that we have several proofs which cannot be questioned. 
The war diary of the 1st Battalion of the 104th Infantry 
Regiment states: "Start from Mars la Tour at 9 a.m; the 
12th Jager Battalion formed the advance guard. Only the 
led horses and ammunition wagons were to accompany the 
battalion. Advanced through the bottom, leading from 
Mars-la-Tour to Jarny, on the right wing of the regiment. 
An exceedingly hard march, as that bottom consisted for 
the most part of wet meadows traversed by deep ditches. 
There were still many dead Prussians and Frenchmen lying 
about, killed in the battle which had taken place here." 
Dr. Helsig, Head Librarian of the Leipzig University, who 
participated in the War of 1870 as assistant first sergeant of 
the Reserve in the 102d Infantry Regiment, states in a letter: 
' 'According to my recollection we advanced there without 
interruption with exception that, marching in this brigade 
in battle formation, we had to halt several times for a short 
while enroute to reestablish the formation." Major Haase, 
reserve list, who served as ensign in 1870 in the 12th Field 
Artillery Regiment, wrote me— I give these excerps from 

their letters by permission of the gentlemen mentioned : 

"The advance was materially delayed by complying with 
the orders to march in mass of brigades. In the first place 
we had not practiced such march formation in peace time, 
and besides it could not be done in that terrain. The troops 
in several instances encountered obstacles which could be 
overcome or avoided by the infantry without having to break 
the formation, but which compelled the divisional artillery, 
which had orders to march with contracted battery fronts 
between the infantry brigades, to take up column formation, 
subsequently again deploying at the trot to gain their pre- 



SAXONS AND PRUSSIANS 469 

scribed formation. The corps artillery also, marching be- 
tween the two divisions, was in many instances forced to 
assume column formation, deploying again subsequently." 

"Concerning the comradeship existing between Saxons 
and Prussians," says Major General Haase, "there is no in- 
dication of antipathy according to my recollections; on the 
18th of August we only had the depressing feeling that the 
crossing with the Guard Corps had been ordered to keep us 
away from the firing— in other words that we were not 
trusted." 1 Librarian Dr. Holssig gave me the following in- 
teresting information concerning this. "It is probably very 
natural that there existed at the start among the Saxon 
troops, who had fought against the Prussians four years be- 
fore then, a certain amount of antipathy against the former 
enemy, that is, at least among those troops who in those days 
(1866) had been in the field. This was less the case with the 
officers than with the older noncommissioned officers. But 
the feeling soon disappeared. Even during the very first 
marches the perfect correctness of the dispositions taken by 
the Great General Staff had a great deal to do with this 
change of feeling, especially when comparisons were made 
with conditions obtaining in the Austrian campaign. And in 
addition, the Prussian troops, whenever we came together, 
met our men with such true comradeship, that even the most 
prejudiced were induced to change their previous opinions. 
Concerning the Guard especially, their military bearing, seen 
on the march, aroused our admiration. This admiration was 
increased even more in front of Paris where we were next 
to them on the investing line and where we frequently occu- 
pied outposts together, on which occasions we learned with 
what absolute faithfulness to duty and precision they per- 
formed their service. On that account we never felt any 
jealously when the Guard let fall an expression like 'That 
surely w r as a day for the Guard!' when the 18th of August 
was being discussed." 

Undoubtedly the Guard's valorous though premature 
attack on St. Privat conduced to shaking the enemy 
and preparing his final defeat. And no less must 
all Saxon participants in the battle express their warm thanks 
to the Guard for acknowledging clearly the decisive 
influence, brought by our Crown Prince through his initiative, 
on the outcome of the battle, (see my essay on Crown Prince 

1 Compare with this statement my particulars on page 103 to 106 
of this volume. (P. 459 ante.) 



470 PAUL HAAKE 

Albert and Prince George of Saxony on August 18, 1870. ) 

I shall use this opportunity to correct an error in that 
essay (page 459, Note 2). The "little Planitz" mentioned by 
Crown Prince Albert in his war diary is, as I was informed 
by Chamberlain von Posern, not the Planitz who subse- 
quently was minister of war, but his cousin, Charles Adolphe 
Ferdinand Edler von der Planitz, who was retired from 
active service in 1894 as major general and died in 1906, and 
who served in 1870 as first lieutenant, Guard Cavalry Regi- 
iment, on the staff of the commanding general of the Xllth 
Corps. Neither was my statement of page 134 (P. 459 ante) 
entirely correct; there I said: "that the left wing of the 
Guard urgently needed the help of the Xllth Corps toward 7 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 18th of August and that von 
Pape's aide, Second Lieutenant von Esbeck, called von 
Platen, almost imploringly begged * * * " Mr. von 
Esbeck Platen, requested by me to point out errors in my 
work, replied as follows: "It is true that I urgently, 
if you want to call it so, requested General von Craushaar 
for flank support of the Guard, but not for support in the 
attack on St. Privat; what I actually said to General von 
Craushaar (he being the first higher leader I met) was 'Gen- 
eral, for the past hour the guard has been lying in front of 
St. Privat in the hottest kind of battle; it will hold its place 
but cannot advance unless it receives flank support', as I rec- 
ollect as though it were today and to which I can make oath. 
I certainly was in a hurry and it is quite natural that I was 
excited considering the importance of the situation ; but I did 
not 'for God's sake' pray to bring help to the Guard bleeding 
to death in front of St. Privat and I did not execute my mis- 
sion 'imploringly.' — At that time I was confronted too much 
and almost exclusively by the military 'must' of the situation 
to allow myself any other emotions, which in any case I did 
not feel Besides, entreaties were far from my mind for the 
reason that I had had no idea of asking sacrifices from my 
comrades in arms, but was far rather convinced that. I 
brought them the highest fortune that can fall to a soldier's 
lot: a chance to get at the enemy." 

The statement that, in the afternoon of the 18th of 
August, the decisions of the highest leaders were governed 
by feelings of jealousy, seem to Mr. von Esbeck as incredible 
as do Bismarck's expressions —as narrated by Moritz Busch 
and von Keudell— "which would, as could be subsequently 



SAXONS AND PRUSSIANS 471 

proved, contradict actual facts in so far as the Guard Jagers 
and Guard Rifles were concerned, as neither one of these 
battalions participated in the assault on St. Privat, the latter 
belonging to the 2d Guard Infantry Division and being 
engaged in a hot battle at Amanvillers." "According to 
my knowledge and conviction" he wrote me, "the attack of 
the Guard, spoken of as premature, was based on the certain 
belief that, if great feats were yet to be accomplished that 
day, five o'clock would be the very latest hour for starting 
the attack in order not to allow the numerically superior 
combined hostile forces to get away during the night, or 
pierce our lines. I was the first eyewitness on the hill near 
Jerusalem Ferme of the impression which the approach of 
the intact Saxon corps made on the enemy; for I saw that 
closed up French battalions (from the reserve, I suppose) 
marched off on the road to Metz. Thus there is absolute 
truth in the statement of Captain Helmuth that the pressure 
exerted by the mass of the Saxon Corps, together with the 
subsequent valorous deeds of the combatants, had the most 
honorable share in the great victory gained in the battle of 
St. Privat." 



Appendix A 



Biographical Notes 

BOQUSLAWSKI, Lieutenant General, (Albert Karl Friedrich Wilhelm 
von Boguslawski) — Born in Berlin, 1834. Second Lieutenant 1854; 
First Lieutenant, 1862; participated in campaigns of 1864, 1866, and 
1870-71 in 50th Infantry Regiment; Captain, 1867; Major, 1872; 
Lieutenant-Colonel, 1879; Colonel, 1883; Major General, 1888; Lieu- 
tenant General, 1890. Retired from active service December 9, 
1890. Died in 1905. 

Author of "Die Entwickelung der Taktik von 1793 bis zur Geg- 
enwart" (1869); "Taktische Folgerungen aus dem Kriege 1870" 
(1872); "Ausbildung und Besichtigung" (1873); "Das Lebendes Gen- 
erals Dumouriez" (1879); "Entwickelung der Taktik seit dem 
Kriege 1870" (1879); "Die Fechtweisen aller Zeiten" (1880); "Die 
Hauptwaffe in Form und Wesen" (1880); "Der kleine Krieg und 
seine Bedeutung fur die Gegenwart" (1881); "Unterweisungfurdas 
Verhalten des Infanteristen im Gefecht" (1882); "Anlage, Leitung 
und Durchfiihrung von Feldmanovern" (1883); "Geschichte des 50. 
Regiments" (1883);" Taktische Darlegungen aus der Zeit von 1859 
bis 1890" (1890); "Der Zug der Englander gegen Copenhagen im 
Jahre 1801" (1890); "Notwendigkeit der zweijahrigen Dieustzeit" 
(1891); "Der Krieg in seiner wahren Bedeutung fiirStaat und Volk" 
(1892); "Die Landwehr von 1813 bis 1893" (1893); Der Krieg der 
Vendee gegen die franzosiche Republik" (1894); "Vollkampf, nicht 
Scheinkampf" (1895); "Der Ehrbegriff des Offizierstandes" (1896); 
"Betrachtungen iiber HeerwesenundKriegfuhrung"and "DieEhre 
und das Duell" (1897); "Volksheer, nicht Volkswehr" and "Das 
Fahrrard" and "Contra Bebel und Bleibtreu" (1898); "Hermine 
Liideking" (1899); "Armee und Volk im Jahre 1806" (1900); "Strate- 
gische Erforderungen" and "85 Jahre preussischerRegierungspoli- 
tik in Posen und West Preussen 1815 bis 1900" (1901); "Die Anti- 
Duellbewegung" (1902); "Taktische Folgerungen aus dem Buren- 
kriege" and "Aus derpreussichen Hof-und diplomatischen Gesell- 
schaft" and "Aus bewegten Zeiten" (1903); "Nicht Rede aber Fehde 
wider die Sozialdemokratie" (1904) — besides numerous articles in 
Supplements of the Militdr Wochenblatt, and in the National- Zeit - 
ung and Tdgliche Ru ndschau . 

BUDRITZKI, Lieutenant General Rudolf Otto von—Born in Trier in 

1812. Cadet, 1827 to 1830; second lieutenant, 1830; captain, 1848. 

473 



474 ST. PRIVAT 

Commanding Saxon contingent 1861 to 1864. Colonel 1864. Com- 
manded 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment during the campaign 
against Denmark in 1864. Commanding 3d Guard Infantry Brigade 
during Austro -Prussian War of 1866. Commanding 2d Guard In- 
fantry Division during Franco -Prussian War of 1870-71. Retired 
from active service in 1875 and died in 1876. 

DANENBERG, Ferdinand von, General of Infantry. — Born in Meck- 
lenburg-Schwerin in 1818. Cadet, 1833; second lieutenant, 1836; 
captain, 1852. Detailed to the Great General Staff 1859 to 1870. 
Chief of Staff of the Guard Corps during the Austro -Prussian War 
of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Major General 
1872; Lieutenant General, 1875. Commanding lid Army Corps, 
1881. General of Infantry, 1884. Retired from active service, 1887. 
Died in Berlin in 1893. 

VON DER GOLTZ, Freiherr Colmar Wilhelm Leopold.— Born in 1843 
in Prussia. Second Lieutenant of Infantry, 1861. Participated in 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866, severely wounded at Trautenau. 
Detailed to the Great General Staff in 1868. First Lieutenant, 1869. 
Served with headquarters, Second Army, during Franco -Prussian 
War of 1870-71. Captain, 1871. Duty with Great General Staff, 
1878 to 1883. Joint compiler of Official Account of Franco -Prussian 
War during that time. Major, 1878. On leave from 1883 to 1895 in 
Turkey, where he held the rank of Major General, Division Gen- 
eral and Field Marshal. Lieutenant Colonel, 1883; Colonel, 1887; 
Major General, 1891; Lieutenant General, 1896. Inspector General 
of engineer corps and fortresses 1898 to 1902. General of Infantry, 
1900. Commanding 1st Army Corps, 1902 to 1907. ColonelGeneral, 
1908. Field Marshal, 1911. Retired from active service, 1913. 

Author of: Operations of the Second Army to the Capitulation 
of Metz; The Seven Days of Le Mans; Operations of the Second 
Army on the Loire; Leon Gambetta and His Army; The Nation in 
Arms; Rossbach and Jena; A Trip to Macedonia; Journeys in Ana- 
tole; The War in Thessaly and the Turkish Army; The Conduct of 
War; Military History of Germany in the 19th Century. 

GROLMANN, Wilhelm von, General of Infantry. — Born in Silesia in 
1829. Private 1st Guard Infantry Regiment 1847; 2d Lieutenant, 
1849; 1st Lieutenant, 1858; captain 3d Guard Infantry Regiment, 
1861; chief of staff of 10th Division, 1866; major, 1866; participated 
in Austro-Prussian War of 1866; Lieutenant Colonel, 1870; partici- 
pated in Franco-German War of 1870-71, commanding the 4th Guard 
Regiment. Colonel, 1872; Major General, 1877 and commanding 
3d Guard Infantry Brigade; Lieutenant General, 1882 and command- 
ing 8th Division. Commanding IVth Armv Corps, 1887 to 1888; 
General of Infantry and commanding Xlth Army Corps, 1888 to 
date of retirement, November 18, 1892. Died in Barzdorf, 1893. 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 475 

HELMUTH, Arnold H. Military Writer.-Born in Brunswick in 1857. 
After completing cadet course in Erfurt Academy, appointed sec- 
ond lieutenant 27th Prussian Infantry Regiment. Student officer, 
War College, 1861 to 1864. Participated in Austro -Prussian War of 
1866 as first lieutenant. Detailed to duty with the Great General 
Staff in 1867 and attached to military-history section. Relieved 
from that duty in 1868 on being promoted captain. Participated in 
Franco-Prussian War, commanding his company; distinguishing 
himself at Beaumont, by defeating with his company the attack of 
an entire regiment of Cuirassiers. Re-detailed to the Great Gen- 
eral Staff in 1871, as chief of military-history section. Promoted to 
major and assigned to duty as Chief of Staff of the 22d Division, 
1875. Died in 1878 at the age of 41. Author of: History of the 
4th Magdeburg Infantry Regiment No. 27; Military Traditions of 
the Berg Garrison; The Battles of Vionville-Mars la Tour; The 
Prussian Guard on August 18, 1870; Sedan; Three Lectures on the 
Battle of St. Privat; Joint compiler of the German Official Account 
of the Franco -Prussian War. 

HODENBERG, von, Freiherr.— Captain of Infantry from 1866 to 1870. 
During the Franco- Prussian War on the general staff of King Al- 
bert of Saxony. Later for many years adjutant general to King 
Albert. Died in 1903 as Major General of Infantry. 

HOHENLOHE-INGELFINGEN, Prince Kraft zu. Born in 1827 in up- 
per Silesia. Second Lieutenant, 1845. Student, Artillery and En- 
gineer School, 1845-46. Student, War College, 1851-53. 1st Lieu- 
tenant, 1854, and military attache at Vienna to 1856. Personal Ad- 
jutant of the King, 1856 to 1864. Major, 1858; lieutenant colonel, 
1861; colonel, 1865. Participated in Austro-Prussian campaign of 
1866 as commander of the reserve artillery of the Guard Corps. 
Major General, 1868 and commander of Guard Corps Artillery Brig- 
ade. Participated as such in Franco-German War of 1870-71. 
Inspector of artillery, 1871. Lieutenant General and commanding 
12th Division, 1873 to 1879. Inspector General of Artillery same 
year to date of retirement, 28th November, 1879. General of In- 
fantry, 1883. General of Artillery, 1889. Died in 1892. Author of 
Letters on Strategy, Artillery, Infantry and Cavalry. 

KESSEL, Bernhard Heinrich Alexander von, General of Infantry. 
Born in Breslau in 1817. Entered army in 1835, joining 1st Guard 
Infantry Regiment and served in that regiment through all grades 
to colonel. Participated in wars of 1866 and 1870-71, greatly distin- 
guishing himself in leading his regiment in both wars. Author of : 
Practical Training of the Prussian Infantry Battalion; Tasks of our 
Infantry Battalions and Brigades. Retired from active service in 
1879 and died in 1882. 

KLENCK, von, Captain of Cavalry.— Served in the Saxon Corps in the 
1870 campaign, during which he received the Iron Cross, Sept. 1870, 
and in Nov. the Ritterkreuz of the Military Order of St. Henry. 



476 ST. PRIVAT 

KRET5CHMAR, von, Colonel.— At the time of the Franco -Prussian 
War, first lieutenant and adjutant to the artillery commander of the 
Saxon Corps. 

MANSTE1N, General Albrecht Ehrenstein Gustave.— Born in 1805. 
Entered the army in 1822. First saw field service in 1864 command- 
ing the 6th Brandenburg Division in the Campaign against Den- 
mark. Participated in the Austro -Prussian War of 1866, command- 
ing the same division. Commanded the 9th Army Corps during 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. Retired from active service 
in 1873 and died in 1877. 

PAPE, Alexander von. General Field Marshal. — Born in Berlin in 
1813. Served nearly all his life in the Guard Corps. Second lieu- 
tenant, 1831; captain, 1856; major, 1860, colonel, 1863; major gen- 
eral, 1866. Commanding 2d Guard Infantry Brigade during Austro- 
Prussian campaign of 1866. Commanding 1st Guard Division dur- 
ing Franco -Prussian campaign of 1870-71. General of Infantry, 
1880 and Governor of Berlin to date of retirement in 1892. Died in 
1895. 

RHEINBABEN, General of Cavalry, Albert von.— Born in Breslau in 
1813. Cadet, 1827; second lieutenant, 1830, first lieutenant, 1846. 
Adjutant at headquarters 6th Army Corps, 1849. Member of the 
Great General Staff , 1850 to 1857. Commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade 
during the Austro -Prussian campaign of 1866. Commander of the 
9th Division, 1868 to 1870. Lieutenant General and commanding 
5th Cavalry Division during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. 
Inspector General of Military Education to 1880, when he retired 
from active service. Died in 1880. 

SCHIMFF, von, Colonel. — First Lieutenant in the Saxon army in 1867. 
In 1868 made with Schubert and others a reconnaissance along the 
Franco -German frontier. First lieutenant of Mounted Guards in 
1870. During the Franco-Prussian War served on the staff of King 
Albert and later became Chamberlain at the Saxon court. He was 
detailed on the Great General Staff during the time when the ac- 
count of the battles around Metz were being drawn up. Author of 
"Daa XII. Korps in Kriege 1870-71." 

SCHUBERT, Gustav, later, von Schubert. Born in Leipzig, 1824. 
Cadet and second lieutenant Foot Artillery, 1843. Battery com- 
mander, 1861-5. On General Staff in 1885 for second time. De- 
tailed to lecture to General Staff and War Colege on American 
Civil War. During the Franco -Prussian War Chief of Staff of the 
XHth Army Corps (Saxon). Retired, 1887. Died, 1907. 

VOIGTS-RHETZ, Constantiu Bernard von, General of Infantry.— 

Born in Brunswick in 1809. Second Lieutenant, 1829. Detailed at 
War College 1833 to 1836. On duty in topographical bureau, 1837 
to 1838. First lieutenant, 1840. Detailed on duty with Great Gen- 



BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 477 

eral Staff in 1841. Captain, 1842; major, 1847 and adjutant of the 
Vth Army Corpa to 1850. Chief of Staff of the Vth Army Corps, 
1852. Lieutenant colonel, 1853; colonel, 1855 and commanding the 
19th Infantry Regiment. Major General, 1858 and commanding 
9th Infantry Brigade. Lieutenant General, 1863 and command- 
ing 7th Infantry Division. Chief of staff of the First Army during 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Governor General of Hanover, 
1866-67. Commanding Xth Army Corps, 1868. General of Infantry, 
1868. Commanding Xth Army Corps during Franco -Prussian War 
of 1870-71. Retired from active service in 1873. Died in Wiesba- 
den in 1877. 

WITTICH, Frederick William von, Lieutenant General.— Born in 

Westphalia in 1818. Cadet, 1831; second lieutenant, 1835. Student 
at War College 1840 to 1843. Captain and company commander, 
1844 to 1857. Colonel and chief of staff of 5th Army Corps to 1866. 
Participated as such in Austro-Prussian War of 1866. Command- 
ing 5th Infantry Brigade, 1866 to 1867. Commanding 50th and 49th 
Infantry Brigades, 1867 to 1871. Participated as commander of the 
49th Brigade in the Franco-Prussian War of 1880-71. Lieutenant 
General and commander of the 22d Infantry Division, September, 
1870. Died October 2, 1884. 



Appendix B 

Bibliographical Notes 
French 

THE FRENCH GENERAL STAFF ACCOUNT.— First published in the 
Revue d' histoire, rMig€e a V Etat-Major de V Arm6e, Volumes XIV- 
XVI, 1904. Reprinted in book form in 1905 by Chapelot et Cie, 30 
Rue et Passage Dauphin, La Guerre de 1870-71, Les Operations 
autour de Metz du IS au 18 Aout, III, Journe'es des 17 et 18 Aout, 
Bataille de St. Privat. The volume of documents annexes (pp. 529) 
and the maps are indispensable for the study of the French side, 
though lacking in critical notes. 

HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE DE 1870-1871, TOME V, REZONVILLE 
ET SAINT-PRIVAT, By Pierre Lehautcourt (General Palat), 

Berger-Levrault et Cie. 5, Rue des Beaux-Arts, Pari*. This work 
is recommended as the best general critical history. The author 
combines a knowledge of historical method with sound military 
appreciation. The General Staff Vol. 5 of Studies in Military His- 
tory and Tactics, the 18th of August, had, however, not yet ap- 
peared when Lehautcourt's Tome V was written. 

LA MANOEUVRE DE SAINT-PRIVAT, by General H. BonnaL- Pub- 
lished by Chapelot et Cie., 1912; preface dated December 1911. 
This (3d) volume deals with the battle itself ; the two previously 
published, with the preliminaries to include August 16th. It con- 
sists of a detailed narrative of the events of August 17th, 18th and 
19th, with running comment; a chapter on the supp3y of the Ger- 
man army throughout the campaign, and one of general comment, 
follow. Specific citations are almost entirely lacking, but the 
writer evidently relies chiefly upon French official documents and 
a few French memoirs. He has also used to a considerable extent 
the German Official Accounts and the German General Staff mono- 
graph on "Aug. 18." In several instances he criticizes sharply 
these two accounts. His praise and blame are impartially distri- 
buted, Moltke receiving much of the former, and the French high 
command, especially Bazaine, much of the latter, 

FRANC AIS ET ALLEMANDS, by Dick de Lonlay.— Gamier Freres, 
6, Rue des Saint PSres, Paris, 1888-1891. 

An "Histoire Anecdotique" in four large volumes, illustrated 
in colors; volumes III and IV contain the description of Saint- Pri- 
vat. Although it is intended chiefly as a popular history, the author 

478 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 479 

gives a bibliography of the earlier published material, quotes num- 
erous documents and has evidently written with great care. This 
work is widely quoted and contains considerable material not found 
elsewhere or difficult of access. 

L'ARTILLERIE DANS LA BATAILLE DU 18 AOUT, By Lt. Colonel 
Gabriel Rouquerol. -Published by Berger-Levrault et. Cie., 1906. 
The author is a well known officer of French Field Artillery, the 
writer of several books on artillery, both technically and historically 
treated. This book is not primarily one of history, but rather of 
applied histoi'y; it seeks lessons for the French artillerist and 
finds them in the historical events discussed. Organization 
and armament are treated at some length, as an introduction; 
the narrative is brief and general as regards infantry, full and 
detailed as regards artillery. The comment is mostly incorpo- 
rated with the narrative, the final summing up being very brief. 
One special chapter of some interest is that on artillery ammu- 
nition supply. The principal authorities are the French and 
German official accounts; regimental histories, etc., are used to 
considerable extent. The provision of maps is unusually great, and 
the utility of each one is multiplied by the numerous outlines of 
troop positions, drawn on thin paper, to be superposed on the maps 
proper. 

ETUDES SUR LE 18 AOUT 1870, By Captain Roy.-Published by 
Berger-Levrault, 1911. A reprint from the Revue Militairc Genir- 
ale. General Langlois contributes a preface, praising the work 
highly and emphasizing the writer's principal conclusions — the 
necessity of the aggressive spirit and of the tactical connection of 
arms. The French and German official accounts are the founda- 
tion of the narrative; the German General Staff monograph is 
frequently referred to. Memoirs and magazine articles are oc- 
casionally cited. Besides the usual maps, there are several good 
panoramic views, giving an excellent idea of the appearance of 
parts of the battlefield. 

Belgian 

ETUDES DE TACTIQUE SUR LA BATAILLE DE ST. PRIVAT by W. 
de Heusch. Published at Liege, 1896. A reprint from Revue de 
VArme Beige. The writer was a Major of Belgian Grenadiers, and 
formerly professor of Military Art and History at the Ecole Mili- 
taire, Brussels. The book is in the general form of old classic 
treatises on strategy and tactics: gives outline of events and then 
series of comments. Constantly refers to Belgian regulations, 
and seeks to deduce lessons for the Belgian army. Rarely men- 
tions an authority, but refers occasionally in a general way to 
Moltke's Memoirs and the Prussian Official Account. Appears to 
follow last named authority chiefly for the facts. Book is a tacti- 
cal study rather than an historical monograph. 



480 ST. PRIVAT 

Russian 

CAUSES DES 5UCC&S ET DES REVERS DANS LA GUERRE DE 
1870, By de Woyde, Lieutenant General, Russian Army. -French 
translation, two volumes and atlas, published by R. Chapelot et 
Oie, Paris, 1900. Also published in German translation. The orig- 
inal work was published in Russian in 1890 but the author corrected 
and revised the German translation of his work in 1898, from which 
the French translation is made. The work is keenly critical from 
a military standpoint and much in vogue in the German army. The 
author's sources of information are limited but he makes good use 
of those known to him. 

Swiss 

DER KRIEG UM DIE RHEINGRENZE, 1870, By W. Rustow, Colonel, 
Swiss Army, Ziirich, 1870. — This book possesses an interest ow- 
ing to the date of publication, contemporaneous with the war, and 
the fact that the author had access to the German documents (he 
quotes von Moltke's and gives the substance of Prince Frederick 
Charles' orders for August 18) and evidently gives the German 
official view at that time. It is well mapped but gives no sources 
or critical notes. 

German 

DAS FRANZOESISCHE GENERALSTABSWERK UEBER DEN 
KRIEG 1870—71: WAHRES UND FALSCHES. By E.V. Schmid. 
Published at Leipiz, 1907. The writer was a German (Wiirtemberg) 
colonel retired ; he died before publication, and probably before 
giving final revision to his manuscript; the editor claims to have 
made changes only in case of obvious errors. He gives the 
events in much detail, referring to both French and German Offic- 
ial Accounts, and to a great number of memoirs, periodicals, etc., 
chiefly German but frequently French. In using this book it will 
be well to remember that it is what its name indicates — a critical 
examination of the French Official Account. But its form is that 
of an independent narrative, it is written in a dispassionate style, 
notes approval as well as disapproval, and always cites the auth- 
ority upon which its statements are made. 

GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT, Der Krieg, 1870-71.— Five volumes 
text, three boxes of maps, Berlin, 1873-78, to be had translated into 
both French and English. This work isindispensible for the study 
of this war. It is carefully edited with a view to the suppression 
of uncomfortable data and to distribute praise and blame accord- 
ing to political needs at the time of writing. In this respect it rep- 
resents a sort of middle official view, already at variance with 
some of the earlier published accounts, but much more liberal than 
the later 1905 study. It quotes many orders and messages. The 
accuracy with which these have been produced as well as many 
statements of fact in the text have been widely disputed. It gives 
practically no references to sources and no critical notes. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 481 

HISTORY OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870-71, By Field 
Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, Berlin, 1891.— To be had in 

English translation. This is a condensed account, the chief interest 
of which lies in its having been written by the military director of 
the war on the German side. It is a most guarded and conservative 
statement and little more than a condensation of the German Offi- 
cial Account. 

There are numerous tactical studies in German on "examples" from 
military history, some based on independent research and others 
written on an acceptation of the Official Account as representing 
the facts. Among the independents, Kunz, Kriegsgechictliche Bei- 
apiele aus dem deutsch-franzosischen Kriegvon 1870-7 1 , is perhaps 
the best. He gives no reference to sources or critical notes but is 
widely quoted by German military writers as an historical author- 
ity. Heft 10 of his series (1899) is devoted exclusively to Saint Pri- 
vat. He gives a list of titles of "works consulted" at the end, in- 
cluding many regimental histories both French and German. 

A noteworthy tactical study based on the official accounts is 
that by von Scherff, General of Infantry, Kriegslehren in kriegsge- 
schichtlichen Beispielen der Neuzeit, the 3d Heft of which is devoted 
to Saint Privat. 

Another recent tactical study on "The French 6th Corps at St. 
Privat" by General von Gossler, based on the German and French 
official accounts and dealing chiefly with the leadership of Bazaine 
and Canrobert will be found in the Vierteljahrshefte fiir Truppen- 
fiihrung und Heereskunde, 1914, No. 2. 



Index 

Amanvillers— Evacuated by French (Helmuth) 34 

Fight raging in sunken road near — (Helmuth) 30 

Breaking off the fight on ridge of — (Helmuth) 34 

Captured by General Manstein at dark (Helmuth) 6, (18th of 

August) 337 

Final assault on ridge at 7.30 p.m. (Helmuth) 33 

French counter attacks on are defeated (18th of August) 333 

French evacuate positions west of (18th of August) 340 

General Wittich's charges against sunken road near— (Helmuth) 32 
Hessian Guard Jagers relieved by Kaiser Alexander Regiment 

(Helmuth) 31 

3d Guard Brigade charges ridge at (Helmuth) 29, (18th of 

August) 329 

Artillery Operations— Artillery did not play a material part in 

the pursuit (18th of August) 372 

Artillery of Hid and IXth Corps support attack of 3d Guard 

Brigade on Amanweiler (18th of August) 366 

Artillery preparation on Ste. Marie (Schimpff ) 175 

At Roncourt (Schimpff ) 193 

Changes of position after fall of Ste. Marie (Schimpff )___ 183 

Correction of different accounts of (Kretschmar) 393-400 

General account August 18th (Hohenlohe) 94, (18th of August) 258 
German artillery interferes in battle at Ste. Marie (18th of 

August) 258 

Guard batteries accompany advance of Guard Infantry (18th 

August) 292 

Guard batteries go into position north and south of St. Privat 

( 18th of August) 371 

Guard batteries in action south of St. Ail (18th of August) 241 

Guard batteries open fire on St. Privat (18th of August) ... 362 

Guard batteries southeast of St. Ail advance to support the 

infantry attack (18th of August) 285 

On ridge southwest of St. Privat after fall of village (Schimpff) 211 
Positions of batteries along Ste. Marie— Aboue road (Schimpff) 189 
Saxon batteries go into action northwest of Ste. Marie (Hoden- 

berg) .139 

Saxon batteries in fight at forest of Jaumont (18th of August) 357 
Saxon batteries join in bombardment of St. Privat at 7.46 p.m. 

(Helmuth) 36 

Saxon batteries open fire on Roncourt 5.45 p.m. (Schubert) __ . 413 
Saxon batteries prepare attack on Ste. Marie (18th of August,) 250 
Saxon batteries support the attack of the 1st Guard Infantry 

Brigade (18th of August) 305 

Support of infantry attack on St. Privat (Helmuth )... 23 

483 



484 INDEX 

Bazaine, Marshal— Estimate of the situation, August 16, 1870 

(Helmuth) 1 

Berger, General— Attack orders to 4th Guard Bingade at 5.15 

p.m. (18th of August) . 280 

Von Bismarck, Prince Otto— Opinion of premature attack of the 

Guard Corps (Haake) 462 

Bohn, Colonel— Killed south of St. Privat (Helmuth) . . 15 

Bois de la Cusse— Stubbornly held by 9th Corps (Helmuth) 6 

Budritzky, General— Gives signal for final assault on St. Privat 

(Helmuth) 36 

Canrobert, Marshal — Concentrates his forces around and in St. 

Privat (Helmuth) 34, (Schimpff) 195 

Requests Bazaine to send reinforcements (Schimpff) 194, (18th 

of August) 262 

Casualties— German armies, August 18th (Goltz) . 82 

German and French forces (Schimpff) 212, note, (Helmuth) 42, 

(Boguslawski) 127 

Second Army, August 18th (Goltz) 82 

25th (Hesse) Division, August 18th (Wittich) 88 

23d Division, August 18th (Schubert) 416 

Cavalry — Destroys railroad and telegraph between Metz and 

Thionville (Klenck) 103 

Cavalry Charge— Against abandoned French position held by 

1st Guard Infantry Brigade (18th of August) 316 

Cavalry Divisions — Operations on August 18th (Hohenlohe) 89 

Close of the battle and assembly of the Germans (Helmuth) ... 41 
Communication — Lack of between different army headquarters 

(Leipziger Zeitung) 375 

Concentration op German armies, August 17th (Helmuth) 2 

Craushaar, General — Abandons project of assaulting Roncourt 

to support the Guard at St. Privat (Helmuth) 35 

Advances with his brigade from the west on Roncourt (Helmuth) 34 

Initiative in attack on Ste. Marie (Haake) 445 

Killed near St. Privat (Helmuth) 35, (Schubert) 416 

Crossing op Troops — Prince Frederick Charles' reasons for caus- 
ing (Haake) 4i>0 

Crown Prince Albert op Saxony— Decides to start from Jarny 
in spite of army orders binding him to that place (Schimpff ) 

163, (18th of August) 232, (Haake) 439 

Decides to envelop enemy's right wing (Hodenberg) 137, 
(Schimpff) 166, (18th of August) 247, (Schubert) 409, (Haake) 

447 . 448 

Dispositions for march from Jarny (Haake) 439 

Establishes his headquarters in Roncourt (Helmuth) 42 

Extract of diary covering movements of 12th Corps on August 

17th (Haake) 426 

Issues orders at 11.30 a.m. in Jarny for the march (Schimpff) .. 162 



INDEX 485 

Crown Prince Albert of Saxony — (continued) 

March dispositions of his corps at 11.30 a.m. (Hodenberg) 133 

Official report of attack on St. Privat (Haake) 464 

Orders dated 2 p.m. for enveloping movement (18th of August) 

248, (Schubert) 409 

Orders dated 11.30 a.m. to march on St. Marie (Hodenberg) ... 135 

Orders for the march at 5.20 a.m. (Schimpff) 160 

Orders to XHth Corps dated 5.20 and 5.45 a.m. (18th of August) 217 

Orders to XHth Army Corps dated 2 p.m. (Schimpff) 166 

Perceives the extention of hostile position beyond St. Privat 

to Roncourt (Goltz) 69 

Proceeds to Roncourt at 5.30 p.m. (Hodenberg) 143 

Receives, in Jarny, Prince Frederick Charles' orders at 10 and 

10.15 a.m. (Schimpff) 161 

Report of 11.45 a.m. to army headquarters (Hodenberg) 133 

Reports corps' arrival on Metz — Etain road to headquarters 

(Schimpff) 161 

Reports from Jarny at 11.45 a.m. thatSte. Marie is occupied by 

enemy (18th of August) note . 234 

Reports his decision to army headquarters to attack Ste. Marie 

and to envelop French right wing at 3 p.m. (Boguslawski) 

120, (18th of August) 246 

Reports his movement on Ste. Marie to army headquarters 

(Schimpff) 166 

Reports to army headquarters at 11.45 a.m. his march on Ste. 

Marie (Schimpff) 162 

Rides toward Roncourt at 6.30 p.m. (Helmuth) 34 

Takes station on Hill 842 (Shimpff) 165 

Verbatim report to army headquarters dated 2.30p.m.j(Hoden- 

berg) 138 

Verbatim copy of orders to the 12th Corps for the 18th of 

August (Haake) 431 

Diringhofen Briqade, 10th Corps— Arrives at St. Privat from 

St. Ail (Helmuth) 41 

Doncourt — Guard Corps arrives at (Helmuth) 4, (Goltz) 60 

Reported free of the enemy at 8.50 a.m. (18th of August) 224, 

(Goltz) . 53 

Eighth Army Corps- Receives orders from General Steinmetz to 

occupy localities evacuated by IXth Corps (18th of August) 236 

Enveloping Movement — Account of movement (Hodenberg) 141 

Column attacks Roncourt (Helmuth) 34, (Schubert) 414 

Column occupies Roncourt at 6.30 p.m. (Goltz) 75, (Schubert).. 414 
Column reaches Montois la Montagne at 6 p.m. (Helmuth) 34, 

(Goltz) 75 

Column turns against St. Privat for attack (Helmuth) . . 34 

Completion of (18th of August) 346 

Criticized as not sufficiently far reaching (Leipziger Zeitung).. 390 



486 INDEX 

Enveloping Movement— (continued) 

Crown Prince Albert issues his orders for (18th of August) 248 

Decided on by Crown Prince Albert of Saxony (Hodenberg) 

137, (Schimpff) 166, (18th of August) 247, (Schubert) 409, 

(Haake) 447 448 

Discussion as to slowness in execution of (Haake) 449 450 

Discussion how it could have been hastened (Haake) 456 

Extended farther northward (Schimpff) 190, (18th of August) 

263, (Schubert) 412... 412 

46th Brigade blamed for slowness in execution (Haake) 450 

Initial steps for (Haake) 438 

Prince George of Saxony's measures for extension of (Schimpff) 190 
Saxon column appears on plateau near Montois at 6 p.m. 

(Schimpff) 196 

Started at 5 p .m . by 23d Division (Schubert) 412 

Strength of enveloping column (Hodenberg) 140 

Erckrrt, Colonel— Killed at Ste. Marie (Helmuth) 11 

v. Esbeck, Lieutenant— Appeals to Saxons for support of the 

Guard (Helmuth) 35, (18th of August) 350 

Comment on his action urging the Saxons to support the 

Guard Corps (Leipziger Zeitung) 388 

Estimate of the Situation — Criticism of Prince Frederick 

Charles' (Leipziger Zeitung) 382 

Differences in, held by von Moltke and Prince Frederick 

Charles (18th of August) 224 

General von Pape at about 5 p.m. (18th of August) 297 

General von Pape at 7 p.m. (18th of August) 325 

Guard Corps and Second Army, at 5 p.m. (18th of August) 273 

General von Moltke (Helmuth) 2 

General von Moltke changes his between 9 and 10 a.m. (Haake) 437 

Marshal Bazaine, August 17th (Helmuth ) 1 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg (Helmuth) 13-14, (18th of 

August) 273 

Prince August of Wiirttemberg at 7 p.m. (18th of August) 326 

Prince Frederick Charles (Goltz) 48, (18th of August) 273 

First Army — Commences battle at 12.45 p.m. (18th of August) 236 

Position of, August 18th (Boguslawski) _ 115 

Reports departure of enemy and proceeds to the attack (18th 

of August) 235 

First Guard Infantry Division— Situation of at 7 p.m. (18th of 

August) 325 

First Guard Infantry Brigade — Attack of, divides itself on 

Roncourt and St. Privat (18th of August) 307 

Begins attack against ridge from Ste. Marie (Helmuth) ... 19 

Enters abandoned French position and defeats charge of 

French cavalry (18th of August) 314 

Executes right turn against ridge of St. Privat (Helmuth) 20 



INDEX 487 

First Guard Infantry Brigade— (continued) 

Location at 5.30 p.m. (18th of August) 299 

Location and condition of at about 7 p.m. (18th of August) ... 317 

Unable to press attack against ridge home (Helmuth) 20 

Starts for St. Pri vat at 5.45 p.m. (18th of August) 303 

First Guard Division— March of, to Auboue is stopped at Ste. 

Marie (18th of August) 241 

Prepares for attack on Ste. Marie (18th of August) 246 

Starts from Doncourt to Habonville (18th of August) 231 

Storms south front of Ste. Marie (18th of August) 253 

Forty-fifth Brigade— Occupies Roncourt (Goltz) 75, (Schubert) 414 

Takes possession of the woods of AubouS (18th of August) 265 

Forty-sixth Brigade— Blamed for slowness during enveloping 

movement (Haake) 450 

Fourth Guard Brigade— Attacks St. Privat (Goltz) 76, (18th of 

August).. 280 

Captures French position along hedge road (18th of August) . 288 

Captures Hill 321 southwest of St. Privat (18th of August) 282 

Charge against ridge south of St. Privat (Helmuth) 15, 18 27 

Description of its battlefield, 5 p.m. (18th of August) 278 

Location of units at 5 p.m. (18th of August) 280 

Starts attack on St. Privat (18th of August) 280 

Fourth Guard Regiment— Assaults St. Privat from the north 

(Helmuth) 38 

Attacks northwest corner of St. Privat (18th of August) 323 

In battle north and east of St. Privat (18th of August) 258 

Joins Saxons in assault on St. Privat (Helmuth) 35 

Reinforces left wing from Ste. Marie (Helmuth) 26 

Sent to support left wing of 1st Guard Brigade (18th of August) 320 
French Army— Effective strength, August 18th (Schimpff), note 169 

Location of corps, morning of August 17th (Schimpff) ... 170 

Location of corps on August 18th (Goltz), note 53 

Positions between Roncourt and St. Privat (Schimpff) 188 

Loses heights southwest of St. Privat (18th of August) 294 

General Situation— Review of the situation of the Hd Army up 

5 p.m. (18th of August) 270 

Gravelotte, French Camp at— Observation officer sent by Hd 
Army reports movements in, at 6.40 a.m. and 8.45 a.m. 

(Goltz) 51 

Outposts report movements in, at 4.50 a.m. and at 5.15 a.m. 

(Goltz) 51 

Reported unoccupied by outposts of 18th Division (Goltz) 51 

Strength of troops (Goltz) 52 

Groeben, Captain von der— Reports Ste. Marie and St. Privat 

occupied by enemy (18th of August) 231 

Guard Corps— Advances against St. Privat at 5.30 p.m. (Goltz) 74, 

(Hohenlohe). 98 

Arrives at Doncourt at 10 a.m. (Helmuth) 4, (Goltz). 60 



488 INDEX 

Guard Corps— (continued) 

Arrives at Habonville at 1 p.m. (Goltz) 67 

Attacks St. Privat (18th of August) 270 

Bivouacs at Hannonville au Passage (Goltz) 47 

Commences deployment at Doncourt at 10.25 a.m. (Hodenberg) 133 

Delayed at Mars la Tour (18th of August) 220 

Directed to carry on battle with artillery only (Goltz) 67 

Estimate of the situation at St. Privat at headquarters (18th of 

August) 273 

1st Division storms south front of Ste. Marie (18th of August) 253 
Independently changes march direction from Verneville to 

Habonville (Goltz) 65 

March from Doncourt and Bruville to Habonville (Helmuth) 5, 

(18th of August) 239 

March of, to Auboue comes to a halt at Ste. Marie (18th of 

August) 241 

Occupies Habonville with its advance guard (18th of August) . 243 

Ordered to attack Ste. Marie from Amanvillers (Goltz) 61 

Ordered to halt at Doncourt, at 8.35 a.m. (Goltz) 54 

Ordered to march on Amanvillers instead of Verneville (Goltz) 63 

Ordered to march on Verneville (Goltz) 58 (Hodenberg) 133 

Reaches Mars la Tour toward 6 a.m.; forced to halt by Saxons 

marching through (Helmuth) 3 

Receives orders to march to Doncourt and support the IXth 

Corps (18th of August) 226 

Reports at 11.30 a.m. from Doncourt that St. Privat is occupied 

by enemy (18th of August) note 234 

Reports its attack on St. Ail and Ste. Marie at 2 p.m. (Goltz) .. 69 

Requests 12th Corps to advance on Ste. Marie (Haake) 445 

Resumes march from Mars la Tour (Helmuth) . 3 

Starts attack on St. Privat at 5 p.m. (Schimpff) 193 

Starts from Hannonville at 5.30 a.m. (Boguslawski) 118 

To attack hostile right wing from Amanvillers (Boguslawski) 119 
Guard Corps Artillery — Accompanies infantry attack on St. 

Privat (Hohenlohe) 98 

Advances from position at Habonville — St. Ail against St. 

Privat at 4 p.m. (Goltz) 71 

Advances St. Ail to support infantry attack (18th of August) . _ 285 
All batteries hasten to ridge south of St. Privat when the in- 
fantry enters the village (Helmuth) 39 

Attacked three times by French infantry from Amanvillers 

(Hohenlohe) 100 101 

Carries on delaying action from 2 to 5 p.m. at St. Privat (Hoh- 
enlohe) 97 

Formed in two groups on ridge at Amanvillers (Helmuth) 25. _ 26 

Goes into position at St. Ail (Boguslawski) 120 

Goes into position at Habonville (Helmuth) 7 



INDEX 489 

Guard Corps Artillery— (continued) 

Guard Batteries accompany advance of Guard Infantry from 

between St. Ail and Ste. Marie (18th of August) 292 

Opens fire on Ste. Marie aux Chenes (Helmuth) 10, (Hohenlohe) 

98, (18th of August) 241 

Opens fire on St. Privat at 7 p.m. (Boguslawski) . 126 

Receives orders to prolong artillery line of 9th Corps (Goltz). . 66 
Silences French artillery at St. Privat and Amanvillers (Hoh- 
enlohe) 101, (Boguslawski).. . 121 

Three batteries take position on ridge at Amanvillers (Helmuth) 

18, 25 (Hohenlohe) 99 

Turns its entire activity against St. Privat (Goltz) 76, (Hohen- 
lohe) 98 

Guard Corps Cavalry— Account of destruction of Metz— Thion- 

ville railroad and telegraph (Klenck) 112 

Arrives on battlefield at 2 p.m. (Klenck) 111 

Bivouacs night of August 17-18 between Parfondrupt and St. 

Jean les Buzy (Klenck) 111 

Crosses Mosel August 16th (Klenck) 103 

March to Cheminot August 15th (Klenck) 103 

Operations from August 15th to 18th (Klenck) 103 

Reports that French left Doncourt (Goltz) 53 

Guard Grenadiers (French) — Arrive with artillery to protect 

the fleeing French right wing (Helmuth). 39 

Habonville— Occupied by advance guard of Guard Corps (Hel- 
muth) 8, (18th of August) 243 

Hedge Road— Captured by Regiment Konigin at 6.30 p.m. (18th 

of August) 296 

Charges against (Helmuth) 16 17 

French position on, captured by Regiment Konigin (18th of 

August) ...288 

Hessian Guard Jaegers— Succored on Amanvillers ridge by 

Kaiser Alexander Regiment (Helmuth) 31 

Jaumont Forest and Quarries— Fight at and capture of by 

the Saxons (18th of August) 356 357 

Jerusalem — Assaulted and taken by remnants of Queen Augusta 

and Kaiser Franz Regiments (Helmuth) 37 

Kaiser Alexander Regiment — Charge on ridge at Amanvillers 

(Helmuth) 29 

Succors Hessian Jagers on Amanvillers ridge (Helmuth) 31 

Kaiser Franz Regiment— Attack of, diverted to Ste. Marie— St. 

Privat road (18th of August) 290 

Charge against ridge south of St. Privat (Helmuth) 15 

Location at 6 p.m. (18th of August) 292 

King John Regiment— Engaged northwest of St. Privat (Helmuth) 36 
Koenigin Regiment— Captures hedge road at 6.30 p.m. (18th of 

August) 296 



490 INDEX 

Ladmirault, General— Attempts, with his last forces, thre« 
charges against the combined German artillery line (Hel- 

muth) 40 

LBFr (German) Wing— Precarious situation of (Helmuth) 2g 

Reinforced by 4th Guard Regiment (Helmuth) 26 

Location of Army Corps— Morning of August 18th (Goltz) 47, 

(Boguslawski) 115 

At 10 a.m. (Goltz) 59 

At 10.30 a.m. (18th of August) . 222 

Between 2 and 3 p.m. (Goltz) 68 

At 5 p.m. (18th of August) ______ 270 

Twelfth Corps after capture of St. Privat in bivouacs (Schimpff ) 

note 213 

Location of Troops— First Guard Infantry Brigade at 5.30 p.m. 

(18th of August) 299 

French 6th Corps at 7 p.m. (18th of August) 351 

Guard divisions at 5 p.m. (Schimpff) 192 

Saxons in bivouac night of 18th (Schimpff) note _ 213 

Losses — Total losses of French and Germans (Boguslawski) 127, 

(Goltz) 82, (Helmuth) 42, (Wittich) 88 

Manstein, General— Captures heights of Amanvillers (Helmuth) 6 

Opens battle at Verneville (Helmuth) 5 

Orders fight on Amanvillers ridge be broken off (Helmuth) ... 34 
Mars la Tour— Account of march crossing at (Boguslawski) 118, 

(Helmuth) 3 

Halt of Guard Corps at (Helmuth) . 5 

Meeting of Guard and XHth Corps at (Helmuth) 3, (Bogus- 
lawski) 118 

Metz— Thionville Railroad— Destruction of by Saxon Guard 

Cavalry (Klenck) 113 

Measures Taken by Corps Commanders anticipating Prince 

Frederick Charles' orders (18th of August) 230 

v. Moltke, General— Change of estimate of situation between 9 

and 10 a.m. (Haake) 348 

Operation orders for August 18th (Helmuth) 2, Goltz 46 

Orders of 10.30 a.m. to Second Army to attack from direction 

of Amanweiler (Haake) 438 

v. Montbe, Colonel — Blamed for insufficient independence 

(Haake) 450 

Montigny la Grange— French evacuate position west of (18th of 

August) 340 

Montois la Montagne— Forty-eighth Brigade marches on (18th of 

August) ...265 

Found unoccupied by Saxons (Boguslawski) 122 

Saxon enveloping column arrives at (Helmuth) 34, (Goltz) 75 

Ninth Army Corps— Arrives at Caulre Ferme at 8.30 a.m. and halts 

there (Goltz) 50 



INDEX 491 

Ninth Army Corps— (continued) 

Assumes the offensive and attacks Amanvillers (Qoltz) 79-80 

Enters battle at Verneville (Goltz) _ _ 6^ 

Leaves Caulre Ferme at 10.30 a.m. (Goltz) 64 

Ordered to halt at Caulre Ferme (Goltz) 64 

Ordered to march on VernSville (Goltz) 58, (Hodenberg) 133 

Receives orders to march to La Folie and attack enemy with 

artillery (18th of August) 226 

Operation Orders— Royal Headquarters for August 18th (Hel- 

muth) 2, (Goltz) 46 

For Hd Army for the 18th (Goltz) 45, (Hodenberg) 130 

v. Pape, General— Closes gap between 1st and 4th Brigade with 

2d Guard Regiment (Helmuth) 23 

Convinced that Ste. Marie must be taken and issues orders 

therefor (18th of August) 243 

Dispute with Prince August as to commencement of attack 

(18th of August) 299 

Enters St. Privat and takes measures to secure that place 

(Helmuth) 41 

Estimate of the situation about 5 p.m. (18th of August) 297 

Estimate of the situation at 7 p. m. (18th of August) 325 

Gives signal for final assault on St. Privat at 7.30 p.m. (Hel- 
muth) 36, (18th of August) 364 

Orders 4th Guard Regiment to support 1st Guard Brigade at 

6.30 p.m. (18th of August) 321 

Perceives that attack on Amanvillers from Habonville is im- 
practicable (Boguslawski) 120 

Praises Saxon assault on St. Privat (Haake)' 459 

Report of attack on Ste. Marie (Haake) 459 

Reports capture of Ste. Marie at 2.30 p.m. (Goltz) 70 

Sees enemy at Ste. Marie and St. Privat from Habonville (18th 

of August) 239 

Pause in Battle— Occurs between 4 and 5 p.m. (Helmuth) 12, 

(Goltz) 71, (Schimpff) 193 

Point du Jour — Captured and held by 1st Army (Helmuth) 6 

Prince August of Wuerttemberg— Decides to attack St. Privat 

(Goltz) 73 

Declines offer of artillery of Xth Corps to prepare attack on 

St. Privat (Leipziger Zeitung) 386 

Dispute with General von Pape as to commencement of attack 

(18th of August) 299 

Does not obey orders from Prince Frederick Charles of 10 a.m. 

to the letter (Hohenlohe) 93 

Estimate of the situation between 5 and 6 p.m. (Goltz) 71-72 

Estimate of the situation at 7 p. m. (18th of August) 326 

His reasons for starting attack on St. Privat at 5 p.m. (Bogus- 
lawski) 122 



492 INDEX 

Prince August op Wuerttemberg — (continued) 

Issues orders for the attack on St. Privat (Helmuth) 14 

Gives orders for final assault on St. Privat (Helmuth) 36 

Reasons inducing him to order the attack on St. Privat (Hel- 
muth) 13-14 

Prince Frederick Charles— Arrives at Habonville at 2.15 p.m. 

(18th of August) 244, 344 

Arrives at Mars la Tour at 5 a.m. (Goltz) 48 

Assembles all commanding generals to receive verbal orders 

at 5 a.m. August 18th (Goltz) 46 

Criticism of his estimate of the situation (Leipziger Zeitung) 382 
Decides to start attack on Ste. Marie at 3.45 p.m. (18th of 

August) .. 245 

Desire to have the Guards between the Saxons and Hessians 

(Haake) 430 

Directions to commanding generals of his five army corps 

morning of August 18th (Haake) 1 427 

Directions to 9th, Guard, and 12th Corps at 10 a.m. (Haake) ... 437 
Directs 10th Army Corps to support advance of the Guard 

Corps on St. Privat (Goltz) 75 

Directs 12th Corps commander to send a brigade to Woippy 

(Goltz) 77 

Dispositions for the advance of the 1st Army August 18th (18th 

of August) 215 

Estimate of the general situation (Goltz) 48 

Estimate of the situation between 5 and 6 p.m. (Goltz) 73 

Estimate of worth of Saxons (Haake) 428 

Explains his estimate of the situation to the corps com- 
manders (Goltz) 50 

His intentions to attack on the 18th (Goltz) _ 45 

His dispositions to open battle (Boguslawski) _ 119 

Inspects battlefield from Habonville (18th of August) 344 

Instructions, at Mars la Tour, to Hd Army governing advance 

along Metz— Etain road (Schimpff) 157 

Issues attack orders to 12th, Guard, 9th, 10th and 2d Army 

Corpsat 11.30 and 12 noon (Goltz) 63-64 

Issues march orders to Hd Army at 5 a. m. (Goltz) 49 

Issues orders at 12.30 p.m. to 3d Army Corps to start (Goltz) .. 65 

Operation orders for August 18th (Goltz) 45, (Hodenberg) 130 

Orders Crown Prince of Saxony to have his cavalry destroy 

Metz — Thionville railroad and telegraph (Goltz) 70 

Orders Guard artillery to prolong artillery line of 9th Corps 

(Goltz) 66 

Orders to Guard Corps, dated 10.15, to march on Verneville 

(Goltz) 58; at 10 a.m. (Hohenlohe) :.. 93 

Orders to Guard Corps, dated 10.15 a.m., to support IXth Corps 

(18th of August) 226 

Orders to 9th Army Corps to halt at Caulre Ferme (Goltz) 54 



INDEX 493 

Prince Frederick Charles— (continued) 

Orders to 9th Army Corps dated 10 a.m. (18th of August) 226 

Orders to 9th Army Corps to march on Verneville (Goltz) 58 

Orders to Guard Corps at 11.30 a.m. (Haake) 438 

Orders to lid Army for August 18th (18th of August)... 215 

Orders, at 6.40 p.m., to 12th Corps to send one brigade at least 

to Woippy (18th of August) 328 

Orders to lid Army at 8.30 p.m. (Goltz) 81 

Partiality to Guard Corps (Haake) 428 

Proceeds to the battlefield (18th of August) 234 

Proceeds to Doncourt 8.30 p.m. (Goltz) 81, (18th of August) ... 345 
Proceeds to west of Habonville shortly after 2 p.m. (Goltz) ... 66 
Proceeds to IXth Army Corps at 6.30 p.m. (18th of August) ... 327 
Reports start of Hd Army at 5 a.m. to Royal Headquarters 

(Goltz) 50 

Report of, to Royal Headquarters, dated 6.15 a.m. (18th of 

August) 222 

Report to Royal Headquarters dated Vionville, 10.10 a.m. (18th 

of August) note 228 

Takes position west of Verneville at 1.45 p.m. (Goltz) 65 

Prince George of Saxony— Independent decision to advance on 

Ste. Marie aux Chgnes (Schimpff ) 166, (Schubert) 409 

Measures for occupying woods at Roncourt (Haake) 451 

Official report of attack by 23d Division on St. Privat (Haake) 457 
Official report of march on and attack of Ste. Marie (Haake) .. 443 
Orders general advance against St. Privat at 6.30 p.m. (Hoden- 

berg) 144 

Reaches Montois with enveloping column toward 7 p.m. (Hel- 

muth) 34 

Receives General Voigts-Rhetz's orders at 10 p.m. to have his 

command at Tronville at daybreak (Hodenberg) 135 

Queen Augusta Regiment— Charge against ridge south of 

St. Privat (Helmuth) 15 17 

Charge on ridge at Amanvillers (Helmuth) 29 

Queen Elizabeth Regiment— Second Battalion led by Colonel 

Bernhardi to final assault again- 1 Amanvillers ridge (Hel- 
muth) _. 33 

Reconnaissance — Bad consequences of failure of sufficient prior 

to battle (Leipziger Zeitung) 375 

Renewal op Battle at 7.30 p.m. (Helmuth) 33 

v. Roder, Colonel -Killed northwest of St. Privat (Helmuth) .. . 36 

Roncourt— German left wing contained at (18th of August) 362 

Occupied by French (Shimpff ) 188 

Saxons attack and take Roncourt at 6.30 p.m. (Helmuth) 34, 

(Goltz) 75, (Boguslawski) 122, (Schimpff) 197, (18th of 

August) 355, (Shubert) 414 

Twelfth Corps concentrated at (Hodenberg) 143 

Twelfth Corps moves on (Schimpff) 185 



494 INDEX 

Royal Headquarters— Concludes hostile main force to be in 

frontof Metz (Goltz) 63 

Conduct up to the opening of the battle (18th of August) 237 

Directs that general attack will not be made until material 

forces can advance from Amanvillers 67 

Lack of communication between it and different army head- 
quarters (Leipziger Zeitung) 375 

Orders for the general attack, dated 10.30 a.m. (Goltz) 61 

Orders Guard and 12th Corps to attack Ste. Marie from Aman- 
villers (Goltz) 61 

Orders to 1st Army dated 12 noon (18th of August) 237 

Orders to lid Army dated 1.45 p.m. (18th of August) 238 

Proceeds from Pont a Mousson to Flavigny (18th of August) . . 222 
St. Ail — Guard Fusiliers gain it ahead of the enemy (Helmuth) ... 9 
Ste. Marie aux Chenes — Attack on by Guard and Saxons (Hel- 
muth) 9,10, 11, (Hodenberg) 138 

Account of battle at (Schimpff) 173 

Artillery of Guard and XHth Corps prepares attack on (18th 

of August)... 250 

Battle ceases toward 4 p.m. (18tb of August) 260 

Battles north and east of (18th of August) 256 

Captured by Guard and XHth Corps at 3.30 p.m. (Helmuth) 11, 
(Goltz) 70, (Hohenlohe) 95, (Boguslawski) 120, (Hoden- 
berg) 138, (Schimpff) 178, (18th of August) 253, (Schubert) 411 

Description of battlefield (Schimpff) 167 

First Guard Division storms south front of (18th of August)... 253 
Forty-seventh Infantry Brigade assaults west side of (18th of 

August) 255 

Found free of the enemy at 12.30 p.m. (Hodenberg) 137 

Guard Corps reports it occupied by French (Goltz) 65 

Measures of the French to defeat attack on (18th of August) .. 252 
Occupied by the French at 1 p.m. (Boguslawski) 120, (Hoden- 
berg) 138 

Opening of attack against (Goltz) 69 

Positions of batteries in action at (Schimpff) 189 

Report by General von Pape of attack on (Haake) 459 

Report of 24th Division of march on and attack of (Haake) . . . 440 
Reported occupied by enemy by Captain Groeben (18th of 

August) 231 

St. Hubert— Captured and held by 1st Army (Helmuth) 6 

St. Privat — Artillery opens fire on (18th of August) 269 

Assault on by Saxons (Schimpff) 203, (Schubert) . . 415 

Attack of the Guard Corps on (18th of August) 270 

Attack on by Saxons (Hodenberg) 144, (Schimpff) 200 

Capture of by Guard and XHth Corps (Schimpff) 206 

Commencement of attack on (Helmuth) 14 

Captured at 7.30 p.m. (Hodenberg) 145 



INDEX 495 

St. Privat (continued) 

Description of the battlefield (18th of August) 278, (Schimpff) 

167, (Schubert) 410 

Description of French position at (Schimpff) note . . . 157 

Final assault on, 7.45 p.m. (Helmuth) 36, (18th of August) 363 

Forces holding, at 6 p.m. (Schimpff) 196 

Fourth Guard Brigade's attack on (18th of August) 280 

French evacuate the advanced positions west of St. Privat 

(18th of August).... 311 

General course of attack on ( Boguslawski) - 123 

General descripton of (Helmuth) _. 8 

General plan of battle (Helmuth) 5 

Guard Corps reports it occupied by French (Goltz) 65 

Hand to hand struggle in (Helmuth) 39 

Movement of troops on French right wing during battle at Ste. 

Marie (18th of August) 261 

Official report of Prince George of Saxony of attack on (Haake) 457 

Position of defenders at 5.30 p.m. (18th of August) 301 

Preparations for the assault on (18th of August) 359 

Prince August's reasons for attacking at 5 p.m. (Boguslawski) 122 
Reported occupied by enemy by Captain Groeben (18th of 

August) - 231 

Report of French camp at reaches Prince Frederick Charles 

(Boguslawski) 119 

Shot into flames by entire Saxon artillery at 7.36 p.m. (Hel- 
muth) -. 36 

Situation in, shortly before the assault (18th of August) 358 

Sixth Corps concentrated in and around (Schimpff) 195 

Stormed by Guard and 12th Army Corps (Goltz) 79, (Hodenberg) 145 
Saxon Artillery— Appears west of Ste. Marie aux Chenes and 

opens fire (Helmuth) 10, (Hodenberg) 139 

Entire artillery joins Guard batteries in bombarding St. Privat 

(Helmuth) 36 

Fires on Ste. Marie (Goltz) 69 

Location at 5 p.m. (18th of August) - 305 

Prepares attack on Ste. Marie (18th of August) 250 

Supports attack of 1st Guard Infantry Brigade (18th of August) 305 

Takes up second position north of Ste. Marie (Goltz) 71 

Saxon Guard Cavalry— Destroys railroad and telegraph between 

Metz and Thionville (Klenck) -- 103 

Saxon (12th) Army Corps— Account of march, morning of the 18th 

(Haake) 432 

Advance along Metz— Etain road ( Schimpff) 157 

Advance guard, composition of (Schimpff) 160 

Advance guard reaches the Metz— Verdun road at |8.30 a.m. 

(Goltz) 50, (Schimpff) 160 

Arrives at Jarny at 8.60 a.m. (Goltz) 64 



496 INDEX 

Saxon (12th) Army Corps (continued) 

Arrives at Mars la Tour at 1 p.m. (Schimpff) 153 

Arrives at Ste. Marie (18th of August) 247 

Bivouac places of units after the battle (Schimpff) note 213 

Completes enveloping movement (18th of August) 346 

Concentrated at Roncourt (Hodenberg) 143 

Conflicting reports of time of starting from Mars la Tour on 

the 18th (Haake) ...468 

Defense of charge of slowness in movements August 18th 

(Haake) 434 

Delayed at Mars la Tour (18th of August) 220 

Description of outpost position at Mars la Tour (Schimpff) note 154 
Discussion as to slowness in enveloping movement (Haake) 449-450 

Forty-seventh Brigade assaults Ste. Marie (18th of August) 225 

Location of individual parts at 5.15 p.m. (Golfcz) Note 1 72 

March dispositions at 11.30 a.m. (Hodenberg) 133 

March dispositions at 2 p.m . (Hodenberg) 137 

March of on August 18th (Hodenberg) 130 

March on Jarney (18th of August) . 217 

March on Ste. Marie (18th of August) 233 

March to the battlefield (Schimpff).. 163 

March to Roncourt (Schimpff) 185 

Movements on August 16th and 17th (Haake) 423 

Operations of left wing (Hodenberg) 140 

Ordered to attack Ste. Marie from Amanvillers (Goltz) 61 

Ordered to halt at Jarny (Goltz) 54 

Ordered to march on Ste. Marie at 11.30 a.m. (Hodenberg) 134 

Order of march toward Ste. Marie (18th of August) note 233 

Positions of separate parts of at 5 p. m. (Schimpff) 191 

Preliminary arrangements of, for the battle (Schimpff) 163 

Reaches Montois la Montagne at 6 p.m. (Goltz) 75 

Reports enemy in position at Ste. Marie and its advance against 

that point (Goltz) 65 

Reports enemy at Valleroy at 8.50 a.m. and corrects that report 

at 9.30 a.m. (Goltz) 54- 55 

Reports enemy west of Valleroy (Goltz) 54 

Reports its attack on Ste. Marie at 2.30 p.m. (Goltz) 69 

Reports Valleroy unoccupied (Goltz) 55 

Starts enveloping movement at 5 p.m. (Helmuth) 13 

Starts from Mars la Tour at 7 a. m. (Boguslawski ) 117 

Starts from Pont a Mousson at 3 a.m. (Schimpff) 151 

Starts march on Jarny (Goltz) . 50 

Turns against St. Privat (Boguslawski) 126, (Hodenberg) 144 

Sohwbidnitz, Lieut. -Colonel, 107th Regiment— Killed on ridge 

near St. Privat (Helmuth) 35 

v. Schubert, Lieut. -Colonel — Translation of field notes from 

photographic reproduction (Schubert) 420 



INDEX 497 

Second Army— Consideration of manner of advance on the 18th 

(Boguslawski) . H? 

Directs 9th Corps to delay its attack (Boguslawski) 119 

Dispositions for its advance on August 18th (18th of August).. 215 

Dispositions for attack (11.30 a.m.) (Boguslawski) 119 

Events up to 5 p.m. (18th of August) 239 

Events up to the close of the battle (18th of August) 329 344 

Final orders on the 18th at 8.30 p.m. (Hodenberg) 148 

Great right turn started by Prince Frederick Charles (Helmuth) 4 
Headquarters arrives at Habonville at 2.15 p.m. (18th of August) 244 

Headquarters arrives on battlefield (18th of August) 240 

Location of various parts morning of the 18th (Goltz) 47, (Bo- 
guslawski) US 

Location of army corps at 10 a.m. (Goltz) 59 

Location of army corps at 10.30 a.m. (18th of August) 222 

Location of army corps between 2 and 3 p.m. (Goltz) 68 

Losses on August 18th (Goltz) 82 

March directions August 18th (Boguslawski) 117 

Measures taken by up to noon (18th of August) 228 

Orders to Guard Corps at 10.15 a.m. (Hodenberg) 133 

Orders to 9th Corps at 10 a.m. (Hodenberg) 133 

Orders to XHth Corps dated 12 noon (Schimpff ) 162 

Reaches the line Caulre— Doncourt— Jarny at 10.30 a.m. (18th 

of August) 222 

Review of the situation of the 2d Army up to 5 p.m. (18th of 

August) 270 

Strength in battle on August 18th (Schimpff) 157 

Second Army Corps— Comes to relief of 1st Army at St. Hubert 

and Point du Jour (Helmuth) 6 

Enters battle on right wing of German line of battle (Goltz) 80, 81 
Second Guard Division— Order of march on La Folie (18th of 

August) note 232 

Starts from Doncourt to La Folie to attack enemy (18th of 

August) 232 

Second Guard Regiment— Charges ridge south of St. Privat from 

Ste. Marie (Helmuth) 23 

Closes gap between 1st and 4th Brigades (Helmuth) 23, (18th 

of August) 318 

Sixth (French) Army Corps— Casualties of, August 16th 

(Schimpff) 168 

Positions of at 1 p.m., August 18th (Schimpff ) 171 

Position of troops defending St. Privat at 7 p.m. (18th of 

August) 351 

Steinmetz, General— Criticism of conduct of (Leipziger Zeitung) 383 
Sunken Road of Amanvillers Ridge— Fight raging in (Helmuth) 30 

General Wittich's charges against (Helmuth) 32 

Tenth Army Corps— Ordered to halt at Bruville, 8.35 a.m. (Goltz) 54 
Ordered to support advance of Guard Corps on St. Privat 
(Goltz) 75 



498 INDEX 

Tenth Army Corps (continued) 

Ordered to turn against St. Privat (Goltz) 66 

Reaches Batilly at 2.30 p.m. (Boguslawski) 127 

Reports arrival in Jouaville at 2.05 p.m. (Goltz) 66 

Receives orders at 6 p.m. to advance on St. Ail (Boguslawski) 127 

Third Army Corps— Ordered to start at 12.30 p.m. (Goltz) 65 

Third Guard Brigade— Attacks ridge at Amanvillers (Helmuth) 

29, (18th of August) 329 

Captures hostile position at Amanweiler (18th of August) 337 

Directed by IXth Army Corps to take position south of Habon- 

Ville (18th of August) 269 

Placed at disposal of IXth Army Corps (18th of August) 268, ... 269 

Twelfth Cavalry Division— Account of march from Mars la 

Tour to Metz— Etain road (Schimpff ) 156 

Arrives at Puxe at 11 a.m. (Schimpff) 162 

Movements of between August 16th-18th (Hodenberg. . ...) 134 

Ordered to start at 4 a.m., August 17th, toward the Metz — Etain 
road (Haake) 424 

Twenty-fifth (Hesse) Division — In bivouac north of Gorze, 

August 17th (Wittich) 83 

March to Habonville (18th of August) 239 

Operations on August 18th (Wittich) 83- 88 

Starts for Verneville at 11.30 a.m. (Wittich) 84 

Twenty-fourth Division, XIIth Corps — Arrives at Chateau 

Moncel at 10 a.m. (Schimpff) 151 

Official report of march on and attack of Ste. Marie (Haake)... 440 

Twenty-third Division, XIIth Corps Arrives at Jarny at 9 a.m. 

(Schimpff) 161 

At Delme August 15th as strategic reserve (Schubert) 401 

Attacks Roncourt (Schubert) 414 

Attacks St. Privat (Schubert) 415 

Casualties August 18th (Schubert) 416 

March from Mars la Tour to battlefield (Schubert) 406 

March to Mars la Tour ( Schubert) ... 404 

March to Nomeny (Schubert) 401 

Receives orders at 2.45 to start enveloping movement (Schubert) 411 

Valleroy— Reported unoccupied by 12th Army Corps (Goltz) 55 

Verneville — First cannon shots at, at 12 noon (Goltz) 64 

General Manstein opens battle at with artillery (Helmuth) 5 

Ninth Army Corps enters battle at (Goltz) 64 

Voigts-Rhetz, General —Letter to commanders to have all 
available forces appear at Tronville at daylight the 18th 
(Hodenberg) 135 

War Diary — Colonel von Schubert's diary (Schubert) 420 

First Squadron, Royal Saxon Guard Cavalry Regiment (Klenck) 103 

Wittich, Major— Killed south of St. Privat (Helmuth) 15 

v. Wittich, Major General— Diary 83 



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